A Constitution for the Common Good by W Elliot Bulmer sampler

elliot bulmer, after graduating with an ma in Arabic and Politics
from the University of Edinburgh, was commissioned as a Logistics
Officer in the Royal Navy and served in Iraq as part of a psyops unit.
After leaving the Navy, he completed a phd in Politics at the University
of Glasgow while working as Research Director of the Constitutional
Commission, a Scottish charitable organisation for constitutional
education and research. He now works for the Constitution Building
Programme of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance in The Hague, Netherlands. He is the author of A Model
Constitution for Scotland: Making Democracy Work in an Independent
State (Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2011) and several articles on constitutional
subjects in peer-reviewed academic journals, as well as being
a frequent contributor to Scotland’s consti tutional debate in print
and online.
Luath Press is an independently owned and managed book publishing
company based in Scotland, and is not aligned to any political party or
grouping. Viewpoints is an occasional series exploring issues of current
and future relevance. All opinions is this book are the sole opinions of
the author and do not represent the position of International idea, the
Constitutional Commission or any other person or organisation.

A Constitution for the
Common Good
Strengthening Scottish Democracy
after the Independence Referendum
W. ELLIOT BULMER
Luath Press Limited
EDINBURGH
www.luath.co.uk

First published 2014
New Edition 2015
isbn: 978-1-910021-09-5
The paper used in this book is recyclable. It is made from
low chlorine pulps produced in a low energy, low emissions manner
from renewable forests.
Printed and bound by
Bell & Bain Ltd., Glasgow
Typeset in 11 point Sabon
by 3btype.com
The author’s right to be identified as author of this work under the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 has been asserted.
© W. Elliot Bulmer

How splendid and honourable it is to mediate on government and
public administration, on which our well-being, our health and our
life depend.
francesco guicciardini,
Dialogue on the Government of Florence, 1527
For some men falsely persuading themselves that bad governments
are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their
ambition, avarice, and luxury, set themselves with the utmost art and
violence to procure their establishment: and by such men almost the
whole world has been trampled underfoot, and subjected to tyranny,
for want of understanding by what means and methods they were
enslaved. For though mankind take great care and pains to instruct
themselves in other arts and sciences, yet very few apply themselves
to consider the nature of government, an enquiry so useful and
necessary both to magistrate and people. Nay, in most countries the
arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the people, or
to keep them under slavery; it is become almost everywhere a crime
to reason about matters of government. But if men would bestow a
small part of the time and application which they throw away upon
curious but useless studies, or endless gaming, in perusing those
excellent rules and examples of government which the ancients have
left us, they would soon be enabled to discover all such abuses and
corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is therefore very
strange that they should think study and knowledge necessary in
everything they go about, except in the noblest and most useful of all
applications, the art of government.
andrew fletcher of Saltoun,
A Discourse of Government With Relation to Militias, 1698

Acknowledgements
Writing a book is a solitary endeavour, but producing a book – which
involves turning the raw text into something publishable and readable – is
always a joint effort. I particularly wish to thank: Dr Craig MacAngus
and Dr Peter Lynch, both of the University of Stirling, for reviewing drafts
and providing valuable feedback; John Drummond, of the Constitutional
Commission, for his unstinting support; my parents, for their continued
encouragement; Gavin MacDougall and the team at Luath Press, for their
efforts in ensuring a swift turn-around from manu script to finished book;
my colleagues at International idea, especially Sumit Bisarya and Professor
Tom Ginsburg; and lastly but most importantly my wife Eva who has
fulfilled the duties of scribe, editor, reference­ checker and caterer-in-chief
with good cheer and patience.
6

