The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

More documents

Recommendations

Info

888 Social Science Quarterly city of Vukovar, for example, the number of Serbs determined the use of Cyrillic for local use (Vesti, 2012). In Macedonia, at the state and the municipal level, the threshold of 20 percent guarantees far-reaching rights, including official use of the minority language and special veto rights among others. In other cases, the entitlements might not be legally binding, but numerical strength is crucial for making claims and symbolic entitlement. The main distinction that numbers provide is between being a minority and holding a claim to co-ownership of the state. For example, the demands of Serb political parties in Montenegro to have Serb identity recognized as constituent people equal to Montenegrins, or the fear of Croat parties and groups in Bosnia that the status of Croats as constituent people might be endangered by low numbers. Finally, the group size provides for political capital and legitimacy to parties and organizations claiming to represent these groups. For example, in Bosnia a large number Bosnians would undermine the claims of ethno-nationalist parties to be the only legitimate representatives of the different communities. With the significance of census results established, we can turn to the strategies of ethnic entrepreneurs at censuses. In addition to shaping the categories, as noted above, the main activity of these ethnic entrepreneurs has been threefold: challenging censuses, mobilizing their constituencies, and seeking to broaden their base. Contestation The threat of boycott and challenging the census process has been a frequent strategy employed by ethnic entrepreneurs. As noted earlier, Albanians in Kosovo boycotted the 1991 Yugoslav census. Serbs, in turn, largely boycotted the Kosovo census in 2011. As a result, the last reliable census for Kosovo dates back to 1981. In their recent article, Visoka and Gjevori (2013) have argued that censuses in Southeastern Europe experience four levels of contestation: marginal, partial, extensive, and full. Marginal contestation implies few challenges by organized groups. A partially contested census is challenged by at least one minority group. A significant boycott of the census by an important minority could be considered an extensive contestation. A fully contested census means that the census is abandoned due to strong resistance. The four-pronged categorization allows the authors to characterize the 2011 censuses in Serbia and Montenegro as marginally contested, the census in Albania as partially contested, the census in Kosovo as extensively contested, and the Macedonian census fully contested. However, contestation itself can be controversial and contested. Minorities are rarely monolithic actors, and outside the context of authoritarian repression (as during the 1990s in Serbia), the motives for boycotts are not always accepted. For example, in Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, an influential leader of the Islamic community, called on Bosniaks to boycott the census. Two key parties of Bosniaks, both in the Serbian government at the time, supported the census (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2011). Similarly in Kosovo, Serbs in the north followed the call of the Serbian government to boycot the count, whereas some Serbs in central Kosovo followed the advice of the Serb Independent Liberal Party, which was represented in the Kosovo government, to participate (Barlovac, 2011). The contestation within minority communities sheds light on the fact that censuses are not just controversial between minorities and the state, but especially today, as minority parties regularly participate in government in Southeastern Europe, differences also emerge within minority groups.
The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 889 Mobilizing the Group The particularity of the census election campaigns is similar to the broader dynamics Donald Horowitz outlined regarding political campaigning in divided societies (Horowitz, 2000:333–64). If group boundaries are well defined, and fairly stable, the census campaign will seek less to convince others to join the group, but rather to mobilize the predefined community. Ethnic entrepreneurs are not natural proselytizers. Even though censuses are a mandatory exercise, ethnic entrepreneurs can only increase group size by either lobbying with the state for particular categories, or by supporting voting for ethnic kin who are temporarily (or permanently) abroad. Most importantly, ethnic entrepreneurs will seek to maximize the count by ensuring group coherence, and preventing individuals from “opting out” like the self-declared Martian in the beginning of the article. Though the goal of the census might be positioning groups toward others and reinforcing the boundary between them, the main target of campaigning is within the group itself, and the biggest challenge arises not from others, but rather from “within.” Essentially, when group boundaries are relatively firm, the main challenge to group coherence arises from those opting out of the group entirely, or at least rejecting or choosing not to identify with a particular identity package, such as the linkage between national or ethnic identity, religion, and language. In such instances, there is always the option to join another group, or altogether reject the existing categories and choose a fictional group or none at all. Competition Among Groups If group boundaries are less firm, election campaigning is focused on the “undecided.” There are numerous examples of fluid identity boundaries in Southeastern Europe, falling into three categories: (1) fluid identities between different national identities due to either shifts in their self-perception or high levels of congruence (i.e., in terms of language, religion, and so forth) with other ethnonational groups; (2) fluid boundaries between minorities and local majorities, based on assimilation or mimicry by minorities; or (3) fluid identities between state and national identity. Examples of fluid group identities are Serb and Montenegrin identity, between Bosniak and Muslim identities in Sandzak and Croatia, between Bunjevci and Croats in Vojvodina, and Vlachs and Romanians in Eastern Serbia. Campaigning was particularly pronounced in Montenegro, as supporters of Montenegrin identity sought to reaffirm the identity that had experienced a sharp decline since the early 1990s, but also managed to establish an independent state in 2006. Likewise, Serb ethnic entrepreneurs (like parties whose legitimacy rests on claiming to represent Serbs, or the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is locked in a conflict with the Montenegrin Orthodox Church) also engaged in campaigning. Roma are a pertinent example of the blurry boundary between minorities and majorities, where the flexibility does not extend both ways, as it only extends to Roma opting for a majority identity. Ethnic mimicry also occurs in regard to other smaller minorities where parts of the community are largely assimilated to the (local) majorities. Here, the contestation occurred between groups, often about which categories (and by extension groups) are legitimate, and then over its members. Bosniak identity construction in Bosnia and Sandžak (in Serbia and Montenegro) was characterized by several challenges. “Muslim” was used as an identity category until 1991 in Bosnia, and the term “Bosnian” was not been “tested” in a census until 2013. In
Page 1 and 2: The Construction of National Identi
Page 15: The Construction of National Identi
Page 31: The Construction of National Identi

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?