richard_dawkins_-_the_god_delusion
T H E G O D H Y P O T H E SIS 51cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable,and I live my life on the assumption that he is notthere.'7 Strong atheist. 'I know there is no God, with the sameconviction as Jung "knows" there is one.'I'd be surprised to meet many people in category 7, but I includeit for symmetry with category 1, which is well populated. It is in thenature of faith that one is capable, like Jung, of holding a beliefwithout adequate reason to do so (Jung also believed that particularbooks on his shelf spontaneously exploded with a loud bang).Atheists do not have faith; and reason alone could not propel oneto total conviction that anything definitely does not exist. Hencecategory 7 is in practice rather emptier than its opposite number,category 1, which has many devoted inhabitants. I countmyself in category 6, but leaning towards 7-1 am agnostic only tothe extent that I am agnostic about fairies at the bottom of thegarden.The spectrum of probabilities works well for TAP (temporaryagnosticism in practice). It is superficially tempting to place PAP(permanent agnosticism in principle) in the middle of the spectrum,with a 50 per cent probability of God's existence, but this is notcorrect. PAP agnostics aver that we cannot say anything, one wayor the other, on the question of whether or not God exists. Thequestion, for PAP agnostics, is in principle unanswerable, and theyshould strictly refuse to place themselves anywhere on the spectrumof probabilities. The fact that I cannot know whether your red isthe same as my green doesn't make the probability 50 per cent. Theproposition on offer is too meaningless to be dignified with a probability.Nevertheless, it is a common error, which we shall meetagain, to leap from the premise that the question of God's existenceis in principle unanswerable to the conclusion that his existence andhis non-existence are equiprobable.Another way to express that error is in terms of the burden ofproof, and in this form it is pleasingly demonstrated by BertrandRussell's parable of the celestial teapot. 31
52 T H E G O D D E L U S I O NMany orthodox people speak as though it were thebusiness of sceptics to disprove received dogmas ratherthan of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, amistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth andMars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in anelliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove myassertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot istoo small to be revealed even by our most powerfultelescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since myassertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumptionon the part of human reason to doubt it, Ishould rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however,the existence of such a teapot were affirmed inancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday,and instilled into the minds of children at school,hesitation to believe in its existence would become a markof eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions ofthe psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitorin an earlier time.We would not waste time saying so because nobody, so far as Iknow, worships teapots;* but, if pressed, we would not hesitate todeclare our strong belief that there is positively no orbiting teapot.Yet strictly we should all be teapot agnostics: we cannot prove, forsure, that there is no celestial teapot. In practice, we move awayfrom teapot agnosticism towards a-teapotisin.A friend, who was brought up a Jew and still observes thesabbath and other Jewish customs out of loyalty to his heritage,describes himself as a 'tooth fairy agnostic'. He regards God as nomore probable than the tooth fairy. You can't disprove eitherhypothesis, and both are equally improbable. He is an a-theist toexactly the same large extent that he is an a-fairyist. And agnosticabout both, to the same small extent.Russell's teapot, of course, stands for an infinite number ofthings whose existence is conceivable and cannot be disproved.That great American lawyer Clarence Darrow said, 'I don't believe* Perhaps I spoke too soon. The Independent on Sunday of 5 June 2005 carriedthe following item: 'Malaysian officials say religious sect which built sacred teapotthe size of a house has flouted planning regulations.' See also BBC News athttp://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4692039.stm.
- Page 6 and 7: ContentsPrefaceChapter 1Chapter 2Ch
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- Page 16 and 17: PREFACE 7Free Inquiry, especially,
- Page 18 and 19: A D E E P L Y R E L I G I O U S N O
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- Page 36 and 37: THE GOD HYPOTHESIS 31The God of the
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- Page 50 and 51: THE GOD HYPOTHESIS 45Anecdotes of s
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- Page 54 and 55: THE GOD HYPOTHESIS 49Huxley was not
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T H E G O D H Y P O T H E SIS 51
cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable,
and I live my life on the assumption that he is not
there.'
7 Strong atheist. 'I know there is no God, with the same
conviction as Jung "knows" there is one.'
I'd be surprised to meet many people in category 7, but I include
it for symmetry with category 1, which is well populated. It is in the
nature of faith that one is capable, like Jung, of holding a belief
without adequate reason to do so (Jung also believed that particular
books on his shelf spontaneously exploded with a loud bang).
Atheists do not have faith; and reason alone could not propel one
to total conviction that anything definitely does not exist. Hence
category 7 is in practice rather emptier than its opposite number,
category 1, which has many devoted inhabitants. I count
myself in category 6, but leaning towards 7-1 am agnostic only to
the extent that I am agnostic about fairies at the bottom of the
garden.
The spectrum of probabilities works well for TAP (temporary
agnosticism in practice). It is superficially tempting to place PAP
(permanent agnosticism in principle) in the middle of the spectrum,
with a 50 per cent probability of God's existence, but this is not
correct. PAP agnostics aver that we cannot say anything, one way
or the other, on the question of whether or not God exists. The
question, for PAP agnostics, is in principle unanswerable, and they
should strictly refuse to place themselves anywhere on the spectrum
of probabilities. The fact that I cannot know whether your red is
the same as my green doesn't make the probability 50 per cent. The
proposition on offer is too meaningless to be dignified with a probability.
Nevertheless, it is a common error, which we shall meet
again, to leap from the premise that the question of God's existence
is in principle unanswerable to the conclusion that his existence and
his non-existence are equiprobable.
Another way to express that error is in terms of the burden of
proof, and in this form it is pleasingly demonstrated by Bertrand
Russell's parable of the celestial teapot. 31
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