The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

896 Social Science Quarterly
TABLE 5
Opting Out of Dominant Language Categories in Select Post-Yugoslav Censuses
Croatia Serbia Montenegro Kosovo
Serbo-Croatian or 10,881 0.25 13,770 2.22
other hyphenated
variant
Unknown 9,329 0.22 81,692 1.13 2,252 0.13
Undeclared 46,499 0.65 24,748 3.99
Mother tongue 3,318 0.53
Total 20,210 0.47 148,401 1.78 41,836 6.74 2,252 0.13
in consolidating their ethno-national identities. On the other hand, they are, as we shall
see, the most common way in which individuals opt out of the dominant identity patterns,
by choosing an individual identity “package” that does not follow either the census forms
or the choices promoted in public debates.
Unlike in the U.S. census, citizens were not able to explicitly indicate multiple identities in
any the post-Yugoslav census. There were also no explicit “hyphenated” identity categories
available. The only option available was for citizens to indicate multiple identities as
“other” identity. As a consequence, respondents are not counted with either of the groups,
but rather constitute part of the census category of “others.” Only Montenegro and Serbia
released the results of citizens making such a choice, but the number of citizens choosing
this option over other identity combinations has been relatively minor, with 0.76 percent of
Montenegrins (see Table 2) and only 0.27 percent of Serbs (Večernje novosti, 2012). These
low numbers stand in stark contrast to the number of citizens in all countries born out of
so-called mixed marriages (i.e., between individuals with different national backgrounds).
In the absence of a large number of hyphenated identity choices, the main hybrid identities
are based on challenges to the identity packages. Here, we can distinguish between
moderate and strong hybrid identities. Moderate hybrid identities are those where individuals
opt out of one identity category, but without choosing a feature from different
national packages; for example, a citizen choosing Croat national identity, Croatian language
as mother tongue, but identifying as atheist. However, if the person chooses from a
different national identity packages (i.e., the citizens does not just opt out, but also opts in
to another group identity), we consider it a strong hybrid identity. Determining the scale
of these choices is methodologically not always easy, as not all statistical offices provide
cross-tabulations of national identity, religion, and language.
In terms of language, between 0.13 percent in Kosovo and 6.74 percent in Montenegro
(see Table 5) of the population chose a language not fitting into the identity package
suggested by the state and called for by ethnic entrepreneurs. In some cases, the language
is simply not declared or “unknown,” including fictional languages. In others, respondents
use the old categories of Serbo-Croatian or other hyphenated names of the language. In
Montenegro, some also merely called their language “mother tongue,” a reflection of the
fact that the language taught in schools was officially known as such between 2003 and
2011 and encompassed the different variants of Serbo-Croatian.
Montenegro is also the country with the largest share of citizens opting out of the
expected link between national identity and language. According to cross-tabulation data,
a fifth of the population does not speak the language associated with their respective
national identity (see Table 6). A majority of Croats, and between a third and 40 percent of
Montenegrins and Bosniaks, respectively, indicate not speaking “their” national language.