MEDIA TRANSFORMATIONS

052011 

052011 

ISSN 2029-865X 

Media Transformations 

Media Transformations 

MEDIA TRANSFORMATIONS 


Vytautas Magnus University 

Faculty of Political Vytautas Science Magnus and University Diplomacy 

Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy 

Department of of Public Communications


Vol. 5 / 2011

UDK 316.77 

Me-31 


EDITORS: 

Auksė BALČYTIENĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Peter GROSS, University of Tennessee, USA 

EDITORIAL BOARD: 

Péter BAJOMI-LÁZÁR, University of Oxford, UK 

Rasa BALOČKAITĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Bogusława DOBEK-OSTROWSKA, University of Wroclaw, Poland 

Mykolas DRUNGA, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Stig HJARVARD, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 

Kristina JURAITĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Epp LAUK, University of Jyvaskyla, Finland 

Nelija LOČMELE, IR.lv, Latvia 

Gintautas MAŽEIKIS, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

J. D. MININGER, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Tom MORING, University of Helsinki, Swedish School of Social Science, Finland 

Laima NEVINSKAITĖ, Vilnius University, Lithuania 

Lars W. NORD, Mid Sweden University, Sweden 

Audronė NUGARAITĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Henrink ÖRNEBRING, University of Oxford, UK 

Artūras TEREŠKINAS, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Aušra VINCIŪNIENĖ, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania 

Jaromír VOLEK, Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic 

� � � 

This special issue includes original papers presented at the international conference “Critical Media 

Transformations: Practices, Challenges, Perspectives”, organized by the Department of Public Communications 

at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas in cooperation with “Interlinks10.Net: Nordplus 

Network of Journalism Schools” on October 7-8, 2010. The publication was funded by the grant (No. 

MOR-30/2010) from the Research Council of Lithuania. 

ISSUE EDITORS: 

Auksė BALČYTIENĖ | Aušra VINCIŪNIENĖ | Kristina JURAITĖ | J. D. MININGER 

LAYOUT AND DESIGN: 

Alina BUTRIMĖ 

SPONSORS: 

ISSN 2029-865X 

© Vytautas Magnus University, 2011

CONTENTS 

Auksė BALČYTIENĖ and Aušra VINCIŪNIENĖ 

Editors’ Introduction: How to deal with uncertainty in modern communications 

Sanna KIVIMÄKI 

Is there any class in this class? Class sensitivity in higher media education 

Mykolas J. DRUNGA 

Is a picture worth a thousand words? 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

Latvian daily press journalists: Between or together with commercialization and 

partisanship? 

Ieva BEITIKA 

Development of public service broadcasting: 

Local and global challenges and the public value 

Vaida PILIBAITYTĖ 

Nuclear energy discourses in Lithuania and Belarus 

Elisabeth Kirkeng ANDERSEN and Harald HORNMOEN 

Mediating science in Norway: Practices and transformations in major newspapers 

Inesa BIRBILAITĖ 

Topic of climate change in communication and media research: 

The past, the presence, and the future 

Viktorija RUSINAITĖ 

Taking over the Net: Constructing celebrity leadership discourse in virtual social 

networks 

/ 4 

/ 8 

/ 18 

/ 24 

/ 44 

/ 66 

/ 88 

/ 106 

/ 124

4 


EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION: HOW TO DEAL 

WITH UNCERTAINTY IN MODERN 

COMMUNICATIONS 


The primary goal of this issue is to broaden our understanding about the scope 

and characteristics of diverse challenges that media is facing in rapidly changing 

economic, technological, social and cultural conditions. 

The scale, the scope and the speed of change that our societies are going through 

are indeed striking. We live in the times of diverse transformations, crises, devaluations 

and disillusionments. Our closest surrounding realities are becoming 

very ambiguous and uncertain. We do not have adequate social models and metaphors 

that could explain the consequences of changing economic conditions, 

technological influences and new social relationships have on how we communicate, 

whom we trust, what we relate to and who we keep in close touch with. 

The questions that scholars and professionals encounter in the fields of contemporary 

media and communications are facing very similar uncertainties. Media 

and journalism must be prepared to address the requirements of the new modernity. 

Contemporary media must develop new forms, it must offer audiences 

individualized access, design and sustain social relations, offer networking experiences 

and guarantee choices for consumers. At the same time, no matter how 

inspiring and liberating these new communicative practices may be the consequences 

and effects of these changes and their impact on the quality of democracy 

is still questionable. 

Editors’ introduction: How to deal with uncertainty in modern communications

Media Transformations 5 

The prospects for increasing individualization and virtual networking are unclear 

indeed. The goals, ideals and expectations of being publicly visible in virtual 

social networks are often not so much of searching for the common causes and 

principles of life as the desperate need for networking, bonding, socialization 

and relationship-building. Individualization indeed brings power of experimentation, 

but it is short lived and gradually disintegrating. 

Different researchers have sounded the warning bell reminding us that modern 

societies are at the risk of being divided into too many different niches, into too 

many ideologically-shaped virtual and physical associations and formations. 

Participation in such networks and niche associations can be very inspiring and 

offering solace, but leading to societal fragmentation and social polarization rather 

than a common space for meeting, discussion and public dialogue. 

An exceptional attention in this collection of articles is dedicated to contemporary 

media developments in the countries around the Baltic Sea. Quite a few motives 

inspired the choice of young Baltic democracies as a comparative example 

here. First, these countries already have a historical experience of approaching 

and dealing with very rapid change. Significant changes and transformations that 

these countries needed to address date back to the early 1990s. They date back 

to the times when new media structures and business models as well as media 

regulation policies were designed and their implementation started. 

These many local transformations in those countries were gradually complemented 

with new challenges that all actors of modern communications (media 

professionals, policy makers and audiences) needed to confront. Among those 

new challenges were the globalization of media markets and ideas, economic fluctuations 

and other uncertainties associated with questions on how to commercialize 

the media business, how to approach technological diffusion and how to 

deal with all the consequences linked to the changing roles and habits of the new 

audience, especially of young readers, and the evolving culture of participatory 

and dialogical communication. 

By addressing developments and fashions in the media of young Baltic democracies, 

by also comparing and contrasting these with media developments and 

changes in the West, the chapters of this issue also show that other questions 

may be at the stake when assessing the value of change (aside to, for example, 

economic and technological descriptors of one particular country, e.g. its market 

size or technological awareness of its population). Therefore, it pays a very close 

attention to the role of journalism culture and communication traditions as well 

as enduring values and norms in communication practices, which are becoming 

increasingly significant when approaching uncertain situations and dealing with

6 


the consequences of a very rapid change in the area of modern communications. 

The geographies of journalism in all seven chapters of this issue are quite restrictive 

and move around the boarders of the Baltic Sea. One of the chapters 

brings social class into the discussion of media representations of social class and 

their implications in higher media education in Finland. However, suggestions 

for teachers on how to be more class sensitive without compromising other differences, 

including gender, race and sexuality, extend well over the national boarders. 

Another chapter in this issue covers journalism changes in Norway which 

is a Nordic country, but the reference to changes in this country goes very well in 

line with the analysis of science communication in the Baltic States. 

In the first chapter, Finnish researcher Sanna Kivimäki questions the role of social 

class in media studies, arguing that social class marks everyone involved in 

learning process, both students and teachers, but it remains an invisible issue. 

Therefore, it is important to be aware of social background of your students, as 

well as your own position as a teacher, which enables you to explain and interpret 

different phenomena in media and communication studies. The second chapter 

in this issue asks a fundamental question in the development of professional 

journalism tradition. Mykolas Drunga poses a philosophical question and asks 

whether “a picture could be worth a thousand words”. The author is interested 

in the way journalists see and perceive the surrounding reality. He assesses how 

journalists grasp and report it and how they do it using words as well as pictures 

and images. From a different perspective, but also addressing very similar concerns 

that contemporary journalism is facing in young democracies, Ilze Šulmane 

assesses the relationship between the economic, journalistic and political 

fields in Latvia. Her study confirms the tendency of Latvian media being closely 

associated with partisan as well as business interests. As this study succinctly 

shows, in such a complex and clientelist combination of different interests and 

manipulations, commercialism rules in media and editorial contents is subjected 

to the power holders’ as well as direct editorial interests. Ieva Beitika questions 

the value of public interest in young democracies and seeks to identify possible 

ways to manage public service broadcasting in Eastern European countries. 

Three other articles deal with science journalism, environmental and climate 

change reporting in particular. Vaida Pilibaitytė analyses environmental and 

nuclear discourses in the media of the two neighboring but politically very different 

countries (Lithuania and Belarus). She argues that such issues as climate 

change or other environmental concerns are emphasized and addressed in media 

internationally, while geopolitics is more important on a national level. At the 

same time and in both countries, the political and corporate interests coupled 

Editors’ introduction: How to deal with uncertainty in modern communications


with unspecialized reporting have a universally constraining effect on national 

public discussions on nuclear energy. Discourse analysis performed by Elisabeth 

Kirkeng Andersen and Harald Hornmoen concentrates on how journalism 

that covers and uses scientific research has been practiced in major Norwegian 

newspapers in certain periods of time. Their research results illustrate how representations 

of scientific research in Norwegian press have changed from resembling 

science’s own discourses to a more distinct adaption of the research, adjusting 

it to journalistic requirements of angles and storylines. Finally, in her study 

Inesa Birbilaitė gives an in-depth literature review of sampled peer-reviewed articles 

dealing with climate change communication issues and aims to sketch the 

past, the present and the future of this particular research area in a broader field 

of communication studies. 

And finally, the last article in this issue takes a closer look at the emerging role 

and increasing public use of social media and networks. In her study, Viktorija 

Rusinaitė examines how celebrity culture is sustained online and how celebrity 

leadership discourse is constructed virtual networks.

8 


IS THERE ANY CLASS IN THIS CLASS? 

CLASS SENSITIVITY IN HIGHER MEDIA 

EDUCATION 


sanna.k.kivimaki@uta.fi 

MA, Researcher, Coordinator 

Department of Journalism and Mass Communication 

University of Tampere 

Tampere, Finland 

ABSTRACT: We all live surrounded by media representations of social classes. The aim of this 

article is to reflect the implications of class differences in higher media education. The challenges 

of social class in media studies are bidimensional: what is taught and how it is taught. 

First I ask how to focus more on social class when analyzing media contents in higher media 

education? Secondly I ask, what does it mean, that class marks everybody involved in learning 

situations, both students and teachers? Thirdly, I try to make some concrete proposals 

for teaching. 

KEYWORDS: social class, higher education, media studies 

Is there any class in this class? Class sensitivity in higher media education

INTRODUCTION 


In a course called Teaching in English, teachers and tutors from Finnish universities 

and polytechnics are shocked. Our British teacher advises us to find out 

about the students’ social backgrounds – the occupations of their parents, for instance, 

to understand students better. There is a brief silence in the class room and 

our minds are full of questions. Isn’t it very impolite to talk about class differences 

between people – in a Nordic welfare state? Why should I know something 

about the status of students’ parents – students are adults, living their own life, 

aren’t they? 

The aim of my article is to reflect the implications of class differences in higher 

media education. I am highly aware of the context-bound tensions connected to 

the concept of social class. For instance in Finland, since the 1980s the concept of 

social class has not been very popular in the field of media studies. “After all, we 

all belong to the middle class” has been a dominant way to think and much of the 

research interests is directed towards questions like nationality, gender, sexuality. 

In addition to this, the definition of the social classes of a welfare state is often 

problematic, despite the fact that in everyday life we can easily recognize the positions 

of the relatively rich and the relatively poor. Instead of using several pages 

to the complex class-discussion, I refer to ‘social class’ loosely; to the recognisable 

differences in housing, education, health care, ways to behave etc. Sometimes I 

replace ‘social class’ with ‘social status’ or ‘socio-economic background’. 

My theoretical background lies mainly in feminist and critical pedagogies, in 

their many-sided ways to discuss differences in general; class distinctions are 

strictly connected with other differences, such as gender, race and sexuality. It is 

important to think about all kinds of oppressions, because comparing and ranking 

them with each other leads nowhere. But it is a real challenge to take into 

account these multiple effects. 

In this sense academic subjects like communication and media studies are especially 

interesting, because identities and subjectivities are often argued to be highly 

media bound. We all live surrounded by media representations of social classes. 

Cultural products like movies, television programs and literature create those differences, 

make them visible and recycle more or less stereotypical representations of 

social classes all the time. Discussing interpretations on contemporary culture 

– with no axiomatic right and wrong interpretations - can make teaching and 

learning situations challenging. The challenges of social class in media studies are 

bicentric: what is taught and how something is taught.

10 


First I ask how to focus more on social class when analyzing media contents in 

higher media education? How to concentrate on uncomfortable themes, which 

are paradoxically present, but often silenced at the same time? Secondly I ask, 

what does it mean, that class marks everybody involved in learning situations, 

both students and teachers? Thirdly, I try to make some concrete proposals for 

teaching. 

LOST/SILENCED/HIDDEN CLASS? 

Nowadays it is often argued that academic research in general – and even cultural 

studies and feminist studies – have lost its interest in social, economic and 

political questions and because of that, also its relation to everyday life (Ferguson 

& Golding, 1997, Ruoho, 2002, Skeggs, 2004, Herkman, 2006). On a general 

level, modern identities are understood to reside at the intersections of gender, 

race, sexuality, nationality and class, but the truth is that since the 1990s, social 

class has been much less reflected than the other distinctions. Also in media studies 

and in media education, we are used to recognizing and discussing differences 

such as “gender” and “race”, “sexuality” and perhaps “age”, but “class” is often 

fated to be absent – or something, which takes place only in the past or in the 

UK. Until recently, social classes are even much less discussed in Finland than 

for instance in Sweden. We have eagerly repeated the phrase: us Finns, we are all 

middle class. The obvious disappearance of “society” and “social class” from the 

Finnish research agenda during the 1990s is a really interesting because at the 

beginning of the 1990s Finland suffered from a catastrophic economic depression. 

According to sociologists this decline dramatically changed the Finnish 

society (Julkunen, 2001, Heiskala & Luhtakallio, 2006). 

One interesting point is that if “social class” is taken into account, they are usually 

more easily recognized somewhere else, in other people or in different lifestyles, 

especially in the lower classes. The middle class is not as clearly defined and 

transparent as the working class is. At least a Finnish word ‘keskiluokkaisuus’, 

‘middle classness’, can refer to very many different aspects with no clear signification. 

In this respect middle classness is similar to such concepts as masculinity 

and whiteness: they are like empty boxes and not so clearly qualified as the other 

ones, i.e. working classness, femaleness or blackness (Dyer, 1997). There is a lot 

of axiomatic aspects in middle classness which is easily presented as a model 

for everybody, for instance certain kind of individuality, self-government, dynamics, 

freedom to choose and express oneself. For instance, refusing to attend 

upward mobility races and higher education may mean that you are branded a 

looser in your life (Skeggs, 2004, Käyhkö, 2006). 


SOCIAL IMAGINARY AND MEDIATED SOCIAL CLASSES 


Putting class back into media studies curriculum is the main point, of course; the 

challenge lies mainly in the content which is taught and how this content fits in current 

society and current university. In media studies, class arguments are usually 

accepted when researching for instance British Reality TV, but class is not so popular 

in media studies in general – which I think, refers to the lack of social theory, to 

the inconvenience of the concepts of class and to certain general carefulness of talking 

about complex classes. First of all, class has to be taken seriously: class matters 

(Hooks, 2000), even in the Nordic welfare states – and even in the Nordic media. 

According to British sociologist Beverley Skeggs (2004), social classes are constructions, 

the result of different kinds of making, like gender and race. 

According to Andrew Nestingen (2008), American researcher in Scandinavian 

Studies, media culture and popular culture in general are at the heart of the development 

of publics in Scandinavian welfare states. Media and popular culture 

serve continual representations and debates over national homogeneity, collectivity 

and individualism, over the changing nature of civil society. In this sense, 

media does not merely work as a technology of nation or as a technology of 

gender, but also as a technology of the social. Nestingen (2008: 42–43) refers 

to the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2002) and his idea about modern 

social imaginary. Taylor ‘s (2004: 23–24), modern social imaginary refers to several 

ways to imagine one’s own social place and relations to other people. Social 

imaginary can also refer to anything, with which commonalities, like common 

and shared habits and stories about “us” are legitimated. Social imaginary shapes 

the background understandings against which our self-understandings, values, 

beliefs, moral and ethical distinctions are formulated. Regarding this, social status 

is at least as interesting object of research as gender and sexuality. 

There is a massive proliferation of popular culture output devoted to class relations 

and – as we know - the power of repetition is huge. According to Beverley 

Skeggs, who analyses class and gender in many of her books (e.g. Formations of 

Class and Gender, Becoming Respectable, 2002 and Class, Self, Culture, 2004), the 

media is often helpless with class questions – as it has also been with feminism, 

homosexuality and racial issues. Media produces substances which lean on the 

most stereotypical clichés because it really does not know any alternatives. Here 

are some examples, mainly focusing on working-class representations. 

Absence and invisibility are perhaps the most essential points in (working) class 

representations. Like the American Barbara Ehrenreich (1995), I can only wonder 

where the average working people have disappeared from media culture. The

12 


majority is silenced, when e.g. the television fills its screen with fictional doctors, 

detectives and lawyers. If you want to see some other characters, you have to pay 

attention to the minor characters that are located in the background of these “real 

subjects”. There is an army of secretaries, postmen, waitresses and drivers who 

contribute to the activities of the main characters. 

Skeggs (2004) has paid attention to the negative and worthless value of working 

class in stereotypical representations in the Anglo-Saxon media. The respectable 

modern middle-class is hindered in its progress by the atavistic block. Working 

class representations are connected to excess, waste, disgust, authenticity, tastelessness, 

entertainment, non-modern, escapism, danger etc. Excess and exaggeration 

are marked in many-sided ways. For instance, the concept of white trash 

is connected with the idea of excess. Trash is something like dirt, something too 

much in the wrong place (Douglas 2000). As Skeggs (2004) argues, exaggerated 

sexuality is something very usual and conventional when representing working 

class women – and working class men, too. In addition to this stereotype, they 

are also often represented tasteless and unstylish. Outward appearances and clothes 

seem to be an essential part of social classes and of changes in subjectivity. 

So, social class seems to be a performative construction, too. With its close ties 

to appearance, especially clothes, it reminds me of the concept of cross-dressing, 

which is usually connected with the desire for wearing clothes associated with 

the other gender (see also Tasker 1998). 

In stereotypical representations, working-class masculinity seems to be much 

more valuable than working-class femininity. Also in Finnish media culture working-class 

men seem to be admirable because of hard work. The homo-social 

admiration of other men is clearly seen e.g. in the television program called Äijät 

(Old geezers or Real guys) which was shown on Finnish television a couple of 

years ago. The idea of the program was that two rock-stylish guys met “the real, 

cool work”, such as mining, garbage collection and chimney sweeping. We rarely 

see cleaners, nannies, supermarket cashiers or lower clerical workers on screen 

or on television, at least not too often as the cool characters of the centre stage. In 

this sense, the cleaning reality-show called How clean is your house presented a 

few years ago on Finnish television, was an unusual exception. 

Anyway, class is intertwined with different kinds of fiction and fantasies in many 

ways, as for instance Valerie Walkerdine (1997) has argued. For instance, individual 

upward mobility stories seem to be very popular in fiction: they can combine 

the idea of social structures and individual stories, which fit in well in the current 

neoliberal climate. Variations are many, from Cinderella – stylish fairytales and 



from rags to richness stories. We all know Cinderella and My Fair Lady, often 

mentioned as the typical examples of an upward mobility story – or, to be exact, 

a feminine upward mobility story supported by a male benefactor. A poor, but 

beautiful girl meets a wealthy and powerful man, falls in love, changes her dress 

and behavior and tries to “pass” as in such movies as Working Girl (1988), Pretty 

Woman (1990) and Maid in Manhattan (2003). 

TEACHERS AND STUDENTS WITH BACKGROUNDS 

Education is considered as democratic space, where the desire to study and learn 

makes all equal. The underlying assumption is that all are equally committed 

to get ahead. Still, students with not so privileged background may have totally 

different ideas about money, attitudes, social relations, values and biases (Hooks, 

1994: 177). We all come from somewhere, but social backgrounds are rarely talked 

about in classrooms in Finland. Class is often seen as a difference, which can 

be changed up to a certain point: everybody has the study opportunity in the welfare 

states. Anyway, social classes are present, even if we don’t talk about them. 

In this sense, class is “a different difference” compared with “gender” or “race”, 

which are usually thought to be something you can’t change. For this reason, 

it’s somewhat easier to interfere with gender or race related discrimination than 

discrimination connected to social classes, sexuality or religion. 

One tension in the classroom might be, that university teachers tend to be middle 

class people. Middle class people are usually more educated; they have more space 

for action and agency that is social and cultural capital, not necessarily money. 

Middle class people often have the possibilities and power to name and interpret 

cultural phenomena. On the other hand, higher education often means changes 

in students’ class position, especially if they come from lower classes. For 

them, higher education often means bigger investments, bigger economic risks 

and withdrawal from their own background. For students with the middle-class 

background, higher education means usually confirming the middle-class position. 

Anyway, the official and academic discourses assume that all students develop 

personalized educational projects for self-improvement, but hardly recognize 

the material exigencies (Reay, David & Ball, 2005). 

According to Paula Saukko (2003: 45), a Finnish cultural researcher working in 

the UK, scholars’ interpretations of oppressive structures might tell more about 

their theoretical and political commitments than about the structures. Saukko 

(2003: 12) has also asked if cultural studies is capable of doing justice to and 

understanding radically different cultures, such as working class or non-western

14 


cultures. Falling in love with words like empowerment, optimism, surviving and 

feel-good might need a reality-check and the capability to face also miserable 

situations. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps the best known critic of 

academic intellectuals. According to him (1984) researchers and teachers should 

be much more self-reflective and they should avoid unreal and alienated interpretations 

of life. The world is not only meanings but also problems to solve. The 

liberal slogan “live and let live” is not enough. 

The challenge is how to implement all kinds of different perspectives on the courses 

at the same time. How to act in a way, which doesn’t exclude any students with 

“different” background? Especially working-class students might feel themselves 

outsiders easily when attending universities. Anyway, we should be more interested 

in all kinds of outsiderness, whether it is related to class, nationality, sexuality or age. 

BUT HOW TO DO IT? IDEALISTIC IDEAS ABOUT PEDAGOGICAL ACTS 

How to be more class sensitive – without declining other differences? What kind 

of pedagogical acts would be significant to handle this difficult class question? 

I have borrowed some ideas from two Americans, Karen Robertson and Susan 

Zlotnick, whose workshop Putting class back into women’s studies curriculum was 

held in Uppsala in June (Challenging Education – Feminist and Anti-Oppressive 

perspectives on teaching and learning 14.-16.6.2009). 

First of all, a media teacher should be very aware of her/his own position in the 

power system – a position, which allows to name and rename phenomena and 

evaluate different kinds of students’ interpretations. As a teacher, you shouldn’t 

suppose that students think like you do, or that they try to think in your way. 

You have to give up the assumption of sameness and you can’t suppose anything 

about students’ social class, gender, sexuality, race or religion. You can’t assume 

that students are white, heterosexual and from the middle-class background – 

despite the fact that probably most of the university students fill these criteria. 

One concrete step towards more class (and gender) sensitive teaching is to pay 

attention to some classified, gendered and radicalized contents in teaching: the 

taken for granted presumptions of “a good student” or “a good media researcher”, 

for instance. A teacher should reflect the language and especially metaphors used 

in academic discourses, teaching situations and text books, as well as all kinds of 

examples which are used. One essential point is to understand that class does not 

mean only working-class (Ruoho, 2002). 



Getting to know one’s own middle-classness might meet resistance, as well as reflecting 

one’s own working-classness in public. In this sense, teaching and learning 

situations should be very safe and all participants should be very committed to 

them. Also certain kind of slowness is important: it takes time to be honest with 

uncomfortable class questions, and working with them is highly emotional. Like 

gender and race, social classes are also constructed with emotions and affects, e.g. 

rage, agony, suffering, frustration, anger, shame and displeasure (Skeggs, 2004). 

Researchers and teachers often speculate about the possible empowering effects 

of media content and write about therapy, pleasure and enjoyment. Stressing 

pleasure, enjoyment and the therapeutic function of the media is a very onesided 

way to interpret media contents. But I think that if you speculate about 

empowering, you should also take into account the possibility of disempowering. 

Technologies such as movies are highly involved in the process of constructing 

subjectivity, but probably also with the processes of deconstruction – they might 

be breaking, too (de Lauretis, 2004). 

A teacher has to challenge her/his self, and maybe students’ identities, too. Talking 

about differences makes vulnerable – how much a teacher should tell about 

her/his self? Robertson and Zlotnick (2009) proposed memory work, which 

aims to understand the social construction of individual identities by writing 

short memories. The method was originally developed by German Frigga Haug 

(1987) in order to resist dominant cultural ideologies, which leave something 

essential invisible. In Haug’s case that was female ‘experience’, but the idea could 

fit in with the class question, too. Memories are written with or without photos 

to surpass emotional load and to get to the point – and teachers participated in 

this activity, too. Anyway, if a teacher is not willing to go so far, the framework of 

one’s own thinking should be at least visible. 

There is a lot of challenges in putting class back into media studies curriculum. 

For instance, what to think about interpretations, which are students own, but 

much more conservative than teachers’ own? How to challenge conservative students? 

They are not going to love you, if you split their middle-class subjectivities. 

In Finland, and perhaps in the whole Scandinavia, we usually have quite short 

courses, which make difficult to create safe spaces to handle these kinds of uncomfortable 

contents, to discuss likes and dislikes. 

But why? What kind of knowledge is useful at the university? Is “class” useful in 

current university? As for instance Päivi Naskali from University of Lapland has argued 

(2009), the basic values of the Finnish university have changed from general

16 


and social good towards individual good, productivity and efficiency. The main 

target of the whole education system seems to be the “enterprising self ”, and new 

citizens are supposed to be active and flexible, risks taking and responsible for their 

own success and failures, she continues. In an environment like that, discussing in 

public for instance your lower background might be very oppressive. 

Still, I am optimistic. At her/his best, a media teacher can generate a creative space 

for new ways of knowing, for new knowledge, for change, too. If we can’t find 

a proper and useful language to talk about socio-economic status, we should try 

to create that, new concepts and new vocabulary. New vocabulary might mean 

something like class-cross-dressing, capitalist realism or romanticism or disempowerment. 

There is a great number of problems to solve, a lot of new concepts 

and expressions to create. 

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seksuaalisuudesta. Toim. Anu Koivunen, suom. Tutta Palin ja Kaisa Sivenius. 

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London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 40–42. 

Ferguson, M., Golding, P. (1997). Cultural Studies in Question. London, 

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Dyer, R. (1997). White. London: Routledge. 

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Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 

Herkman, J. (2006). Kriittinen kulttuurintutkimus valinkauhassa. In 

J. Herkman (toim.). Tutkimusten maailma. Suomalaista kulttuurintutkimusta 

kartoittamassa. Jyväskylä: Nykykulttuurin tutkimuskeskus, pp. 21–32. 



Hooks, B. (1994). Teaching to Transgress. Educations as the Practice of Freedom. 

New York, London: Routledge. 

Hooks, B. (2000). Where We Stand: Class Matters. New York, London: 

Routledge. 

Julkunen, R. (2001). Suunnanmuutos. 1990-luvun sosiaalipoliittinen reformi 

Suomessa. Tampere: Vastapaino. 

Käyhkö, M. (2006). Siivoojaksi oppimassa. Etnografinen tutkimus työläistytöistä 

puhdistuspalvelualan koulutuksessa. Joensuu: Joensuu University Press. 

Naskali, P. (2009). Uusi yliopistolaki, yliopiston identiteetti ja tasa-arvo. 

Kasvatus, Vol. 1, 89–91. 

Nestingen, A. (2008). Crime and Fantasy in Scandinavia. Fiction, Film, and 

Social Change. Washington: University of Washington Press & Museum 

Tusculanum Press. 

Reay, D., David, M. E., Ball, S. (2005). Degrees of Choice. Social class, Race and 

Gender in Higher Education. Trentham Books. 

Robertson, K., Zlotnick, S. (2009). Workshop: Putting class back into women’s 

studies curriculum. Challenging Education – Feminist and Anti-Oppressive 

perspectives on teaching and learning. Conference held in Uppsala, June 14–16. 

Ruoho, I. (2002). Medianarsistin sortonostalgiaa vai feminismin politisointia? 

Tiedotustutkimus, Vol. 4, 42–53. 

Paula, S. (2003). Doing research in cultural studies: an introduction to classical 

and new methodological approaches. London: Sage Publications. 

Skeggs, B. (2004). Class, Self, and Culture. London, New York: Routledge. 

Skeggs, B. (2002). Formations of Class & Gender. Becoming Respectable. 

London: Sage. 

Taylor, Ch. (2002). Modern social imaginaries. Public Culture Vol. 14 (1), 

91–124. 

Walkerdine, V. (1997). Daddy’s girl. Young girls and popular culture. London: 

Palgrave Macmillan.

18 


IS A PICTURE WORTH 

A THOUSAND WORDS? 


m.drunga@pmdf.vdu.lt 

Lecturer 

Department of Public Communications 


Kaunas, Lithuania 

ABSTRACT: Journalists and scientists seek to grasp reality and to understand it. Print journalists 

use the vehicle of the word; radio journalists do so too; TV journalists also rely on words, 

though their principal vehicle of communication is the picture, the image, as is that of moviemakers 

and of still photographers. But recently the importance and power of photography has 

been exaggerated. It’s time to put things aright again. 

KEYWORDS: objects, photographs, reality, realistic, seeing, transparent 

Is a picture worth a thousand words?


Still, there’s a way of understanding realistic photography that minimizes the 

difference between looking at it and visual perception of the world. Kendall 

L. Walton has articulated such an understanding masterfully. It’s high time to 

“deconstruct” this alluring but faulty conception, sentence by sentence. In the 

abstract to his famous paper, Walton (1984: 67) writes: 

“Photographs are transparent; in looking at a photograph of something one 

sees the thing itself ”. 

No, in looking at a photograph of something one sees just a photograph; one 

thereby sees a picture, an image, of that thing, but not directly that thing itself; 

the thing itself one sees, at best, indirectly, which in some crucial respects isn’t 

nearly as good as seeing the thing itself directly. You can’t, for example, hold up 

the photograph in one hand and with your other shake hands with the “indirectly 

seen” woman pictured in it unless she herself is standing right next to you; in 

which case you’d be shaking hands with the (directly seen) real woman, not with 

her image. And being able to shake hands or otherwise interact with the persons 

(things) you see is absolutely essential to direct seeing, which is part of the reason 

why in looking at things photographically you’re not really seeing them. 