Contents
Acknowledgements 6
Preface to the Second Edition 9
Introduction 13
chapter one
Does the Constitution still matter? 21
i Independence, Democracy and the Constitution 23
ii Independence, Sovereignty and Folkric 27
iii The Constitutional Debate before the Independence Referendum 29
iv Constitutionalism without Independence? 36
a A Federal United Kingdom 39
b A New Treaty of Union 45
c Home Rule 47
chapter two
How can Constitutions promote the common good? 52
i The Common Good as the Purpose of the State 53
ii What is the Common Good? 58
iii Common Good, Pluralism and Pre-commitment 61
iv Political Liberty as a Common Good 65
chapter three
How prescriptive should the Constitution be? 67
i The Case for Procedural Constitutionalism 67
ii The Limits of Prescriptive Constitutionalism 80
iii The Relationship between Procedural and Prescriptive Elements 84
chapter four
How could the Constitution strengthen democracy? 93
i Direct Democracy 95
ii Representation and Inclusiveness 104
iii Second Chamber: Senate or Tribunate? 117
iv Local Democracy 124
v Democratising Parties 127
chapter five
How can the Constitution promote good governance
and accountability? 131
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a constitution for the common good
i Parliamentary Scrutiny and Fourth Branch Institutions 131
ii Recall and Popular Dissolution 139
iii Prime Ministerial Term Limits 143
iv Guarding the Guardians: Supervision of the Military
and Security Services 146
chapter six
How can the Constitution reflect our values and identities? 152
i The Preamble and Para-Consitutional Covenants 152
ii Religion and State 159
iii Monarchy and National Identity 170
chapter seven
How can the Constitution help us to achieve social justice,
tackle poverty and reduce inequality? 177
i Social and Economic Rights 177
ii Judicial or Political Enforcement 181
iii Beyond Rights: Empowering the People 184
chapter eight
How can the Constitution promote public ethics? 187
i The need for Good Citizenship 188
ii Education for Citizenship 191
iii Principles of Public Life and Codes of Conduct 194
iv Public Honours 199
chapter nine
How can we build a new constitutional settlement? 201
i Does process matter? 201
ii Stages of the process 208
iii Possible next steps 213
appendices 219
appendix a A Constitution for an Independent Scotland 221
appendix b ‘A New Treaty of Union’ 270
appendix c A Home Rule and Full Fiscal Autonomy Settlement for
Scotland 277
appendix d A Constitution for a Federal United Kingdom 284
Endnotes 325
8

Preface to the Second Edition
the first edition of this book appeared in August 2014, shortly before
the referendum on Scottish independence. This second edition appears
after the May 2015 uk general election, in which the Scottish National
Party achieved nearly a clean sweep of Scottish seats (56 out of 59, leaving
Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Tories with just one seat apiece).
Much has changed over the intervening period. As the referendum result
was to many a great disappointment, so the general election result was a
sign of hope. It was a sign that all was not lost, that Scotland has emerged
from the last few years stronger and more self-confident, and that the
constitutional question is far from settled.
The general election result is a sign, above all, that Scotland can no
longer be dealt with in the old colonial way, with a mild sop here and a
messy fudge there. While the Tory establishment in London may wish to
go back to the business of oligarchy as usual, the people of Scotland have
sent a clear warning signal: ‘We stayed in the Union on the promise of
radical and fundamental change; deliver it, quickly, or we will leave’. Even
the most arrogant, blinkered and conceited of British Prime Ministers
cannot fail to hear that warning. Whether they have the sense to heed it,
of course, is another matter.
It is clear, too, that the activism and engagement sparked by the
independence referendum has not dissipated. Membership of the Scottish
National Party tripled in the few weeks following the vote, whilst membership
of the Scottish Green Party doubled. The networks, platforms, media
channels and organisations created by the referendum campaign have
continued to exist. People are ‘not going back to their sofas’, as Robin
McAlpine, leader of the Common Weal campaign, put it.
Independence is off the agenda for now, but it might not remain so for
long. If Westminster fails to change its ways, and if it proves itself
incapable of accommodating a free and autonomous Scotland within a
reformed Union, then one can imagine various scenarios in which the
demand for a second referendum on independence – or on a package of
constitutional measures very close to independence – may become irresistible.
Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, has repeatedly stated that a
9

