The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

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890 Social Science Quarterly addition, the Bosniak “identity package” is more challenging, as the language associated with community, “Bosnian,” is contested and also a product of the dissolution of Serbo- Croatian. Bosnian speakers, therefore, may opt for three alternatives: Serbian, Croatian, or Montenegrin. Finally, the boundary between Bosnian and Bosniak identity remains fluid and untested. The identification with the state (Bosnian) rather than an ethnic group was not option in the 2013 census, but could be chosen as a “write-in” option. This option was the success of a coalition of NGOs called “Be a citizen” (Budi građanin/ka) that campaigned, for this (Perry, 2013:12–14). They also encouraged citizens to identify as Bosnian to challenge the prevailing ethno-nationalist stratification of society. In this sense, Bosnia is an exception, as identification with the state does not imply a particular ethno-national identity. Selfidentification as Croat, Serb, Macedonian, or Montenegrin cannot be a marker of national identity linked solely to the state and devoid of ethno-national connotations. Only Kosovo and Bosnia theoretically provide the possibility to separate identification with the state and the ethno-national community. However, the reality of this is quite different. In both cases, the state is identified more strongly with a particular community, Albanians for Kosovo and Bosniaks for Bosnia. 5 Ethnic entrepreneurs promoting Bosniak identity, led by the Islamic Community, the Party of Democratic Action (the main Bosniak ethnonational party), and a coalition called “It is important to be Bosniak” (Bitno je biti Bošnjak), sought to discredit both Muslim and Bosnian identity categories. The Muslim option was dismissed as unnatural (i.e., confusing religion and national identity), and the Bosnian identity was attacked by these groups for being “fake,” and the groups accused intellectuals and NGOs lobbying for Bosnian identity of continuing the wartime violence against Bosniaks (Armakolas and Maksimovic, 2014). Next to discrediting alternative identity categories, census campaigns have been marked by an effort of ethnic entrepreneurs to reinforce the “identity package” that is construed in the census forms, explicitly or implicitly, to jointly form national identity. This was particularly pronounced in cases where citizens had alternatives easily available. This includes particularly speakers of Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin who are able to switch among the four languages, amidst the fluid national identity markers, as noted above and between religious and nonreligious categories. For example, in a one-page advertisement in the Bosnian daily, Dnevni Avaz, the well-known intellectual, Muhamed Filipović, implored Bosniaks “that we have to be consistent and declare according to the historical truth and rights of our people and that in regard to our ethnic and national belonging as Bosniaks; in regard to our religion as members of the Islamic faith; in regard to our mother tongue which we all share as speakers of Bosnian” (Dnevni Avaz, 2013). Similar calls were made by Croat minority organizations (YouTube, 2011a), and Islamic religious leaders in Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro (Imamović, 2012; YouTube, 2011c), leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Vesti, 2011), and religious institutions, NGOs, political parties, and minority organizations. In conclusion, campaigning and mobilization during the census was more extensive in countries with more fluid identities, where advertisements, billboards, and videos sought to encourage identification with one particular ethno-national group or another, and stressed adherence to coherent identity packages. Countries with rigid lines of division, such as Kosovo, witnessed considerably less competition and campaigning, as there is less possibility to blur identity lines and the identity packages are more clearly defined. 5 A total of 2,352 citizens of Kosovo opted for “Other” in the ethnic/cultural background category that also includes Kosovars. Results on ethnic self-identification of the Bosnian census have not been released by the completion of this article.
The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 891 As such, censuses are elementary moments of group making, and an opportunity for ethnic entrepreneurs to assert and define groupness (Brubaker, 2004:7–20). Thus, in addition to the arena of contention between state and minorities, censuses are fundamentally about citizens and how they respond to the different demands, categories, and pressures. Individual Challenges to Ethno-National Identity The final aspect of the census as a site where identities are negotiated is the response of citizens. Here, we are interested in citizens who fail to identify themselves along the lines prescribed by the states and ethnic entrepreneurs. While categories, as noted above, are suggestive and citizens had been subject to strong pressure and campaigning, the ultimate census choices rested with them. The contestations between minority organizations and the state represent the conflict of two (or more) concepts of collectivities (i.e., how does the state vs. how do the representatives of a minority define the collectivity or does the state discourage the self-identification as a minority). However, an important subject neglected in the literature to date that has broader repercussions for the study of nationalism is the study of respondents. Do respondents accept the identity categories offered by the state or the categories suggested by their presumed political representatives? The responses allow us not only to ascertain the acceptance of these categories, but also to assess the success of ethnic boundary making. If citizens refuse to follow ethno-nationalist logic, they can undermine groupness and challenge its legitimacy. An ethnic group without members does not exist, and if a nation is the result of a “daily plebiscite” (Renan, [1882] 1996), then the census is the most visible plebiscite for (or against) a nation. Here, we are less interested in motives for rejecting these categories, which can range from social or political protest, to the perceived inappropriateness of the categories for one’s own identity. Individuals have a range of options to respond to censuses. The most visible level of rejection might be a boycott of the census. For example, the German census of 1987 was controversial due to concerns about data protection, and because a number of civil society groups led a campaign to boycott the census. For the post-Yugoslav censuses, boycotts were not widely promoted outside of “ethno-national boycotts” led by minority parties or organizations mentioned above. In Bosnia, in addition to some ethno-national groups, civil groups also threatened a boycott if the forms would not comply with their preference. However, boycotting a census, especially for individuals without organized support, is difficult, as participation in censuses is mandatory and boycotts usually carry fines (even if not always enforced in practice). Another tool for individual contestation is to opt for identity categories that mock the established groups, often through drawing on imagined groups. From Martians to Earthlings, the name of the favorite soccer club, to Jedi and Sith, a wide range of groups were used. The Jedi/Sith category has been widely used in other censuses, including Australia and the United Kingdom and had its echoes in the post-Yugoslav censuses. These categories are not officially listed in the census results and are subsumed either in the residual category of “Others” (Montenegro), “Unknown” (Serbia), or “Unallocated” (Croatia). 6 While invisible in the official statistics (but available on request), these movements achieved considerable media attention. The media response generally dismissed them as a 6 E-mail communication with Statistical Offices of Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, 2014 and 2015, on file with the author.
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