“Photography is not just a new means of producing pictures”. 

True; but it is principally that. 

“It is also an aid to vision, as are eyeglasses, mirrors, telescopes, and 

microscopes”. 

True again. But there are big differences between these mere aids to vision, on the 

one hand, and both photography (as a means of producing pictures) and photographs 

(the pictures produced thereby), on the other. Whereas the main use of the 

above-mentioned aids to vision is merely instrumental, photographs and photography 

can have important aesthetic functions as well. They (photographs and 

photography) are also useful in criminal and historical investigations of all kinds: 

visually comparing photographs of people with the people themselves by looking 

at both photographs and people can help, e.g., policemen and historians to identify 

accurately both photographs and people. All this presupposes that mere aids 

to vision (on the one hand) and photographs (on the other) belong to essentially 

different kinds of human artifact. 

“Mirrors enable us to see around corners. Telescopes and microscopes make 

distant and small objects visible”.

20 


But when you look at things in mirrors or through eyeglasses, telescopes, or microscopes, 

even if you directly see only their images, you also automatically gain 

knowledge about where you’d have to go and what you’d have to do to see them 

without these aids, i.e., directly. Looking just at photographs of things never by 

itself tells you any of that. 

“With the help of photography we can see into the past as well”. 

Not really. We can see into the past only in the way of seeing pictures of it; but we 

can’t see the past itself; the past we can only remember. 

“We must resist the tendency to water down this claim, to take it as a colorful 

and exaggerated way of saying that in viewing a photograph one has the impression 

of seeing the thing photographed, or that the photograph one sees 

is some sort of substitute or surrogate for the object. Watering it down in any 

of these ways endangers both its interest and its truth. We really do, literally, 

see our deceased ancestors when we see photographs of them”. 

No, we don’t, not really and not literally. In this life, we really and literally don’t 

see our dead ancestors at all. We last saw them, really and literally, some time 

before they passed away, while they were atill alive. (And my last three sentences 

would be true even if there were no afterlife, even if this life were all there is.) 

Now, to be sure, in viewing a photograph one does not have the impression of seeing 

the thing photographed – “impression” is the wrong word here. But neither 

does one actually see the thing (that was) photographed; what one may have is 

the illusion of seeing the thing in the photograph. Notice how Walton subtly slips 

from talking about “seeing the thing photographed” when denying it (the thing 

photographed) is an impression to talking about “the photograph one sees” when 

denying it (the photograph) is a substitute or surrogate for the object. Of course, 

the photograph is no substitute or surrogate; it’s more of a memento of the object: 

a reminder rather than a replacement. Nothing is a substitute for a dead person, 

especially if you loved her or him. 

Finally, why must we “resist the tendency to water down” Walton’s claim if in so 

doing we merely “take it as a colorful and exaggerated” – and figurative – way of 

saying that enjoying a piece of realistic photography is like veridical perception. 

They are alike in that both present the world as it is, although perception does it 

incomparably more powerfully and resourcefully. Looking at photography is to real 

perception of the world somewhat as a computer is to a human being. There are 

likenesses here without the former becoming a form of the other, as Walton claims. 



“Slippery slope considerations give the claim an initial plausibility. If we see 

through eyeglasses, mirrors, and telescopes, don’t we also see via closed circuit 

television monitors and live television broadcasts? If so, on what grounds 

would it be reasonable to deny that we see athletic events when we watch 

delayed broadcasts of them, or that we see through photographs and photographic 

films?”. 

We do see objects through eyeglasses, in mirrors, and through telescopes. But 

in the first case we see them directly, and in the second and third, indirectly, by 

seeing their images. When I see something through my glasses, I usually know 

just in virtue of seeing it how much and in what direction I have to move in order 

to touch that thing. I usually don’t know this, and not in the same way, if I just 

see a live television broadcast of that thing. Much less do I see that thing if I only 

watch a delayed broadcast of it, or see a photograph or photographic film of it. 

A few criticisms similar to mine of Walton’s main thesis (that photographs are transparent) 

have also been voiced earlier by Gregory Currie and Noël Carroll. “With ordinary 

seeing we get information about the spatial and temporal relations between 

the object seen and ourselves. (…) Call this kind of information “egocentric information”. 

(…) Photographs, on the other hand, do not convey egocentric information,” 

claims the former (Currie, 1995: 66), although agreeing that “photographs 

can serve, along with information from other sources, in an inference to egocentric 

information”. According to the latter, as quoted or paraphrased by Walton, “I can 

‘orient my body’ spatially to what I see, either with the naked eye or through a 

telescope or microscope. But when I see a photograph I cannot orient my body to 

the photographed objects. The space of the objects is ‘disconnected phenomenologically 

from the space I live in’ (Carroll, 1995: 71). 

Currie and Carroll are right, I think, and Walton’s response seems unpersuasive. 

He admits that an “account of what it is to see should explain how seeing enables 

organisms to acquire information about their surroundings.” But then he claims 

that “there is no reason to assume” that such an account “must limit seeing to 

cases in which that is done”. 

However, it seems obvious and indisputable that cases in which organisms are 

not enabled to acquire information about their surroundings just aren’t cases of 

seeing, period. Being enabled to get information about the percipient’s environment 

constitutes the very essence of visual perception, at least when consciously 

undergone by humans above the age of infancy.

22 


In “regarding viewers as actually seeing things when they see photographs of 

them” Walton claims that he “was not especially concerned to be faithful to the 

ordinary sense of the word “see” (if there is such a thing).” Well, there certainly is; 

it’s been around in languages and cultures for thousands of years; and that’s what 

we’re concerned with here. 

So, to return to our title question: Is a picture worth a thousand words? For journalists 

and scientists, it usually isn’t. Journalists and scientists see reality and then 

report on it – that’s their most important function. They create reports for the 

public on the reality they see – but they do so in words, occasionally interspersed 

with pictures. 

These pictures need to be interpreted, and only words can do that. Words themselves 

need to be interpreted with words, as do mental pictures. Mental pictures 

are important; but they are nothing and have no effect unless they are translated 

into words. However enjoyable and even informative looking at pictures may be, 

looking at reality directly is even more important, at least for scholars and journalists. 

For them, words still are the primary vehicle of communication. 

REFERENCES 

Carroll, N. (1995). Towards an Ontology of the Moving Image. In C. Freeland 

and T. Wartenberg (eds.), Film and Philosophy, New York: Routledge. 

Currie, G. (1995). Image and Mind: Film, Photography, and Cognitive Science. 

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Walton, K. L. (1984). Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic 

Realism. Nous, Vol. 18, No. 1. 


Media Transformations 23

24 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

LATVIAN DAILY PRESS JOURNALISTS: 

BETWEEN OR TOGETHER WITH 

COMMERCIALIZATION AND 

PARTISANSHIP? 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

Ilze.sulmane@lu.lv 

Lecturer, ASPRI Researcher 

Faculty of Social Sciences 

University of Latvia 

Riga, Latvia 

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a comparative study of Latvian daily press journalists from 

three Latvian and three Russian language papers (during two time periods, 2006 and 2010). 

Data from thirty in-depth interviews with chief editors, observers, analysts and correspondents 

of socio-political themes during both periods, as well as observation of situations at the 

editorial offices and recent changes in the ownership show the different ways that news industries 

cope with losing the readership of daily newspapers. This data also demonstrates the impact 

of recent economic crisis and shows the relationship between the economic, journalistic 

and political fields in Latvia through the eyes of media professionals. The study confirms the 

tendency of commercialization being closely related with partisanship and the power holders’ 

use of economic problems and some professional flaws of media organizations in subjecting 

editorial contents to owners’ direct economical and political interests. 

KEYWORDS: Latvian daily press, journalistic roles, commercialization, partisanship, ownership, 

editorial policy 

Latvian daily press journalists: Between or together with commercialization and partisanship?

INTRODUCTION 


As the media in many countries face crises caused by the development of new 

technologies and more general economic difficulties, researchers try to assess the 

undergoing changes in journalistic practice and news business (Levy & Nielsen, 

2010). The development of new media, the economic and political crises, as well as 

diminishing trust within Latvian society of institutions, politicians and printed media, 

raise questions about how to cope with these situations. These developments 

further question the role of media professionals and what media system model – 

liberal, democratic corporatist or polarized pluralist (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) – is 

most characteristic of Latvia’s media system. Indeed, they raise the question as to 

which of these models, or other more specific ways (Jakubovitz, 2007), could and 

should be the most legitimate perspective for Latvia as a post-communist country. 

Comparative content and discourse analyses of Latvian and Russian language 

media has for a long period showed differences in media agendas, political sympathies, 

identity representations, and attitudes towards historical events. The 

existence of two information environments has been named as a disintegration 

factor in society by political and media experts as well as representatives of the 

common people (Šulmane, 2010: 239–252). Divided and small media markets 

also make competition for advertising money and audience attention very sharp. 

Field theory (Bourdieu, 2005: 30–39) is used here in order to explore journalistic 

cultures in their diversity and in its relationships with other fields, mainly economics 

and politics, where the objective relationship of symbolic domination exists. 

Although the field of journalism is not autonomous, journalists struggle within 

the field for the power to impose their vision of the social world. Therefore I 

study the system of presuppositions inherent to journalists and editors (specific 

“doxa”, according to Bourdieu). Those who are professionally engaged in producing 

discourses, offer their “vision and division”, as well as struggle for this vision 

to be acknowledged as legitimate categories of constructing social reality. To exist 

in a field means to differentiate oneself. Field theory enables one to discuss outside 

forces (audiences, political and economic pressures), as well as to take into 

account the impact of media organizations and the socio-economic, cultural and 

educational background of journalists themselves. 

With regard to political communication, we should recall political journalists 

who have partly lost their status, as they nowadays have to combine civic and 

hedonistic values and have to compete with other representation spheres and 

many other mediators in order get into the news (Blumler & Gurevitch, 2005: 

108). Therefore it is important to explore what professional ideologies are characteristic 

for Latvian press journalists, as printed press used to be the platform for 

communication between political and journalistic elites.

26 

1 The interviewed 

journalists are from 

the following papers: 

Diena (The Day), 

Latvijas Avīze – LA 

(Latvia’s Newspaper), 

Neatkarīgā” – NRA 

(Independent 

Morning Paper) in 

Latvian and Telegraf, 

Chas (The Hour) and 

Vestji Sevodnja” – VS 

(News Today) in 

Russian. 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

Professional journalistic cultures that can be deconstructed in terms of ideology 

are connected with journalistic epistemology, ethics and such functions in society. 

Following M. Deuze (2005: 442–464) I explore such professional values as 

public service ideals, objectivity, autonomy and ethics, and try to compare those 

manifested in interview discourses with practice. 

METHODOLOGY 

I have compared journalistic discourses obtained in in-depth interviews with 

newspaper journalists from six national dailies during two time periods – early 

Summer, 2006 and Summer and Autumn, 2010 1 . Thus both interview sets took 

place before the intensive Saeima election campaigns had started and in 2010 also 

shortly after the elections which took place at the beginning of October. Interviews 

in 2010 were gathered during a longer period, as the changes in ownership 

caused changes in the editorial boards and allowed me to follow the reactions and 

attitudes of journalists to these developments and compare relationships among 

different actors during the crisis and in a more stable period. Respondents for the 

first interview series were chosen to meet the following characteristics: from each 

of six editorial boards’ chief editors, columnists, editors and correspondents writing 

on social political themes (representative and influential in the paper) were 

chosen. For the second interview phase I tried to interview the same persons, if 

they had the same position. If not, I spoke with journalists who had taken over 

the job of my respondents. I also interviewed those journalists that had moved to 

other dailies (those under my study) as well as those who had to leave their job 

after ownership change. 

Questions about professional roles, professional values (objectivity, independence, 

separation of facts and opinions, need of common code of ethics), self-identity 

and journalistic styles and editorial policy were also posed. 

THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 

A survey of Latvian journalists in 1998 showed that Russian language journalists 

were the first to feel and explicitly verbalize the economic pressures and self-censorship 

due to pressure from their chief-editor. Stabilization in the Russian language 

press market had come later than in the Latvian language press, where big 

foreign investors ensured stability and editorial independence. The survey results 

showed that a lack of Latvian language knowledge limited the use of sources and 

that Russian journalist mostly lived in one-language information space. It also 

showed direct interdependence between language use (nationality) and political 

and professional views of journalists. 



The interview discourses in 2006 show slight changes: the respondent’s (and paper’s) 

language did not always predict the possible answers of the journalists. 

Some views about professional ethics, journalism as a business or vocation, were 

closer if Diena and Telegraf journalists or NRA and VS journalists were compared; 

therefore, differences in journalistic cultures did not lie any more only in the 

ethnic division. Economic difficulties most often were mentioned in the interview 

discourses of journalists from Telegraf. Some of them pointed out that they felt 

worried about the continued existence of their paper, considering that three dailies 

(plus a business paper) is too much for the Russian language market, and that 

the Russian speaking audience demanding a quality paper is very small. 

Compared with the situation in 2006, the interviews in 2010 show that governing 

bodies as well as correspondent-level journalists both from Latvian and Russian 

dailies feel the impact of the economic crisis, which is expressed in the lack or 

decrease of advertising income, lower salaries of journalists, reductions of journalistic 

and technical personnel. For example: 

“Unfortunately economic crisis has impact on salaries for journalists. [...] 

The quality of people (journalists) who can be hired for the money we have 

is decreasing. Therefore the quality of the newspaper falls,... it affects all papers” 

(Editor-in-chief, NRA). 

The editor-in-chief from LA points out: 

“Like other papers we had to reduce number of journalists, amounts of honorarium, 

salaries, reduce the [ newspaper] structure. Number of pages is 

diminished. [There is] less space to write, more themes per person to cover. 

A journalist has no time. Investigation and deep investigation is not paid 

for. The work is for daily quick news. We try to give the gifted journalists the 

possibility to write these deep, serious articles”. 

A Diena journalist noted: 

“It is difficult to say if it is a conscious tendency to popularity… materials 

become ‘lighter’, more yellow. To a certain degree it is connected with lack of 

money [needed] to keep people who practice qualitative journalism”. 

Journalists mentioned not only time constraints, which were caused by more work 

for less money and which resulted in a decrease of content quality, but also writing 

both for the print and Internet versions of the newspaper. Tendencies of developing 

Internet versions of the dailies are evaluated differently. Some journalists indicate 

that working for the Internet allows them to better feel in contact with audiences, 

but they evaluate this job as less prestigious than for the printed version. A journalist 

from Diena admitted that she tries to keep the best publications for the printed

28 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

version, while a journalist from NRA stressed that the print and Internet version 

are two completely different products with different audiences. 

The economic crisis has made the papers reduce other expenses, e. g.: the VS 

editorial office has moved to a less expensive place; renovation of the newspaper’s 

editorial premises (in Chas) has been postponed; many more journalists have to 

work in the same space (journalists from the Diena and Dienas Bizness). 

Journalists from competing papers, e. g. LA, expressed some kind of malicious 

satisfaction and disapproval about the great financial losses experienced by 

Diena, because they felt Diena’s journalists had long lived too lavishly. Several 

journalists from Latvian language papers, particularly in 2006, expressed their 

firm belief that VS and Chas are partly financed from Russia. 

In 2006 journalists were quite critical of their competitors’ editorial policies and 

contents. They stressed the differences in writing style of Latvian and Russian 

journalists in Latvia and also clearly defined characteristic traits of different 

newspapers of the same language, being extremely critical of their closest competitors: 

Diena versus NRA; Chas and VS versus Telegraf, and Chas versus VS. 

The main conclusion was that it seemed impossible for the journalists to move, 

for instance, from Diena to NRA or vice versa, or from Telegraf to Chas or VS. 

In 2010 the borderline is not so sharp any more. This can be viewed in the personnel 

change: a journalist who specialized in economics moved from the Russian 

language Telegraf to Diena, and some professional journalists were bought 

by richer newspapers (e.g. from Chas to VS). This can be evaluated as a tendency 

of the falling “purchasing difference” of the daily papers’ brands and of the unification 

of form and content in the newspapers. In the case of Diena, already 

beginning in 2006 hiring journalists from a Russian language background has 

been also a part of editorial policy. 

In a 2006 interview Diena’s editor-in-chief did not acknowledge any changes toward 

the simplification of contents in order to obtain larger audiences. Widening 

of themes was admitted, but not at the expense of serious topics, such 

as politics, economics and culture. Some concern about late awareness of the 

newest competitor – the Internet – was expressed, but, regardless, Diena was 

the first to establish its Internet version. Some of the rank and file journalists, 

however, already at that time pointed to some commercialization tendencies 

connected with the need to earn more money (to enlarge audiences) and thus to 

losing some characteristics of quality journalism in Diena. 

Among the difficulties partly caused by the economic crisis, journalists name the 

wide use of public relations materials (due to the time constraints of journalists) 

and also pressures from PR firms and advertising departments: 



“You are against public relations specialists who offer you surrogate information... 

to learn to differentiate it... needs very delicate organs of sense. The 

fight with surrogate information is very important. (…) Advertising pressure 

is immeasurable, crazy. For example, interview with Ainārs Šlesers as the 

chairman of Riga free port - advertising department wanted very much not 

to put [words] “paid publication” below” (Editor-in-chief, NRA). 

The interview discourses show that journalists even from the same paper do not 

share similar opinions: already in 2006 a journalist from NRA, the president of 

the Latvian Journalist Union, spoke about “advertorial” – a tendency to merge 

editorial and advertising content as a “normal development” in the press. 

As in many other countries all the national dailies except the Russian language 

VS changed their format to tabloid; as well, they have more colors, bigger photos, 

and flashy headlines. VS journalists and the editor-in-chief in 2006 stressed 

their difference from other dailies, mentioning half-naked women and anecdotes 

on the front page together with serious political and foreign news and socially 

oriented content in other pages as a distinctive characteristic of the paper and 

admitting that they had to make people aware of that erroneous, “hooligan style” 

which has been unsuccessfully copied by others. “A quality yellow newspaper” 

was the self-identification of VS in 2006, and, as the paper with largest audience 

among Russian language dailies; it has not experienced serious changes. 

In 2010 many of the interviewed journalists admitted some tendencies of unification 

and commercialization of the daily papers. They point out that they had 

become more popular, sensational, trivial in content, etc., that the “research” goes 

on about less important themes and that a lack of deep analysis of processes is 

going on in society. 

A journalist from VS points to the possibility that newspaper quality is closely 

connected with the quality of readers: if their purchasing power diminishes, if 

they lose a job or emigrate, there will be fewer people who need a newspaper or 

will be able to buy one. The editor-in-chief of LA (2009) is also quite pessimistic: 

“I am worried about the fact how big – and it seems to me it is small, – is 

the part of society which demands the intellectual, high quality journalism. 

Who has the growth – all yellow magazines, commentaries in the Internet, 

populism in LNT and TV3 news?!”. 

TNS data and media experts confirm that the global tendency of decreasing readership 

for daily papers is true also for Latvia: from 48-53% of readers of dailies 

in 2006 to 26% in Autumn 2010 (Rožukalne, 2010a). We can see that the tradition 

and prestige of reading daily newspapers continues to diminish, and it is

30 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

connected not only with peoples’ lower purchasing possibilities, but also with 

the quality of papers, the readers’ lost trust in daily papers, as well as the growing 

habit of Internet use for obtaining daily news free of charge. 

THE CHANGING ROLES OF JOURNALISTS IN NATIONAL DAILIES 

Already in 2006 some journalists were quite sure that the journalistic style and 

role should change. While most Latvian journalists considered the practice of dividing 

facts and opinions, and balanced representation a must, most of the Russian 

respondents emphasized that this is not characteristic for Russian literary journalism, 

which is more emotional and opinionated. Some Latvian journalists acknowledged 

that separation is an ideal that is difficult to acquire. Others said that Internet 

growth makes journalists reconsider their writing style and that the concept of 

separating facts and opinions is outdated. The Editor-in-chief at LA said: 

“My personal feeling about how newspapers can compete in times when Internet 

and TV are taking away audiences, is by two things – opinion leaders, 

when the reader seeks for opinions with which he can identify himself… in 

this case they should be representing similar position. And the second thing 

(…) is not quick, instant news, but you show the issue all the way to its roots. 

Consequences, causes, that we name as investigative articles are the values a 

newspaper can give”. 

Journalists in 2010 have become more conscious about the fact that the Internet 

and the print version of a paper are two different publications with partly different 

audiences and that working for the portal is on the one hand very interesting, 

as it gives the possibility to “feel the audience”, and is much easier, but on 

the other hand writing for the print version of the paper is more prestigious and 

self-rigorous (journalist from Telegraf). 

The interview discourses from 2006 presented similar views about activity – most 

of them confirmed that an active position of the paper was preferred to neutrality 

or objectivity. What differed were the ways to reach it. Diena journalists pointed 

out that the decisions were obtained in debates with the editor-in-chief, and 

commentaries and the editorial line was worked out collectively. Diena’s editorin-chief 

was the only one among the respondents who suggested that an important 

role of a paper is to serve as a platform for public discussions. Telegraf ’s 

editor-in-chief pointed out that there were questions in which journalists had to 

be careful – they could not afford to criticize Russia and Putin, for instance, since 

due to immediate audience reaction a fall in circulation would follow. 

Correspondent-level journalists from NRA explained that they were independently 

writing socio-political news and did not feel any pressures from the top, 



but there were two to three persons (“court writers”) who represented owner’s 

position in their articles. Most of them mentioned the diversity of viewpoints 

and writing styles, as well as unclear editorial policy in NRA to be the paper’s characteristic 

feature(s). The paper’s top-level officials said that “a journalist’s work is 

like carpenter’s”, and that working in a paper “is pure business; if serving society 

does not trouble business, [such a role] may be [played]”. 

In 2006 a commentator from Chas related that he had an agreement with the 

owner that he could write anything he wished, but if it was criticized by the owner 

the commentary simply did not appear in the newspaper. Its editor-in-chief 

pointed out the journalist’s role as an agitator and organizer. 

A journalist from Chas, an NGO activist writing about education reform and 

related topics, in 2006 told me that he did not feel like a journalist, but used his 

journalistic role to fulfill political goals: 

“[Russian] Journalists have a special mission – they are not just journalists, 

but also workers in the awakening. The first phase of the third awakening 

ended with the victory of Latvians. The Russian community is being established, 

it is bubbling and simmering, and I would call this the second phase 

of the third awakening. I want this to be a serious process”. 

Journalists from LA named their mission as the only newspaper in Latvia that 

was constantly defending Latvian national interests – language, economics, and 

historical justice. But the editor-in-chief divided her personal, more moderate 

views from those of the paper’s audiences and owners. She also noted that if the 

generation who feels these questions important for them “dies out” the paper 

would have to think about what should be changed in the editorial policy. Representatives 

from other dailies mentioned that LA had lately become “less nationalistic”, 

and possessed a wide range of information and sources that fulfilled 

its audience’s needs. 

Journalists from Diena and Telegraf underscored their professional roles similarly; 

however, attitudes towards some professional values were quite different among 

representatives of other papers. Most of the differences are about the possibility 

of a journalist being a journalist and a politician at the same time and about the 

ethical code for journalists. For Dienas’s representatives it was unacceptable for a 

journalist to have a leading position in party and to be a Saeima deputy simultaneously 

(but he/she could be a member of a party). Similar views were expressed 

by LA, NRA, Telegraf journalists, only in less categorical form. 

Journalists from Chas and VS demonstrated this both practically and verbally: 

in 2006 some of them were standing as candidates for the elections; also in the

32 

2 There existed 

a formal code as 

early as 1992, but 

several other codes 

exist in separate 

media organizations 

and the Latvian 

Journalists’ Union. 

But both the Union 

and its code of ethics 

is evaluated as being 

without prestige by 

many journalists, 

and a very small 

part of them are 

members. 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

interviews they either stated that such practice is only for a short period while 

they are fighting for their rights (Chas), or that it is also good from the business 

point of view – i.e., the newspaper does not lose a good journalist and the paper 

does not have to pay an extra salary to a parliament correspondent, since he also 

writes for the paper (VS) as a deputy. 

In 2006 journalists showed very different attitudes towards the need for a common 

ethical code 2 and a more active Journalists’ Union. If Diena’s journalists 

expressed concern about the situation and unsuccessfully tried to gain a majority 

in the congress of Latvia’s Journalist Union, thus trying also to establish a selfregulating 

press council, many of the interviewed journalists acknowledged that 

a common code in Latvia is impossible. For part of them it seemed improbable 

due to differences in journalism (Latvian and Russian), while others said that a 

code is not needed because it is human morality that guides a person, not a set of 

professional regulations. Some Russian journalists were afraid that such a code 

could be used as an instrument to criticize and beat them (Chas, VS). Still others 

were sure that a code is impossible in a situation where competitors in the media 

field (and behind them – the owners) were fighting with different means and the 

code could be a barrier to this competition (NRA). 

From the time when the head of the Latvian Journalist Union became a journalist 

at NRA (who said in 2006 that no code is needed) there has been a discussion in 

the professional environment whether to try to join the Union and to gain the 

majority or to organize an alternative. The latter was done in November, 2010 

– the Latvian Journalist Association was founded with the aim to improve journalists’ 

professional environment, to defend press freedom, to foster discussion 

about professional and ethical problems, to defend professional, economic and 

social rights, to take care about the lifelong education of journalists and to cooperate 

with international and other journalistic and media industry organizations. 

The declared aims of both organizations seem common, though the Union has 

declared that it is more a trade union, not a watchdog for journalists. The professional 

ideologies standing against them are different. And like the example from 

the political field where different views are not discussed inside a party in order 

to gain majority but a new party is organized, journalists do the same. The experience 

of the first professional organization shows that it is difficult to do truly 

active work if the organization does not have at least some full-time officials, 

which is impossible with low membership. 

If political issues (topoi) were dominating in comparison with professional ones 

in the journalistic discourses in 2006, the interview data from 2010 and recent 



observation show that journalists have become more and more concerned not 

only with political and identity issues, but they are also preoccupied with their 

own fate and the possibilities of working in circumstances with internal and 

external pressures. This is another argument for the need for an organization 

that could actively protect its members. It is similar to the situation in society 

where there are well-organized employers’ organizations (and in media sphere 

Publishers’ Association) and weak trade unions (and journalist organizations). 

Clearly journalistic discourses show individual differences and a mixture of partisan 

and market driven journalism when characterizing themselves, their competitors 

and audiences. 

The latest interview set also shows a new tendency: some representatives of the 

younger generation of journalists conclusively point out that the differences are 

ideological, not professional: 

“There is one journalism [not “Latvian” and ”Russian”], different is only the 

way in which it is packed, and different are ideologies it represents” (former 

editor from Telegraf). 

ROLE OF OWNERSHIP 

A lack of transparency in who the real owners of Latvian press are has been named 

by media experts for quite a long time as a drawback, causing distrust, and preventing 

audiences from realizing what political and economical interests hide under 

the agendas of different newspapers (Dimants, 2004, Šulmane & Bērziņš, 2009). 

The views of journalists and editors themselves regarding the role of owners 

and editorial autonomy have been quite different. Explicitly formulated editorial 

policy(s) and teamwork can influence the individual freedom of journalists, but 

it is evaluated differently. For some journalists it serves as a guideline, helping in 

their work, while others view it as a factor restricting their freedom (a former Diena 

journalist now working in NRA). The impact of the owner is sometimes felt in 

specific cases (covering specific issues, depending on the position of a journalist 

in media organization), but in the case of a laissez-faire (liberal) leadership style it 

may not be felt as consistent demands (journalists from NRA in 2006). 

Journalists from Chas and VS stressed that they have never felt pressures from 

their owner (as the owners of these papers represent two Russian parties). The 

editors-in-chief (Chas, VS, 2006) have expressed the opinion that a local owner 

whose only business is media business is always more independent (e. g., owners 

of both Russian publishing houses have joined parties and have taken part in 

elections 2010 as candidates for the Saeima), and view Diena as dependent from 

foreign capital and “Swedish social-democratic ideas” (NRA journalist, 2006).

34 

3 They were journalists 

belonging to the paper’s 

elite: former leader 

of Dienas Mediji, 

chief of department 

of commentaries, 

analytical journalist 

etc. Shortly after losing 

his job they founded 

a new socio-political 

weekly magazine and 

portal Ir (“It is”) which 

hopefully will have a 

more successful fate 

than its predecessors in 

Latvia. 

4 Ainārs Šlesers, 

Andris Šķēle; Ainārs, 

Andris and Aivars 

(Lembergs). They 

represent interests of 

Latvian First Party/ 

Latvian Way (LPP/LC), 

People’s Party (TP), 

Latvian Peasant party 

(ZZS) and Ventspils 

group. In 2010 national 

businessmen organised 

the election bloc For 

Good Latvia (PLL) 

with a massive election 

campaign and the 

direct support of the 

private TV channel 

LNT. The result was 

not as successful as 

planned. In the Riga 

municipality LPP 

has coalition with 

Harmony Centre 

(SC), representing 

Russophone party bloc 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

LA and NRA are owned by companies connected with port of Ventspils and 

Lembergs (mayor of Ventspils) and his opponents, but top managers have denied 

their dependence from their owners in interviews of both periods. 

Diena’s editors and journalists have always stressed that belonging to the Bonnier 

group guarantees independence and editorial autonomy. Owners have been 

interested only in circulation data and their positive influence is connected with 

professional growth and high professional and a organizational culture in the 

editorial office. 

CHANGES IN DIENA 

Respondents from Diena and former journalists from this paper pointed out that 

Diena had gradually lost its impact already from the moment when permanent 

editor-in-chief S. Elerte left the paper. The interviewee who took over her job 

argued that new editorial politics had almost lived up to expectations (stabilizing 

audiences and reducing the costs), but selling the paper by new Bonnier representatives 

to an unknown buyer (the Rowlands family) was a new shock that had 

an impact on the paper’s reputation, circulation, quality and the community of 

journalists. Those who did not like Diena’s “fighting liberalism”, “sorosite propaganda” 

and the tone of the “last instance of truth” publicly expressed their joy 

and praised the changes that might stop the paper’s explicit political sympathies. 

However, the first entry by representatives of the new owners was implemented 

very unskillfully and was met with resistance and protests from the journalists 

and was made public, showing popular commentators and editors being thrown 

out of their former workplace within an hour 3 . It demonstrated for the interested 

public that journalists and an influential media brand could simply be sold and 

bought like any other product. 

The new editor-in-chief from the Latvian business paper Dienas Bizness was met 

with caution, both editorial offices were merged, and the editorial board was represented 

by persons who were not thought to be capable of editing a daily by 

media professionals. Already at that time interviewed journalists were quite sure 

about the real owners of the paper – they and also commentators in Internet portals 

used the phrase “AŠ2” or “3A” 4 , referring to two or three of Latvia’s oligarchs 

who had thought to be the real owners. 