a constitution for the common good
vote for the snp in the general election was not a vote for independence,
and that there are no plans at present to hold a second independence
referendum. This comes, however, with two very important caveats:
firstly, that the snp manifesto for the 2016 Scottish Parliament election is
yet to be written, and that manifesto might well outline conditions under
which another independence referendum would be held; and secondly,
that a substantial change in circumstances – such as a vote on leaving the
European Union – might force a second independence referendum rather
sooner than many had anticipated.
Many of those who voted No in September 2014 did so only on a
conditional basis, taking last minute interventions by former Prime
Minister Gordon Brown as an indication that a No vote would guarantee
much greater autonomy for Scotland within a radically reformed Union.
A ‘solemn vow’ to this effect was publicly given by Brown and affirmed
by the leaders of the Conservatives, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats.
Thus the referendum can be interpreted not only as a rejection, for the
time being, of full independence, but also as an endorsement of substantial
constitutional change within the uk. Even if a second referendum on
independence is not forthcoming, the deep constitutional problems facing
Scotland and the rest of the uk are not going to go away. Scotland is still
unequally yoked to an ill-constituted fading imperial state, in which
dissatisfaction is still growing and tensions between different countries
and classes are increasing. An acceptable and democratic solution to this
problem must be found before unacceptable solutions, of a regressive and
anti-democratic nature, are imposed upon us.
The snp group in the Westminster Parliament, in conjunction with the
Scottish Government, should push for the full implementation of the vow,
taking advantage of the vow to claim the largest sphere of autonomy
possible short of full independence. Now is the time to respond to the
Scottish public’s endorsement of fundamental change and to articulate a
viable constitutional position that meets Scottish aspirations. There is an
opportunity to capture the public imagination, to set the terms of debate,
and to build a broad consensus around an intermediate position between
independence and devolution that can unite both disappointed Yes voters
and the broad swathes of No voters who still want real change. This
intermediate position would not be merely a transfer of limited powers
10

preface to the second edition
from one government and parliament to another, as envisaged by the
lukewarm proposals of the Smith Commission, but a more radical
reconfiguration of the state.
This second edition therefore contains a new section charting out three
possible models of constitutional change that Scotland could pursue within
the United Kingdom: a federal model, in which the uk would be reconstituted
as an equal union of four nation states; a new Treaty of Union,
which would provide for a bi-lateral relationship between Scotland and
the rest of the uk, and a ‘Home Rule’ arrangement that would leave the
central institutions of the uk relatively unchanged, but greatly diminish
their influence and control over Scotland. Which track we take depends
partly on the willingness of Westminster to give ground and partly on the
extent to which the other parts of the uk wish to travel with us, but each
of these solutions could in principle deliver the secure and substantial
autonomy for Scotland promised in the vow. This means that Scotland
could be fully internally self-governing and self-financing, and have a
constitutionally secured position that is not subject to the will of
Westminster, while remaining part of the uk for the purposes of foreign
affairs and defence, and while sharing a limited range of powers in
relation to passports, citizenship, the currency and similar matters.
The questions that were so energising and exciting before the referendum
(What sort of country would we like to be? What sort of democracy do
we need? How can we get there?) are too important to be forgotten and
swallowed up in unedifying partisan tussles over a pinch of stamp duty
here or a peck of income tax there. In taking this constitutional agenda
forward, whether in an independent Scotland or in an autonomous
Scotland within a reformed and ‘loosely United’ Kingdom, we (by which
I mean all who care about the freedom and well-being of Scotland, whether
for or against independence) must take care to ensure that democratic
constitutional change does not take a back seat to technocratic tinkering.
In particular, we must not allow ourselves, or our political representatives,
to become so embroiled in petty wrangling about ‘more powers’ that we
fail to engage in a deeper discussion about values and principles, or about
improving democratic processes and safeguarding fundamental rights.
11

