The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 887
categories. Bosnia follows the logic of the trinational state (Bosniak, Serb, Croat; Islam,
Orthodox, Catholic; and Bosnian, Serbian, and Croat, respectively), while in Kosovo all
of the recognized identity groups are listed. Lastly, the census of Montenegro only offers
options for languages (Montenegrin, Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian, Croatian, or any other
language), but not for national identity or religion.
All census forms have an additional write-in category for other identities in the categories
of religion, language, and national identity, and the possibility to remain undeclared in
answering the question on national identity and religion.
While Croatia did not allow for multiple identities (Jović, 2011:41), Montenegro and
Serbia did allow for such self-identification, although this is not noted explicitly on the
form. While all permit write-in categories, and citizens are not precluded from identifying
themselves with several groups, such categories are neither offered, nor do the forms
explicitly offer such a choice.
Finally, the level to which citizens can opt out varies among censuses. In all countries,
national identity was a voluntary category (although it was not explicitly marked as such
in Croatia), and religion was a voluntary category in all cases except Montenegro.
The forms and the categories they establish also offer an insight into the state selfconception,
and how the state negotiates the three constraints on the categorization noted
above. It is no surprise to scholars of Southeastern Europe that national identity is determined
by not just self-identification with a nation, but also through religion and language.
This may be done explicitly, as in Macedonia and Serbia, or implicitly, as done elsewhere.
Thus, the census forms not only reflect these common understandings of identity, but also
reaffirm them through posing leading questions to respondents. The questionnaires also
reveal the degree to which a state defines itself as a nation-state or otherwise. While Croatia
offers only the options of Croat–Croatian–Catholic as predetermined identity categories,
others leave more space. When the state gives great constitutional weight to identity, the
legally relevant categories are listed, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo. Thus, Croatia emerges
as a nation-state, whereas Kosovo and Bosnia are clearly multinational states with group
rights, and Montenegro and Serbia leave some space for a more or less rigid understanding
of identity. The largely voluntary nature of these identity markers is both a legacy of the
socialist Yugoslav censuses and the international standards.
Census Election Campaigns
Continuing our inquiry into the census as a site of contestation, we now turn to social
actors who seek to shape the outcome of the census. These are primarily ethnic entrepreneurs
who are invested in the identity-specific outcome of the census. These include NGOs,
political parties, and religious and cultural institutions, such as the Serb National Council
in Croatia, mentioned at the beginning of the article.
It is a common adage that in divided societies, such as Bosnia, elections resemble censuses,
with voting patterns following ethnic lines. While this is often true, censuses, in turn, also
resemble elections. Campaigns are held, politicians and public figures call for citizens to
make particular choices, and the results have political consequences (Jović, 2011).
There are three key reasons why political actors care about censuses. First, census results
serve as a basis for concrete legal entitlements. In most post-Yugoslav countries, the local
share of minority populations translates into specific linguistic or educational minority
rights, and possible access to political representation. Thus, minority representatives have a
vested interest in securing a high number of minorities in particular regions. In the Croatian