The period of stabilization was quite short. Readers had scarcely got used to the 

names of new authors in the commentary and news pages when more changes 

took place: national businessman V. Koziols, who is believed to be one of the 

oligarch’s “men”, was announced as the owner of the largest part of Dienas Mediji. 



The above-mentioned story about ownership change has several consequences. 

On the individual level interviews from Diena showed that for some journalists 

it has been difficult to decide to stay or go. For most of them it was a distressful 

process of waiting for changes and administrative decisions: are they on the black 

list or not; what and how to write in order to “understand the new frame of 

permissible”; feeling the distrust from audiences and sources; asking themselves 

what level of self-censorship will be demanded or acceptable; and how to keep 

one’s name and professional reputation. The process was also collectively frustrating 

and humiliating, as representatives of management publicly announced that 

they would “cleanse all shadows of S. Elerte”, the former editor, and that everybody 

outside is waiting for the paper’s death. Even taking off artists’ posters that 

for a long period decorated the editorial office was perceived as a demonstrative 

abjection from the new bosses. 

My respondents also emphasized that the fact of “giving the sack” to some of 

the best journalists and commentators after ownership changes shows that the 

new management works against business logic. This says that in the situation of 

reduction of workforce the first ones who are asked to go are the less experienced 

journalists, not the best commentators, specialists in serious topics or editors 

who can also train and lead newcomers. Still it should be noted that some really 

professional, analytical and objective journalists, like political reporter I. Egle, 

who has written on politics under different editorial leadership and in times of 

different political sympathies of the paper, has maintained her place. 

The developments have also had an impact on the position of journalists and 

the possibilities of growth of young inexperienced journalists. The new owner 

does not have a journalism background; a weakening at the editorial level (e. g., 

heads of department and authoritative journalists) makes the editorial politics 

less explicit and affects the quality of the content. It fosters an attitude of seeing 

the journalists as an ordinary workforce with little additional value – reputation, 

trustworthiness, and brand name. 

The latest changes are more skillful, gradual and less publicly observable. The 

editor-in-chief is a former Diena photojournalist. Changes in the editorial staff 

are not public any more, and some former columnists’ names can be found under 

simple news items. The paper’s twentieth birthday (November 23) was arranged 

in such a way as to create the impression of continuity and stability, but quite 

aggressive self-advertising in the paper and other media show that new managers 

understand the importance of trying to bring back readership during a subscription 

campaign. As a former journalist from Diena underlined – state-level, 

commonwealth thinking, which was characteristic for S. Elerte, was changed to

36 

5 Vienotība, the 

election bloc of 

New Time (Jaunais 

Laiks) and two 

other parties, won 

the Saeima elections 

and is represented 

by prime minister 

V. Dombrovskis. 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

noisy and superficial social “investigations”. 

Perhaps more socially oriented content is advisable for the paper during a time 

of economic crisis, and such editorial policy can help to enlarge readership. But 

the active and well-informed public intellectuals and representatives of civil society, 

perhaps, will proceed to the new magazine Ir. We already have two popular 

dailies in the Latvian press market; journalists have labeled both as national-conservative. 

To some extent it can also be evaluated as a certain disillusion in liberal 

ideology that is publicly expressed in media and interviews with journalists. 

If it is not a good decision for media business, it may be a political decision to 

reduce criticism to oligarchs and parties connected with them. Possible confirmation 

of this suggestion is hidden in the following quotation: 

I asked the owners, chairpersons of the board what and how – passive or active 

operation. Passive means less critics, active operation is when you start propagating 

some needs. And the answer is that rather [it should be] passive position, [we] 

should take away those big stones that could come. (…) Not to glorify [bloc] For 

Good Latvia, but to [ensure] that the ideas of Vienotība 5 do not appear. The new 

owners, they [should] formulate these things. Then I know whom I may hit and 

whom I may not. Otherwise it can happen that I hit those whom I should not, as 

it can turn out. Media position themselves in all parts of the world, and it is not a 

sin. I think it is hard to take a position, because these politicians have not themselves 

normally positioned. (…) But Diena will not defend liberal values any more, 

because there is nobody liberal in our political spectre any more. And I think that 

from business point of view it is not profitable to defend liberalism” (Chief editor 

of Diena Mediji, for a short time Diena’s chief editor, author of its new concept). 

Journalists from competing newspapers have also expressed their attitudes towards 

developments in Diena: 

I feel that it is a very negative process, as Diena for all these years has been 

a flagship, a market leader... in the sphere of socio-political influence. That 

what is happening is bad not only for the Diena, it is very bad for all of us – 

during last few years the trust in printed press has been falling. The shock 

wave to one, it comes to us, too. Trust in us falls also. Diena’s readers will not 

come to us, I understand that, they can be lost for all printed press (editorin-chief 

of NRA). 

Several respondents mentioned that Diena has partly lost its role as standard of 

comparison for journalists and its face of a liberal paper for readers of liberal 

worldviews. A journalist from LA stated: 



“Latvijas Avīze came with its national-conservative position which is exceptionally 

necessary. Diena had its own priorities. Its position was a manifest 

struggle against corruption and for elimination of corruptive ties, it was Diena’s 

accent. And this set-up of democratic principles. (…) As it has disappeared 

from the media agenda, it is a great loss for Latvia’s political and social 

environment”. 

In spite of that journalists of LA have considered the possibility of taking over 

Diena’s readers in case of the death of the paper, but the editor from Telegraf had 

noticed readership growth for Telegraf during the crisis at Diena. 

CHANGES IN TELEGRAF 

In 2006 Russian journalists from competing papers criticized Telegraf for its 

support of liberal party Jaunais Laiks (New Time), calling this a mistake, because 

it was not acceptable to Russian audiences and that “this political project” 

was very bad business, as it was losing money. After ownership change when the 

paper was taken over by an anti-Lemberg group in Ventspils, the new editorial 

staff was represented by well-educated journalists of the post-soviet generation, 

and a period of stabilization started. In spite of that Telegraf, financed by Ventspils 

millionaire O. Stepanov, had ownership change once again. The new owner, 

most probably, is the daughter firm of Bankas Snoras, indirectly connected with 

Russia’s banking tycoon V. Antonov (Margeviča, 2010). 

At the end of November 2010 A. Krasnitsky, chief editor of Telegraf, resigned. He 

named the main reason for the resignation as differences in opinions with the 

newspaper‘s new publisher regarding the freedom of the media, and the newspaper’s 

content and structure. Only a year ago O. Proskurova, the previous chief 

editor of this newspaper, quit due to similar reasons. 6 

L. Lapsa, who has worked in Publisher’s Soviet of the Telegraf from 2008, also decided 

to resign. He has stressed that during two year’s time Telegraf had become 

a professional, respectable and independent newspaper. This view was expressed 

also in my interviews with journalists – several representatives from Latvian 

and Russian dailies stressed that Telegraf lately had become “a representative of 

qualitative journalism, I sometimes quote it. Sometimes they are first to find something 

new, there are some analytical journalists” (journalist from Diena). 

As a respondent for my study A. Krasnitsky before elections said that he had 

become the chief editor in order to reanimate “the corpse”, as Telegraf already 

in 2006 and afterwards had the lowest circulation among Russian dailies. He 

expressed his belief that a part of Russian non-readers do not have a paper that 

they need and admitted that he had a sentiment to work for media where Cyrillic 

6 O. Proskurova 

worked together 

with A. Krasnitsky 

on the new concept 

of the Telegraf. Both 

of them represent 

the post-soviet 

generation of welleducated 

multilingual 

journalists who 

do not have the 

experience working 

in soviet media 

system or as party 

instructors like the 

editors-in chief 

of other Russian 

language dailies.

38 

7 Portal Pietiek. 

com (It is enough) 

was founded by two 

journalists who had 

to resign from Diena 

after ownership change 

and a former Diena 

journalist who has 

worked re in Telegraf ’s 

Publisher’s Soviet. He 

is also the author of 

critical books about 

Latvia’s ex-president 

and several of Latvia’s 

oligarchs. The portal 

is seeking financial 

support, and in a 

short time period has 

become popular and is 

often quoted 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

alphabet is used. His aim was to address the paper to average families who felt 

themselves responsible for their fate, who were not as aggressive as readers of VS, 

who were not blaming only Latvians or outside forces for all their difficulties (as 

Chas and their readers). 

A. Krasnitsky acknowledged that the paper has “instinctive feelings” towards 

Harmony Centre (Russian parties’ bloc): 

“Political sympathies, it is not love, just sympathies. But strangely – with 

those we have good feelings, we do not have the best relations, because we 

also criticize them as the largest and power party in Riga municipal government. 

We praise them for good deeds. But the main principle is to verify 

everything, not to trust anybody. …To think ourselves, to separate our position 

from the popular beliefs”. 

The paper has criticized the mayor of Riga for breaking some promises to voters, 

for the case when the mayor of Riga had used swearwords during s municipality 

meeting. The last straw, the pretext for firing him, was the publication of material 

about a boy who was in danger of being expelled him from his school for naming 

the mayor of Riga “a fool” (“durak”). 

J. Breslava, a representative of the publisher in an interview to BNS said: 

“We think that in these times one has to write to support efforts to take 

this country out of the crisis, society needs directions, connected with economic 

development, and not identification and emphasis of problems. Mr. 

Krasnitsky has a different opinion. He thinks that journalists are the public‘s 

watchdogs”. 

Is Mr. Antonov, a Russian businessman who is rumored to have bought Telegraf 

some time ago, the person who is going to tell the right “directions of development” 

for Latvia, asks V. Dombrovsky, expert in economics and author of the 

blog in portal Politika.lv. He also stresses that it is not an exaggeration to say that 

independent Russian language newspapers in this country have become nearly 

extinct (Bizness & Baltija, perhaps, being the last one). In recent years we have 

seen similar developments in the Latvian-language newspapers. As some notable 

“pockets of resistance” he names Ir (weekly magazine) and Pietiek.com (new portal) 

7 . V. Dombrovsky does not end his blog on a pessimistic note. He admits that 

“big boys have interests, and they see media as an investment to influence the simple-minded 

voters” and that economic power seeks to acquire political power to 

further its economic interests. Although many countries “ended up in the feudal 

pit where political power is the same as economic power (and vice-versa), some 

countries have escaped from this predicament. Why?” And the author answers: 



“I think it happened because the sum of the many acts of individual courage 

reached a certain critical mass. Like the one committed by Mr. Krasnitsky, 

who preferred to lose his job, rather than agree to peddle the new owner‘s 

vision of what‘s good for Latvia. Like the group of journalists that walked 

away from captured Diena and established Ir. Like (some) of the remaining 

journalists at Diena who often refused to do what they were told by their 

new masters. Like those who are putting their efforts into Pietiek.com. The 

list is quite long, really” (Dombrovsky, 2010). 

According to Krasnitsky in an interview to Ir (Ločmele, 2010) similar processes 

have taken place in all the Baltic States: behind these processes of owner-change 

stand the same people, the oligarchs being “downgraded to operator level” and 

the order coming from Russia. Still, in his opinion, they also have guarantees for 

maintaining their own interests as the latest elections have shown that primitive 

advertising does not work and oligarchs need a “media machine”. 

These cases show that first-rate journalists and editors either quit and establish 

their own media (e. g., the weekly magazine Ir (It is) or the portal Pietiek.com), or 

try to work under new conditions. 

The situation of un-transparent ownership change and the loss of professional journalists 

during a short period of time, as well as swift changes to the editorial staff, 

have several consequences. It has an impact on the quality of journalism in the daily 

papers: it deepens insecurity, which in ordinary journalists fosters self-censorship. 

It also shows that media owners view their business as a business where profit 

is not and cannot be connected with notions of responsibility and independence. 

Those changes in two daily papers have not been on the agenda in most of the other 

daily newspapers (only in blogs and commentaries), they also up to now have 

no dramatic losses in readership. Therefore I can agree with one media expert’s 

thesis (Rožukalne, 2010c) that society is used to thinking that the media working 

for narrow interests of their owners is a normal way of their existence. 

PARTISANSHIP 

No including the soviet times when journalists were seen as party loud-speakers, 

a tradition that is not so easy to change in the minds of people, the period of awakening 

showed many journalists becoming leaders of the Latvian People’s Front 

and politicians more generally. Sixteen or twenty years after gaining independence 

most of the journalists from Latvian-language newspapers clearly define the 

line of division – one can be either a politician or a journalist, but not play both 

roles at the same time. Those who are politically very active become deputies, 

ministers, or start working for NGOs. 8 

8 Diena’s former editorin-chief 

S. Elerte is now 

minister of Culture 

(party bloc Unity); 

A former journalist 

from Telegraf, then a 

special correspondent 

for media in Russia has 

become mayor of Riga 

(Harmony Centre bloc).

40 

9 Saeima regulations 

allow deputies to have 

scientific or creative 

extra jobs, but only 

some of media inhouse 

regulations 

say that it is not 

permissible. 

10 Sports journalist 

and commentator 

from Chas and head 

of department of 

publicistics of VS in 

2006. Kabanov from 

VS was elected as a 

deputy from PCTVL 

in 9th Saeima, but 

from Centre of 

Harmony bloc in the 

10th Saeima in 2010. 

11 For example in 

portal Politika.lv 

(Rožukalne, 2010b), or 

magazine and portal Ir 

(Ozoliņš, 2010). 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

Some journalists from Russian newspapers admit that it is not a very good 

practice and from an ethical point of view rather undesirable; but it is a reality, 

possible under specific conditions in Latvia. Some representatives from VS and 

Chas concede it as congruent with market journalism principles and not against 

the existing laws. 9 Not only several journalists from Chas and VS have stood as 

candidates 10 to the Saeima, but also owners of publishing houses become politicians. 

The director of the publishing house Fenster (publishing VS), A. Kozlov, 

who works at Riga municipality (Harmony Centre bloc), the only owner of publishing 

house Petit (publishing Chas), A. Sheinin, as well as its journalist, former 

editor-in-chief of Chas K. Zagorovskaya, were candidates from the bloc For 

Good Latvia in 2010 (but were not elected). Instead the editor-in-chief now is 

an experienced journalist, a former communist party secretary, and head of the 

press department during soviet times. 

Editors and journalists from both editions never denied their close relations with 

parties: “informational support for parties with whom we have a contract” (VS, 

in 2006), free access to media, e. g., first page column in Chas went to its owner 

during the campaign in 2010, talking only to “their” party members, using only 

“their” deputies as sources. During several election campaigns researchers monitoring 

the process found out that mostly in Russian-language papers the possible 

hidden advertising cases could be observed. N. Kabanov, who has managed to 

combine his work as a deputy and politician with journalism, has an impact not 

only on the VS readers, but also influences the minds of wider society about the 

close relationships of politicians and journalists. It has been a topic of public discussions 

mainly in liberal press and portals. 11 

The habit of serving politicians is acknowledged by leading journalists from VS: 

“We do not like it very much [owner being in party], but there is no way out, as a 

rule our press in general is politicized by indication of party affiliation”. 

Ownership change has put to silence a paper that has supported Vienotība; an 

influential Chas journalist suggest an open recognition of editorial line – not to 

criticize “our” politicians and give them free access to media. She also discovered 

that both Russian parties and even bloc PLL can be evaluated as similar, expressing 

uncritical sympathy and support of its leader A. Šlesers. 

The interview discourses show different types of journalists working for the Russian 

media: from open party mouthpieces to representatives of well-educated 

bilinguals of mixed ethnic background (fearing of assimilation). The latter ones 

have had to leave their job. 


SOME CONCLUSIONS 


As there are several Latvian parties representing both the position (government) 

and the opposition, different Latvian-language media have criticized them from 

different perspectives and the government is criticized both by Latvian and Russian 

media. The so- called Russian parties for quite a long period have got used to uncritical 

support of Russian-language press. After becoming a position party (in Riga 

municipality), having lost the predicted first place in the Saeima elections, they 

take offence at the Russian media for trying to start being critical watchdogs and 

for putting politicians in the unusual role of being criticized by Russian journalists. 

Losers (national parties, their sponsors and business circles) are seeking ways 

about how to win the media in order to impose their vision of the social world. The 

process of ownership change has not been transparent, which does not allow the 

real beneficiaries to be seen. It has also not been a very smooth process at the very 

beginning because of lack of experience of buying a valuable newspaper brand 

(which is not fully like buying other ordinary products) and because of the fact 

that journalists publicly expressed resistance. However businessmen learn quickly. 

The existing journalism culture in Latvia, where there are no real means of self regulation 

– i.e. a common code of ethics, a platform for the discussion of doubtful 

practices – together with quality decrease in printed journalism caused by economic 

crisis, makes the journalistic field more vulnerable. A lack of journalistic 

solidarity, of basic common values for the journalistic community, of generation 

change or the loss of experienced middle (editor) level journalists in daily press 

has resulted in the diminishing of role of national dailies. 

To exist in a field means to differentiate oneself. As processes of concentration 

become more definite both in the field of journalism (bigger owners of more 

media) and in political field (parties’ blocs) the fight among different power forces 

become more explicit (intolerant discourses about “other”, out-group), as in 

order to obtain symbolic power they must become visible and trustworthy. 

If journalistic, economic and political fields are compared we can observe that 

the Latvian case validates Bourdieu’s thesis of the journalistic field becoming less 

autonomous and more dependant on political and economical fields (Bourdieu, 

2005: 29-47). We can view contradictory tendencies. On the one hand we see the 

approximation of political and journalistic elites as they have a common habitus 

– journalists become deputies, party advisors or PR officers. Media commercialization 

has fostered conservatism, advocacy, bias and censorship in media 

organizations. On the other hand we can see that forces in those fields become 

more adverse: as media feels the abuse of power from economic and political 

fields, journalists from mere reporting and interpreting turn to sharp criticism,

42 

Ilze ŠULMANE 

muckraking or advocacy (which was seen in Diena’s commentaries before ownership 

change, but now can be found in the new portals, blogs and commentaries) 

thus becoming independent political actors, a tendency marked also by 

other researchers (McNair, 2006: 57). 

Effective evaluation of political elites can become a marketing instrument that 

could help to differentiate media organizations, as visual demonstration of freedom 

and independence has a commercial value. Tendencies in Latvia’s national 

daily press do not certify this. 

Commercialization and the growing tendencies of political parallelism causes 

me to express doubt about the optimistic prediction that the media in Latvia is 

developing in the direction of a democratic corporatist model. Several facts both 

from the interviews and recent events show some Italianization tendencies and 

struggle between journalistic professionalization and clientelism. The economic 

crisis causes a decrease of outside and inside pluralism but the habit of serving 

and need in positioning foster partisanship. Therefore, the answer to my question 

as found in the title, is that processes in the Latvian press can be characterized 

both by commercialization and partisanship tendencies. 

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DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE 

BROADCASTING: LOCAL AND GLOBAL 

CHALLENGES AND THE PUBLIC VALUE 

Ieva BEITIKA 

ievabeitika@gmail.com 

PhD Candidate 

Department of Communication Studies 

Faculty of Social Sciences 

University of Latvia 

Riga, Latvia 

ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to explore global and local challenges of public service 

broadcasting (PSB) development and to identify possible ways to manage these challenges in 

Eastern European countries (post-Soviet space). The study encompasses three main contextual 

dimensions: (1) local challenges of PSB, characterized and influenced by different political, 

social, economic and cultural conditions, experiences, traditions, norms, and the development 

of the democracy between countries, including transitional influences and consequences of 

media system development in post-Soviet space; (2) global challenges of PSB, including a 

continuing debate on the role, place and identity of PSB within media and political systems, by 

taking into account ongoing processes of digitization, technological development, media convergence, 

privatization, competition, commercialization, and their consequences; (3) a theoretical 

concept of the public value and its further developed approaches that emphasize strategic 

operation, performance, assessment and the development of public sector organizations 

(including PSB) by deliberating public needs and interests, as well as creating public value in 

an accountable and transparent way. It leads to the need for new commitments to the public 

and stresses the role of civic participation, support and trust in the work of PSB. The research 

is based on secondary literature studies, qualitative analysis of documents, semi-structured 

interviews, and a case study of Latvia. 

KEYWORDS: public service broadcasting, strategic development, public value, deliberation 

Development of public service broadcasting: Local and global challenges and the public value


THE CONTEXT OF PSB DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE 

POST-SOVIET SPACE 

The media systems that existed in the Soviet Union before the beginning of 

the transformations are characterized as „a wide-ranging system of censorship 

overseen by Communist Party agencies, the monopoly of state broadcasting and 

exclusive state/party ownership of the press, party nomenklatura as media executives, 

and hegemonic propaganda content” (Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008: 12). 

After the fall of the Soviet Union countries began to transform their political systems 

towards Western liberal democracy that normatively is unthinkable without 

“freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of association” (Jakubowicz 

& Sükösd, 2008: 10, Rozumilowicz, 2002: 12). Within the article “a transformation” 

is understood as the positive result of replacing the Soviet Unions’ political 

regime with Western-style democracy (Brown, 1999) and “a process of democratization” 

is seen as progress towards an ideal model of Western democracy (Rozumilowicz, 

2002: 9). 

Media freedom and independence are core preconditions of democracy. Without 

a democracy there is no platform for ensuring a qualitative, plural and diverse information 

space, ensuring “public voice” and “public value”, which should be the 

main role of PSB. Changes in the media system are seen as an indicator for identifying 

changes in the political system – especially related to PSB (Sparks, 2000, 

Jakubowitcz, 2008). Accordingly, institutionalization of media independence in 

post-Soviet space was a first step and a ground base for removing dependency or 

influence links between the political system and the media system. The success 

of progress differs between countries, but it is possible to identify similarities in 

consequences from the Soviet era (or influences of past experiences) that still 

affect PSB development and operation. It is important to take them into account 

by planning further development strategies, rules of law or other developmental 

activities. Otherwise, it is possible to meet with unexpected results. 

Jakubowicz has formulated three early media policy orientations developed in 

post-communist countries during the time of transformations: 

(1) Idealistic orientation – the very early view by intellectual and cultural opposition 

to the communist system, assuming “the introduction of a direct communicative 

democracy as part of a change of social power relations” (Jakubowicz, 

2004: 4) that was seen as “a radical vision of direct, participatory communicative 

democracy” (Jakubowicz, 2008: 112). 

(2) Mimetic orientation is characterized as an imitation or “a straight transplantation 

of the generalized Western media system with a free press and a dual broadcasting 

system” (Jakubowicz, 2004: 4). The development of independent PSB is 

seen as a crucial part of the media policy evolution in democracy.

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Ieva BEITIKA 

(3) Atavistic orientation means “the unwillingness of new power elites to give up 

all control of, or ability to influence, the media” (Jakubowicz, 2004: 4). 

The political elites of post-Soviet space tended to play (and partly still do play) 

dual roles. On the one hand, countries tried to adopt the exact patterns and standards 

of the Western European media system in order to establish them by imitation 

– according to the mimetic orientation. On the other hand, a positioned 

mimetic orientation of media policy was an official, but not real position, because 

the political elite was still in a sense the ruling actors of media operation. 

Although countries regained their “long-awaited” independence, political elites 

were not so willing to lose those possibilities that allowed them to control PSB 

in different ways both prospective and non-transparent. There was indisposition 

resistance towards creating a legal and institutional framework for PSB immediately. 

Jakubowicz has noted that although there was an understanding of a necessity 

for new laws, proclaiming “the need for PSB to be independent, and seek 

to create a legal and institutional framework for this independence”, parliaments 

tended to define it as a “long-term goal to be achieved gradually” (2008: 101). 

Tendencies in Latvia proved it by enacting the Radio and Television Law in 1995, 

in spite of the warning strike of Latvian Radio journalists already in 1991. Journalists 

asked for defining their legal status and professional conditions, which 

also restricted the options for creating the best broadcasting reports they could 

(Brikse, Duze & Sulmane, 1993: 241). In turn, in early 1990s societies were thrilled 

by the new situation where they could add their “voices” in the public sphere 

freely, but mostly they did not recognize what democracy and independence 

mean, and what their roles are in this new and different political system (Brikse 

et al., 2002). Initially political culture and the views of these societies were characterized 

as “a mythological way of thinking” (Vihalemm et al., 1997, Lauristin, 

2007), based on hoping for democracy as a miracle that will change the system 

completely and that will fulfill the desires of independence as a rescuer. But the 

core issue is that democracy cannot succeed without people who want it, develop 

it, and sustain it. PSB is also a part of it that has to be rebuilt all the time if citizens 

want to strengthen PSB’s role in societies’ development. Therefore, broadcasters 

and society have to know what outputs and outcomes they want to get as a result 

of PSB operation and why they need PSB in general. 

All in all, PSB independence is impossible if there are direct or indirect political 

influences that permanently restrict the operation in accordance with defined standards. 

Consequently, it leads to atavistic orientation. Furthermore, according to 

models of the creation of PSB, post-Soviet space is characterized as a creator of 

paternalistic broadcasters that tend to function as public educators “from above” 



by “playing a clearly normative role in the country’s cultural, moral and political 

life” (Jakubowicz, 2008: 102–103). Especially in the time of the digital age the paternalistic 

approach has spooned itself out. There is a need for creating and defining 

new roles and new models that could involve citizens into the operation 

of PSB more actively, directly and purposively. In the case of Latvia parliament 

enacted the Radio and Television Law that included the central principles of the 

independent media system in democracy, but the core problem is that they did not 

establish precise and accountable mechanisms for achieving, controlling and sustaining 

them. It is not enough to declare only principles in post-Soviet countries, 

if there is no insistence on creating such a system that maximally prevents possible 

risks and options for political and economic influence. Although the system is 

taken over, it cannot be copied without proper adjustments for local environment. 

The lack of independence of PSB is identified as one of the most important issues 

in post-Soviet countries. Jakubowicz stresses the dependency from political 

forces in particular (2008: 101–102). For instance, the Latvian Parliament 

had not been able to make urgently necessary and required decisions in order 

to strengthen and sustain PSB independence and development for 15 years. In 

2010 there is a new law on Electronic media enacted that still does not solve all 

the identified issues. These necessary decisions mainly are related to concrete 

and already discussed issues on financing, governance and supervision, as well 

as issues related to the regulation of the entire communication environment, 

for example, unknown media owners, procedures of broadcast licensing, and 

the Internet. Therefore, it is possible to argue that politicians tend to delay PSB 

development in a way so as to achieve strong PSB independency, journalistic 

quality and the public trust. The PSB policy making is still oriented to the value 

for officials or elite rather than for the public in Latvia. 

In regard to implementation of media policy, it is important to be aware that in 

post-Soviet space close relationships were developed between politics and economics. 

The trend could be concerned with experienced structural corruption 

in Soviet times, embedded into the political culture and habitual experience of 

citizens’ everyday lives and cannot be changed during a short period of time. 

Accordingly, Sparks (2000) also argues that the form of capitalism that came 

after the communism is different from Western countries, because of the different 

and close interrelationship model between political and economic power, 

especially with respect to the mass media. There are several ways to influence 

the operation of PSB, because of the political and economic power proximity. 

Sparks points out the following issue of nontransparent broadcasting licenses 

allocation and oversight; that also means nontransparent rules of the game in

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Ieva BEITIKA 

media business, as well as unclear accountability of them, including PSB that 

have to be accountable of the public service remit they have accomplished. Economic 

powers also fight for pieces of audience and an advertising market of PSB, 

if it operates in the market. The very important point is to eliminate all factors 

of these risks that determine possibilities to influence PSB operation directly or 

indirectly in every country. Otherwise, it is possible to argue that created democracy 

is “negotiated by elite groups, organized for the benefit of elite groups, 

and demarcated by the interests of those elite groups” (Sparks, 2000: 46–47). 

Therefore, at the beginning of transformations politicians believed, and some still 

do believe, that they have some privileges to expect and obtain a special support 

from PSB and a “right” to use them to promote state reforms that more often is rather 

a form of “manipulation for propaganda and political purposes” (Jakubowicz, 

2005: 5). This is another example that demonstrates not only the political unwillingness 

to lose their control of media, but also a lack of understanding of what the 

main principles of democracy are. Thereby, PSB organizations, created and developed 

during the process of transition, were “strongly influenced by the political elite” 

(Sparks, 2008: 47). Although media have to work under certain and independent 

supervision by regulatory authorities (that mostly are state funded), these bodies 

were “recomposed to follow the shifting results of elections” (Sparks, 2008: 47). 

Latvia is not an exception. During the time before regular nominations and 

appointments of them, there had been political discussions of potential members 

in discourses of political affiliations rather than competences and their adequacy 

to hold an office. Statistics confirms the conclusion made by Sparks that 

member(s), who are elected (or re-elected), mostly can be associated or linked 

to those political powers which are in current government. Latvia also confirms 

Spark’s conclusion (Beitika, 2009: 162). A similar situation was observed regarding 

the changes of general directors of Latvian Television (LTV). There is no 

general-director who would have completed the entire term of the office. 

More recently, the year 2006 can be seen as a starting time of the PSB restructuring 

in the sense of weakening news service and its “open” independence. 

Although the process of “restructuring” was explained as an arrangement of the 

PSB economic and operational system, results were contrary to these arguments 

according to quality assurance. The director of news service G. Reders received 

“an offer” to continue the work in Brussels as a correspondent of European Union 

(EU) affairs. Non-governmental organizations characterized it as having been 

“sent into exile” (TI Latvia, 2007). Instead, M. Gailitis was appointed, who had 

not been related to the television news processes and who was without higher 

education at that time. In turn, the most viewed analytical broadcast “De facto” 



was shut down by the dismissal of producer A. Giga. The dismissal was proposed 

because of an expletive (word) that was broadcasted in the report (there are 

still no unambiguous opinions on that). The author of this report was another 

journalist. She received “an offer” to work in the morning program that was rejected. 

Changes that affected the independence of LTV and caused journalistic 

quality deterioration were proposed by the management of LTV. Although media 

experts, civil society, and international organizations indicated suspicion of 

political influence and non-transparency and the necessity of restructuring, the 

situation was not changed. As a result the whole team of the investigative broadcast 

“De facto” came to the commercial television station TV3 and started to 

produce a similar investigative broadcast “Nothing personal”. 

There are other cases in Latvia that also prove or raise doubts about the political 

and economic influence in PSB operations. For example, the previous generaldirector 

of LTV required unplanned changes of the program by excluding the 

film “The Putin System” in the evening before the presidential elections in Russia 

(in 2007). He resigned after heavy pressure from the media and society. Not 

for nothing this year an independent watchdog organization the Freedom House 

has estimated the situation of freedom of the press with 23 points that is worse 

than in 1996 (21 points) according to the results of Freedom House’s Freedom of 

the Press index. Nevertheless, the organization stresses that “after two decades 

of progress, press freedom is now in decline in almost every part of the world” 

(Freedom House, 2010). This is an example for various forms of potential and 

real political and economic influence that can be related to all elements and levels 

of PSB. Within this context it is also important to recall that “the classical 

conception of media as the watchdog of democracy, freedom and independence 

were related directly to governance” (Rozumilowicz, 2002: 12), whose freedom 

and transparency should be seen as preconditions. Therefore, according to the 

discussion of challenges in the digital age, there is a need for taking into account 

that media democratization of post-Soviet space is still in progress and the independence 

of PSB is still at risk. Officials are still not aware of their bounds of 

authority in regard to PSB operation. 

