[Blake_Stimson,_Gregory_Sholette]_Collectivism_aft(z-lib
9. Beyond Representation andAfWliation: Collective Actionin Post-Soviet RussiaIRINA ARISTARKHOVAWhen “a thinking political subject” looks around today, twentyyears after the ofWcial end of the cold war and a few years since the beginningof the war on terrorism, two basic questions once resorted to by theRussian intelligentsia come to mind: “Who is to be blamed?” and “What isto be done?” But these questions sound rather old-fashioned to our ear nowand, really, they are from the nineteenth century. Consistent with the moodof today they may more accurately be reframed as “Who cares?” It seems asif now we have never been further away from the old ideal of collectiveaction and collective responsibility, and every attempt to organize suchactions seems counterproductive. This essay will survey the decade of the1990s in post-Soviet Russia, focusing speciWcally on two politically marginalefforts to go against the grain of political apathy: the art movement knowntoday as Moscow Actionism (Moscovcky Akzionism), presented here throughthe works and ideas of the artist, theorist, and curator Anatoly Osmolovsky,and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (CSM, Komitet SoldatskikhMaterei), today properly called Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothersof Russia (UCSMR). My main focus will be to raise some general questionsabout the efWcacy and ethics of political action within the larger crises ofpolitical apathy and political representation in post-Soviet Russia. Towardthis end, the awareness and treatment of heterogeneity in pursuing suchactions and the role of experimentation, using various theories of “the political,”will be critically evaluated. I will argue that what I call “maternal politics”embodies a different notion of the political subject that in turn opensup new ways of thinking about political action in relation to recent experiencesin post-Soviet Russia.253
254 Irina AristarkhovaTHE EGOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL APATHYIN POST-SOVIET RUSSIAThe initial years of perestroika (1986–91) were a very exciting period as areal opportunity opened up for self-reXection and redeWnition of Russiannational identity, particularly in relation to its own violent past. However,reXexivity and critique were soon silenced by demands to not “dig too deep”—not be too critical—and the promise of redeWnition turned instead to be amandate for reconciliation with the (largely Orthodox religious) past and areturn to “true Russian roots and traditions,” albeit often as a modern politicalor artistic strategy. 1 The Russian Orthodox Church became arguably thesingle most inXuential social force of the 1990s, uniting political and culturalleaders in adopting a collective amnesia.In the context of these changes, Russian intellectuals and artistswere overwhelmed, and not only by the problems of everyday life. After seventyyears of physical and intellectual isolation, it became clear that largeportions of so-called contemporary thought, art, and action were not part ofSoviet discourse, training, or life. The international political and artisticlegacy of the 1960s, for example, was to play a limited role. This was a verydifWcult situation for cultural workers—artists, writers, intellectuals, academics,students—who had long yearned to engage with that broader culturalclimate. At the same time, tourists as well as specialists in the Russian andSoviet past came to visit the hollow spectacle of post-Soviet society and oftento take away souvenirs of the Soviet past. Much of the cultural exchange thattook place during this period—in art, academic circles, or civil society—(withnotable exceptions, of course) was experienced as dissatisfying. There arenumerous and different reasons for this—one day someone should write onthis subject—but here I will only point out that such contacts often resultedin profound misunderstandings, not only in terms of reference (linguistic orotherwise) but also in emotions and intentions. We Russians were oftenasked to conWrm existing “truths” on the issues of Marxism, gender, politics,democracy, Russian character, etc., in ways that seemed to miss the pointfrom the beginning. Reaction followed on our part—the only reaction thatseemed available: “defending our way of life,” even though it was not clearwhat that had come to mean. In this respect, the 1990s could well be calleda “defensive decade” in Russian intellectual and artistic history as Russianswere asked to conWrm whatever their new friends thought had happened tous under Soviet rule with the visitors often assuming a higher ground withmore advanced approaches and methods in both art and thought. Evenwhen the situation was more complex than this, the feeling of inadequacyand lack of ability to respond led to a feeling of closure and voicelessness. 2
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254 Irina Aristarkhova
THE EGOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL APATHY
IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
The initial years of perestroika (1986–91) were a very exciting period as a
real opportunity opened up for self-reXection and redeWnition of Russian
national identity, particularly in relation to its own violent past. However,
reXexivity and critique were soon silenced by demands to not “dig too deep”—
not be too critical—and the promise of redeWnition turned instead to be a
mandate for reconciliation with the (largely Orthodox religious) past and a
return to “true Russian roots and traditions,” albeit often as a modern political
or artistic strategy. 1 The Russian Orthodox Church became arguably the
single most inXuential social force of the 1990s, uniting political and cultural
leaders in adopting a collective amnesia.
In the context of these changes, Russian intellectuals and artists
were overwhelmed, and not only by the problems of everyday life. After seventy
years of physical and intellectual isolation, it became clear that large
portions of so-called contemporary thought, art, and action were not part of
Soviet discourse, training, or life. The international political and artistic
legacy of the 1960s, for example, was to play a limited role. This was a very
difWcult situation for cultural workers—artists, writers, intellectuals, academics,
students—who had long yearned to engage with that broader cultural
climate. At the same time, tourists as well as specialists in the Russian and
Soviet past came to visit the hollow spectacle of post-Soviet society and often
to take away souvenirs of the Soviet past. Much of the cultural exchange that
took place during this period—in art, academic circles, or civil society—(with
notable exceptions, of course) was experienced as dissatisfying. There are
numerous and different reasons for this—one day someone should write on
this subject—but here I will only point out that such contacts often resulted
in profound misunderstandings, not only in terms of reference (linguistic or
otherwise) but also in emotions and intentions. We Russians were often
asked to conWrm existing “truths” on the issues of Marxism, gender, politics,
democracy, Russian character, etc., in ways that seemed to miss the point
from the beginning. Reaction followed on our part—the only reaction that
seemed available: “defending our way of life,” even though it was not clear
what that had come to mean. In this respect, the 1990s could well be called
a “defensive decade” in Russian intellectual and artistic history as Russians
were asked to conWrm whatever their new friends thought had happened to
us under Soviet rule with the visitors often assuming a higher ground with
more advanced approaches and methods in both art and thought. Even
when the situation was more complex than this, the feeling of inadequacy
and lack of ability to respond led to a feeling of closure and voicelessness. 2