Introduction
it is now nearly four years since my first book, A Model Constitution
for Scotland (2011), 1 was published. A Model Constitution stemmed from
a belief that the Scottish constitutional debate needed to be refocused,
away from the ‘status question’ of Scotland’s relationship with the rest of
the United Kingdom, and towards questions of good governance,
democratic participation, citizens’ rights and public values. I argued that
independence alone would not deliver its promised benefits without a
democratic constitutional foundation and that not ‘mere independence’,
but the much nobler ideal of a ‘free and civic way of life’, 2 should be, and
indeed long has been, the ultimate aim of the Scottish national movement.
This perspective is needed now, in the wake of the referendum, more
than ever before. Since September 2014 there has been much talk of ‘new
powers’, but almost no discussion of the constitutional structures within
which those powers might sit, or of the constitutional principles that
might guide and govern their proper use. The change that was worth
seeking before the referendum was not simply a transfer of power from
one Parliament to another; rather, it was the creation of a new and more
democratic constitutional settlement for Scotland. In the post-referendum
environ ment, when various forms of Home Rule or federalism are
reappearing on the medium-term agenda, that desire for real constitutional
change is as relevant and as challenging as ever.
I also sought to show that freedom cannot simply be defined in terms
of economic freedom, or individual freedom to act without responsibility
or restraint; such debased notions of freedom belong to tyrants, oligarchs
and outlaws, not to citizens. Freedom in its civic, democratic sense necessarily
includes active membership in a self-governing polity through which
we the people deliberate upon and try to discern the common good. In
other words, freedom is defined in terms of ‘democratic voice’, not just
‘market choice’. Democratic citizenship is a communal, not an individualistic,
preoccupation. It is always intimately and intrinsically connected
to a concern for social justice, for the removal of gross inequalities in
material condition and for the promotion of a good, flourishing life.
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a constitution for the common good
Aside from making these general, somewhat normative points, my
intention in writing A Model Constitution was a modest one. A Model
Constitution never claimed to be the final word on the subject of what
form a Constitution for an independent Scotland should take. I simply
wished to help inform public decisions by showing readers, most of whom
have no experience of life under a written Constitution, and may never
have even seen one, a what a workable, achievable and broadly acceptable
Constitution for Scotland might look like. I sought neither to predict nor
to prescribe any particular set of constitutional outcomes, but only to
illustrate general principles by way of a ‘worked example’ in order to
encourage more informed public debate and more committed public
action. Judging by the comments I have received from readers and from
my experience of attending public meetings in my capacity as Research
Director of the Constitutional Commission, the book fulfilled these intentions
with some success.
Over the last few years, I have had opportunities to discuss A Model
Constitution with Scottish Cabinet ministers, members of the Scottish
Parliament (from several parties), civil servants, academics in the fields of
politics and public law, and members of leading civil society organisations.
I have also presented the Model Constitution at many public meetings,
and have learnt much from listening to citizens who, although they might
have previously had no particular interest in constitutional affairs, have
come to recognise that a Constitution is key to realising their desire to live
in a better Scotland. More recently, through my work with the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, I have been
able to engage with people working on constitution-building processes in
emerging democracies. These experiences have continued to refine my
thinking about what sort of Constitution would be needed in Scotland, as
a
In this book, following the conventional usage of almost all democracies outside the
United Kingdom, the word ‘Constitution’ refers always to a supreme law that, as a
minimum: (i) defines the state; (ii) regulates its major political institutions and
processes; (iii) protects civil liberties and fundamental human rights; (iv) is binding on
all institutions of the state, including Parliament itself; and (iv) can be amended only
by a special process, usually requiring a broader consensus than that required for the
enactment of ordinary legislation. The uk, in this sense of the word, has no ‘constitution’
at all, and the idea of an ‘unwritten, unentrenched, unenforceable constitution’
is oxymoronic.
14

introduction
well as challenging some of my previous assumptions on the boundaries
of constitutional possibility.
A Model Constitution concerned itself mainly with the institutional
mechanics of a Constitution for Scotland. It discussed how to elect the
First Minister, the powers of the Presiding Officer, the appointment of
judges, the workings of the electoral system, the composition of the Electoral
Commission, the process of enacting legislation, the rules concerning the
dissolution of Parliament, different types of referendum, and other institutional
matters concerning the form and structures of government. However,
a number of difficult and controversial substantive issues (such as the
relation of the state to religion, or the statement of values and principles
in a preamble) were omitted, or covered only briefly. In some cases this
omission was due to constraints of space and time, in others because I had
not yet come to fully recognise their salience.
With increasing calls for a United Kingdom-wide constitutional settlement,
a and Scotland’s place within or relationship to the United Kingdom
still very much in question after the independence referendum, now is an
opportune time to reflect self-critically upon A Model Constitution, to update
the reader on recent developments, and also to discuss questions of content,
context and process that were not fully addressed in the earlier work.
This book takes a step back from institutional engineering to discuss
the cultural, political and social considerations of constitutionalism. It
marks a shift in emphasis from the letter of the Constitution to the spirit.
Whereas A Model Constitution focused on the dry bones of ‘rules and
rights’ in the Constitution, as they might feature in the work of politicians,
civil servants or lawyers, this book also shows how the living flesh of the
Constitution – reflecting our values, reinforcing our aspirations, and
resonating in our hearts – can be relevant to the everyday lives of ordinary
citizens.
a
The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons has
even gone so far as to publish a draft Constitution for the United Kingdom for
discussion. This is a very centralising text, which would significantly reduce the powers
of the Scottish Parliament, but it is at least a technically sound draft that reflects the
basic principles of constitutional democracy. The text of the draft constitution is
contained in the committee’s Second Report, dated 3 July 2014: www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpolcon/463/46302.htm
15