One of the reasons why PSB was not introduced as successfully as expected (in 

line with the Western model) was the overly optimistic and idealized view of 

PSB. There is a mistaken assumption that it is possible to transplant exact media 

institutions and to implement them for proper operating without considering the 

social, political and cultural context of local society (Jakubowicz, 2004: 63–64). 

All in all, it is possible to identify the main influential dimensions of PSB development 

in post-Soviet societies in terms of transformations and consequences:

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(1) political (un)willingness, political culture and political understanding regarding 

to media democratization; 

(2) (un)willingness and de-motivation of PSB staff (including managerial staff) 

for making structural and cultural changes of the organization in order to become 

more professional, more trusted and highly independent organization that 

works for the public value; 

(3) political and economic influence over PSB and its regulatory authority; that 

also leads to dependency, unprofessionalism and incapacity of regulatory authorities; 

(4) public exclusion in decision making; weak public support for PSB; “long-distance” 

relationships with society (i.e. the paternalistic approach still dominates). 

Beyond these dimensions, there is a financial dependency issue, namely, whether 

or not countries have systemically ensured stabile, predictable and politically 

independent financing model. The previously mentioned dimensions are interconnected, 

which leads to local challenges in order to strengthen and sustain 

PSB independence and an ability to operate within Western European principles 

and to develop them by taking into consideration new global challenges. 

These trends are important in the context of PSB development caused by global 

challenges and following PSB transformations as public service media (PSM) 

or even public service communication (PSC), audience fragmentation, threats 

to journalistic quality, development of new journalistic forms (civic or citizen 

journalism), and the development of new forms in media editorial work. 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO POST-SOVIET PSB 

Regarding the beginning of its transformations, post-Soviet space had to demonopolize 

national radio and television as PSB in order to democratize the 

media system, instead of maintaining the state controlled media. Such further 

challenges as media market liberalization, commercialization and marketization 

of media, professionalization of journalists and media staff, establishing media 

freedom and independence, pluralism and diversity of media and their content, 

globalization, digitalization and convergence (Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008: 16- 

17, Syvertsen, 2003, Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003) are similar with those issues 

that “traditional democracies” have also met at different levels. There are similar 

voices calling for: who are we now and what are our identity? What is our mission? 

Whom do we serve and why? How to sustain journalistic quality? How to 

compete into the market that is fragmented and convergent? Is there a need for 

us? How to best develop? The rapid development and expanding of digital technologies 

in the 21st century have created revolutionary changes in broadcasting 



and the media sphere. Is the Internet “an enemy”, a challenger, an opportunity or 

a new awakener for PSB organizations to rethink what they do, how they do it, 

to/with whom do they do it, and why? Where are they within the media system? 

What are the relationships between PSB and the society, its audience? Finally, it 

is all about changes, adaptation, opportunities and the search for new operational 

strategies of PSB. 

Although independent and qualitative PSB is seen as a fundamental value of 

democracy, changes in the global media environment have caused various crucial 

challenges to sustain the ability to create high-quality information and cultural 

space and to achieve sustainability, trust of the society, and technological 

strength. EU and the Council of Europe especially have emphasized these roles of 

PSB, including social cohesion, cultural and language development and national 

identity creation (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 2000, Rumphorst, 

2003). In spite of all challenges, it is possible to argue that PSB is “still a major 

player in political and cultural life in Europe” (Coppens & Saeys, 2006: 261). 

Most European countries have been working on changes of communication regulations 

that are carried out in accordance with identified global challenges that 

had also been promoted by the EU due to the requirement of implementing the 

Audiovisual Media Services Directive by the 19 th of December, 2009. As it is inevitable 

not to take into account differences between member states, it is a competence 

of national level parliaments to choose their own models, approaches 

and mechanisms as to how to implement the required principles and norms and 

how strongly to regulate them. The Council of Europe has called for “a clear 

political commitment of European governments to maintain strong and vibrant 

independent public service broadcasting whilst adapting it to the requirements 

of the digital age” (Council of Europe, 2004). 

Overall, these trends in the changing media environment have contributed to the 

redefinition of PSB in the public sphere by rethinking its role, and its function 

to serve society as citizens, not as customers. While there are lots of similar questions 

and lots of incomplete and specific answers as to how to develop PSB in 

different democratic countries, the concept of public value offers an adjustable 

and debatable strategic operational framework in order search for answers about 

how to cope with the challenges and to serve the public legitimately. 

PSB AND PUBLIC VALUE 

The defined global and local challenges of PSB development lead to the need for 

new PSB commitments to the public. New circumstances in the media landscape 

increase the role of civic participation, support and trust in the PSB operation.

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Ieva BEITIKA 

The concept of public value originated with American scholar Mark H. Moore, 

in the book Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government (1995), 

written as a response to the rapid commercialization that faced the world and 

affected the public sector. Moore argues that he desired to stop the increasing 

trend of implementing the practices of the private market in the public sector. 

Therefore, he had created a concept that is more strategic and oriented to the 

management level, where the public is seen as citizens who have their interests 

and needs, not only as customers from a consumer society. Here, it is important 

to add that initially Moore developed it by extending it to all public services. 

In the coming years Moore and other researchers have developed and adapted 

the concept to different fields in public and non-profit sectors, such as PSB, public 

health, etc. G. Stoker, who is a follower of Moore’s ideas, has analyzed the 

concept of public value as the next phase of paradigms of public management – 

after the paradigm of traditional public administration and following the paradigm 

of new public management (NPM) (Stoker, 2006: 44), though British scholars 

were first who originated the new paradigm of Public Value Management (Kelly 

et al., 2002: 10). Within the article the term “public sector” is used in the sense 

of Moore and his followers. As, for example, M. Cole and G. Partson also argue, 

the “public sector” includes all organizations related to public service delivery to 

society and which are financed by using tax payers’ money or other resources, 

even partly. Thereby, the public sector includes all state institutions, agencies, 

nonprofit organizations or companies (Cole & Partson, 2006). 

The concept was taken from the USA to Europe – to the United Kingdom (UK) 

by J. Benington of the Warwick Institute of Governance and Public Management, 

Will Hutton of “The Work Foundation” and then by the UK Cabinet Office. In 2002 

Kelly et al. worked the discussion paper out, which proposed public value as a core 

approach to government reform in the UK, which also includes the reform of PSB 

(BBC). Therefore, the UK was the first country that appropriated the concept and 

began to adopt it by reforming the public sector and its management in Europe. 

In 2004 the BBC had created a new strategic policy document „Building Public 

Value: Renewing the BBC for Digital World”, about how to reform and to develop 

it further. They had carefully evaluated the previous work in order to discuss the 

way of future development (Grigg & Mager, 2005). Public value was established as 

a fundamental principle of every BBC operation. Researchers have admitted that 

this document is one of the most self-critical analyses of the BBC, and it is equally 

seen as thoughtful and innovative (Collins, 2007: 167). „BBC Trust” also introduced 

the Public Value Test in order to measure and exercise “oversight of the public 

corporation’s management” and operation (Davis & West, 2009: 604). 



Although in recent years the concept of public value has been further developed, 

researchers have noted that it is a field to proceed in order to find out the 

most appropriate approaches about how to adopt, to develop and to measure it 

as a useful tool for different realms, institutions or organizations, including PSB 

(Moore, 1995, 2000, Stoker, 2006, Talbot, 2008, Kelly et al., 2002). Also Moore 

continues to work on a theory of public value. 

There is no one single definition of public value. Moore initially proposed a strategic 

concept that offers a framework of public value rather than giving one particular 

definition. He points out that a public institution has to “create value for 

the citizens”. If private sector managers work for the benefit of their shareholders, 

public sector managerial work is oriented to create “public value” (Moore, 

1995: 28). Kelly et al. have defined that “public value refers to the value created 

by government through services, laws regulation and other actions” and in a democratic 

state public value has to be defined by the public themselves and that 

has to be determined by citizens’ preferences. They assure that “public preferences 

are at the heart of public value” by emphasizing that in a democracy only the 

public can determine what is valuable for them (Kelly et al., 2002: 4-6). Their 

defined approach has been widely used among scholars. 

Researchers of the think tank “The Work Foundation” (UK) have come to the 

conclusion that “public value is what the public values”. In order to ensure it, there 

is a strong role of public managers “to help determine through the democratic 

processes of deliberation and public engagement what social outcomes are desirable” 

(Horner et al., 2006: 4). Furthermore, during the last decade there are 

increasing discussions about the growing “democratic deficit” in different levels 

especially, for example, of EU (Bowman, 2006). In turn, the concept of public value 

can be a mechanism to link public services and citizens by creating a strategy 

of how “to articulate collective citizens’ preferences” (Horner et al.: 2006: 6). PSB 

can take an important part of creating closer relationships to society as partners, 

not just as an “unknown mass”, which the media has to educate, inform and entertain 

in whatever way they “want” or as they “imagine” what people need or desire. 

Overall, the concept determines the operation of public service organizations in 

accordance with defined and desired outcomes (by creating public value) that are 

supported and legitimized by society and other stakeholders. Regarding the performance 

of public organizations (agencies), Moore originally emphasizes three 

main aspects: “delivering actual services; achieving social outcomes; maintaining 

trust and legitimacy of the agency” (Talbot, 2008: 4, Moore, 1995). Initially the 

concept of public value is created as a normative approach that mainly explains 

the managerial behavior in order to create public value of the organization. As it

54 

Figure 1. 

The strategic 

triangle for 

explaining the 

creation of public 

value (adopted 

from Moore 2003). 

Ieva BEITIKA 

has been expanded and adopted to different public realms, it has became a more 

conceptual framework through which it is possible to develop the organization 

in accordance with its goal, namely, to create public value. Nevertheless, it is a 

normative concept. In order to implement the concept, it has to be reconsidered 

through the local lens and worked into development strategies by managerial actors 

and stakeholders. Society involvement should be a mandatory requirement. 

For making the concept operational and to explain what constitutes public value, 

Moore has developed a strategic triangle for explaining the creation of public 

value (Moore, 2003, 2004, Talbot, 2008). It consists of three components: (1) legitimacy 

and support (authorization); (2) organizational capabilities; (3) social 

mission (see Figure 1). 

Legitimacy 

& Support 

Organisational 

Capabilities 

Social 

Mission 

Firstly, it is important to be aware strategically of what outcomes the organization 

is going to produce by creating public value and by serving the public. Decision 

makers have to find out clear answers, at the very least, to such questions 

as: “organizational vision, mission; strategic goals; links among goals and activities, 

outputs and outcomes; range of outcomes; activities and outputs that create 

outcomes” (Moore, 1995, 2003, Moore & Khagram, 2004). Regarding PSB, it is 

important to create a clear understanding of its desired identity and core values. 



Secondly, there is a need for “legitimacy and support” from stakeholders that 

“authorize the organization to take action and provide the resources necessary to 

sustain the effort to create value” (Moore & Khagram, 2004). Here it is important 

to create strategic mechanisms as to how to expand support and authorization. 

For consideration Moore has defined such characteristics as visibility, legitimacy 

with general public; credibility with civil society actors; relations with government 

regulators; reputation with media; funder relations and diversification; volunteer 

roles and relations (Moore, 2003). 

Thirdly, there is a need for defining concrete “operational capacities” in order 

to deliver the desired results, outputs and outcomes, and to be able to develop 

them feasibly. Moore suggests considering concrete organizational outputs; productivity 

and efficiency; financial integrity; staff and partner morale, capacity 

and development (including societies’); organizational learning and innovation; 

and investments (Moore, 2003, Moore & Khagram, 2004). Each organization has 

to find out the most appropriate mechanisms to ensure and achieve them. 

The think tank “The Work Foundation” has developed the concept as a model 

with three similar parts: (1) authorization of public value (by receiving public 

funds, continuous legitimacy or authorization seeking is mandatory), (2) creation 

of the public value (embodied in all decisions of what services provide and 

how they do it; the process requires “constant engagement with the public in the 

planning process”), and (3) measurement of public value (Horner et al., 2006: 

6-33). Substantively, they have separated the part of measurement, which Moore 

includes in the process of building operational capacity. In comparison to Moore’s 

approach, parts of the “operational capacity” and “social mission” converged 

in the “creation of public value”. Moore also argues that the primary purpose 

of performance measurement is to maximize the benefit of the organization in 

accordance with defined outputs and outcomes (in a context of society’s development 

– economic, political, environmental, cultural, well-being, etc.). Furthermore, 

he strongly criticizes performance measurements only in accordance with 

narrow targets (Grigg & Mager, 2005: 25). 

Regarding the measurement of the PSB performance, for example, it is not enough 

to count broadcasted hours in order to ensure accountability of PSB in society. 

Similarly, it is not enough to create online blogs or accounts in the social 

media without a clear strategic view of purpose and ways, i.e. how to use them 

in order to achieve the determined goals effectively. The Work Foundation stresses 

that a measurement is a crucial part in order to ensure that organization is 

focused on the being responsiveness to citizens’ preferences (Horner et al., 2006).

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In comparison to Moore, it is possible to create a strategic triangle of “services, 

outcomes and trust/legitimacy” that also outlines interrelated components about 

how to build the public value up (Kelly et al., 2002: 11). Accordingly, it is important 

to create an organizational strategy that includes a systemic view of the 

organization, its environment and challenges. Altogether, an organizational strategy 

is a central conceptual document that declares the overall mission of an organization, 

and which offers an account of the sources of support and legitimacy 

that is a base for sustaining society’s commitment to the public enterprise. It also 

explains how the public enterprise has to be organized and operated to achieve 

the defined and declared objectives (Moore, 1995: 70). A strategy must be realistic 

– it has to be built up in relation to all strategic parts that are interrelated. 

It is unacceptable that public managers do their work, but do not know whether 

the created outputs and outcomes are valuable for society or not. Therefore, it 

is highly important to gain legitimacy from a wide range of stakeholders, for 

example, including society as a whole, professionals, users, academics, experts, 

regulators, auditors, parliament, government, other partners (Moore, 2005, Stoker, 

2006). Trust and legitimacy are key factors for attaining active cooperation 

and even coproduction between citizens and state agencies (Talbot, 2008: 4). 

Consequently, it is important to seek a consensus among strategic objectives, 

effectiveness and efficiency, public interests, needs, support and legitimacy by 

evaluating also the operation of PSB in terms of changes of actual economic, 

political, social and cultural environment. Thereby, the concept of public value 

leads to relationship building between the public organization and the society 

(communities, interest groups, audiences, etc.). 

As the Western world in 1980s and 1990s began to concentrate on measuring 

specific targets and specific forms of accountability, it began to lose real links 

with society as a whole that required defining ends and outcomes (Moore, 1995, 

2003). Therefore, it is more important to take into account post-communist consequences 

related to PSB operation and the developments that were identified in 

the first part of this article. For example, the paternalism approach, difficulties in 

sustaining PSB’s independency from political and economic powers, or their own 

(management and staff) unwillingness to make structural and strategic changes 

can be influential factors in the capability of PSB to operate for a society by creating 

public value. In Latvia it is possible to identify all of the above-mentioned 

influential factors. Even if there are organizations and people who regularly remind 

us of the concrete necessities to make systemic changes and improvements 

of media system and PSB, willingness to develop PSB is a challenge in itself in 

Latvia. For example, the Auditor General of Latvia I. Sudraba has also repeatedly 



emphasized that the work must be based on strategic results and outcomes. In 

2007 findings and conclusions after the lawful review of LTV economic activities 

were similar, highlighting the importance of transparency, establishing clear 

internal control systems, supervision and accountability that shape a part of creating 

public value (The State Audit Office of Latvia, 2008). 

Consequently, the very profound issue of post-Soviet space is also the lack of social 

capital, which is one of the reasons why public institutions are “less responsive, 

less efficient and less honest” (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 506) and why citizens 

are not so willing and prepared to stand up for their rights. Accountability to society 

is one of the basic principles of creating an organizational and developmental 

strategy. It has to be maintained continuously and explicitly (Moore, 1995). 

According to the origins and the following development of the concept of public 

value, it is possible to identify at least three theoretical dimensions: 

(1) public value as the next phase of an understanding of the value created by 

public sector (as “merit goods” and “public goods”); 

(2) development of “public interest” and “public values” theoretical concepts 

(including searches for new generation of public service management after the 

NPM, as well as ways how to cope with new global challenges of media environment 

in the digital age, for example); 

(3) a crucial part of deliberative democracy. 

Overall, the concept of public value is perceived as a new one in academic terms. 

Firstly, Moore, Stoker and other followers analyze public value as a result of deliberative 

processes, in which decision makers seek authority for an action. Davis 

and West characterize it as a “generative perspective” (Davis & West, 2009: 

606). Secondly, there are opponents (Bozeman, 2002, Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman, 

2007), who see a set of values “through the grouping of core and derivative 

values” by analyzing them against “the various institutions of government, their 

conduct, and their mode of engagement with each other and their publics”. This 

approach is termed the “institutional perspective” (Davis & West, 2009: 602). 

So far Moore’s basic hypotheses have supported most of the research. Nevertheless, 

there are also critics of the concept – for example, critics of too much responsibility 

and too less accountability for managerial actors (Rhodes & Wanna, 

2007), a necessity to define the value more realistic (Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman, 

2007), about difficulties to measure the public value (Cowling, 2006), or about 

an idealistic view of the staff ’s honesty, motivation and united understanding of 

organizational mission, goals and values (Horner et al., 2006: 17–18, Beck Jørgensen 

& Bozeman, 2007: 354–381).

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On the one side, the concept of the public value is like an abstract idea, but on 

the other side, it is a constructive and normative key framework for developing 

real strategic operational plans for the public service organizations. Nevertheless, 

especially regarding post-Soviet space, it is important to take into account possible 

risks of dishonesty, unwillingness, managers’ inabilities, incapacities or even 

different levels of corruption among public managers, other decision makers, or 

media staff. These risks weaken the ability of PSB to serve the public. If public 

managers who lead the public organization are capable, flexible and motivated 

professionals who are able to scan the environment continuously and to cope 

with unexpected situations, new circumstances, new proposals for improvements, 

the concept of the public value can help to identify new necessary changes 

of the organization and its environment, media system (Moore, 1995: 72). 

Therefore, the concept of public value is not just about the management. In accordance 

with the strategic triangle it includes requirements for understanding every 

step of what an organization does and what is most important to whom, and why. 

Secondly, it is about strategic work by management actors. Thirdly, it is about the 

systemic thinking and practicing that in terms of PSB includes also regulation, governance, 

and oversight. Argumentation against to any kind of systemic reforms 

expectantly could include the issue of insufficient funding – particularly in those 

countries where funding systems of PSB are not independent from direct state aid 

and where governments still tend to maintain a kind of control of them. However, 

money is not always the only resource necessary to meet goals. Rather it is an 

authority that organizations can use in contributing the society to act in a way 

to achieve public objectives or broader outcomes such as quality of life, healthy 

society or capacitated society, for instance (Moore, 1995: 29). Researchers Mager 

and Grigg (2005) relate these goals as a contribution to „economic, social and 

environmental well-being”. In turn, Mark Thompson, who is a Director-General 

of the BBC, has explained that public value can be seen as “the sum of the civic, 

social and cultural benefits the BBC delivers when it meets its public purposes” 

(Thompson, 2006). The BBC has noted that it “exists solely to create public value” 

because of their unique public status in the UK’s broadcasting system (Building 

Public Value. Renewing the BBC for Digital World, 2004: 28). It is important to 

re-define the role of the PSB within the new circumstances of media environment. 

Certainly, every country has to set down their own core values according to their 

political, economic, social and cultural situation, progress, challenges, traditions 

and experiences by taking into consideration the role of the PSB, public interests 

and needs, as well as the development goals of the society. In the case of post- 

Soviet space, it may be assumed that there should be enacted stronger requirements 

– not only for declaring and explaining these main values, but also for 



mechanisms of controlling them in order to achieve desired outputs, outcomes, 

organizational operation, accountability and responsibility. 

In Latvia discussions of the public value as a core strategic concept of the PSB 

operation have not yet been initiated. During discussions of PSB development 

media experts have proposed to perceive everything that PSB does as a “public 

value” in a context of European Broadcasting Union’s developed explanation of 

what PSB is – “PSB is broadcasting: made for the public, financed by the public, 

controlled by the public” (Rumphorst, 2003: 1). They proposed to define PSB 

as a unique media, not just one type of media, which operates in the market by 

arguing that PSB itself is “a public service remit” that should entirely function as 

public value (Brikse et al., 2009: 8). But, firstly, it is still quite difficult to contribute 

understanding of PSB as a media whose “owners” principally is the society. 

Secondly, some Members of 9th Parliament from Human Rights and Public 

Affairs Committee still did not recognize why the discourse of “the state media” 

should replace “the public service media” in their arguments and speeches. The 

dominant discourse includes argumentation that PSB is still state funded, and 

there is no need for paying attention to which form is used even they knew differences 

between them. 

Results of this study show that PSB development in post-Soviet space is still 

affected by local transitional challenges that also have to be taken into account by 

coping with global challenges of media environment and by creating the strategy 

of the public value as a precondition to develop PSB. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Any changes have to be grounded for the purpose of defined goals. It is crucial to 

answer the question, why do we need one or the other kind of transformation or 

change. Even if there are challenges caused by globalization, digitalization or unsolved 

systemic issues of media democratization in post-Soviet space, there is no 

point to ask “what to do?” without answering “what do we want to achieve?” by 

reforms. The framework for creating public value offers a strategic view, how to 

answer these questions and how to try to develop a sustainable PSB organization 

that is able to serve the public independently and qualitatively and that are highly 

responsive to the public’s needs and interests. 

Nevertheless, each country has to adapt and evolve its own approach to public 

value. The research proves that critics of the public value concept as “idealization” 

of honesty, motivation and willingness of PSB to create public value, as well as 

corruption, are rather considerable and justified, especially in post-Soviet space, 

where PSB still fights for political and economic independence.

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Therefore, if there is a clear basis for how to build public value, there is a wellgrounded 

platform on which to assess certain challenges and to implement solutions 

by serving society’s interests and needs. Initially there is a need to answer 

several main questions, such as (1) what are the main goals?; (2) what are the desired 

outcomes? (Public value/mission); (3) what are the main operating principles? 

(Building operational capacity); (4) what are our issues, risks, challenges? (Building 

operational capacity); (5) how to involve the society? (Environment authorization); 

(6) what are the all possible ways, how to solve them, how to act?; and 

(7) what is the consensus? Although it seems to be quite self-evident, the point is 

not about definitions on a paper. It is about embedding them in everyday actions. 

When there are operating principles, goals and outcomes identified, then it is 

an opening platform for creating public value. The concept of the public value 

allows for thinking, discussion, and systematic and strategic thinking, thinking 

creatively and practically, as well as widely and experimentally. PSB should use 

all these principles in a deliberative way by involving all possible stakeholders. 

Thus, initially it is also important to create a strategic plan of how the strategy 

of “creating public value” will be developed and deliberated among all possible 

stakeholders not only in the short-term, but also in the long-term perspective. 

It is time for a new awakening in order to decrease influences of post-communist 

consequences, firstly institutionally, and secondly in the consciousness of 

society. The key phrase is “a systemic and strategic reform”. There is a need for 

complete PSB work for the “real” public, not for the elite or for an “unknown 

mass”. A significant question still remains: is PSB a unique media that creates 

value by everything it does or just a part of media market that has obtained some 

privileges because of state determined functions, for example, fulfilling public 

service remit? 

Nevertheless, the issues identified here are fundamentally related to the political 

culture, civic culture, economic situation, historical experience, traditions, and 

the progress of transformations and democratization in general, that have to be 

taken into account. So it is even more important to reform PSB strategically and 

systemically in a deliberative and authorized way. 

Overall, there is a fundamental need for breaking the rule of “the value for the elite”. 

As researchers have pointed out, most post-Soviet countries are led by groups 

of elites, which tend to work for their own interests, not for the public’s. In Latvia 

political unwillingness has been a crucial reason why the very necessary changes 

(that are well-known) have not been established for 15 years and why the prevention 

of risks that weaken the possibility for the PSB’s independent operation has 

not been a priority. In turn, the Latvian Parliament was able to change the con- 



cessions law during one day in order to allow a concession of the most popular 

Latvian Radio Channel 2 (that was recently shut down). Mostly it is all about the 

willingness that politicians admitted during public debates this year (see Working 

group on Latvian Public Service Media Development Issues). 

There is no one right answer as to how to cope with all these challenges; however, 

there is the possibility and opportunity to attempt the creation of a useful model 

for deliberation and public discussions, including all stakeholders, in order to 

authorize the environment. 

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66 

1 This article was based 

on research carried 

out in 2010 for the 

Master of Science thesis 

produced as a result of 

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(MESPOM) jointly 

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Kingdom). 


NUCLEAR ENERGY DISCOURSES 

IN LITHUANIA AND BELARUS 


vaida.pilibaityte@mespom.eu 

Environmental Communication Expert 

Baltic Environmental Forum Lithuania 

Vilnius, Lithuania 

ABSTRACT: After years of stagnation, nuclear energy is believed to experience a revival. Despite 

a global momentum, little cross-cultural analysis exists about the national drivers for nuclear 

power such as geopolitics. Discourse studies are emerging as a way to examine approaches 

on energy security options in different countries. This work documents discourses based on 

media texts produced in two neighbouring pro-nuclear Eastern European countries Lithuania 

and Belarus in contrast with the global policy discourse with particular focus on nuclear energy. 

Discourse analysis conducted in this study relied on Hajer’s analytical concepts – discursive 

storylines and coalitions. National discourses were studied from 157 media texts published in 

2006-2009. National pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear discourse coalitions have been described 

and compared with those found in the global discourse. The results show that climate change 

is emphasized internationally, while geopolitics is more important on a national level. Pronuclear 

narratives in both countries promotes nuclear as cheap and reliable, and downplay uncertainties 

present in the global discourse. The anti-nuclear energy storylines similar to those 

of global discourse are vocal about risks and lack of public involvement. The study 1 concludes 

that in political discourses like in Lithuania there are more opportunities to challenge dominant 

narratives than in the technocratic debate taking place in Belarus. However, political and 

corporate interests coupled with unspecialized reporting have a universally constraining effect 

on national public discussions on nuclear energy. As a result, significant misinterpretations of 

global trends and knowledge gaps seem to occur in both types of the national debate. 

KEYWORDS: Belarus, discourse, environment, Lithuania, media, nuclear energy 

Nuclear Energy Discourses in Lithuania and Belarus

INTRODUCTION 


There seems to be a wide agreement that after years of stagnation climate change 

concerns have instigated a worldwide shift back in favour for nuclear power 

(Holton, 2005, Marshall, 2005, Nuttall, 2005, Eerkens, 2006, Wald, 2008, Kojo 

& Litmanen 2009, MIT, 2009, Teather, 2009). The proponents argue that atomic 

power has a role to play in addressing major energy security challenges of today 

by providing an increased access to stable and affordable supply of low-carbon 

electricity (NEA, 2008, WNA, 2009). Since the energy sector is responsible for 

around 70% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, there have been calls 

for a major change in the way energy is produced, transported and consumed 

(IPCC, 2007, IEA, 2009). The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects a doubling 

nuclear power capacities by 2030 (IEA, 2009) and the United Nations Intergovernmental 

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also believes that nuclear could 

contribute to carbon-free electricity and heat in the future (IPCC, 2007). 

There were 441 reactors operating worldwide as of the end of 2010, nuclear energy 

constitutes around 7% of primary energy and 14% of global electricity supply 

today (IPCC, 2007, IAEA, 2009, 2010). The International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) notes that although projections indicate future growth, the industry has 

been declining with an ageing global fleet and few new connections to the grid 

(WEC, 2007, IAEA, 2009). After accidents at the Three Mile Island in the United 

States (US) in 1979 and Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986 some developed countries 

have halted their nuclear programmes or even introduced phase-out plans (Rüdig, 

1990, Holton, 2005). However, there have been several indications of changes 

in those policies lately. Public surveys show increasingly favourable attitudes in 

countries with existing nuclear plants such as Sweden where a nuclear phase-out 

policy was introduced in the 1980s. The US, China and Russian Federation are 

planning the largest increases in capacity by 2020 (NEA, 2008, IAEA, 2009). 

But despite the global momentum, nuclear industry faces many technological, economic 

and social challenges related to radioactive waste management, weapons 

proliferation and public acceptance. Notably, Europeans continue to feel unaware 

about nuclear safety: only 25% of the EU citizens say they are “very well” or “fairly 

well” informed about these issues, while 49% are “not very well informed” and a 

further 25% are “not informed at all”. Surveys also show that information about 

nuclear issues is mainly obtained from the media (Eurobarometer, 2010). 

It might be fair to say, that in more general terms, little is known about the discursive 

2 nature of the global nuclear revival. In this light, some authors argue 

that cross-cultural discourse studies exploring contrasting situations in which 

2 Discourse is 

defined as a set of 

ideas, concepts and 

categories through 

which meaning is 

given to social and 

physical phenomena, 

and which is 

produced and 

reproduced through 

an identifiable set 

of practices (Hajer, 

1995).

68 


the nuclear energy is debated today could be useful not only from policy making 

perspective but also risk management and global security perspectives (Bickerstaff 

et al., 2008). 

Nonetheless, critical social inquiries into politics, sociology, and political economy 

of the modern energy are few (Byrne and Toly, 2006, Devine Wright, 2007). 

The most recent work on nuclear energy discourse looks at the rhetoric of the 

Cold War public debate (Nehring, 2004), the history of technology (Proops, 

2001) and post-Chernobyl discourses of transition (Schmid, 2004). Some researchers 

have also used discourse analysis to examine political communication 

(Windisch, 2008), radioactive waste management processes (Johnson, 2007) or 

studied issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program (Izadi & Saghaye-Biria, 2007). 

Apart from those, there are also several inquiries into nuclear energy discourses 

in the context of the renewed interest in nuclear power, energy security, climate 

change and risk perceptions (Bickerstaff et al., 2008, Baločkaitė & Rinkevičius, 

2009, Berg, 2009, Scrase & MacKerron, 2009, Lehtonen & Martiskainen, 2010). 

