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The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

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894 Social Science Quarterly<br />

TABLE 3<br />

Census Results from Subotica (Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, Serbia), 1991–2011<br />

1991 2002 2011<br />

Serbs 22,463 14.94 35,826 24.14 38,254 27.02<br />

Croats 16,282 10.83 16,688 11.25 14,151 10.00<br />

Hungarians 64,274 42.77 57,092 38.47 50,469 35.65<br />

Bunjevci 17,527 11.66 16,254 10.95 13,553 9.57<br />

<strong>Yugoslav</strong>s 22,486 14.96 8,562 5.77 3,202 2.26<br />

Unknown 419 0.30 168 0.10 563 0.40<br />

Undeclared 1,747 1.16 6,470 4.36 11,815 8.35<br />

Regional 126 0.08 706 0.48 2,067 1.46<br />

Total 150,266 148,401 141,554<br />

percent <strong>of</strong> the population was <strong>Yugoslav</strong>, nearly twice the number <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a as a whole<br />

(8.39 percent) <strong>and</strong> nearly five times the number for all <strong>of</strong> Serbia (3.24 percent). Unlike<br />

elsewhere, the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s did not collapse <strong>in</strong> the first census after 1991, as still<br />

5.77 percent identified as <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s <strong>in</strong> 2002. At the time <strong>of</strong> this census, more than 10<br />

percent <strong>of</strong> all <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia lived <strong>in</strong> Subotica, which had a population <strong>of</strong> less than 2<br />

percent <strong>of</strong> Serbia. At the same time, <strong>in</strong>habitants not identify<strong>in</strong>g with a national identity,<br />

or choos<strong>in</strong>g a regional identity, rose, amount<strong>in</strong>g to nearly 10 percent <strong>of</strong> all respondents<br />

by 2011 (see Table 3). Although Subotica experienced significant population shifts after<br />

1991—<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the emigration <strong>of</strong> Hungarians <strong>and</strong> Croats due to nationalist pressures <strong>and</strong><br />

the immigration <strong>of</strong> Serb refugees from Croatia <strong>and</strong> Bosnia—the rise <strong>of</strong> the “undeclared” is<br />

clearly tied to the strong presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong> identity. <strong>The</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> undeclared citizens <strong>in</strong><br />

2011, <strong>and</strong> the decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s, suggests that many former <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s have chosen not<br />

to identify with the dom<strong>in</strong>ant national categories, a pattern repeated <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, as we<br />

shall see next.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Bay <strong>of</strong> Kotor <strong>in</strong>cludes three municipalities <strong>of</strong> Montenegro border<strong>in</strong>g the Adriatic<br />

Sea, Croatia, <strong>and</strong> Bosnia <strong>and</strong> Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. A region with a large Croat <strong>and</strong> Serb community,<br />

it also has a strong seafar<strong>in</strong>g tradition, <strong>and</strong> had a large naval base <strong>in</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong> times. Nearly<br />

50 percent <strong>of</strong> all Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s lived <strong>in</strong> these three municipalities. As research on<br />

<strong>Yugoslav</strong> identity has noted, <strong>in</strong>dividuals were prone to identify as <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s if they lived<br />

<strong>in</strong> a mixed Serb-Croat region (Sekulic, Massey, <strong>and</strong> Hodson, 1994; Isailović, 2011). After<br />

1991, the number <strong>of</strong> self-identified <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s decl<strong>in</strong>ed, shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g to less than 1 percent. At<br />

the same time, we note a marked rise <strong>of</strong> those citizens who refused to declare their national<br />

identity. <strong>The</strong>se citizens account for around 9 percent <strong>in</strong> both the 2003 <strong>and</strong> 2011 censuses<br />

(see Table 4). Though not all <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s rejected the national categories after 1991, we<br />

can see a clear pattern, as the share <strong>of</strong> those refus<strong>in</strong>g to declare is nearly twice the level as<br />

elsewhere <strong>in</strong> the country.<br />

As a result, we can l<strong>in</strong>k the relatively large share <strong>of</strong> undeclared citizens (see Table 2) to the<br />

pre-1991 category <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s. This is not to argue that citizens switched automatically<br />

from one to the other but, rather, that with the disappearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong>ia, <strong>in</strong>dividuals<br />

were deprived <strong>of</strong> a ready, non-ethno-national, identity category to choose from, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the attractiveness <strong>of</strong> the undeclared category. <strong>The</strong> third case highlights that this identity<br />

shift is, however, not universal <strong>in</strong> the post-<strong>Yugoslav</strong> context.<br />

A third region with a large number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Yugoslav</strong>s <strong>in</strong> 1991 was Slavonia, the Croatian pla<strong>in</strong><br />

that stretches from the outskirts <strong>of</strong> Zagreb to the Serbian border. Here, because Serbs <strong>and</strong><br />

Croats lived <strong>in</strong> mixed villages <strong>and</strong> towns, there was much <strong>in</strong>termarriage <strong>and</strong> a large number

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