Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

0 Frontline Pakistan
killing 55 people, including themselves. 2 It was the first time suicide
bombing was used in such an attack, lending a new and dangerous
dimension to sectarian terror. An earlier attack in June had killed 13
police trainees from the Shia Hazara community. The violence spread
to Karachi and parts of Punjab province, leaving more than 350 people
dead in the year 2004.
The 2 March Quetta massacre coincided with the bomb attacks on
Shia processions in the Iraqi cities of Baghdad and Karbala, which
had left more than 200 people dead. Although no direct link between
the two incidents could be established, there appeared to be some
familiar pattern among the different theatres of jihad across the globe.
The perpetrators were driven by the same ideological world-view
and the dynamics of their operation appeared similar. The objectives
and the goals of Pakistani sectarian terrorists in the post-9/11 world
appeared closer to those transnational jihadists. It was two-track jihad:
they simultaneously fought internal sectarian jihads and external jihad
against the West in general and, more specifically, against the USA. 3
Religious sectarianism, the principal source of terrorist activity in
Pakistan, presented the most serious threat to the country’s internal
security. Sectarian terrorism had been deeply intertwined with the
Islamization of the state, as non-Sunni sects felt increasingly threatened
by the Sunni orthodoxy propagated by the power of the state.
The spate of killings in Quetta and other parts of the country had
sent a grim reminder that the religious terrorist network was not
only intact, but had also expanded. The surge in sectarian terrorism
raised serious questions about Musharraf’s efforts to combat Islamic
extremism. It was all the more inexplicable given Pakistan’s success in
capturing key al-Qaeda leaders.
Heavily armed terrorist groups continued to operate despite the
government’s claim that it had rooted out Islamic extremism. While
the administration silently watched the situation drift into anarchy, the
armed marauders carried out their deadly operations with impunity. The
pattern and scale of violence had indicated that the sectarian militants
were armed and well organized. Pakistan’s largest city and commercial
capital, Karachi, and Punjab province had long been the main centres
of sectarian violence; now the sphere of strife had extended to new
areas, with a series of bloody attacks in the western border city of
Quetta where such incidents were previously unknown.
The upsurge in Sunni militancy was linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban
insurgents using Pakistan as a base for their activities. The connec-