The study from Lithuania concludes that the public sphere is dominated by the 

“talking and acting classes”: political and business elite who are ignoring the society 

and preventing open discussions on these issues (Baločkaitė & Rinkevičius, 

2009). A couple of more recent analyses echoing intensifying global nuclear debates 

originate in the United Kingdom (UK). Scrase and Ockwell (2009) found 

that the government consistently favoured nuclear new build in its policy documents 

while simultaneously implying to be undecided on the issue. 

This article presents the results of a study that has documented recent national 

nuclear energy discourses in the media of two Eastern European countries – Lithuania 

and Belarus – in contrast with the global nuclear energy discourse. The 

two former Soviet states followed very different economic and political development 

paths after the fall of the Soviet Union, but both continue to depend 

on energy imports from Russia. Since these countries have announced plans to 

simultaneously build new nuclear power plants, they present an interesting case 

for comparative national nuclear energy discourse analysis. 

Lithuania is one of the three Baltic States with a fairly developed energy infrastructure, 

and energy system that remains centralized with no connections to the 

Western grid except the underwater 350 MW “Estlink” cable connecting Estonia 

and Finland (ABB, 2010). Lithuania is also home to the biggest Soviet-built 

Chernobyl-type Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which has been shut down 

in 2009 as per the EU membership agreement. This turned the country from 

energy exporter to importer and mainly relying on Russian gas to meet its energy 

needs. In order to address this, the government of Lithuania declared plans to 



build a new nuclear station with partners in Estonia, Latvia and Poland a national 

priority in 2007 (Miškinis et al., 2007). However they have been struggling to 

find an investor ever since (Ministry of Energy, 2010). 

Belarus, Lithuania’s neighbour to the southeast, is often referred to as “Europe’s 

last dictatorship” and one of the most repressive places in the world with a façade 

regime where democratic “scaffolding” conceals a dictatorial style of governance 

(Korosteleva et al., 2003, Piano and Puddington, 2009). For the past two decades 

Belarus has sustained an extensive and rather well-maintained energy sector and 

a strategic role as a key transit route for energy exports from Russia to the West. 

Nonetheless, the country is heavily reliant on Russian imports itself (WB, 2005). 

Although without a nuclear programme of its own, Belarus was one of the most 

severely affected by the Chernobyl accident of 1986 (UNDP, 2002). Increasingly 

intimidated by the oil and gas price disputes with Russia, the government 

of Belarus perceives nuclear power as the key to its energy security and in 2008 

finalized the political decision to build its first plant close to the western border 

with Lithuania (Lukashenko, 2008). According to current scenario, both funds 

and technology for the project are to be sourced from Russia (BELTA, 2010). 

In parallel, Russia has initiated its own new nuclear project in the Baltic enclave 

of Kaliningrad close to the Lithuanian border, while Poland plans on developing 

its first nuclear programme and is in the process of choosing location for two plants 

in its northern region (Polskie Radio, 2010, Ria Novosti, 2010). The situation 

was termed by the media the “nuclear competition” and instigated a new public 

debate about economic and security implications of building three to four new 

plants within such a close proximity (Krasauskas, 2009). 

The sections below describe the research methodology, briefly present the discourse 

coalitions found in the recent global nuclear energy policy discourse and 

contrast it with the comparative discourse analysis of nuclear energy in Lithuanian 

and Belarusian national media. The results are presented according to 

problems nuclear plant is intended to address, arguments used for justification 

of this power source, perceived risks, constraints and prospects linked to it, argumentative 

strategies used by various discourse actors, and the role that media 

plays in this debate in each of the countries. 

METHODOLOGY 

Discourse analysis was used as framework here: to examine the current nuclear 

energy policy formation, describe how it relates to energy security and climate 

change mitigation, and indentify similarities and differences on global and national 

energy policy level when considering the nuclear energy option. Hajer (1995)

70 

3 Media outlets were 

selected based on a 

diversity of their type 

(news portal, national 

daily, political or business 

weekly), circulation 

(high or low), editorial 

stance (pro-government, 

pro-nuclear, opposition, 

anti-nuclear and neutral) 

and regular coverage 

of nuclear energy and 

energy security. Texts 

were sampled according 

to a publication date, 

taking into consideration 

several national 

discourse-triggering 

events. Lithuanian texts 

were sampled from the 

biggest national daily 

newspaper “Lietuvos 

rytas” (eng. “Lithuanian 

Morning”), the 

independent political 

weekly “Atgimimas” 

(eng. “Revival”) and the 

biggest private online 

news portal Delfi.lt, while 

Belarusian texts – from 

the main government 

daily “Sovetskaia 

Belorussia – Belarus 

Segodnia” (eng. “Soviet 

Belarus – Belarus Today”, 

thereafter “Sovetskaia 

Belorussia”) the private 

business weekly 

“Belorusy i Rynok” 

(eng. “Belarusians 

and Market”) and the 

leading private online 

news portal “Naviny. 

by – Belarusskie Novosti” 

(eng. “News.by – 

Belarusian News”). 


defines discourse as a set of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning 

is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and 

reproduced through an identifiable set of practices. He proposes the following 

discourse analytical categories, graphically depicted in Figure 1: (1) discourse 

context, (2) actors, their expressed beliefs and themes, (3) prevailing discursive 

storylines and (4) discourse coalitions. 

Storylines are understood as simplified narratives that are replacing complex 

disciplinary debates. The figure illustrates how by implying simplified problem 

resolutions various actors are united by certain storylines to form discourse coalitions 

– communicative networks driving either policy stalemate or change. 

The empirical research was designed in the following way. The global nuclear 

energy discourse was analyzed first and national discourses constituted the 

second part of the research. Both parts were divided into three similar research 

stages: (1) the literature and policy review, (2) description of discourse context 

and compilation of the information-rich data sample and (3) discourse analysis. 

For the global discourse analysis policy documents produced by major 

international actors were purposefully sampled and coded using a number of 

qualitative criteria. The national discourse analysis was carried out based on 157 

purposefully sampled texts produced by six national media outlets during the 

period 2006–2009 3 . After documenting and analyzing both global and national 

discourses following the same methodological sequence, empirical findings 

were compared and interpreted as described in the following section. 

Nuclear Energy Discourses in Lithuania and Belarus 

Figure 1. 

Discourse 

analytical 

categories 

(based on 

concepts by 

Hajer, 1995).

GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 


Global energy governance is a multi-actor and multi-level process that is, among 

other things, influenced by the argumentative power struggle. In order to track 

the contrasting strands driving discursive knowledge on the topic, energy policy 

publications by the Greenpeace, the IAEA, the IPCC, the Nuclear Energy 

Agency (NEA) of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 

(OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World 

Energy Council (WEC) and the World Nuclear Association (WNA) have been 

analyzed. This analysis shows that recurring nuclear energy-related themes include 

economic costs, technology, safety and risks, waste management, weapons 

proliferation issues as well as public attitudes, fuel cycle and availability, liability, 

regulatory framework, human resources and global installed nuclear power 

capacity projections. 

Following Hajer’s discourse analytical approach, three diverging strands of discursive 

storylines have been identified and grouped into pro-nuclear, anti-nuclear 

and moderate discourse coalitions. They are characterized by various degrees 

of confidence about nuclear power deployment. 

The pro-nuclear energy global discourse coalition argues that the industry is well 

posed for revival, that nuclear power is economically viable in most cases, with 

an excellent safety record, feasible waste management options, promising future 

technology and waning public concerns. The anti-nuclear energy discourse coalition 

considers nuclear energy a costly and dangerous waste of time. It points at 

low GHG mitigation potential, project cost overruns and issues like radioactive 

waste that can also be used to develop nuclear weapons, if mismanaged. The 

third – moderate nuclear energy discourse coalition – does not reject it as a way 

to secure supplies, meet the demand and mitigate climate change, but contains a 

set of storylines putting a much greater emphasis on economic and technological 

uncertainties as well as social challenges for new nuclear energy projects. 

NUCLEAR ENERGY DISCOURSES IN LITHUANIA AND BELARUS 

The institutional conditions such as political system and the level of press freedom 

for establishing and maintaining discursive advantages in Lithuania and Belarus 

differ significantly. The comparative analysis detailed below provides some 

insights into the national discursive drivers for nuclear power and highlights important 

discrepancies in the debate on national and global policy levels. It indicates 

that national discourses include most global themes pertaining to nuclear 

energy justification and risks, but geopolitics and other country-specific issues 

are discussed only on the national level. Several global constraints for nuclear

72 


energy deployment such as liabilities and technological development are either 

left out or largely misinterpreted by national discourse actors. Moreover, there 

are some substantial differences in the interpretation of these themes. 

PROBLEMS ADDRESSED 

Unlike in the global nuclear energy discourse, climate change or growing demand 

that are not among the main motivating factors for pursuing nuclear 

power reflected in the Lithuanian and Belarusian discourses. In Lithuania the 

nuclear power project is mainly geopolitically driven and intended to plug the 

energy gap occurring after the Ignalina NPP is decommissioned, as required by 

the EU. In Belarus the need to diversify energy supplies and secure access to 

affordable electricity is articulated the most. However at the same time the pronuclear 

coalition tries to manoeuvre around the obvious paradox in trying to increase 

energy security by partnering with Russia, the very same country Belarus 

is dependent on. 

JUSTIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY 

Economics of nuclear energy, ability to secure supplies, global trends, GHG 

emissions reduction, alternatives, and the role of public opinion are the themes 

featuring in all the studied nuclear energy discourses. When it comes to advantages 

or alternative of nuclear energy from the point of view of fuel supply, the 

global and national narratives are very similar. As noted above, one of the central 

ones in the global discourse, the climate change argument is only marginal in 

both countries. The Lithuanian pro-nuclear narratives mention the EU emissions 

reduction commitments, while Belarus hopes to benefit from selling CO 2 quotas. 

Only Lithuanian discourse contains some counter-arguing narratives echoing 

global debate about doubts whether nuclear is the most effective climate change 

mitigation option. 

There are a few interesting discrepancies in covering other themes. Notably, 

not even the most pro-nuclear global storylines address the issue of economic 

costs without caution or being conditional about it (e. g. “economically viable in 

most cases”). One example is the IAEA that points out that no estimates taking 

into account global economic crisis have been made so far. International actors 

emphasize either the need for governments to minimize financial risks of such 

projects, or many financial uncertainties, while critics are quoting cost overruns 

up to three times the initial estimates. In other words, costs become more part of 

constraints than justification for nuclear energy. But national pro-nuclear narratives 

are almost unilaterally referring to it as “the cheapest” and even coming “at 



no cost for consumer”. The Belarusian storylines also describe nuclear reactors as 

“not more expensive” than a coal-fired plants and certainly much cheaper alternative 

to developing local renewable resources. 

The global nuclear energy revival is one more theme that is worthwhile taking 

a closer look at since it is one of the central arguments of pro-nuclear camps in 

both countries. Global narratives talk about “authoritative statements of intent” 

to renew or extend nuclear capacities in countries like US, France, Japan, Russia, 

China and Republic of Korea and projected doubling or even tripling of installed 

nuclear capacities mainly in Asia and the OECD countries. Nonetheless, the 

pro-nuclear actors of the two countries insist that “the whole world is turning 

to nuclear energy” and present it as the main justification for their own nuclear 

programmes. The Belarusian media refers to nuclear plant construction plan as 

a truly “European decision”. At the same time, national anti-nuclear coalitions 

counter-argue that “more and more countries are seeking a nuclear-free status” 

and that “countries are turning to renewable energy sources”, but their voices are 

much weaker and the possible reasons for that are discussed further down. 

Variations on the theme of public acceptance are following somewhat similar pattern. 

It appears that on the global level, the lack of public acceptance is recognized 

as one of the key problems requiring special attention and more awareness 

raising effort. A pro-nuclear storyline can merely say that there is a “slight increase” 

in a number of supporters in countries with operating plants and fewer 

“declared opponents”. Local communities in Finland and Sweden that are supposedly 

“competing” for waste repositories to be sited in their region are a single 

example put forward by global discourse actors. But in Belarus that is turned into 

a universal trend of public acceptance of nuclear energy projects in Europe. In 

both countries pro-nuclear actors cite public opinion polls to back their claims 

about majority supporting nuclear power and claim that as long as the members 

of the public are provided with “all the information” they will eventually it. 

There are also several themes that are only characteristic to the national discourse 

and are shared by both Lithuania and Belarus: geopolitics of energy, national 

prestige and progress and project legitimacy. In general terms, in both countries 

the existence of nuclear power plants or plans of the neighbouring countries 

to build one are very strong motivating factors to proceed with their own program. 

Moreover, this introduces the aspect of urgency to the debate. In Lithuania 

neighbouring plants are understood as potential competitors for a foreign investor 

on the one hand and on the other – as a result of Lithuania’s “nuclear energy 

ambitions”. Both in Lithuania and Belarus nuclear power is presented as a major

74 


driver for national economy and research: Belarusian proponents compare it to a 

space exploration, while Lithuania aims to maintain a perceived regional nuclear 

energy leadership as opposed to becoming a regional “energy backyard”. 

Another theme that unites the two countries is an overall need to confirm the legitimacy 

of the decision to pursue nuclear power. In both cases statements about 

“no alternatives” or abstract “studies” are common and critics complain about difficulties 

with obtaining such documents. What regards the nuclear energy project 

Lithuanian discourse, actors focus on how to best finance the plant – should it 

be a national capital based public-private partnership or should the government 

announce an international tender and try to attract a foreign investor. A similar 

discussion in Belarus is predominantly about the controversial decision to choose 

Russia as the main project partner, while in Lithuania this is simply a no-option. 

RISKS INVOLVED 

The theme of Chernobyl accident of 1986 is perhaps the only one where global 

and national pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear storylines more or less match: in is 

either perceived as a one-time technological event or a grave disaster that proves 

fallibility of nuclear technology. In most other cases variations on interpretations 

of risk themes exist. 

The global nuclear energy discourse analysis divides these storylines rather clearly 

into those that claim risks and impacts to be low and/or controllable and those 

that note controversies and point at industry’s failures. In national discourses 

portrayal of risk perception is not so straightforward. 

Similarly like in the global discourse, national pro-nuclear energy discourse coalitions 

in Lithuania and Belarus present the problem of managing radioactive 

waste as resolved, while the issue of spent nuclear fuel management is left for 

the distant future. But there is a general tendency even among opponents to dread 

possible negative environmental impacts from the neighbouring nuclear installations, 

at the same time perceiving nuclear risks from facilities in your own 

territory as a more manageable technical problem. This holds true in relation to 

technological safety as well. The health and environmental impact of radioactive 

waste management is one example. Lithuanian media tells stories about dangers 

of transboundary pollution from Russia and Belarus through shared rivers, while 

Belarusian local inhabitants fear the mismanagement of radioactive waste repositories 

across their border. 

However, Belarusians who are still living with the aftermath of Chernobyl disaster 

are also concerned about possibility of a similar accident and uncertainties about 

waste management – especially risks associated with its possible transportation 



across the country for recycling in Russia. Suitability of the chosen plant location 

and a general lack of safety culture in Belarusian regulatory institutions are also 

of concern. Meanwhile Lithuania considers itself as a country which has years of 

experience of operating nuclear power plant on their territory. Waste management 

issues are discussed mainly in the light of costs and corruption related to 

managing plant decommissioning funds. 

This shows that the pro-nuclear global storyline arguing that the public is mainly 

concerned about proliferation and terrorism and less so about operations of 

nuclear plants as such does not hold true. In fact, the storylines on weapons proliferation 

along with other nuclear fuel lifecycle-related risks such as accidents 

and pollution occurring during uranium mining, enrichment and recycling that 

are emphasized by anti-nuclear and moderate global discourse coalitions are absent 

in the national discourses studied. The reason for this may be the fact that 

these countries do not feel the imminent threat of terrorism, whereas impacts 

occurring elsewhere are not considered as equally relevant for the national discourse; 

though in global discourse themes pertaining to fuel cycle are linked with 

health and environmental impacts as well. 

Another interesting discrepancy exists in the framing of reactor safety. Although 

Lithuania has not yet made a decision about the type, Russian technology is considered 

“marked by Chernobyl” and advanced reactors “not tested yet”. Moreover, 

the whole idea of building a plant to become less dependent on Russia leaves 

this option out. Meanwhile, Belarus has been severely affected by the Chernobyl 

disaster, therefore those advocating for another “Russian” plant have to be much 

more specific to convince the public that it is safe. Nevertheless, scientists’ arguments 

about it being “the only technology tested elsewhere in the world” and 

“10,000 times safer than in Chernobyl” are very hard for opponents to contradict. 

CONSTRAINTS AND PROSPECTS 

As already noted earlier, when discussing storylines related to nuclear power 

project justification there is one rather distinct tendency to interpret global 

expectations and projections as non-debatable facts on the national level. This 

is especially true for constraints linked to costs, installed global capacity projections, 

public acceptance and the state of technology. However, the anti-nuclear 

energy coalitions in both countries are trying to counter-argue some of these 

overly optimistic claims. 

Both national anti-nuclear discourse actors argue that local alternatives would able 

to meet the energy demand at much lower cost. In Belarus critics emphasize the 

financial resources needed of safety measures and radioactive waste management.

76 


In Lithuania they are also referring to the ongoing project in Finland, which is 

facing difficulties and suggesting power links to the West as an alternative. 

The storylines about diminishing expertise base and lack of human resources as 

well as possibilities to train them that are present in global discourse are very 

much downplayed on the national level. Even though in both countries claims 

about the possibilities to train the necessary workforce at home are confronted by 

anti-nuclear discourse coalitions. This is especially the case in Lithuania, where 

decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP is not going as smoothly as planned and 

many point at the fact that Lithuania did not actually build the existing plant itself. 

Meanwhile in Belarusian discourse national scientists are portrayed as standing 

at the forefront of the global nuclear research. 

A number of rather specific constraints such as financial liabilities and the state 

of technological advancement of new reactors is only part of global discourse 

linked to constraints. However, the national pro-nuclear actors often talk about 

nuclear industry’s future technological promises such as inherent safety features 

or fast breeders to support the argument about “advanced modern reactor 

technology”, although in reality most of these have nothing to do with the actual 

planned construction in the country. 

Geopolitics as a constraint by itself has rather different interpretation in both 

countries. In Lithuania it is mainly linked with neighbouring countries ambitions 

to build their own plants and competition over a foreign investor as perceived 

by the pro-nuclear discourse coalition. It also relates to fears about Russia’s 

influence, but not so much like in Belarus where it is seen as the main constraint 

for any other foreign capital to take part in the project. 

Fuel availability is touched upon in Lithuania in relation to energy security, but it 

does not become a truly distinct theme like in global and Belarusian discourses. 

The importance of this theme is greater here because of the question whether 

uranium can be supplied by other country than Russia given that Russian company 

is also providing nuclear technology. Therefore this issue has much stronger 

links to energy security and geopolitics in Belarus. 

ARGUMENTATIVE STRATEGIES 

According to the “social-interactive” discourse theory, apart from promoting 

their views, actors are aiming to achieve discursive hegemony or dominance over 

others (Hajer, 1995). Following Hajer’s (1995) definition, it can be argued that 

pro-nuclear energy coalitions in both Lithuania and Belarus are hegemonic, since 

their views are being translated into concrete policies. According to Hajer (1995), 

discourse hegemony is determined by at least three factors: credibility, acceptability 

and trust in terms of how particular arguments are perceived by others. 



Comparative discourse analysis demonstrates that although in terms of the 

content the two nuclear discourses have many similarities, there are some significant 

differences among strategies for winning over the argumentative struggle 

in the studied countries. First, it can be argued that the very nature of the debate 

in Lithuania is more political with decision-makers being the main discourse 

actors, while in Belarus the issue is discussed in a more technocratic way – scientists 

dominate the debate in the media. Second, the language plays an important 

role in the discursive struggle taking place on the national level. One such illustrative 

example common for both countries is anti-nuclear actors referring to the 

“dependence on Russia”, while top political leaders diplomatically preferring to 

say dependence on the “East” or simply a “single source”. 

Political leaders and officials are the main pro-nuclear advocates in Lithuania, but 

they have much less monopoly over a credible argument as such, compared to 

scientists in Belarus. It seems that such line-up does create more opportunities to 

challenge the dominant pro-nuclear coalition on more equal terms. Rather than 

only justifying why nuclear is the best technological option, the Lithuanian political 

leaders are pressed to present economic feasibility studies. There is at least 

one rather significant difference among the two national discourses in terms of 

credibility and trustworthiness of discourse actors, especially in the anti-nuclear 

coalition. In contrast with the Belarusian debate described below, the Lithuanian 

discourse also features one of the top nuclear physicists who is also representing 

the National Academy of Sciences, the Bank of Lithuania and some other prominent 

financial analysts who are questioning the feasibility of the project not only 

in pages of the alternative, but also the mainstream media. 

Moreover although the tone of the Lithuanian debate is also getting emotional 

at times, the attack on the critical camp rarely bares an openly pejorative character. 

The diverging narratives are competing with war, slavery and mythical 

metaphors that are particularly eloquent in editorials and opinion pieces. Nuclear 

project is portrayed as a “three-headed dragon” fighting Russian gas “giant” 

that is threatening to “enslave” Lithuania and turn into an “energy desert”; others 

dread it as a “monstrous” and “hellish” reactor that may eventually bring on the 

“nuclear winter”. 

The story about the “Leo LT” consortium can be considered symbolic of a relative 

strength the pro-nuclear coalition has in Lithuania as it never proceeded 

with national nuclear projects, but was liquidated due to wide-spread corruption 

concerns. The narratives mainly pertaining to themes of project model and legitimacy 

serve as examples of discursive struggle on this issue. Today the Lithuanian 

discourse remains very political, without much discussion on issues like

78 


technology and safety. But this particular debate also highlighted failures of the 

Ignalina NPP decommissioning and helped to introduce to the debate more diverse 

themes such as national capacity to handle big nuclear projects. 

A technocratic discourse is unfolding in texts sampled from the Belarusian media. 

Here it proves much more difficult to question and counter-argue dominating 

proponents of nuclear, especially given the role of the state media that excludes 

critical actors from the public discourse or denounces their arguments as 

ill-informed or anti-state. Elite scientists are put at the forefront to answer most 

of the nuclear-related questions be it safety, waste management or advantaged of 

the chosen investor. Since most often they are expressing their views unilaterally 

by explaining and educating rather than justifying, they gain an advantage of 

framing nuclear themes in the way that they become more difficult to challenge. 

They reject any public doubts as “psychological”, not based on “hard facts” or 

simply “silly”. Belarusian scientists refer to themselves as “professionals” who do 

not succumb to “radiophobia” (Ermak, 2008, Lukashenko, 2008). Government 

officials and engineers who are complementing their arguments are also difficult 

for the critical public to confront. 

Their argumentative position is strengthened by President Alexander Lukashenko 

himself who notes that it was scientists who suggested nuclear as the most suitable 

option for strengthening energy security. Moreover, while he leaves the technical 

discussion to scientists, Lukashenko is rather straightforward about his opinion 

about critics whom he at times addresses in a rather pejorative manner. For example, 

he attacks anti-nuclear scientists for scaremongering: “Are these scientists?! 

These are either brainless people or people without consciousness, and most probably 

without either” (Lukashenko, 2007). Other opponents are portrayed as the people 

pursuing publicity or personal benefit: “These are political bandits of a second 

political Chernobyl wave. […] I will use all resources and power in my possession 

today to not allow this” (Krylovich, 2008). Pro-nuclear media commentators also 

contribute to promoting such views. Those who oppose nuclear have knowledge 

are called “old ladies” (rus. “babushka”) and “green loudmouths (rus. “zelionyie 

krikuny”)” who haven’t not suggested a viable way solve energy problems in any 

country and just “want Belarusians to live at the splinter” (Kriat, 2008). 

Meanwhile, the opposing camp has less leverage in terms of credibility, since it is 

mostly comprised of weary local citizens, church leaders, concerned intellectuals, 

retired physicists, and foreign medical doctors or randomly quoted sociological 

analysts. They raise concerns about nuclear projects in a “closed society”, 

secrecy of decision making, underestimated environmental dangers or becoming 

another “black Chernobyl hole on the map” that are easy to denounce as “radiop- 



hobia”. Some attempts to emphasize the credibility of the alternative expertise 

come in a form of underlining the background of the leader of a Russian green 

NGO who is presented as “nuclear physicist”. 

However, apart from the above mentioned power imbalances there are instruments 

that media of both countries are putting at play to the advantage of-pro 

nuclear coalition. They are discussed in the section further down. 

THE ROLE OF MEDIA 

The media as a discourse scene and an actor substantially contributes to knowledge 

production and often becomes an ideological manipulation tool in the power 

struggle. The information about media system, regulation, circulation and 

ownership structure in the studied countries can help to understand the origin 

of recurring narratives; to some extent the degree of influence of quoted actors as 

well. Therefore comparing the debate in Lithuanian media which is considered 

among the most free in the world and in Belarus where media ranks among the 

lowest is also worthwhile. 

The analysis shows that despite this significant disparity, both the Lithuanian 

and Belarusian leading dailies are producing exclusively pro-nuclear storylines, 

leaving out sceptical arguments and attacking the critics. 

The leading Lithuanian privately-owned “Lietuvos rytas” has a well-advertised 

tag “independent”, but is a rather good example of the extent to which business 

and the governing party can manipulate press coverage for its own benefit in 

a similar way an autocratic government is using its own media for propaganda 

purposes. Enthusiastic journalists describe the plan to build a new plant by 

consolidating public and private enterprises as “revolutionary” (Lietuvos rytas, 

2007), purported it as the “project of the century” (Sotvarienė, 2008) that will 

“cut the umbilical cord with the mother Russia” and help the country to “escape 

from the Russian energy trap and integrate into the EU energy system operating 

on completely different principles” (Sotvarienė, 2008). Amid the heated debate 

about legitimacy of the deal that was taking place in the parliament and was 

reflected in other media outlets, this daily was consistently praising the national 

business corporation (Sotvarienė, 2008) and lashing critics by denouncing them 

as “bristling” and “panicking loudmouths” (Ignatavičius, 2008). Pro-nuclear inclinations 

of this newspaper were obvious not only in editorials, but in the news 

items as well, a rather crude violation of a standard requirement of journalistic 

ethic to separate facts form subjective author’s opinions that quality media is 

supposed to adhere to.

80 


The discursive storylines are much more diverse in the Lithuanian online media 

of foreign ownership such as “Delfi.lt” that appears to be more resistant to national 

business influence on their content. However, the most anti-nuclear storylines 

originate in alternative publicly-funded analytical media such as “Atgimimas”, but 

their journalists focus more on energy politics rather than the variety of issues 

surrounding energy security options or nuclear power in particular. Furthermore, 

despite the formal regulatory media freedom journalists hardly do a good job 

when covering energy issues in Lithuania. Even background stories often are mere 

collections of different views rather than in-depth analysis of the government’s 

energy policies, nuclear technology, global trends, and national capacity to implement 

nuclear project or alternatives. Media largely disregards policy inconsistencies 

and allows vague and unsubstantiated political claims go unchallenged. 

An illustrative example of media manipulations in Belarus can be the state-owned 

“Sovetskaia Belorussia” and the way it manages to imitate the public “debate”. 

Notably, none of the sampled analytical texts from this paper actually quote critical 

experts or scientists. Instead, referring to unnamed “experts” or concerned 

members of the public some critical arguments are included in a form of “critical” 

interviewer’s questions to be “explained” and “clarified” by those put in the 

position of power, authority and expertise to answer: scientists, government officials 

or political leaders. Another similar technique observed is an interview with 

several interviewees sharing pro-nuclear power opinions. This way a discursive 

illusion of a debate is created utilizing otherwise theoretically perfectly standard 

interview genre, only with ideologically pre-determined purpose. In one instance 

a journalist of “Sovetskaia Belorussia” goes as far as to publishing a fictitioussounding 

polemic dialogue between a pro-nuclear citizen [himself] and a sceptic 

[his friend] that follows a scenario where a “reasonable” person convinces the 

“ill-informed” sceptic. Moreover, it is not uncommon for journalists to sometimes 

subtly imply or suggest the “right” way of interviewee’s argument reception 

with comments like “a serious argument” (Legkaia & Kirilenko, 2007) or a “logical 

stance based on solid economics” (Minchenko, 2008). 

It is worth noting that the privately-owned Belarusian media such as “Naviny. 

lt” and “Belorusy i rynok” also tend to mix facts and opinion. Only in this case 

they are mostly directed against the government’s nuclear plans. The author’s sarcasm 

appears to be a way to attract critical attention to flawed official statements 

apart from being a standard technique for providing an alternative opinion. As 

an example, one journalist is sceptical towards the official claiming that anyone 

can obtain information on the nuclear power project and is encouraged to show 

an initiative to discuss the environmental impact assessment: “It is obvious that 



in the country where citizen activities mainly take the form of collective watching 

of the television simultaneously broadcasting the press conference by the 

President on all three channels, there are not too many communities interested 

in discussing something oddly called the EIA” (Krylovich, 2009). One way to 

explain this style of reporting in Belarusian media could be a limited availability 

of politicians, scientists and experts willing to publicly criticize or analyze the 

government’s policies due to the nature of the political system in the country. 

This work complements findings of the earlier study by Baločkaitė and Rinkevičius 

(2009) about the dominance of “talking elite” and focus on economics and 

politics rather than risks in Lithuanian nuclear energy debate. The Belarusian 

discourse seems to bare many traits of the early days of nuclear development 

in France, Finland and the UK where it was marked by non-transparent decision-making, 

dominance of nuclear technocracy, pro-nuclear media and lack of 

“counter-expertise” (Lehtonen & Martiskainen, 2010). Just like in these countries 

nuclear energy is perceived as a source of national pride in Lithuania and Belarus, 

pro-nuclear policies are promoted using adversarial argumentation (Windisch, 

2008) and pinned to energy or state security without much reference to 

facts to back such claims (Scrase & Ockwell, 2009). 

CONCLUSIONS 

Comparative analysis of nuclear energy discourses in Lithuania and Belarus 

reveals disparities between the main global and national discursive drivers for 

nuclear power. Energy security is a single shared motivating factor on both global 

and national level, while geopolitics plays a more important role than climate 

change on the national level. 

A closer look at how global and national discourse actors discuss different aspects 

of nuclear energy shows that pro-nuclear storylines contain so-called “nirvana 

concepts” described by Molle (2008). In other words, pro-nuclear politicians, officials, 

scientists and businessmen in Lithuania and Belarus promote this energy 

source as the cheapest and the most reliable, claiming that all the risks are controllable. 

They tend to oversimplify industry’s global future projections and turn them 

into unquestionable de facto trends, brush off national constraints and downplay 

uncertainties to substantiate national pro-nuclear policies. For example, the analysis 

shows that pro-nuclear actors in the two countries based their policies on 

the most optimistic global assumptions and capacity growth projections made 

mainly for the OECD countries and Asia. Conversely, anti-nuclear narratives in 

both countries mirror those found in similar global discourse coalition that rejects 

nuclear as too expensive and dangerous. Additionally, national anti-nuclear

82 


discourse storylines contain many concerns about the lack of public involvement. 