a constitution for the common good
This book is written for four groups of people. Firstly, it is addressed
to supporters of independence or substantially increased autonomy for
Scotland who are unconvinced by, or uncommitted to, the principle of a
written Constitution. It hopes to convince these people that the promise of
‘more powers’ would not deliver their expected social, political, economic
and cultural gains without a commitment to democracy, human rights and
good governance, underpinned by a strong Constitution. Secondly, it is
addressed to those who wish to see progressive political change, notably
in the areas of constitutional and institutional reform, but who see Britain
through a Westminster-centric lens; I wish to show this group that, given
the chronic structural failures of democracy the United Kingdom, a bit more
devolution here and there is not going to do the job. Thirdly, I have in
mind those who are already committed to independence or substantial
autonomy and to a new constitutional settle ment, and who wish to explore
the ways and means of constitution-building in more detail. I hope that this
group will benefit from the expanded treatment of the issues of substance
and process that were not covered, or were only briefly discussed, in A
Model Constitution. Finally, this book also hopes to make a modest
theoretical contribution to public and academic discussion of constitutions,
in terms of the relation of ‘charter’ to ‘covenant’, that will be of
interest to people outside Scotland and the United Kingdom, whatever
trajectory we take.
Going beyond the institutional focus of my earlier work, this book
considers the wider aims, purposes, nature and scope of a Constitution,
particularly as it relates to democracy, pluralism and the common good.
The central problems of authoritarian backsliding, incumbent manipulation
and corruption that any good Constitution must guard against, as
well as the issues of identity, values and public ethics that any Constitution
is required to address, will continue to face us whether we carry a Scottish
or a British passport. The themes and ideas discussed in the book are
therefore of direct and immediate relevance to Scottish citizens, and to
people throughout the United Kingdom, as we go about the difficult
process of forging a new constitutional order for ourselves, whether this
happens to be in the context of an independent Scotland, in an autonomous
Scotland trying to protect and improve itself through constitutional
guarantees, or in a United Kingdom that finds the courage and ingenuity
needed to reconstitute itself as a federation of free and equal nations.
16

introduction
Much of this book is devoted to the problem of how to reflect common
values and promote the common good while preserving the diversity of a
free and open society. It argues for a ‘civic constitutionalism’. This differs
from the liberal tradition in recognising that there is a ‘common good’ in
society, and that a democratic state is required to play an active, positive
role in the attainment of the common good. However, it does not accept
the illiberal and utopian notion that there is any single, abstract, and
universally evident expression of the common good to be discovered and
imposed by a virtuous minority or by an arcane priesthood of ideological
visionaries. Instead, the common good is recognised as existing in a
contin gent and ephemeral way; it is discovered as a result of pragmatic
agreements arising from political participation, deliberation and negotiation.
This applies: (i) generally, to the common good of society as a whole,
which is the underlying aim of the common weal; and (ii) specifically, in
relation to each policy decision.
If freedom from tyranny and oppression is essential to human flourishing,
and if the common good is to be discovered and sustained through
public deliberation, it follows that there must be freedom of conscience,
association, discussion and political action, and that no one person, nor
any particular group of people, should hold preponderant power in the
state. The primary requirement of a good Constitution, then, is that it
should protect fundamental human rights and democratic processes, and
thus facilitate an open, pluralistic, deliberative politics under the rule of
law. Yet this is not the only requirement. As well as being a legal charter,
through which our rights are protected and under which our public
institutions operate, a Constitution also embodies a national covenant.
Without eroding or denying our many differences, it declares the promises
that we make to one another as fellow citizens, declares the commonly
agreed standards that we are determined to uphold in our public life, and
so expresses our commitment not only to the rights and institutions, but
also to the values and mores of the res publica.
The purpose of the Constitution, according to this understanding, is
not to impose one single view of the common good on the whole of society
(in contrast, for example, to the ideological constitutions of Soviet republics,
or the theological constitutions of Islamic republics), but to reflect deep
and enduring public agreements about the common good (its ‘covenantal’
17

