The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

898 Social Science Quarterly
TABLE 7
Incongruent National and Religious Identities in Montenegro and Croatia, 2011
Croatia
Montenegro
Percentage of
Percentage of
Numbers National Category Numbers National Category
Non-Catholic Croats 275,283 7.1 494 8.2
Non-Orthodox Serbs 27,103 14.52 3,058 1.71
Non-Orthodox Montenegrins 2,695 59.66 32,132 11.52
Non-Muslim Bosniaks 3,520 11.18 152 0.28
indicate that they are agnostics or atheists) or those choosing a religion not conventionally
associated with the national identity of choice (e.g., Serbs indicating that they are Catholic)
(Table 7).
According to the data from Croatia and Montenegro, 7.19 and 5.76 percent of the
populations, respectively, do not follow the established link between religion and national
identity. Among those opting out of the dominant national religion, most identify as
atheists or agnostics. A total of 4.57 percent of Croat citizens indicate that they are agnostic
or atheists. The share of atheists or agnostics among Croats is slightly lower than among
all at 3.92 percent. Among Croatian Serbs, the share of atheists stands at 10.44 percent,
a surprisingly large number considering the common assumption that religious markers
matter more among minorities. The picture among other minorities in Croatia is mixed,
with some similar to the Serb minority (e.g., Italians), and others exceeding Croats in
levels of religious affiliation (e.g., Hungarians). In Montenegro, a more traditional society,
the share is somewhat lower, with only 1.3 percent of the population being atheists or
agnostics. The highest rates are among Montenegrins (2.23 percent) and the lowest among
Bosniaks and Albanians (0.008 percent and 0.01 percent, respectively). However, there
are substantial numbers who opt for other major religions, such as some 6.6 percent of
Montenegrins in Montenegro who are Muslims or Catholics, and 0.68 percent of Croats
in Croatia who are Orthodox or Muslims.
There is no single cause of why individuals opt out of the established identity categories.
As noted in the U.S. context (Rockquemore, Brunsma, and Delgado, 2009), these
individuals cannot be understood as a single community, even if the label of Yugoslav
identity to encompass many of them had still been available. Markowitz has noted in her
research on identity categories in Sarajevo that a substantial number of citizens identify
themselves as Bosnians and reject the ethno-nationalist labels imposed on them because
of the consequences of the war and the Dayton power sharing structures (2007). In addition,
a number of cases examined here indicate citizens who define their identity in
ethno-national categories, but do not accept the terms offered by elites. For example, in
Montenegro, the ambiguity between Serbian and Montenegrin identity has been great ever
since the formal recognition of a Montenegrin nation in post-World War II Yugoslavia.
However, this identity was always viewed by the state, and many citizens, as being “thin”
and sharing many attributes with Serb identity. The nation-building process since the late
1990s, which resulted in Montenegro’s independence in 2006, produced a self-defined
language and Orthodox Church, but many Montenegrins retain strong ties to Serbian
identities, as do many Serbs who only “switched” from Montenegrin identity since the
1990s (Jenne and Bieber, 2014).