The storylines from the moderate global discourse are hardly present in national 

discourses, with an exception of few storylines in Lithuanian discourse. 

The analysis also looked at argumentation in Lithuanian and Belarusian discourse 

and found that although the two national nuclear discourses have many similarities, 

there are some significant differences among strategies for achieving the 

pro-nuclear discourse hegemony or dominance in the debate in these countries. 

There are plenty examples from both countries illustrating confrontational style 

of argumentation characterized by sarcasm, attack and exposure techniques used 

towards the opponents. Defamatory and derogatory statements are common in 

editorial columns and opinion pieces, but can be found even in the speeches by 

the President of Belarus. 

In general, it is more difficult for national anti-nuclear actors to challenge dominant 

discourse coalitions with equally credible arguments in Belarus. This situation 

occurs because of the technocratic nature of the debate dominated by 

the government scientists and officials who tend to denounce any criticism as 

ill-informed “radiophobia”. Meanwhile in Lithuania the debate is dominated by 

very pronounced geopolitical arguments mainly related to the perceived threat of 

Russia, but more discourse actors are debating on more equal grounds and thus 

discourse has democratic characteristics. Pro-nuclear politicians and officials do 

face some more credible opposition as they are confronted by several high profile 

scientists and economists. 

In both countries the leading media tends to manipulate the debate by predominantly 

promoting pro-nuclear storylines and ignoring critics, though smaller 

alternative outlets contain more diverse views and online media seems to be the 

most vibrant in terms of competing narratives on nuclear energy. Nonetheless, 

even in Lithuania, where media has more regulatory freedom, apart from few 

exceptions, it rarely provides an in-depth, contextualized analysis of nuclear 

energy and energy security. 

It can be argued that although press freedom in democratic system does not in itself 

guarantee democratic and comprehensive public debate on nuclear energy, it 

does provide for more opportunities to introduce new arguments and challenge 

dominant narratives than autocratic system does in a technocratic debate. However, 

it seems that political and corporate interests coupled with lack of specialized 

journalistic reporting skills can have similarly adverse effect on the quality of 

the debate both in democratic and in politically constrained public sphere. As a 

result, significant misinterpretations of global trends and knowledge gaps seem 

to occur in both types of the national debates on nuclear energy. 


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88 

Elisabeth Kirkeng ANDERSEN | Harald HORNMOEN 

MEDIATING SCIENCE IN NORWAY: 

PRACTICES AND TRANSFORMATIONS 

IN MAJOR NEWSPAPERS 

Elisabeth Kirkeng ANDERSEN 

kirkeng@gmail.no 

MA in Journalism 

Faculty of Journalism, Library and Information Science 

Oslo University College 

Oslo, Norway 

Harald HORNMOEN 

harald.hornmoen@jbi.hi.no 

Associate Professor, PhD 

Faculty of Journalism, Library and Information Science 

Oslo University College 

Oslo, Norway 

ABSTRACT: What characterizes journalistic representations of researchers and research in 

Norway? This article presents a quantitative analysis and a discourse analysis of how journalism 

that covers and uses scientific research has been practiced in major Norwegian newspapers in 

1966, 1986 and 2006. The quantitative analysis suggests that this coverage in some respects has 

not changed significantly (e.g. the amount of sources used, the genres used for presentation). 

On the other hand, a comparative discourse analysis of articles covering emergent science in the 

three periods indicates how representations of scientific research are changing from resembling 

science’s own discourses to a more distinct adaption of the research, adjusting it to journalistic 

requirements of angles and storylines. However, the study presented here does not suggest that 

science journalism in Norway has developed an independent position from which it can throw 

a light upon scientific developments in a critical manner. 

KEYWORDS: science and the media, Norway, content analysis, discourse analysis, press history 

Mediating science in Norway: Practices and transformations in major newspapers

INTRODUCTION 


Scientific research plays a crucial role in society. It establishes a basis for political 

decisions and technological development, and gives us new insights into nature, 

culture and society. A survey of Norwegians’ relationship to science and technology 

(Ramberg, 2004) points out that daily newspapers, television and radio 

are people’s most important sources of information about scientific research and 

knowledge, apart from the Internet. In this perspective, it is surprising how little 

research has been done on journalism in Norway that covers science or uses 

scientific researchers as key sources. 

This article presents an analysis of how such journalism has been practiced in 

major Norwegian newspapers in 1966, 1986 and 2006. The main research questions 

are: What characterizes Norwegian newspapers’ use and representations of 

scientific researchers and research in 1966, 1986 and 2006? In what ways have the 

uses and representations possibly changed over this period of time? 

We attempt to answer the questions by applying different methodological approaches. 

A quantitative content analysis is conducted by Andersen, who looks 

particularly at how often and in what way research and researchers are used in 

major Norwegian papers. A critical discourse analysis of a more limited sample 

of articles is done by Hornmoen, who looks more closely at how these articles 

represent emergent science in the different periods 1 . “Emergent science”, as we 

understand it, refers to research that develops at the research frontier. 

EARLIER RESEARCH 

A few studies of science journalism have been carried out in Norway. Most extensive 

are the contributions from Ottosen and Eide from the end of the 1980’s and 

the beginning of the 1990’s (Ottosen, 1988, Eide & Ottosen, 1994). According 

to them, scientific sources initiate media coverage of science to a much larger 

degree than what is implied by popular images of researchers in ivory towers. 

Furthermore, journalists covering science tend to rely on a few oral sources. Eide 

and Ottosen assert that the Norwegian media’s coverage of scientific research 

is extensive in scope, but uncritical. They see the relationship between scientist 

sources and journalists as marked by mutual understanding and a cooperative 

spirit in the service of public enlightenment. 

Hornmoen (1999, 2003) also traces a rather harmonious relationship between 

scientists and journalists, and a dominant view of science communication existing 

among both parties. They tend to understand science communication and 

journalism as a one-way dissemination of scientific knowledge to an audience 

1 Hornmoen’s 

complete study 

(2010) is published 

in Norwegian in 

the online journal 

Sakprosa, available 

at: http://sakprosa. 

files.wordpress. 

com/2008/06/ 

hornmono_layout_5. 

pdf.

90 


conceptualized as people who lack and (therefore) need this knowledge in order 

to make rational choices that serve democracy. This model of communication 

is also known as the deficit model (Gregory & Miller, 1998). 

However, a deficit-model of the public understanding of science is gradually 

changing among journalists, and new conceptions of their duties in covering 

and using science are emerging. There are some signs that Norwegian journalists 

are opting for more critical coverage and increasingly talking about their 

work as science journalism and not science communication. One indication 

is that a certain willingness to use the term “forskningsjournalistikk” (science 

journalism) and not “forskningsformidling” (science or research dissemination) 

about journalistic coverage of scientific research becomes more discernible 

from the beginning of the 2000’s. This is indicated when searching by the 

aforementioned terms in the Norwegian newspaper database Retriever. 

But we do not have studies that suggest to what extent the conception of this 

new and more critical role may be reflected in the actual coverage of science 

in recent times. Moreover, we lack knowledge about possible transformations 

in newspaper coverage of science over a certain time period. So there is reason 

for embarking on a diachronic study of the science coverage in newspapers, 

attempting to trace possible changes and developments in this coverage over a 

time span of forty years. 

A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH: CONTENT ANALYSIS 

The first part of our study presented here uses quantitative methods to investigate 

how the press covers science and uses scientists as sources in this coverage. 

It traces the science coverage from 1966 to 2006 in five daily newspapers: 

Nordlys, Adresseavisen, Bergens Tidende, Aftenposten and VG. Articles chosen 

for closer scrutiny were written in the month of February in 1966, 1986 and 

2006. Selected articles were either about research or they used researchers as 

sources. They were analyzed and categorized according to several parameters 

such as genre, number of sources, and the kind of research reported on. Some 

of the major findings are presented below. 

SAMPLE AND NUMBER OF ARTICLES 

The sample consisted of a total of 1428 articles either using researchers as sources 

or being about researchers and research. The articles were distributed in 

the following way in the month of February (Figure 1). There is a certain increase 

in the number of published science related articles from 1986 to 2006. The 

average number of articles in the earlier periods is in accordance with results 

from earlier studies by Eide and Ottosen (1994). They found that three or four 



articles were published on a daily basis in six major Norwegian newspapers. The 

increase is in accordance with a similar study of the use of scientific experts in the 

Danish press (Albæk, 2002). 

GENRE 

1966 1986 2006 

Number of articles 429 442 557 

Average number of articles per day 2,7 2,7 4,2 

Roksvold’s topology of journalistic genres orders them according to three major 

types of journalism: News journalism, commentary journalism and feature 

journalism (Roksvold, 1997: 10). In our study, the first includes such genres as 

the news report and the news brief. The second embraces editorials, reviews and 

commentaries, whereas the third encompasses genres such as the profile and the 

feature story or reportage. The following figure displays the percentage of articles 

presented as news, commentaries or feature stories. More striking than the increase 

in science related articles (Figure 1), is the similarity in the choice of genres 

(Figure 2). The news genre clearly dominates in the representation of research 

and researchers in all three periods. Commentaries and features are not used nearly 

as frequently to write about research and researchers for newspaper readers. 

1966 1986 2006 

News 93,2 91,4 89,0 

Commentaries 4,0 4,0 5,6 

Features 2,8 4,5 5,0 

Figure 1. 

Number of 

articles. 

Figure 2. 

Genres used.

92 

Figure 3. 

Ways of framing. 


FRAMING THE RESEARCH/RESEARCHER 

In what way is the material framed in the articles? As mentioned above, the articles 

selected were either about research or they used researchers as sources. This 

division is reflected in the major framing categories detected. Not all of these 

categories in the study are presented here (therefore the percentages do not add 

up). However, Figure 3 displays the major categories. 

The first category in the figure refers to articles in which researchers make statements 

as experts and comment upon other researchers’ work or current events 

(research based knowledge). The second category refers to articles that present 

research results, as in the many stories that include variants of the phrase: “new 

research shows that”. The third category refers to articles presenting planned or 

ongoing research projects that accordingly have not come up with any results yet. 

We can observe an increase in the use of researchers as expert commentators 

(although not to the extent that some other studies have indicated, e. g. Albæk, 

2002). More pronounced is an increasing tendency to represent research results 

at the expense of presenting ongoing projects without finished results. Comparatively, 

one notes how articles in 1966 to a large extent were about what researchers 

wished to uncover through their participation in research projects. 

THE TYPES OF RESEARCH COVERED 

1966 1986 2006 

The researcher as expert 22% 29% 34% 

Research results 19% 21% 39% 

Planned or ongoing research 26% 10% 7% 

In earlier quantitative studies of the research coverage in Norwegian newspapers, 

material is grouped according to the general type of research that the reported 

activity or the scientist as source normally represents (see for instance Nilsson et 

al., 1996, Andersen, 2003). These general types correspond to conventional divisi- 



ons in academia, and the categories thus are the social sciences (labeled “Samf.vit” 

in the Figure 4 below), the humanities (“Humaniora” below), the natural sciences 

(“Nat.vit”) and medical research (“Medisin”). We have also added a category called 

“Vitenskap”, which may be translated as “science”. This category encompasses 

articles representing scientific research in general and not a specific field or discipline 

within one of the aforementioned general types of research. In particular, the 

category applies to articles presenting or discussing science policy. 

60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

Humaniora 

Medisin 

Samlet 1966 1986 2006 

Nat. vit 

Samf. vit 

Vitenskap 

The first cluster of bars to the left (“Samlet”) depicts the total distribution in the 

three periods according to the types of research that are written about. In sum, 

most articles refer to the natural sciences in their source use and depiction of 

research activities (38,4%). Medical research follows up by being referred to in 

25,8% of the articles, while the social sciences are referred to in 17,3% and the 

humanities in 10,1%. Tracing the development over the three periods, one notes 

some major changes, from a distinct focus on disciplines and researchers within 

the natural sciences in 1966 to a more equal distribution in 2006, albeit with the 

strongest emphasis on medical research. It should be noted that in some respects 

this distribution differs from findings in similar studies. Although our study indicates 

a strengthening of focus on social science/scientists, other studies tend 

to point to a marked increase in the use of experts from the social sciences. For 

Figure 4. 

Types of 

research 

represented.

94 

Figure 5. 

Total number of 

sources in the 

articles. (“Ingen” 

= No visible 

sources). 


instance, a study by Albæk et al. (2002) on the use of such experts in the Danish 

press displays how social scientists dominated in 2001, whereas experts from the 

natural sciences dominated in 1961. 

Although an increase in the use of social scientists may be more striking in some 

studies than in others, they do point to a rise in this respect. A possible explanation 

for this tendency is the following: Since the 1960’s there has been a considerable 

increase in researchers within the social sciences, coinciding with an increasing 

demand in the media for expert commentators in the coverage of politics 

as well as everyday life (see also Eide & Ottosen, 1994). 

NUMBER OF SOURCES 

Here we detect the total number of sources appearing in a research related article, 

and not only researchers as sources. Sources that are registered are the ones that 

are cited or referred to in the articles, e.g. a news agency, a politician, a “man 

in the street” and/or a researcher. Other possible sources than the ones that are 

visible in the articles have been registered as “not mentioned” (“Ingen” in the 

Figure 5). 

60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Ingen 

1 

2 

Mediating science in Norway: Practices and transformations in major newspapers 

3 

4 

Ingen 

Samlet 1966 1986 2006 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Ingen 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Ingen


The figure clearly shows how a journalism based a single source dominates (the 

percentages for single-source articles are: 1966: 65,3%; 1986: 65,8%; 2006: 63,7%). 

It indicates that little has changed with respect to the number of sources used 

when journalists write science-related articles. However, we emphasize that our 

material includes quite a number of news briefs. 

RESEARCHER SOURCES AND GENDER 

All the researcher sources that were referred to or interviewed in the articles were 

registered. This was done because the gender of the researcher sources presented 

in articles contributes to shaping the image of the research community for 

newspaper readers. 

The Figure 6 displays a use of research sources that is far from gender-balanced. 

In 1966 there were hardly any female sources. In 1986 the female sources still only 

constituted 8, 8% of the researcher sources. There is a more marked increase in 

female sources from 1986 to 2006, when they amount to 20,9% of the sources. Nevertheless, 

this percentage suggests that in four of five articles with a visible source 

the reader is introduced to a male researcher. For the newspaper reader, the scientific 

community will possibly appear as a male bastion. However, this does to some 

extent reflect employment realities within Norwegian higher education. 

Although there is a good gender balance within higher education and research 

as a whole, the proportion of women employed becomes lower the higher the 

occupational category in scientific areas becomes (Løseth, 2010). 

1966 1986 2006 

Number of / 

percentage 

Number of / 

percentage 

Number of /percentage 

Male 325 / 98,5% 361 / 91,2% 398 / 79,1% 

Female 5 / 1,5% 35 / 8,8 % 105 / 20,9% 

Not mentioned 

in the article 

178 127 151 

Figure 6. 

Researcher 

sources and 

gender.

96 


SUMMARIZING THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY 

Our study suggests that there are some striking similarities in the newspapers’ 

science coverage in 2006, 1986 and 1966. This becomes clear when one quantifies 

the articles according to parameters such as genre, sources, kind of research and 

number of articles. A typical science related article is a news story, using one oral 

source, preferably a man, who either presents research results or is used as an 

expert. 

A QUALITATIVE APPROACH: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 

The second part of our study uses a qualitative approach to investigate a more limited 

sample of articles. Critical discourse analysis, particularly inspired by Fairclough 

(1995a, 1995b, 2003), is applied in a comparative examination of articles 

about research within medicine and the natural sciences in 1966, 1986 and 2006. 

The analyzed articles are from Verdens Gang (VG), a major daily tabloid, and 

A-magasinet, a weekend magazine supplement to Norway’s largest subscription 

newspaper, Aftenposten. Samples are chosen after reading through all articles appearing 

in the relevant periods in a search for the words “forskning”, “forskere”, 

“forskerne” and “professor” (“research”, “researchers”, “the researchers” and “professor”) 

in the Norwegian newspaper database Retriever. In this way we have 

ended up with a few articles we judge as exemplary of science reportages in each 

period, that is, reportages about science that apply some devices typical of the 

feature genre in their presentation of research. 

The articles cover so-called new or emergent science. This is “science in the making”, 

normally referring to research that develops over a period of time, not primarily 

to research marked by unexpected and sudden breakthroughs (Dunwoody 

et al., 1999). Such emergent research is uncertain. Contemporary frontiers 

of research in any given field are, as Priest (2001: 9) asserts, characterized by the 

existence of competing explanations. 

The overarching questions for analysis are: 

(1) What image of science is created in the articles? Is it essentially an image of 

science as a process where theories are developed and modified in light of new 

evidence? Or is it a picture of science as an accumulation of facts that scientists 

discover? 

(2) How certain/uncertain does the knowledge appear in the portrayed research? 

This implies detecting such matters as whether or not alternative or opposing 

explanations or viewpoints are represented. 

(3) Which images are constructed of the relationship between different actors: scien- 



tists as sources, other sources, the journalist and the implied audience? Here we 

look at the construction of process and participant types, and attempt to answer 

questions such as: Which text participants are portrayed as agents initiating activity? 

Who are so-called patients? What kinds of processes are initiated? 

In order to answer the questions, we apply relevant analytical categories from 

critical discourse analysis, looking at modality, presuppositions, the use of metaphors 

and the representation of discourse or speech. In a multimodal analysis 

both visual and verbal elements are examined. 

UNCOVERED TENDENCIES 

In the following we present some of the main tendencies exposed by the analysis. 

1966 

In 1966, fidelity towards preferred discourses in the scientific community is typical 

of the analyzed articles in both VG and A-magasinet. 

The scientist’s own research questions may constitute the introduction to the 

articles. These can be structured according to a model characteristic of article 

structures in empirical natural science and medicine, the so-called IMRADstructure 

(Introduction, Methods, Results And Discussion). A case in point is an 

article in VG (Sørhus, 1966) about basic cancer research, with a headline resembling 

a research question: “Researchers hunting for the “regulating guardian” of 

the skin: the key chemical substance – is it called Chalone?” (Our translation). It 

is an inconceivable head in today’s papers. The period’s preference for covering 

ongoing research projects rather than achieved results is reflected in a text abounding 

with hedges, questions and expressions of uncertainty. The cancer article 

closely follows an IMRAD-narrative, and not the inverted pyramid-structure typical 

of most news journalism. After posing the headline’s introductory question, 

the article focuses on the methods and process of the research, before concluding 

by reflecting on tentative results. In this manner, a picture is created of science as 

a process of developing hypotheses and theories as well as modifying or rejecting 

them in the light of evidence brought about by new experiments. 

In other words, an academic “cautiousness discourse” dominates in articles about 

science. An individual researcher’s own exposition of his research – with specialized 

terms in abundance – characterizes utterances in direct and indirect speech. 

There is quite a lot of space provided for researchers’ careful assessments of their 

research. The function of their utterances is apparently not only to inform about 

what one knows on the grounds of research. It seems to be equally important to 

exhibit the complexities of the objects of research, e. g. what one does not know 

and the uncertainties involved in applied methods and achieved results.

98 


To a larger degree than in the later periods studied, scientific knowledge is represented 

as contingent, as dependent on such contextual conditions as whether and 

to what degree control experiments have been carried out and which methods 

have been applied. In sum, the articles analyzed in this period are marked by a 

tuition discourse positioning the implicit reader in a role as someone who has 

something to learn from the presentations. The structure and language of the articles 

signal that independent journalistic ways of popularizing and representing 

scientific research are not yet well developed in the press coverage. 

1986 

More discernible in the articles from 1986 is a celebratory discourse, a discourse 

praising scientific research and what it is able to achieve. The emphasis is now 

stronger on results than the process of research, and the preferred article structure 

is the inverted pyramid. Research may be presented as possessing enormous 

methodological power and the ability to disclose causal connections. 

The discourse of praise is evident in the article “The professor who makes new 

animals” (Diesen, 1986, our translation) in A-magasinet. It establishes a frame 

emphasizing animal husbandry research as a Norwegian success story. The researcher 

is depicted as an active agent and unequalled innovator: 

“He loves testing out creative propositions, and his line of thought is full of 

unexpected leaps. Nothing is impossible before it is proven. Yes, the impossible 

may in reality offer fantastic possibilities. (…) It is he who is responsible for most 

of what has happened within animal reproduction in this country. Yes, not only 

in Norway…” (Diesen, 1986, our translation). 

His research is represented as a field with enormous potential as a rational problem-solver. 

Metaphors and adjectives depict gene technology as a potential 

mystery solver in a discourse celebrating the insights it may give us. 

“Every cell in your body offers an endless journey. The DNA-molecule, a giant 

molecule containing unbelievable amounts of information. A little piece of the 

DNA-molecule reveals who you are” (Diesen, 1986, our translation). 

Traces of a conflict frame suggest discrepancies between on the one hand scientists 

who strive for progress and act rationally on behalf of society, and on the 

other hand “most people”, who are hostile towards progress and to a larger extent 

driven by emotion. The researcher is portrayed as an educator through his “willingness 

to disseminate knowledge”. However, the presentation of him and his research 

field also constructs an insurmountable knowledge gap between “ordinary 

people” and researchers such as him. 



In VG, tabloid effects are clearly more visible than in the first period. One no 

longer finds academic article structures. Shorter articles frequently address the 

reader intimately in direct requests as “you”. An advisory discourse is now pronounced 

in a newspaper that increasingly markets itself as “the reader’s newspaper” 

with the slogan “VG helps you”. Research stories in the paper are largely 

included in this service assignment on behalf of the readers. Scientific research 

is apparently perceived to provide a knowledge basis and authoritativeness to an 

advisory journalism, thus assisting the portrayal of the newspaper as a helper for 

“the common woman and man”. 

A rather characteristic VG-story with the headline: “Drink wine, live longer!” 

(Aasbø, 1986) reports about apparent health benefits from drinking red wine. 

The message is delivered in the form of assertions and slogans, such as: “Wine 

is healthy. The body needs the nutrients from wine”; and, “Wine cures stress, 

stomach problems and many other things”. The headline and the lead adopt the 

utterances of the source in a direct address to the readers, who are presumed to 

be wine lovers. Characteristically, this article was published when the Norwegian 

summer holidays were about to begin, a season with an above average level 

of alcohol consumption in the population. Thus, it testifies to how choices and 

presentations of research results in VG’s emergent advisory journalism are influenced 

by seasonal variations. 

2006 

Compared to the preceding periods, the most striking feature of the science coverage 

in 2006 is the more carefully designed and impressive layout of the stories, 

with a greater emphasis on photographs and graphical presentations in order to 

present and explain abstract and complex connections and relations that research 

allegedly has shown or will uncover. In other words, multimodality is more 

noticeable than in the earlier periods. 

In VG, formulas such as “research shows” and “according to the researchers” are 

now more strongly established in salient parts of the layout. Such phrasings contribute 

to an impression that there is wide agreement among scientists that certain 

findings or connections have been established. There is a widelyspread optimistic 

and enthusiastic rhetoric on behalf of science, with stock phrases such as “sensational” 

and “breakthrough”. Thus, the language use tends to position the reader in a 

role as an admiring spectator of findings and discoveries in science. 

The role as an advisor for the reader is no less perceptible in VG in 2006 than in 

1986. To a larger extent, research in the tabloid is now included in a campaign 

journalism that provides the newspaper with an opportunity to draw attention

100 


to its own efforts to induce changes to the benefit of “the common man”. For 

instance, VG in 2006 has extensive coverage of stem cell research. An apparently 

balanced or multi-perspective article about this research (Gjerding & Hansson, 

2006) suggests – when closely inspected – how the newspaper may now emerge 

as an active agent and advocator, in this case pushing for a change in biotechnology 

legislation so that research on fertilized eggs will be permitted in Norway. 

Close reading illustrates a pattern reoccurring in other articles: the more salient 

the position in the layout, the more a potential power to heal is ascribed to the 

stem cells and the research on them. 

In both VG and A-magasinet, the science coverage in 2006 is often characterized 

by a mixture of discourses. A categorically ascertaining discourse frequently 

marks salient elements and spots of articles (e.g. headlines, captions, highlighted 

quotes), as in the headline “The genes are to blame” (Torp, 2006), from a story 

about research into the causes of alcohol abuse (the head may also be translated 

as “the genes are the cause”). In the same articles, the less salient body texts 

are typically marked by a more cautious discourse that modifies the assertions 

appearing in the salient parts. In this manner, the total presentation of the story 

conveys somewhat contradictory messages about the status of the findings 

and knowledge presented. Such ambiguity is created in the intersection between 

a journalistic rhetoric designed to attract reader attention and the reservations 

with respect to drawing clear or definite conclusions that characterize scientific 

discourse. In a contradictory manner, this illustrates on the one hand a more 

independent journalistic reworking and presentation of scientific research than 

in the earlier periods – in the sense that the research material is adjusted to a 

journalistic norm system connected to news criteria, presentation effects and 

dramaturgy. On the other hand, it suggests how journalists can try to approach 

caution in their representations, in accordance with norms in science encouraging 

researchers to reflect upon the limitations of one’s research. 

SUMMARIZING THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 

The representation of scientific research changes from largely attempting to resemble 

scientific discourse in 1966 towards a much more distinct adaption of 

the research in the later periods, when it is adjusted to journalistic requirements 

of angles and storylines and an ability to attract readers. Accordingly, there is a 

change of focus from processes and questions in the research towards a greater 

attention to the results and applications of the research. There is a similar movement 

from representing research as basic science and a process of modifying 

theories towards portraying science as an activity in the “application context”, 

which discloses connections and develops innovations, applications and ”useful 



knowledge”. This is part of a development where research increasingly appears 

in advisory journalism and campaign journalism, particularly in the tabloid VG. 

We have noted, however, how journalists in the latest period may attempt hold 

with greater fidelity to a scientific “cautiousness discourse” in less salient parts of 

an article. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Our study illustrates some diverging tendencies in the science coverage and the 

use of scientists as sources in major Norwegian newspapers over a period of forty 

years. The quantitative study of five major newspapers displayed some striking 

similarities in the science coverage, whereas the discourse analysis pointed to 

some clear changes in the ways research and researchers were represented over 

this period of time. 

The quantitative analysis does indicate a development towards more articles about 

scientific research in the press. However, throughout all periods studied, research 

has primarily been presented in the news genre. There are, in other words, comparatively 

few commentaries and features (although news stories about science often 

include some feature elements). In light of the frequent calls for more critical 

science journalism in the Norwegian press (Hornmoen, 1999), we consider this 

unvaried use of genres unfortunate. In all likelihood, commentaries and features 

give larger possibilities than straight news to discuss science, provide perspective, 

depth and context, and to create engaging narratives around research. 

As to the types of research, there has been a development from a clear dominance 

by the natural sciences in 1966 towards a more equal distribution between 

different academic disciplines in 2006. But one may also trace a change towards a 

clearer homogenization of the research material in the press. In 1966, newspaper 

readers were offered quite a lot of information about ongoing projects and about 

science policy, whereas in 2006, 70 percent of the science-related material is conveyed 

as research results or in the form of expert statements from researchers. 

Add to this a continuing strong reliance on one (visible) source in the articles, 

and the overall picture drawn by the quantitative analysis barely resembles the 

kind of deliberative and multi-perspective journalism envisioned in science journalism 

handbooks (Blum & Knudson, 1998, Hornmoen, 1999). 

The discourse analysis more distinctively pointed out changes over time in the 

ways research and researchers are represented, as described in detail above. But 

do such changes towards a more distinct journalistic adaption of research signal 

a more independent journalism about emergent science? Seemingly, the changes 

reflect a break with a traditionally strong trust in scientific authority. To a larger

102 


the extent, scientific research and knowledge is selected and adjusted according 

to a journalistic system of norms, thus indicating a stronger professionalization 

of the science coverage. Fewer specialized terms and monological expositions in 

direct speech creates the impression of representing researchers’ utterances in a 

less servile manner than before. 

However, the discourse analysis does not suggest that science in recent times is 

represented in a particularly critical or reflective way, inviting and engaging readers 

in a dialogue about science and its role in society. A hindrance for involving 

readers is how journalism’s preferred modes of representation tends to glorify 

science. The formulaic language, applying “wonder appeals” such as “sensational 

breakthroughs” and phrases such as “new research shows”, is increasingly present 

over time in the material, and this language use positions the readers at a respectful 

distance from the research portrayed. 

One should also mention how the development of a symbiotic relationship 

between journalism and research may be an obstacle to advancing a critical 

public debate on science. Journalism is not only dependent upon scientists as 

sources in order to gain access to relevant material. Journalism needs researcher 

sources in order to give its stories credibility as truthful and objective accounts 

of reality (whereas science is dependent upon journalism to acquire legitimacy 

in society). In the journalistic institution, truthfulness is commonly conceived of 

within an objectivity ethic, emphasizing impartiality and neutrality, values that 

are conventionally attributed to science. So it is a question as to what extent the 

press sees its own interests as served by exposing the values, political dimensions, 

interests, conflicts and shortcomings in science. 

But there is a potential for dialogical and critical coverage of science in the Norwegian 

media. Journalists themselves have a major responsibility for developing 

such journalism. Much can be done within the organizational constraints of their 

institution. So-called media logic does not necessarily inhibit journalistic rationality 

to such a degree that journalists are left unable to pose critical questions 

to researchers who claim that they have generated new knowledge or come up 

with the solution to a puzzle. The challenge is ultimately to develop a journalism 

that will stimulate broad reflection around questions that concern all of us. 


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106 


TOPIC OF CLIMATE CHANGE 

IN COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA 

RESEARCH: THE PAST, THE PRESENCE, 

AND THE FUTURE 


i.birbilaite@pmdf.vdu.lt 

PhD Candidate 




ABSTRACT: Abrupt increase in number of scientific publications on climate change (CC) 

communication makes it difficult to track development of this research area. Aiming to map 

the main directions of the CC communication research this paper reviews literature in particular 

discussing a set of sampled peer-reviewed articles dealing with CC communication 

issues and aiming to sketch the pats, the presence, and the future of the research area. First of 

all, this paper identifies and discusses the main contributors of the research area (e.g., scientific 

journals and authors involved). Second of all, it questions approaches taken and discussed in 

sampled studies. Paper concludes in suggesting that CC communication is a quickly developing 

and expanding area with strong roots in research fields of risk management, scientific 

communication, and environmental politics. Recently studies dealing with CC communication 

issues are often recognized as rather independent research area represented by a group 

of well-known scholars and scholarly journals carrying necessary discussions of the field and 

uniting the discourse. The past and the present research on CC communication is questioning 

issues mainly related to media coverage and public understanding – those are the essential 

approaches in communication sciences. The future of CC communication research is expected 

to eliminate existing deficit of studies related on how new media and new communication 

technologies are changing and influencing CC communication processes. 

