Bodmer_Publication

Notes
1 Sears (1996: 60 – 61) quite typically says that
the quality of Bodmer’s work “owes much
to the picturesque mode of depicting
landscapes in which Bodmer was trained,”
but that it also “reflects Bodmer’s service
to Maximilian’s scientific purposes.” His
subtle analysis of those Bodmer prints that
represent Eastern material results on the
whole from his precise knowledge of
artistic conventions, rather than a
conclu sive argument regarding the relation
between art and science. This analysis is
not provided by Ruud (2004) either,
though the relation is a recurrent theme
in his essay.
2 See in this context, for example,
Lorraine Daston’s works on the formation
of scientific objectivity and particularly
Stafford (1984).
3 The introduction to the
“Querschnittsbereich ‘Bild und
Bildlichkeit’” in the 2006/2007 annual
report of the Thyssen Foundation does,
however, show that to think in images
is frequently seen very differently:
when it says “that alongside the culture
of the image that we find in the arts
instrumental imageries have established
themselves in the sciences,” (Thyssen 2007:
190) the opposition art / science remains
alive or it is even reinforced.
4 Cf. Tyler, who opposes “objectivity” and
Maximilian’s “neoclassical instincts”
to “the romantic interpretations that were
then in fashion.” (Tyler 2004: 21; cf. 15, 17,
40, in what on the whole is a well-informed
discussion.) His earlier quotation from
Humboldt does not support his reading.
Ruud (2004a: 50 – 51), on the other hand,
is a special case: he presents a very
com petent sketch of Humboldt’s views
on the union of art and science, and
he recognizes their immense importance
for Bodmer and Wied. But in his ensuing
discussion of individual plates, the conflict
between the two sides becomes promi -
nent, so that his perspective on the
whole remains uncertain.
5 Cf. Hunt (2002: 99) who ascribes to
the artists of the American West a
general “accuracy of observation,” but
also reproaches them with “a romantic
preoccupation with the exotic and
the picturesque.” In Bodmer, he finds
less of this “romantic” tendency than
with others (104). Altogether, American
critics employ so general a notion of
romanticism / Romanticism that it is not
very useful as an analytical instrument.
6 Porter 2002: 34
7 Wied 1862: 6
8 Wied 1825: vii
9 The phrase alludes, of course, to
Words worth’s formula that poetry
“takes its origin from emotion
recollected in tranquillity.”
10 Ruud 2004
11 This is true, at least, of the
published sources.
12 Humboldt 1845
13 Ruud momentarily discusses the importan
ce of this work for Wied in enlightening
ways, but he cannot bring himself to
take Humboldt’s “Byronic waxings”
seriously (Ruud 2004a: 51). Kosmos,
therefore, remains one of many sources
mentioned, of unclear significance.
14 It seems to me, however, that the litera -
ture on Wied/Bodmer overstresses and
in part over-simplifies this context.
15 Humboldt 1845: 49. In the following
discussion of the work I only reference
the page numbers in the text. – The topic
turns up already in the Introduction
(“Vorrede”, pp. 4 – 5) and in the first section
of the text proper (“Delimitation and
scientific discourse on [the project of]
a physical description of the world”),
both times in quite a prominent position.
16 This is a question that cannot have a single,
ahistorical answer, in Humboldt’s view,
but only a historical series of answers;
this follows from the historicity of
knowledge and its forms, as well as of the
resulting pleasure. Humboldt does not
say so explicitly, but it is self-evident in
his contexts. Also, because there emerges
the further question from such reflections
how the different historical answers
should be evaluated, a historical perspective
is inscribed in them from the beginning
and at every point. It, in turn,
ultimately leads to the problem of
progress (see below).
17 DeVoto (1947: 402) comes close to this
observation as early as 1947, but is not
quite able to detach himself from the
tendency to privilege precision over beauty.
18 From what is basically an enlightenment
position, he at one point turns against
common sense in an interesting manner,
labeling it “a system of unverified, in part
completely misunderstood cognitions
derived from experience […:] Taking only
few details into account, such a form of
empiricism is simply pretentious, not least
because it is completely ignorant of the
facts that again shatter it.” He criticizes
this pretentiousness from the position of
“good” knowledge that is founded on
skepticism (17), and distinguishes the
hectic, even sensationalist search for
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