a constitution for the common good
function) while ‘holding the ring’ for public decision-making on how to
resolve particular policy decisions (its ‘charter’ function).This requires a
robust constitutional structure that: (i) protects against the manipulation
of the rules by incumbents, guards against authoritarian tendencies,
protects the rights of dissent and contestation through well-defended civil
liberties, promotes good governance, defines the ethical standards of a
healthy public life, and (ii) articulates the shared common values and the
baselines of human flourishing which enhance the well-being of all
citizens. This argument, together with its consequences for constitutional
design, is a recurring theme of this book.
Chapter One explains why the constitutional question was so integral
to the Scottish independence debate and why it remains integral to the
debate about Scotland’s future, whatever the extent of our relationship to
the rest of the United Kingdom. ‘More powers’ or even ‘full powers’ for
a Scottish Parliament would be of limited use or benefit if not backed by
a clear commitment to democracy, good governance, human rights and
public values. A newly added section discusses approaches to consti tutionalism
in a sovereign and self-governing but non-independent Scotland,
either through a federal United Kingdom or by means of a new Treaty of
Union or an autonomous ‘Home Rule’ Constitution for Scotland.
Chapter Two roots the constitutional project in a commitment to the
common good. It makes the case for an open and pluralist democratic
politics, in which various competing concepts of the common good can be
expressed. This need not, however, necessarily result in a blind, purpose less
‘constitution without values’. On the contrary, an open, pluralist and
democratic view of the common good – as something to be discovered
and determined through public deliberation – requires citizens to strive
for a broad consensus not only on basic rights and ground rules, but also
on the ethics, norms and values which will shape public life and enable
the common good to be realised.
Chapter Three considers the extent, nature and purpose of the Constitution.
Two contrasting elements of, or approaches to, a Constitution are
presented: the procedural ‘charter’ and the directive or prescriptive ‘covenant’.
The term ‘charter’ refers to the set of rights and rules that structure
political activity (‘the rules of the state’), whereas the term ‘covenant’ refers
to the ethical statements and values that shape politics (‘the spirit of the
18

introduction
country’). These distinctions cut across typical institutional categorisa tions,
such as whether a state is unitary or federal, has one or two legislative
chambers, uses a proportional or majoritarian electoral system, or has a
prime ministerial or presidential executive. In exploring the distinction
between these two constitutional approaches and understanding the
connection between them, many theoretical and practical problems of
constitutional design can be clarified. While both approaches are integral
to the whole – a Constitution is both ‘charter’ and ‘covenant’, specific
‘charter elements’ and ‘covenant elements’ can be expressed and enforced
in different ways, and to different extents, on a pragmatic basis, depending
on the needs and aspirations of each society at a given time.
Chapters Four to Eight discuss the application of these general
principles to the institutional and substantive provisions of a Constitution,
whether for an independent Scotland, for an autonomous Scotland within
the shell-state of the United Kingdom, or for a federal United Kingdom.
This discussion includes questions of public participation and democratic
quality (Chapter Four), accountability mechanisms (Chapter Five), issues
of identity, religion and nationhood (Chapter Six), social and economic
justice (Chapter Seven), and public ethics (Chapter Eight).
Finally, Chapter Nine considers the constitution building process. It
charts a potential roadmap towards the establishment of a new constitutional
order for Scotland, whether as part of a reformed United Kingdom
or otherwise. Drawing on experiences from other parts of the world, it
argues that the process of constitution making is as at least as important
as the textual outcome, and that a well-structured, inclusive and consensual
process is the best basis for a stable democratic future.
In summary, this book argues that if we wish to enjoy a flourishing life
in a free and socially just Scotland (whether Scotland is an independent
state or an autonomous state within a loosely federated United Kingdom)
then we need a ‘Constitution for everyone’: a Constitution that is directed
towards the common good of all its people, not towards the particular
privileges of the rich, powerful and influential. Such a Constitution would
facilitate all citizens to engage in an open and pluralist democratic process
through which the common good – in all its plurality and variability,
nuance and flexibility – can be identified and defended.
19