KEYWORDS: media coverage, public awareness, climate change discourse 

Topic of climate change in communication and media research: The past, the presence, and the future

INTRODUCTION 


Since 1896 when the possibility of global warming was first raised by Nobel Prize-winner 

Swedish chemist Swante Arrhenius plenty of scientific articles, monographs, 

books, and dissertations discussing causes and consequences of climate 

change (CC) have been gradually emerging (Krosnick, Holbrook & Visser, 2000, 

Wilson, 2002). The issue of CC was first brought up to the scientific agenda by 

scholars from the research fields of climatology, geology, and geophysics (Weingart, 

Engels & Pansegrau, 2000). However, the threatening scientific evidences encouraged 

an abrupt rise of new discourses on CC leaded by politicians, journalists, 

media, and general society itself (Corner & Hahn, 2009). Interaction based on 

information exchange became crucial for building awareness of existing problems, 

making appropriate political decisions, changing social behavior, and performing 

new research needed to confirm earlier predictions. Effective communication became 

a crucial necessity. However, the lack of knowledge – of how to communicate 

CC issues effectively, how to convince publics about the CC threats while scientists 

and politicians themselves do not necessarily believe it, – were the main questions 

to answer by scholars involved into CC communication research. 

Currently, there are plenty of scientific papers exploring the issue of environmental 

communication as well as CC communication. They provide the answers to 

the questions above and explore newly rising issues. A literature review on environmental 

communication performed by a group of scientists in 2002 argues that 

focus on environmental communication in scientific research can be observed in 

the 1960s. At that time explorations were mainly limited to public understanding 

of ozone depletion and global warming, effective CC communication issues, etc. 

(Pleasant, Good, Shanahan & Cohen, 2002). Indeed, the field has broadened significantly 

in recent years encompassing a wide range of problems dealing with 

scientists’-policymakers’ interface, international diplomacy, media coverage, public 

understanding, and public engagement (Russill & Nyssa, 2009). 

CC communication is a rather new research area. It should be clarified that in 

this paper it is not perceived as an independent or separate research area from 

the general fields of environmental communication and risk communication. 

Instead it is understood as a significant part of them. However, its great political 

and scientific controversy, unprecedented global pervasion, and expressed 

urgent need for glocal actions distinguishes it as highly problematic and diverse 

area which in many cases demands exceptional attention and explorations. 

Hence, in this paper the focus is put on the research on CC communication in 

particular aiming to explore how communication and media research is dealing 

with this extremely diverse, controversial, and global issue.

108 


Aiming to map the main directions of the CC communication research area, 

this paper presents an analysis of sampled peer-reviewed articles on CC communication. 

To compose a sample for the analysis, articles corresponding to three 

keyword sets – “climate change” and media, “climate change” and news, “climate 

change” and communication – were collected from three ISI Web of Science databases, 

including Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), Science Citation Index 

Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), and Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI). 

It is considered that these three databases provide good coverage on the issue, as 

they index around 8.000 academic journals in the fields of science, social science, 

and humanities. Search was performed and sample composed on 23 October 

2010. Only peer-reviewed journal articles discussing CC communication issues 

(N=194) were selected for analysis excluding book reviews, editorials, conference 

proceedings, and other materials. 

Scientific articles are one of the most easily accessible forms of academic production. 

They significantly influence the perception of the research field students, 

professors, or scholars may have. In some cases articles may be the main (or the 

only one) source scholar has access to. Hence, this paper is seeking to overlook 

and understand CC communication research by discussing the past, the presence, 

and the future of the field as it is presented in peer-reviewed academic journals. 

The aim of this paper is to disclose main contributors to the research (in 

particular scientific journals and authors involved) and to explore approaches 

taken by those contributors. Briefly, this study focuses on sketching scientific 

agenda on CC communication as well as identifying specific areas, which are out 

of scientific scope and lack scientific investigations. 

THE EMERGENCE AND OF CC COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 

“International and domestic climate policy began to take shape in the mid-1980s, 

primarily through activities of the International Council of Scientific Unions 

(ICSU), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 

Organization (WMO)” (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007:4). Even more 

significance issues of CC gained in the confrontation with significant weather 

events. For instance, scientists argue that 1990s were the hottest decade in 1000 

years followed by year 2003 when Europe experienced widespread droughts causing 

many deaths. With no doubts, these and other events of that time have been 

highly influencing public discourse on CC as well as dramatically increasing media 

coverage. Political involvement, severe weather events, and growing media 

coverage were and still are very favorable for research area of CC communication 



to emerge and develop. So, no surprise that our sample indicated a significant 

increase in a number of academic publications on CC communication over the 

year 1992–2010 (those are the years our sample ranged). 

In 2000 an international conference on CC communication was held in Ontario, 

Canada. At that time organizational committee stated that topic of CC communication 

has received relatively little research attention (Andrey et al., 2000). As 

the figure shows, the situation has changed significantly since then. CC communication 

is a relatively new but rather quickly growing research area. Two different 

periods in the CC communication scientific coverage can be identified. The 

first period (1992–2006) indicated slow introduction of CC communication issues 

into scientific discourse, and the second period (2006–2010 1 ) showed strong 

increase in number of articles concerning CC communication. Indeed, the dynamics 

of research on CC communication corresponds to the growing political 

concerns related to the issue, increasing media coverage on CC, and of course, 

– the outcomes made by climate scientists. As a consequence of that individual 

scholars start to cooperate. 

A number of research centers dealing with CC communication issues are founded, 

e. g., George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication 

founded in 2007 by Edward Maibach. Scientists also gather during regular conferences, 

workshops, seminars, or research projects. In 2010 the first Africa Climate 

Change Conference held. In 2005 Yale project on Climate Change Communication 

started. This is just a few examples of scientists’ initiatives to share 

knowledge and try to bring CC communication problems on scientific, political 

and public agendas. 

However, despite the rapid development of the research area CC communication 

still does not really have a particular scientific journal to carry its most important 

research, and to provide a recognizable scholarly identity. Sample indicated that 

Figure 1. 

The increase 

in number of 

peer-reviewed 

articles on CC 

communication 

over a year 

1992–2010. 

1 As the data for the 

study were collected 

in October 2010 the 

articles published 

in later month were 

not included into the 

study, therefore, the 

small drop which can 

be noticed in the table 

1 does not mean that 

scientific coverage on 

CC communication is 

decreasing.

110 

Table 1. 

Quantity of articles 

per single journal 

and citation indexes. 


articles discussing CC issues are spread over a number of academic journals and 

involve scientists with different scientific backgrounds and experiences. Articles 

discussed in this paper were published in 95 different academic journals. Table 1 

lists seven journals presenting more than five individual articles. 

Journal 

Global Environmental Change – 

Human and Policy Dimensions 

Environmental Communication – 

a Journal of Nature and Culture 

Quantity of 

articles 

14 (7,2%) 7.4 

14 (7,2%) 0.8 

Public Understanding of Science 13 (6,7%) 14.3 

Risk Analysis 12 (6,2%) 18 

Science Communication 12 (6,2%) 4 

Climatic Change 8 (4,1%) 11.5 

Journal of Risk Research 6 (3,1%) 0.8 

Quantity of 

average citations 

Assessing number of articles per journal and a number of average citations, data 

seem to point to Risk Analysis and Public Understanding of Science as the most 

relevant scholarly sources for research on CC communication. These journals 

were also identified as leading in previous literature reviews on risk communication 

and environmental communication research (Gurabardhi, Gutteling & 

Kuttschhreuter, 2004, Pleasant, Good, Shanahan & Cohen, 2002). Other journals 



listed in the table above also maintain their significant role in constructing scientific 

discourse on CC communication. Indeed, the journal Environmental Communication 

– a Journal of Nature and Culture should be mentioned separately. 

In 2002 A. Pleasant et al. stated that environmental communication oriented 

journals does seem to be a missing piece. As a response to this in 2007 a journal 

orientated exceptionally to the environmental communication issues was 

introduced. As CC communication is a part of environmental communication 

it could be presumed that this journal is solid contender to become significant 

representative of CC communication research. Besides, editorial board members 

(involving leading scholars of the field from all over the globe) as well as content 

of publications could be significant factors to confirm such presupposition. If so, 

it would be much easier to track CC communication research in the future. 

Just like CC communication research area is represented by a number of scientific 

journals in the sample, it is discussed by even bigger number of scientists with research 

focusing on issues such as public understanding of CC, media coverage on 

CC related issues, and science-policy-society interface. Thus, it can be stated that 

the background for the CC communication research area is strongly shaped by the 

traditions and trends coming from scientific fields of risk management, scientific 

communication research as well as from the field of environmental politics. 

Sampled articles also suggest that in the research on CC communication two 

approaches clearly dominate – public awareness research and media coverage research. 

Indeed, other issues like risk perception, environmental communication, 

scientific communication, and environmental politics are also largely discussed. 

Moreover, they are often helpful in providing explanations for outcomes of media 

coverage or public awareness research. 

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 

Academic interest in public awareness of CC issues is rapidly increasing. Over 

the last 20 years there has been a significant number of public opinion surveys 

carried out by various organizations. Since 1992 surveys commissioned by the 

European Union (EU) have been undertaken among representative samples of 

citizens in its Member States (Special Eurobarometers (EB) 1992, 1995, 2002, 

Flash EB in 2002) (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006, Nisbet & Myers, 2007). The growing 

academic interest in public awareness on CC was also demonstrated in the 

sampled articles. Actually, one third of them were questioning how general public 

or certain public segments (e.g. scientists, teachers, students, etc.) understand, 

perceive or evaluate CC related issues, and/or how their knowledge and 

attitudes are affected by media and other channels (such as school, church, etc.).

112 


With the growing political, scientific, and social interest to the issue of CC it 

could be expected that public awareness on the issue is growing. Such an assumption 

could be also supported by the fact that new communication technologies 

provide us with unprecedented opportunities to keep informed about 

local as well as global issues. Moreover, it could be expected that public opinion 

regarding CC issues is in favor of scientific based facts and consequently public 

behavior is changing in order to control CC effects. However, literature review 

presented in this paper provides us with a rather more pessimistic view. 

The sample suggested that just like general CC communication research, number 

of studies on public awareness is increasing over the year under consideration. In 

the sampled articles publics of 15 different countries were investigated. However, 

the significant majority of the studies focused on US, UK, and Canada publics. 

Majority of the studies arrive to the conclusion that people still are lacking general 

knowledge on CC processes. For instance, D. Read et al. in their study performed 

in 1994 conclude: 

“subjects had a poor appreciation of the facts that (1) if significant global 

warming occurs, it will be primarily the result of an increase in the concentration 

of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere, and (2) the single 

most important source of additional carbon dioxide is the combustion of 

fossil fuels, most notably coal and oil. In addition, their understanding of 

the climate issue was encumbered with secondary, irrelevant, and incorrect 

beliefs” (p. 971). 

General misunderstandings of global CC is also reported in later studies by A. 

Bostrom, M. Morgan, B. Fischhoff, and D. Read (1994), M. Govda, J. Fox, and R. 

Magelky (1997), J. Sterman and L. Sweeney (2007), and others. Comparison of 

the results of studies performed in different time periods is not very optimistic. 

Although recently publics seem to be more aware about CC issues in general 

sense but the understanding of causes and consequences of CC is not improving. 

For instance, H. Boon (2009) in the study compares Australian students’ survey 

performed in 2007 sample with a parallel study undertaken in UK in 1991. The 

study arrived to the conclusions that “understanding of these important scientific 

literacy issues remaining unacceptably low in 2007” (p. 43). 

Hence, studies questioning public understanding in 1985-1999 and in 2000-2010 reported 

very similar outcomes. Briefly, although public awareness on CC is slightly 

increasing, significant misunderstandings about the reasons and consequences of CC 

is still widely spread. Besides, according to the study performed in 2010 by scholars 

from Yale University 63% of Americans believe that CC is happening but many still 

do not understand why (Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, 2010). 



The missing piece among the sampled studies is an analysis of public awareness 

of people living in developing and least-developed countries like Africa regions 

which are least responsible, most affected and least informed. Some initiatives 

exist aiming to investigate CC awareness in those regions. For instance, Africa 

Talks Climate (ATC 2 ) was a project leaded by the BBC World Service Trust and 

funded by the British Council performed in 2009-2010. The aim of this project 

was to identify ways to engage, inform and empower Africans in local, national 

and international conversations about climate change. Besides, we do know very 

little of how people perceive CC issues in quickly developing countries such as 

China, India, and Brazil. Those are the regions where CO 2 emissions are greatly 

increasing every year. 

CLIMATE CHANGE MEDIA COVERAGE 

As M. Boykoff and T. Roberts (2007) notice, issue of CC first was presented in 

media in 1930s, when New York Times wrote: “The earth must be inevitably 

changing its aspect and its climate. How the change is slowly taking place and 

what the result will be has been considered” (New York Times 1932: 4 cited from 

Boykoff and Roberts, 2007: 4). In 1950s more articles concerning the issue have 

been emerging and questions of human contributions to climate change were 

brought to public agenda. 

However, until 1980s mass media coverage on CC remained rather sparse. Dramatic 

increase in the coverage starts in 1990s and is closely linked to climate science research 

outcomes and political involvement. Coverage increase is especially obvious 

in European and American newspapers during the period when the assessment 

reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were released 

in 1990, 1995 and 2001. Besides, the first conference of parties (COP) held by UN 

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC) in 1992 attain significant 

attention from media. After the adoption of Kyoto Protocol in 1997 a large increase 

in coverage on CC was evident in Australia, New Zealand, the Middle East, Asia, 

Eastern Europe and South Africa (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007). 

Our sample suggest that increase in media coverage on CC can be determined by 

different factors (political, scientific, or severe climate events) but not by a natural 

media interest in the issue. For instance, J. Shanahan and J. Good (2000) observed 

a link between temperature changes and media coverage. They argued that: 

“there are some relationship between local temperature and frequency of 

attention to climate issues, such that journalists are more likely to discuss 

climate during unusually warm periods” (p. 285). 

2 Read more about ATC 

at www.africa 

talksclimate.com.

114 

3 The Panos Network 

is an international 

foundation working 

with journalists, 

editors, and other 

communicators in 

order to foster debate 

on under-reported, 

misrepresented 

or misunderstood 

development issues 

(Panos webpage 

www.panos.org). 

4 Internews is 

an international 

media development 

organization based 

in California. It aims 

to empower local 

media worldwide, to 

give people news and 

information they need, 

to provide them with 

the ability to connect 

and the means to make 

their voices heard 

(Internews webpage 

www.internews.org). 

5 IIED - International 

Institute for Environment 

and Development 

is independent 

international research 

organization working 

with world’s most 

vulnerable people to 

ensure that heir voice is 

heard in the policy arenas 

– from village councils to 

international conventions 

(IIED webpage www. 

iied.org). 


The dynamics of media coverage are also discussed in study reported by A. Mazur 

(2009) who noticed the relationship between political processes and media 

coverage. The study results showed that: 

“Major international coverage of global warming began in 1988 when NASA 

scientist James Hansen testified before Congress that the summer’s drought 

was the result of climate change. Worldwide coverage dropped after 1992 while 

mean global temperature continued to rise. Coverage revived in 2006-07, 

largely but not exclusively due to the promotional efforts of Al Gore” (p. 17). 

Despite the exceptional media attention to the CC issues during different time 

periods the general coverage increase is rather low mainly because of media 

commercialization. “Media has at times kept the issue of climate change alive, 

but has also limited the extent to which real change in the organization of society 

and foreign assistance have been called for” (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007). M. 

Boykoff and M. Mansfield (2008) argue that “there was no consistent increase 

in percentage of accurate coverage through the period of analysis” (7 years) (p. 

1). However, it should be mentioned, that in this study tabloid newspapers were 

analyzed and authors also add that these “findings are not consistent with recent 

trends documented in United States and UK ‘prestige press’ or broadsheet 

newspaper reporting” (p. 1). 

Hence, a natural media interest into the issues is lacking. Recently, some initiatives 

exist to encourage media coverage on political processes related to CC. For 

instance, the project known as “Climate Change Media partnership” was founded 

by PANOS 3 , Internews 4 , and IIED 5 . The aim of this project is to improve 

media coverage and public debate on climate change in the developing world. 

Indeed, insufficient coverage is not the only problem to discuss. Sampled studies 

suggested that CC media coverage in many cases is not only limited and fragmented 

but also highly dramatized and inaccurate. This leads to public confusion 

and general misunderstanding about the issue. For instance A. Bell (1994) 

found that: 

“there remains considerable mismatch between media reporting of scientific 

information and the public’s understanding of that information. People 

greatly overestimate scientific scenarios for temperature and sea-level rise, a 

reflection of public concern about global environmental risks. They confuse 

the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion, blending information in the 

fashion typical of comprehension meltdown between related topics. People 

know little about the causes of the greenhouse effect” (p. 5). 



“Scientists have a tendency to speak in cautious language when describing their 

research findings, and have a propensity to discuss implications of their research 

in terms of probabilities” (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007: 7). Media play following 

different rules and values. “Scientific lexicon does not help the issue conform to 

this dramatization norm; in fact it makes the ‘story’ less appealing for journalists 

(Ungar 2000 cited from Boykoff & Roberts, 2007: 7). 

Despite the level and quality of the media coverage on CC sampled studies tend 

to report positive media influence on public understanding and awareness. For 

instance, Y. Sampei and M. Aoyagi-Usui (2009) investigated public awareness on 

CC in Japan. They concluded that “dramatic increase in newspaper coverage of 

global warming from January 2007 correlated with an increase in public concern 

for the issue” (p. 203). Similar results were presented by A. Löfgren and K. Nordblom 

in 2010. 

“We conducted a survey where we asked for people’s opinions about the CO 2 

tax in September and in December 2006, i.e. before and after the release 

of Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ and the Stern Review. We found that 

the attitude towards the level of the CO 2 tax was significantly changed after 

these events; people became much more positive towards the tax” (p. 845). 

In some of the sampled studies a temporality of the affects was highly stressed. 

For instance J. Nolan (2010) in the study underscored that: 

“watching “An Inconvenient Truth” does increase knowledge about the causes 

of global warming, concern for the environment, and willingness to reduce 

greenhouse gases. However, the results suggest that willingness 

to take action immediately following movie viewing does not necessarily 

translate into action 1 month latter” (p.643). 

Very similar outcomes were drawn by T. Lowe et al. (2006): 

“seeing the film (The Day After Tomorrow), at least in the short term, changes 

people’s attitudes; viewers were significantly more concerned about climate 

change, and about other environmental risks. Following the film, 

many viewers expressed strong motivation to act on climate change. However, 

the public do not have information on what action they can take” 

(p.435). 

Briefly, - media do help to increase awareness on CC. However, in some cases it 

is rather a temporal effect and does not necessarily shape public behavior latter, 

which is important for CC mitigation. Besides, inaccurate or misleading media

116 


coverage may result in low public engagement of CC and public confusion. There 

is a clear need for media coverage studies of other (especially developing) countries, 

such as China, India and Brazil. As such analyses of media coverage in key 

countries in ongoing UN international climate policy negotiations can help to 

clarify ongoing impediments as well as enhance actions. 

QUESTIONING FUTURE OF THE CC COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 

In addition to the listed suggestions of how to improve and enrich public awareness 

and media coverage studies, it is expected that a new approach in CC communication 

studies shortly will emerge – in particular, a research questioning 

CC communication online (both online content and online public awareness). 

Such research would be helpful in determining the potentials of online tools in 

strategic CC communication especially in developed countries. Besides, numbers 

indicate that internet penetration slowly is increasing in developing and in 

least-developed countries. According to World Bank’s World Development indicators 

internet penetration in Brazil in 2009 was 39% (75.944 million people), in 

China 26% (384 million people), in India only 5% (61.3 million people), and in 

South Africa 8.9% (4.42 million people). Those numbers are not very optimistic; 

however, the influence on online content on global population is increasing and 

now it is the time to find out how to use this for best reasons. 

Communication on CC related issues recently is increasing among online publics. 

Audiences on online forums, blogs, social networks, and micro-blogs are 

discussing the issue. More and more information related to CC is generated. Optimists 

would say that such processes lead us to increasing public awareness and 

better understanding of CC processes. The origin of online communication encourages 

optimistic speculations regarding combined top-down and bottom-up 

communication which is fundamental in communicating such controversial global 

issues as CC. However, pessimists would argue that quality of the information 

online is questionable. As we saw earlier misleading and inaccurate information 

result in public confusion. Furthermore, because of the very liberal environment 

and global publics (different in many aspects) involved it is argued that communication 

online is more likely to result in chaos, rather than in deliberative 

discussion. 

As it is well known the influence of media, political communication on public 

awareness on CC have been changed a lot since the establishment of online-based 

communication. The extent to which Internet has changed agenda setters can 

be seen in the Figure 2. 



While in mass media era traditional media channels like newspapers, television, 

or radio had a significant impact on public discourse as a mediator between 

public and political arenas, today this impact in some cases can be reduced 

to minimum, especially in those online communication environments where 

content is generated, managed and edited by users themselves, e.g., blogs, social 

networks, micro-blogs, etc. Consequently, it is highly possible that future studies 

on CC media coverage may be reporting rather different results compared (level 

of traditional media influence may drop significantly) to those discussed earlier 

in this paper. 

We know how public discourse on CC was constructed in mass media era and 

what were the main determinants constructing public understanding of CC and 

other issues. The rules were quite clear for CC communication specialists, risk 

managers, and environmental politics. To effectively manage information channels 

and content generated was not easy then. However, today such a goal seems 

almost impossible. Consequently, the significant question CC communication 

specialists as well as scholars are confronting recently is how to communicate 

CC today, how to take an advantage from new communication technologies and 

how to avoid possible dangers. 

Figure 2. 

Constructing 

the public 

discourse in 

post-mass 

communication 

age.

118 


CONCLUSIONS 

Literature reviews are an important part of the development of the field, especially 

when the field is rather new, quickly developing and involving approaches from 

different disciplines (Webster & Watson, 2002). Literature reviews help to synthesize 

and reflect on previous theoretical works, thus providing secure grounding for 

the advancement of knowledge (Sæbø, Rose, & Flak, 2008). Quantitative reviews 

may provide indications of growing or declining interest in the research subject 

(Gurabardhi, Gutteling & Kuttschhreuter, 2004); also it may suggest which themes 

are under investigation or are lacking scientific consideration. 

A brief discussion on CC communication research drawn on literature review is 

presented in this paper. Leaning on sampled peer-reviewed articles questioning 

CC communication related issues, this paper aims to sketch the past, the present, 

and the future of CC communication research. It provides general information 

about the research which should be valuable for emerging scholars in the field 

and all those willing to look closer to the CC communication research area. 

Briefly summing everything up, - CC communication research has a strong roots 

in risk management studies, scientific communication research field, and environmental 

politics. Recently, more often CC communication is recognized as a rather 

independent research area; however, in this paper it is perceived as a very strong 

and important area of environmental communication research and risk communication 

research. Increasing interest and quick development of the CC communication 

research is determined by a few external and internal factors. The external 

conditions – growing political concerns related to CC problems, increasing media 

coverage, and outcomes of climate science – determined a quick and in many cases 

rather fragmented development of the CC communication research. Those factors 

determined quick grow of the research area and encouraged number of internal 

changes – the establishment of the scientific journal largely dedicated to CC communication 

questions, foundation of related research centers, and sponsorship or 

regular scholarly events (like conferences, workshops, etc.). All this help to bring 

scholars together, inspire more efficient work of involved scholars, and serve as a 

platform to strengthen rather young research area. 

Following the studies reported in sampled articles it is possible to sketch the 

past and the presence of the research area. Shortly the research can be defined 

as leaded by two approaches – studies of public awareness and media coverage. 

Articles questioning public awareness suggested that awareness on CC is slightly 

increasing, however, significant misunderstandings related to the causes and 

consequences of CC exist. It is claimed that the lack of accuracy in media cove- 



rage determines public confusion and misunderstandings. Articles dealing with 

media coverage on CC also were not very optimistic. Despite the increase on 

coverage on CC in many cases media is still fighting with the issues of dramatization, 

and inaccuracy. 

For the future, - the paper suggest that public awareness and media coverage in developing 

countries (such as China, India and Brazil) and least developed countries 

(e.g., different Africa’s regions) should be largely considered. Such studies would be 

helpful in clarifying ongoing impediments as well as enhancing actions. Besides, 

it is expected that future research will be questioning CC communication online. 

Exploring the content of online discourse on CC as well as investigating online 

users’ behavior would be extremely helpful in defining the role online communication 

could play in strategic CC communication in developed countries. However, 

Internet penetration in increasing and it could be expected that in near future 

Internet would bring us all together to discuss global issues, such as CC. 

For the very end it is essential to shortly discuss existing limitations of this paper. 

First of all, although the sample of the study encompassed scientific peer-reviewed 

articles reporting CC communication research, it does not question book 

reviews, comments, editorials, and other significant material. Hence, for the future 

studies it could be suggested to expand the sample. Besides, free databases 

such as Google Scholar should be also highly considered, and may be expected to 

have even bigger influence on scholars and their perception of the field. Seconds 

of all, only articles responding to keywords “climate change and communication”, 

“climate change and media”, and “climate change and news” were considered. Other 

publications analyzing CC communication issues but using different terms 

(e.g. global warming) are missing. Therefore, in future studies, keywords’ list 

could be extended. Finally, this short report drawn on peer-reviewed articles 

does not necessarily describe general discourse on CC communication research. 

Existing books, conference reports, and ongoing research are certainly dealing 

with discussed and other issues and may have been arriving to different or same 

outcomes. However, this paper was aiming to define the CC communication area 

as it is constructed in peer-reviewed journals, which, in many cases is the main 

(or the only one) source accessible to some scholars.

120 


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124 


TAKING OVER THE NET: CONSTRUCTING 

CELEBRITY LEADERSHIP DISCOURSE IN 

VIRTUAL SOCIAL NETWORKS 


v.rusinaite@pmdf.vdu.lt 

PhD Candidate 




ABSTRACT: Network culture (Varnelis, 2008) witnessed the birth of a new form of celebrity – 

Internet celebrity. The aim of this study is to recreate and develop the principle of popularity 

accumulation in virtual social networks and environments alike, and to witness the effect of 

media on popularity accumulation. The study employed principles of Critical Discourse Analysis 

by Teun van Dijk and supplemented the approach with the capital accumulation scheme 

of Pierre Bourdieu. The study shows that Internet personas can become popular by disseminating 

their representations in the network available to them and when a certain popularity 

is reached within the network it is supplemented by mass media interest and therefore mass 

popularity. The technical architecture of social networking sites helps to accumulate and maintain 

popularity for the already popular networked personas. 

KEYWORDS: Internet celebrity, network culture, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), leadership 

discourse, Internet persona 

Taking over the Net: Constructing celebrity leadership discourse in virtual social networks

INTRODUCTION 


Celebrity culture is mostly associated with mass media and capitalism, it is a 

profitable consumption area which fuels TV shows, celebrity magazine market, 

Hollywood industry and many other areas of profitable pop culture. New media 

environments are used to raise popularity and following of Internet users and communities, 

virtually every celebrity has an Internet page, Internet fan page, Facebook 

page and is popularized through many more channels of internet communication. 

Internet became inevitable part of everyday life, where consumers follow “conventional” 

mass media celebrities, however Internet environments and services helped 

to form and raise the new type of celebrity – Internet celebrity. 

Celebrity in digital environments is a relatively new phenomena constituted by 

the processes and environments of virtual networking. Previous studies have 

addressed the issue of virtual leadership (Hoyt, Blascovich, 2003, Boje, Rhodes, 

2005), self-branding (Hearn, 2008), persona creation in the network culture 

(Lavrinec, 2005); however this article aims to describe and explain the scheme 

of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986, Mažeikis, 2005) accumulation in the virtual 

social networks and environments alike. This article aims to answer the question: 

What is the role of media technology, self-signification practices in popularity 

and leadership accumulation in virtual social networks? 

The article is based on the bottom-up approach: by describing the actions of social 

players (in this case virtual personas and virtual celebrities) in virtual networks, 

trying to understand the meanings they transmit in their everyday communication 

activities, through watching and direct participation in virtual celebrity consumption, 

the article aims to re-create the conceptual model of symbolic capital accumulation 

and creation of leadership discourse in virtual social networks. 

The environment of social networking sites and its features, like interactivity, 

openness and personalization, constitutes the opportunity to choose communication 

strategies that differ from those available in mass media environments 

like television, radio, daily press would. Virtual personas create and employ these 

strategies aiming to accumulate symbolic capital and popularity. According to 

Pierre Bourdieu, (symbolic, social, economical, cultural) capital is a source of 

power (1986). Virtual personas aiming to popularity employ features of social 

networking sites not only to help to accumulate symbolic capital, and accumulate 

popularity, but to preserve it. This article will explain how social networking sites 

are constituted and how this constitution help to preserve popularity raised. 

The Foucauldian society of discipline, according to Gilles Deleuze, was replaced 

by a society of control. Whereas in discipline society it was clear where the 

panopticon, or centre of power is situated, in a networked society power is dis-

126 


tributed within a network itself (Galloway, Thacker, 2007, Varnelis, 2008, Chun, 

2006). This passage illustrates the contemporary importance of power and popularity 

accumulation from networked relations. The power is accumulated, but 

not initiated or given as a king is given his throne. 

The phenomenon of Internet celebrity and popularity accumulation in virtual 

social networks here is analyzed through three cases of virtual celebrities or 

relevantly popular Internet personas. Goda Domeikaitė as an Internet persona 

emerges in the club “Gravity“ newsletter, the American Youtube celebrity Chris 

Crocker creates his representations in social networking sites, and starlet Corry 

Kennedy is popularized in the popular party photo website “The Cobrasnake“. 

The research was carried out in the year 2009. 

CELEBRITY IN THE NETWORK CULTURE 

Mass media celebrity as we know it now, is a persona repeatedly represented and 

re-represented in the mass media, where constant repetition of representation 

generates re-representation and so on. Mass media celebrity does not need any 

special qualities, it does not have to be a holder of special powers or talents, nor 

has it have a history of winnings and achievements. As Daniel J. Boorstin (2006) 

puts it: “the hero was distinguished by his achievement; the celebrity by his image 

or trademark. The hero created himself; the media creates the celebrity. The hero 

was a big man; the celebrity is a big name” (p. 81). Following this logic, the celebrity 

is known not for special personal qualities, heroic actions or genius; rather 

he or she is known because of constant repetition in mass media. (Giles, 2000, 

Boorstin, 2006). A term “celetoid” coined by scholar Chris Rojek (2001) comes 

in handy here: “celetoids are the accessories of cultures organized around mass 

communications and staged authenticity. Examples include lottery winners, onehit 

wonders, stalkers, whistle blowers, sports’ arena streakers, have-a-go-heroes, 

mistresses of public figures and the various other types who command media 

attention one day, and are forgotten the other” (p. 20). 

