quiet-the-power-of-introverts-in-a-world-that-cant-stop-talking-susan-cain

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representing a bank considering buyinga portfolio of subprime mortgage loansmade by other lenders. My job was toperform due diligence—to review thedocumentation to see whether the loanshad been made with the proper paperwork.Had the borrowers been notifiedof the interest rates they were slated topay? That the rates would go up overtime?The papers turned out to be chockfullof irregularities. If I’d been in thebankers’ shoes, this would have mademe nervous, very nervous. But whenour legal team summarized the risks ina caution-filled conference call, thebankers seemed utterly untroubled.They saw the potential profits of buyingthose loans at a discount, and theywanted to go ahead with the deal. Yetit was just this kind of risk-reward miscalculationthat contributed to the470/929

failure of many banks during the GreatRecession of 2008.At about the same time I evaluatedthat portfolio of loans, I heard a storycirculating on Wall Street about a competitionamong investment banks for aprestigious piece of business. Each ofthe major banks sent a squad of theirtop employees to pitch the client. Eachteam deployed the usual tools: spreadsheets, “pitch books,” and PowerPointpresentations. But the winning team addedits own piece of theatrics: they raninto the room wearing matching baseballcaps and T-shirts emblazoned withthe letters FUD, an acronym for Fear,Uncertainty, and Doubt. In this case FUDhad been crossed out with an emphaticred X; FUD was an unholy trinity. Thatteam, the vanquishers of FUD, won thecontest.471/929

representing a bank considering buying

a portfolio of subprime mortgage loans

made by other lenders. My job was to

perform due diligence—to review the

documentation to see whether the loans

had been made with the proper paperwork.

Had the borrowers been notified

of the interest rates they were slated to

pay? That the rates would go up over

time?

The papers turned out to be chockfull

of irregularities. If I’d been in the

bankers’ shoes, this would have made

me nervous, very nervous. But when

our legal team summarized the risks in

a caution-filled conference call, the

bankers seemed utterly untroubled.

They saw the potential profits of buying

those loans at a discount, and they

wanted to go ahead with the deal. Yet

it was just this kind of risk-reward miscalculation

that contributed to the

470/929

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