The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

More documents

Recommendations

Info

898 Social Science Quarterly TABLE 7 Incongruent National and Religious Identities in Montenegro and Croatia, 2011 Croatia Montenegro Percentage of Percentage of Numbers National Category Numbers National Category Non-Catholic Croats 275,283 7.1 494 8.2 Non-Orthodox Serbs 27,103 14.52 3,058 1.71 Non-Orthodox Montenegrins 2,695 59.66 32,132 11.52 Non-Muslim Bosniaks 3,520 11.18 152 0.28 indicate that they are agnostics or atheists) or those choosing a religion not conventionally associated with the national identity of choice (e.g., Serbs indicating that they are Catholic) (Table 7). According to the data from Croatia and Montenegro, 7.19 and 5.76 percent of the populations, respectively, do not follow the established link between religion and national identity. Among those opting out of the dominant national religion, most identify as atheists or agnostics. A total of 4.57 percent of Croat citizens indicate that they are agnostic or atheists. The share of atheists or agnostics among Croats is slightly lower than among all at 3.92 percent. Among Croatian Serbs, the share of atheists stands at 10.44 percent, a surprisingly large number considering the common assumption that religious markers matter more among minorities. The picture among other minorities in Croatia is mixed, with some similar to the Serb minority (e.g., Italians), and others exceeding Croats in levels of religious affiliation (e.g., Hungarians). In Montenegro, a more traditional society, the share is somewhat lower, with only 1.3 percent of the population being atheists or agnostics. The highest rates are among Montenegrins (2.23 percent) and the lowest among Bosniaks and Albanians (0.008 percent and 0.01 percent, respectively). However, there are substantial numbers who opt for other major religions, such as some 6.6 percent of Montenegrins in Montenegro who are Muslims or Catholics, and 0.68 percent of Croats in Croatia who are Orthodox or Muslims. There is no single cause of why individuals opt out of the established identity categories. As noted in the U.S. context (Rockquemore, Brunsma, and Delgado, 2009), these individuals cannot be understood as a single community, even if the label of Yugoslav identity to encompass many of them had still been available. Markowitz has noted in her research on identity categories in Sarajevo that a substantial number of citizens identify themselves as Bosnians and reject the ethno-nationalist labels imposed on them because of the consequences of the war and the Dayton power sharing structures (2007). In addition, a number of cases examined here indicate citizens who define their identity in ethno-national categories, but do not accept the terms offered by elites. For example, in Montenegro, the ambiguity between Serbian and Montenegrin identity has been great ever since the formal recognition of a Montenegrin nation in post-World War II Yugoslavia. However, this identity was always viewed by the state, and many citizens, as being “thin” and sharing many attributes with Serb identity. The nation-building process since the late 1990s, which resulted in Montenegro’s independence in 2006, produced a self-defined language and Orthodox Church, but many Montenegrins retain strong ties to Serbian identities, as do many Serbs who only “switched” from Montenegrin identity since the 1990s (Jenne and Bieber, 2014).
The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 899 The contestations we have explored reflect both instances of the erosion or challenges to ethno-national categories, as well as processes in which new (or redefined) categories emerge. The long trajectory might follow divergent paths: some might follow larger global trends of hybrid and hyphenated identities, while others might shift toward more consolidated ethno-national identity categories. Conclusion This article has argued that censuses are sites of negotiating national identities between state, ethnic entrepreneurs, and citizens. The categories that are proposed and campaigned over suggest particular identity packages that conflate ethnic identity with mother tongue and religion. The study of contestation of the post-Yugoslav censuses suggests that in order to understand how ethnicity is reproduced, we need to focus not only on competition and conflict between groups, their political representatives, and the state, but also on the mechanisms through which these ethnic entrepreneurs demand, request, and suggest loyalty and group cohesion, as well as the extent to which citizens respond. The response varies across the region. Kosovo has the most rigid ethno-national boundaries, with few citizens opting out of the established identity packages in the census. Ethnic polarization and territorialization, as well as the relatively clear “objective” markers of distinction between key groups, reinforce more rigid categories of identity. Croatia, on the other hand, is also an example of a state with a strong dominant national identity and little contestation over national identity. Most “opting out” occurs here as expressions of soft hybrid identities, namely, in regard to religion, where nearly 5 percent of the population identify as agnostics or atheists. Serbia, on the other hand, has more stable religious identities and the contestation occurs mostly within minorities, either between different identity categories (Muslim-Bosniak, Croat-Bunjevac, or Vlach-Romanian) or between the majority and minorities when it comes to citizens identifying with a minority identity, but not language. Finally, Serbia also has a significant number of citizens who do not claim to have any national identity. Montenegro has the largest degree of “opting out” with 6 percent of the population rejecting the dominant categories of national identity, over 20 percent rejecting the presumed link between national identity and language, and 5 percent the link between nation and religion. The study of census category making, and the response of citizens, thus helps to map out the rigidity of identity in the perception of the state as census makers and the citizens as respondents to the census. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that a significant number of citizens in most countries of the region do not fit, or want to fit, into the ethno-national identity categories that states, political parties, and ethnic entrepreneurs promote. The census constitutes the most rigid test of identity, as individuals have to name their national identity, religion, and language to a stranger who represents the state, subversion is discouraged, and public debates focus on choosing the right identity. Making choices that subvert the ethno-nationalist paradigm is heavily discouraged in the public discourse and categories offered in censuses. Nevertheless, between around 10 percent of Croatian citizens and a third of Montenegrins reject the presumed national identity packages, constituting a significant finding that shows the limitations of efforts by the state and ethnic entrepreneurs in imposing ethno-national identities. This article has shown that the choice for noncongruent identity combinations is largely connected to the proximity of identities, especially in regard to language, or when two ethnic groups have the same religion (e.g., Serbs and Montenegrins). A second feature that can explain the cohesiveness of ethno-national identities in censuses is polarization (i.e., identity packages are more coherent and less challenged in more
Page 1 and 2: The Construction of National Identi
Page 25: The Construction of National Identi
Page 31: The Construction of National Identi

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?