A role of media is central in creation and maintaining of the celebrity. In his 

passage Rojek emphasizes not only the temporality of the celebrity “who command 

media attention one day”, but also the role of media in the dissemination 

of representations of these celebrities. As long as media is focused on the subject, 

their personal qualities are not as important for popularity accumulation as the 

media focus itself, because what matters is media attention, distribution of representations 

and constant repetition which generates popularity. 

Audiences attach to the celebrity, but the longitude and depth of the attachment 

depends on the values and signs that celebrities communicate and how well can 

audiences relate and identify themselves with these signs. The reality show win- 



ner can be forgotten in a few months, but Marquis de Sade stays with us for more 

than 200 years, not only because his representations are distributed in long term 

media like fiction books, movies, encyclopedias, etc, but as well because he has 

became the symbol of freedom of thinking. The fan productivity (Do the fans 

create poems, write letters, make pictures with their celebrity?) depends on the 

level of attachment they hold to the celebrity. 

According to John Fiske the division should be drawn between mass culture and 

popular culture. Mass culture is imposed on powerless, passive people, who, as 

Horkheimer and Adorno puts it, are subordinated by capitalist production. On 

the other hand, people are able to resist ideology by re-assesing and reinterpreting 

the texts supplied by creative industries. This, according to John Fiske, is basis 

for popular culture or the culture of people (1989), therefore being a celebrity 

and gaining popularity in these modes of culture differ. If gaining popularity 

in mass culture requires constant repetition of persona representations in mass 

media outlets, gaining popularity in everyday culture of people will qualitatively 

differ. This kind of celebrity representation enables people to identify with them 

and be productive in recreating their representations 1 and reinterpreting the meanings 

celebrities circulate. The identification level and the manner of communication 

between fans and the celebrity generate different kinds of interrelation and 

therefore a different kind of celebrity. 

Subcultural celebrity is a celebrity recognized and celebrated by a closed circle 

of fans, but little known outside these circles. Moreover usually fans can interact 

with their celebrities face to face (Hills, Williams, 2005) 2 . Subcultural celebrities 

popularize themselves in subcultural media, not in mass media; therefore identification 

level with the celebrity is high. 

The Internet celebrities discussed in this article are self-created personas in virtual 

networking sites and environments alike. Their representations are disseminated in 

the networks available for these celebrities. A significant part of contemporary internet 

media environments, such as social networking sites, are accessible to every 

regular internet user, not only producers, media professionals, who has accessibility 

to mass media environments such as TV, radio, etc. The structure of Internet 

celebrity communication is as well a symptom of networked culture. Media scholar 

Kazys Varnelis (2008) emphasizes that during the last decade the network has 

become the dominant cultural logic in Western world. According to him the usage 

of mobile networks and personal websites changed the manner and quality of interpersonal 

communication and mass media consumption. It is not only digitization, 

the turn from analog data processing to the processing of quantifiable bytes 

of data, but the way the data is transmitted through the network. 

1 Such celebrities 

as John Lennon are 

reproduced by their 

fans in books (Lennon 

remembers by Jann S. 

Wenner, The Lennon 

Factor by Paul Young 

and many more), 

journal articles, movies 

(Nowhere Boy by Sam 

Taylor-Wood and 

others), songs, Internet 

databases, fan-pages, 

institutionalized 

in museums (John 

Lennon museum in 

Japan), awards (John 

Lennon song writing 

contest), etc. 

2 Now non existent 

Lithuanian punk 

band dr. Green 

can be considered 

subcultural celebrities. 

Communicating 

anti capitalist, anti 

military, anti racist 

and Do it Yourself 

message they found a 

following in Lithuania. 

After their break up 

in 2008, they are still 

discussed in subcultural 

circles, referred 

and interviewed by 

subcultural media. 

Their fans have tight 

identification bonds, 

which were supported 

a lot by the band, 

who were one of 

the founders of the 

Green punk club, 

phorum-media channel 

hardcore.lt and, 

following the tradition 

of punk bands in 

Europe, used to avoid 

stage performances and 

preferred to play in the 

crowd.

128 


Following Kazys Varnelis (2008) the digitization era marked by emphasis of division 

between physical nature of commodities and its representation is over: 

“Today connection is more important than division, in contrast to digital 

culture, under network culture information is less the product of discrete 

processing units than of the outcome of the networked relations between 

them, of links between people, between machines, and between machines 

and people” (p. 145). 

Decentralized media production (e.g. personal blogs, Twitter accounts, Wikipedia 

projects, personal Youtube channels, indie media websites), network of media 

outlets and services and accessibility of media consumption through mobile Internet 

devices such as mobile phones and laptops served as a ground for the new 

type of self-made Internet celebrities. The work of popularity accumulation in 

new media networks (e.g. social networking sites, networked news portals, etc.) 

is not only dependent on the message sent, but on the structure of the network 

the celebrity has access to and the quality of the networked relations. 

In this article I use two terms: Internet persona and Internet celebrity. Internet 

persona here is an image of a persona created in the media channels in the Internet; 

Internet celebrity is a popular Internet persona. When Internet persona 

gains popularity it becomes Internet celebrity. 

POWER AND LEADERSHIP DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 

IN VIRTUAL SOCIAL NETWORKS 

In order to analyze power and leadership discourse the conceptual framework 

based on Teun van Dijk dimensions of Critical Discourse analysis (Dijk, 2003), 

power accumulation framework by Pierre Bourdieu and analysis on networking 

structure. In order to use CDA and analyze leadership discourse, the question, 

how leadership is related to celebrity should be answered. 

According to Slavoj Žižek (1989), concept of the leader corresponds to the performative 

concept of a Classical Master: “The transubstantiated body of the classical 

Master is an effect of the performative mechanism already described by la 

Boetie, Pascal and Marx: we, the subjects, think that we treat the king as a king 

because he is in himself a king, but in reality a king is a king because we treat him 

like one.” (p. 149) The same logic could be adopted to describe a popular celebrity, 

therefore a celebrity is a celebrity because we treat him or her like one, and this 

is how leadership discourse is created throughout the process of communication 

(treating someone). The perspective of celebrity as a leader allows to use CDA in 

order to reveal power relations between the leader and his/her followers. CDA 



aims at revealing power configurations, and examining the role of the discourse 

in reproduction of dominance and power relations and it is rather an approach 

than a structural method (Dijk, 2003). 

According to Norman Fairclough, CDA is a toolset, which can assist in helping 

to find dialectic relationship between signification practices and social, cultural 

practices (2002). Moreover, CDA, combined with other type of analysis, is often 

used to reveal the power relations and therefore, how the discursive structures 

are utilized to reproduce social domination. Norman Fairclough (2002) highlighted, 

that the important object of analysis in CDA is interaction between communicators: 

“There is an oscillation within CDA between a focus on structure and a focus on 

action – a focus on the structuring of orders of discourse and a focus on what 

goes on in particular interactions. The obstacles to tackling a problem here are 

in part to do with the social structuring of semiotic differences in orders of discourse 

(for example the way in which managerial discourse has colonized public 

service domains such as education). They are also in part a matter of dominant or 

influential ways of interacting, ways of using language in interaction. This means 

we need to analyze interactions.” (p. 126) 

The conceptual framework, employed to reveal domination and the discourse 

of leadership, is constituted from: (1) CDA (Van Dijk, 2003), (2) Capital accumulation 

analysis (Bourdieu, 1986) and (3) structural analysis of virtual environments. 

Here, by employing the capital model by Pierre Bourdieu (1986), the 

leadership discourse of the celebrity can be further analyzed. Different forms of 

accumulated capital are a source of power (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural, social and 

symbolic capital is accumulated and reaffirmed in the form of different symbolic 

acts, ranging from accepting virtual friendship to the chain of Youtube video 

parodies. 

In order to define the field of my research I adopt the dimensions of critical discourse 

analysis suggested by Teun van Dijk (2002). Originally Teun van Dijk 

suggested five-dimensional analysis, these dimensions are: topics (semantic microstructures), 

local meanings, formal discursive structures, context models and 

event models. In my research I dismiss the level of semantic microstructures, 

because in searching for the model of popularity accumulation in the virtual I 

find the structures of communication more important than the meanings of the 

sentences and words they provides in their texts. I also dismiss the event dimension, 

because in searching for a unified framework for popularity accumulation, 

actual events and situations are not important.

130 

Figure 1. 

Framework for 

CDA adopted 

for analysis 

of leadership 

discourse in the 

Internet (Dijk, 

2002). 


I chose three dimensions proposed by Teun van Dijk (context models, formal 

discursive structures, and local meanings) and adopted them according to my 

research (Figure 1). 

Publication analysis: 

audience analysis 

Communication 

context analysis 

Semantic 

macrostructures 

CDA 

(1) Communication context models are frameworks, which can be found in 

scenery or the circumstantial background; in these context models communication 

occurs. These models can be ideological, political, historical, and so on. 

For example, virtual celebrities in the three analyzed cases perform communication 

acts in so-called Western cultural context models. These context models 

influence the type and variety of communicational acts. The characteristics of 

the discourse are controlled by context models, which also help to sustain social 

acceptability of it (Dijk, 2001). It is important to define the locality of these 

contexts. The level of locality in the case of Internet celebrity defines the closeness 

of the fan community relations. In the local context of virtual community 

virtual popular Internet persona is treated like a part of the community. There 

celebrity in the communal context represents the distinct identity of the community 

and community members accept it as audiences. They treat the persona 

as distinct and worthy of celebration. In the global contexts of Internet celebrity 

mass media is involved. Mass media and its audiences “decide” if the celebrity is 

treated like celebrity; however, a close, communal relationship with the celebrity 

is avoided. Context models help to maintain the rules according to which the 

communication should be carried out. 

Taking over the Net: Constructing celebrity leadership discourse in virtual social networks 

Technological 

analysis 

Communication 

structure analysis


Formal (2) communication structures here are technically defined communication 

genres (a structure of communication act when delivering a message 

through video in Youtube channel), which are influenced by communication 

contexts. For example, newsletter, personal Youtube video channel or other technologies 

support different communication genres, which impact the conditions 

of communication. The genre of video monologue (where you can hear the intonation, 

or catch the gaze of the speaker) will differ from a newsletter. Moreover, 

communication structures will describe the manner of mutual action performed 

by communicator and the audience. Communication structures in virtual environments 

are influenced not only by the participants of the communicational act, 

but also by the technologies used. 

The (3) semantic macrostructures which are broad, even globally significant topics, 

which are important for the people, media. These semantic macrostructures 

help to signify the text (videos, writings, comments) with the certain topic and 

therefore the persona as an activist or a part of this topic. For example, Chris 

Crocker uses a lot of symbolical acts in order to suggest LGBT problems as one 

of semantic macrostructures he uses. 

In this reading I will present methods of communication used (communication 

structure analysis), the communication contexts in which Internet personas are 

presented and therefore the meanings that are produced through the choice of 

these contexts and structures. I will explain the meanings entailed in the communication 

structures of persona-audience, persona-media relations, (publication 

analysis: audience analysis) the meanings embedded in the contexts in the virtual 

structures; and the ways these meanings help to accumulate and maintain 

various forms of capital. I will discuss semantic macrostructures in order to understand 

how audiences can identify with the celebrity, as well as how all of this 

is influenced by the technical means of the communication channels. (Figure 1). 

In order to clarify the structure of communication acts and explain the process of 

representation and popularity accumulation in different media channels I set out 

two levels of communication space. Both levels are available for dissemination 

of Internet persona in the virtual. These levels were selected from the point of 

communication resources available to the creator. The primary communication 

area defines the communication resources in forms of different channels and 

technologies available to creator of the Internet persona. This space is designated 

for personal narrative construction and dissemination of it through the work 

of representation and self-branding. These spaces range from personal Youtube 

channel, blog to newsletter, etc.

132 

Figure 2. 

Primary and 

secondary 

communication 

areas. 


The secondary communication area is designated for the work of re-representation 

and reproduction of representations created in primary communication 

areas. In the reproductional area representations are generated from outside 

and the creator of the Internet persona does not have control over this area. The 

secondary communication area is the whole of available channels for gaining a 

mass or subcultural following. The work of representation here is performed by 

the fans, mass media journalists and others, who in different forms re-represent 

the Internet persona created in the primary communication area, the secondary 

communication area could be a talk show on a certain TV channel, fan blog, 

article in a certain newspaper, etc. 

Different channels situated in the primary communication area can have different 

technical features. One of the most important features in this case are reproduction 

areas incorporated in the areas of self creation. These areas are designated 

for creative audiences and fans who can reflect on the Internet persona and 

his/her message. Certain forms of participation, like commenting or evaluation, 

are available (liking, unliking, five-star features, etc.). If reproductional area is 

not incorporated in the primary communication are, it can be simulated by the 

Internet persona himself/herself while sharing the space for audience texts in his/ 

her own texts, like citing reader letters, reacting to fan blog entries, etc. (Figure 2). 

Primary communication area Secondary communication area 

Persona creation area 

Reproductional 

area 

Media reproduction area 



Primary communication area is the area defined by the entity of communication 

channels, where the persona is created and in some cases popularized (Figure 2). 

I call reproductional area the area in which audiences reproduce Internet persona 

and publicize their reproductions. 

THE PRIMARY COMMUNICATION AREA: SYMBOLIC CAPITAL ACCUMU- 

LATION THE VIRTUAL NETWORKING SITES 

For symbolic capital accumulation it makes the difference whether the communication 

channel is openly available for everybody like most of the social networking 

channels (Youtube) or should the user overpass some signification steps like 

employment, appointment, etc. 

To communicate and create leadership discourse so called reserved areas of communication 

the user has to be empowered by employment, choice or other symbolic 

actions like Goda Domeikaitė (employed by a club “Gravity” in Vilnius) or 

Cory Kennedy (who is discovered by a photographer in popular internet picture 

gallery „The Cobrasnake“). Employment and discovery are signifying practices, 

because talents are discovered by media or important people in power who are 

able to share their cultural and social capital with the one discovered. The process 

of employment and discovery empowers and helps personas to accumulate 

power in local channels. These practices also define and unify audiences on the 

grounds of common interest in persona. 

However the open communication spaces being open to everybody usually can 

not offer valuable signification practices. In such channels as Youtube social 

networking site users are supplied with an unrestricted opportunity to join them 

and in some cases create or personalize parts of these channels. This way the 

owner of the system does not exclude the creator from the crowd and does not 

signify him or her as a special person. 

So called semantic macro-structures or topics, which personas or their media 

creators choose to communicate are very important in the process of audience 

identification with the celebrity. Continuous publication of pictures with Cory 

Kennedy in the celebrity gallery raises the question of her identity. The legends of 

her origin are created (Shawn, 2007). Mark Hunter, who became popular because 

of continuous trade of social and cultural capital with celebrities of Los Angeles, 

shares his accumulated capital with new starlet Cory Kennedy. Her pictures appeared 

often in “The Cobrasnake” gallery in 2005-2006, where she was spotted 

young, fashionable and partying with the most popular people in the hip parties 

of Los Angeles. This way the cultural, symbolic and social capital of Cory Kenne-

134 

3 Most popular 

American celebrity 

gossip publications 

People and In Touch 

magazines frequently 

uses pink and Turkish 

blue colors and 

color yellow in their 

publications. 

4 Discrimination based 

on sexual orientation 

was forbidden in EU 

in 2000 (directive 

2000/43/EC). In the 

second Charter of 

Fundamental Rights of 

the European Union 

it is declared that a 

human has a right to 

private and family 

life, right to marry 

and found a family, 

however in 2010 there 

are six EU countries 

which legally recognize 

and perform same-sex 

marriages, there are 

seven states in USA 

which recognize and 

perform same-sex 

marriage. In USA 

there is no federal 

law prohibiting 

discrimination based 

on sexual orientation, 

however it was debated 

in 2007. (European 

Communities, 2009). 


dy is affirmed and re-affirmed again. If Cory Kennedy is created with the help of 

“The Cobrasnake” and Mark Hunter, Chris Crocker does it himself. In his video 

monologues Chris Crocker declares himself a part of the queer community by 

the topics of discussion. 

First of all, most of the topics he discusses in his video posts are topics related to 

him being queer in a small American town or to him being queer and popular. 

Meanings are also transmitted through the visual characteristics of his persona: 

vivid make-up, female like dressing style, long blond dyed hair, over-feminized 

gesticulation. Some of the meanings are transmitted through language characteristics 

such as sexualized talk, manner of spoken and body language. The usage 

of the colors pink and Turkish blue in his profile links to gossip and celebrity 

publications 3 . The color pink also refers to the LGBT community in the Western 

world. In his profile there are still pictures of him, depicting him in various 

playful positions which are specific to female depictions in British and American 

mass culture oriented towards teenagers: for example, slightly opened mouth, 

clear skin, curly blond dyed hair, gazing straight into the camera, close ups inclining 

nudity (which is never shown). The topic of homosexuality is politically 

and socially relevant in Europe and USA 4 , therefore articulating those topics he 

signifies his persona culturally and symbolically. 

Personas are created in different contexts. Mark Hunter publicizes photos of 

Cory Kennedy in a celebrity party gallery. The consumers of Cory Kennedy celebrity 

are not only those locals interested in partying and living in Los Angeles, 

but also audiences from all over the world, who are tempted to take a look at the 

celebrity party action. 

Another example is Goda Domekaite, who is employed as a PR manager of club 

Gravity and author of its newsletter, which is not only accessible to registered 

users, but also closed for other authors and the locality of the channel is reserved 

only for a number of people registered. 

Reserved local areas, in which channels like Internet news portals, subcultural 

zines operate, have already accumulated certain amount of cultural, social and 

symbolic capital on the location of their operation. This capital empowers the 

Internet persona to be employed or discovered. The professional position of manager 

(Goda Domeikaitė) of club “Gravity” signifies the Internet persona as important 

to club “Gravity”. The Internet persona purpose is similar to the purpose 

of the newsletter: they both work to encourage people visit club “Gravity”. Club 

“Gravity” was one of the most popular night clubs in Vilnius and Goda Domei- 



kaitė becomes a vicegerent of the club to her audiences. The symbolic capital is 

provided for Goda by calling her the PR manager of club Gravity and at the same 

time signifying her as an important person in popular club and in the whole 

lithuanian club industry. Chris Crockers persona, not like Goda Domeikate, has 

no localy situated audiences, his communication channel is not tied to the certain 

location, so his celebrity is available for consumption globally. However he 

himself reserves this consumption by choosing the topics he discusses (LGBT 

problems), which attracts certain people from all over the world. 

Reproductional areas can be supplied by the system (Youtube has a comment and video 

response areas placed in the website architecture) or invented by the users themselves, 

citing their personal reproductions in the primary communication areas. 

Though technically there is no availability for audience reproduction inside the 

newsletter channel, Goda Domeikaite creates it herself. The newsletter often 

mentions her correspondence with the readers: “Last week my readers and I discussed 

a lot about politics in Lithuania” (Goda, 2009); “The last letter raised great 

interest in my new tattoo” (Goda, 2009). Citing certain feedback and disseminating 

it back to the users enables her to reaffirm her popular identity again. Goda 

Domeikaitė reaffirms her popular identity by declaring that my readers and I 

discussed a lot and her tattoo raised great interest. 

Open communication spaces, such as Youtube, register and publicly list various 

evidences of user participation. These evidences are channel view count, subscriber 

count, friend count, favorites count, etc. The Youtube system supplies its 

users with the tools for the interpretation and reinterpretation of Internet celebrity 

representations. I call these reproductional areas. The virtual public persona 

(or the owner of communication channel) is in a power position, because it is 

in his or her right to decide which interpretations of themselves will be shown in 

association with his or her content. For example, Youtube supplies the consumers 

of a specific video with the option to evaluate the video, comment or respond 

to a video. The evaluation or comment, in the case of popular Chris Crocker, 

is likely to disappear in the system, because of the sheer volume of the messages. 

Video responses or other interpretations demonstrate active participation in 

meaning production. The Chris Crocker video “Leave Britney alone!” had more 

than two thousand responses in autumn, 2010. Some of these depicted the same 

settings, external appearance, camera positioning, and re-interpreted speech of 

Chris Crocker in the video „Leave Britney Alone“. A class of videos asking to leave 

somebody else alone can be identified in this group. For example, videos like

136 


“Leave Barack Alone”, “Leave care bears alone!”, “Leave Crocker alone” or “Leave 

K-Fed Alone” take the already popular form of “Leave Britney alone” and reuse 

it for their own purposes. 

These parody videos act in two ways: (1) they help Chris Crocker to accumulate 

social and cultural capital because they are semiotically linked to his creation. 

Users reinterpreting this video not only transmit their creations, but they link 

to “Leave Britney alone” as well. It helps Chris Crocker creations to accumulate 

popularity within Youtube network, because the parodies will be available for the 

networks of their creators. However, at the same time, using this popular narrative 

(2) helps to accumulate social and cultural capital for the authors of these 

parodies. Because they are visible in the page structure of the popular page and 

they are related to the original by the name, so it is very likely for them to appear 

in the results of a search engine. 

The audiences are able to use the reproduction spaces supplied by the Youtube 

channel: they crystallize the elements of the persona into cultural codes and therefore 

are able to use these elements to create their own meanings. The dissemination 

of the representations of popular persona helps to accumulate popularity 

and cultural capital. 

SECONDARY COMMUNICATION AREAS: 

MASS MEDIA AND AUDIENCE REPRODUCTION 

If the primary communication area is the area where the persona creates himself, 

secondary areas are for media reproduction. The secondary communication 

areas are defined in order to show how popularity is disseminated outside the 

primary communication areas. The primary communication areas are for the 

creation of the Internet persona, where the persona acts himself. Secondary communication 

areas are for media and fan reproduction. The reproductions may 

appear in various forms, ranging from fan group pages, to fan web pages, blogs, 

newspapers, TV channels, radio shows, and podcasts, etc. These can be classified 

according to the involvement and influence of the Internet celebrity on the 

reproduction (Table 1): (1) self-reproduction areas where the Internet personas 

disseminate their representations and popularize themselves, these include twitter 

accounts, blogs, available mass media, etc. Persona has a high impact on the 

end result; (2) community reproduction areas of virtual celebrities. Like fanpages, 

fangroups, interest groups, where reproductions are disseminated and shared 

between the people having interest in certain celebrity. The Internet persona 

has a low influence on the end result; (3) media reproduction areas. Newspapers, 

radio, TV shows. Low influence on reproduction; (4) other areas. 


Self-reproduction 

area 

Community 

eproduction 

area 

Media reproduction 

area 

Communication channels 

Openly available personal, semipersonal 

communication areas: blogs, 

micro-blogs, personal video channels, 

audio channels etc. 

Can overlap with community and 

media reproduction areas. 

Openly or semi-openly available 

communication and social networking 

pages: community pages, fan pages, 

groups, email-groups, forums, 

comments etc. 

Can overlap with self and media 

reproduction areas. 

Mass media channels. Require employment, 

invitation to a show, etc. 


Personas direct impact on 

the end result 

High. 

Main creator, producer 

or the gatekeeper of the 

content. 

Low. 

The content is mainly created 

by virtual community or 

other virtual personas. 

Low. 

Content is created by media 

professionals. 

Self-reproduction is a common practice for Internet personas. Chris Crocker 

maintains his own MySpace channel, Twitter account, blog in the tumblr system, 

and iTunes account to represent himself. Chris Crocker has a fan page (bebo. 

com) – 999 fans, Facebook fan page – and more than eight-thousand subscribers; 

however, fan messages appear vaguely, there are no discussions or collective 

action related to the Internet celebrity. 

Chris Crocker is reproduced in the mass media. His LGBT related topics appeal 

to the LGBT community. In this way mutual trust is founded. Chris Crocker 

appeared on the Maury Povich talk show in 2007 and on several other popular 

TV and radio shows. This leads to greater recognition in the public sphere. He is 

also reproduced in other media channels. He hosted the „Reality Remix Really 

Awards“ (Fox Reality Channel, Inc, 2007); in this he not only shares symbolic 

capital with Fox Reality Channel, but he re-affirms his persona. Reproduction in 

secondary communication areas helps to broaden the network and accumulate 

cultural and social capital within. 

Table 1. 

Persona 

reproduction 

areas and 

impact

138 


DISCUSSION 

This article aimed to reveal the role of self-signification practices and the structure 

of media channel in popularity and leadership accumulation in virtual social 

networks. Throughout the research it was revealed that self-signification practices 

include three main ingredients: (1) publicity, (2) engagement in interactive 

communication practices and (3) meanings the communication bear. 

(1) Internet celebrities are as well media production (Giles, 2000), because in 

contemporary communication environment media is vital to publicity. Internet 

celebrities usually have a direct access to media channels aimed to popularize 

themselves. If popular personas become popular, when their representations are 

constantly repeated in the media, subcultural popularity is accumulated in semiclosed 

fan networks, for the Internet celebrity popularity accumulation means 

exploiting both (fan network and mass media) strategies. (2) The quality of the 

relations between an Internet celebrity and fans depends on both engagement in 

interactive process of the production and reproduction of meaning. Therefore 

interactivity means more than publicity – it is not constituted by the media system, 

but depends on the users themselves. The more users decide to engage in the 

communication with the celebrity, the higher level of attachment they hold. (3) 

The engagement level and success depends on the meanings Internet celebrities 

disseminate, because fans are able to identify with the celebrity and causes and 

values it communicates. 

The structure of media channel, its virtual architecture defines the communication 

genres between the Internet celebrity and the audience. Media service provider 

supplies the persona creator with technological means for communication. 

In the media platform communication genres are pre-scribed and it depends on 

the informational architecture how Internet celebrity and audiences can interact 

(are there commentary forms, video response possibility, etc.). However, the persona 

creator can prompt genres that are not available, by encouraging users for 

interactivity. For example commentary form can be replaced by fan letters to the 

celebrity and celebrity can encourage interactivity by publicly citing them. Open 

and reserved communication channels were identified in order to show how 

channels can signify and empower it’s users (the empowerment given by national 

television, labour party newspaper and Youtube channel will differ). Usually if 

the channel has accumulated valuable social and cultural capital, the availability 

to join it is reserved. In other words, it is not for everybody to start their Internet 

celebrity on the pages of Gawker.com or Thenewyorktimes.com. 

However already popular channels are able to signify and popularize the persona 

created in this environment. If the channel is open, the work of popularity 



accumulation must be carried out by internet persona creator himself/herself. 

Website architecture reveals that the positioning of the texts shows the power 

configuration in the network, giving the dominant space for the celebrity leader 

and the dominated space for the audience reproduction. However, a celebrity 

can draw attention to the texts of the audience by quoting them, commenting on 

them, etc. In this way interactive communication is created. 

The research was pursued following the tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis 

and choosing a supplementary approach – capital accumulation analysis. 

In this respect, the discourses of leadership are created when certain personas 

accumulate social, cultural, symbolic capital, because all of these are the sources 

of power. The research showed that the relation between audience and Internet 

celebrity is comparable to the model of subcultural celebrity and his or her audience. 

It is more interactive and in some cases even personal. The relation between 

Internet celebrity and mass media is similar to the relation of the (traditional) 

celebrity to the mass media. Mass media reproduces the persona which already 

has accumulated certain amount of popularity, so this way the popularity helps 

to accumulate more popularity. 

However, leadership discourses are maintained by the discursive structures of 

communication. Established media channels have power accumulated (they are 

known) that can signify the persona as important and powerful within the given 

context, whereas in un-established channels, the channels unknown to the 

general public, the internet persona has to create him-/herself from the scratch. 

Contemporary social networking sites are constructed to support and help to 

establish those things that are already popular. The power of the persona is constituted 

by the networked relations and the number of them constitute the power 

persona will be able to accumulate. 

This research gives a framework but not a detailed strategy of popularity accumulation 

in the virtual environments. If aiming to appeal to certain interest group 

or internet community, broader research in user values and their action patterns 

should be carried out, as well as the research of virtual service platform itself. As 

these environments change rapidly, the change on communication genres and 

practices is inevitable.

140 


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142 

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media and journalism studies, that focuses on structural changes in the 

media, the changing role and functions of media in relation to society, and comparative 

aspects of media’s own multiple and diverse transformations. The journal 

invites papers addressing a wide range of topics related to global and local transformations 

of media systems and journalism practices, particularly structural and 

cultural changes in the media, technological diffusion and convergence of media 

industries, commercialization and homogenization of journalism, changing media 

values and policies, journalism training and media education, and media and 

cultural industries. 

Contributions which address the above-mentioned topics from conceptual, 

empirical and methodological points of view are all welcome 

(media@pmdf.vdu.lt). 

Manuscript should include the following: 

� Name, position, degree, institution and e-mail address of the author(s) 

� Title of the article 

� Abstract of no longer than 250 words 

� Keywords including no more than 6 words 

� Body text of the article should not exceed 7000 words 

� References should be listed alphabetically in the following standard form 

For books: 

Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University 

Press. 

Hallin, D. &Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of 

Media and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 

For articles: 

Eide, M. (2007). Encircling the Power of Journalism. Nordicom Review, 

Vol. 28, 21-29. 

Curran, J.; Iyengar, S.; Lund, A. & Salovaara-Moring, I. (2009). Media 

system, public knowledge and democracy: A comparative study. European 

Journal of Communication, Vol. 24(1), 5-26.

For book chapters: 


Holtz-Bacha, C. (2004). Political Communication Research Abroad: Europe. 

In L. L. Kaid (ed.), Handbook of Political Communication Research. Mahwah, 

NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 463-477. 

For online publications: 

Hume, E. (2007). University Journalism Education: A Global Challenge. 

A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance. Retrieved 

September 10, 2010, from http://www.ellenhume.com/articles/education.pdf. 

Reference in manuscript: 

(McNair, 2002:125) 

Manuscript should be 1.5 lines spaced, 12 pt, and typed in Times New Roman. All 

tables, figures and photos should be clearly described, indicating the source. Tables 

and figures should be numbered consequently with an appropriate caption, eg. 

Table 1, Table 2, Figure 1, Figure 2, etc. Notes should be numbered consequently 

through the text and typed at the end of the manuscript. 

Manuscripts are peer-reviewed by 2 referees appointed by the editors. 


ISSN 2029-865X 


Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy 


K. Donelaičio St. 58, Kaunas LT-44246 

Phone: +370 37 327891 

E-mail: media@pmdf.vdu.lt 

Website: http://www.mediatransformations.eu

MEDIA TRANSFORMATIONS

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