richard_dawkins_-_the_god_delusion
1K O O I \ < ) i VI O K A I . i l > : W i l l A K I. V>, ( < , O (.) I» .- 2 3 1the Muslim, by contrast, can claim that evil has an absolute meaning,true for all time and in all places, according to which Hitlerwas absolutely evil.'Even if it were true that we need God to be moral, it would ofcourse not make God's existence more likely, merely more desirable(many people cannot tell the difference). But that is not the issuehere. My imaginary religious apologist has no need to admit thatsucking up to God is the religious motive for doing good. Rather,his claim is that, wherever the motive to be good comes from, withoutGod there would be no standard for deciding what is good. Wecould each make up our own definition of the good, and behaveaccordingly. Moral principles that are based only upon religion (asopposed to, say, the 'golden rule', which is often associated withreligions but can be derived from elsewhere) may be calledabsolutist. Good is good and bad is bad, and we don't mess arounddeciding particular cases by whether, for example, somebodysuffers. My religious apologist would claim that only religion canprovide a basis for deciding what is good.Some philosophers, notably Kant, have tried to derive absolutemorals from non-religious sources. Though a religious man himself,as was almost inevitable in his time/' Kant tried to base a moralityon duty for duty's sake, rather than for God's. His famouscategorical imperative enjoins us to 'act only on that maximwhereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become auniversal law'. This works tidily for the example of telling lies.Imagine a world in which people told lies as a matter of principle,where lying was regarded as a good and moral thing to do. In sucha world, lying itself would cease to have any meaning. Lying needsa presumption of truth for its very definition. If a moral principle issomething we should wish everybody to follow, lying cannot be amoral principle because the principle itself would break down inmeaninglessness. Lying, as a rule for life, is inherently unstable.More generally, selfishness, or free-riding parasitism on the goodwillof others, may work for me as a lone selfish individual and giveme personal satisfaction. But I cannot wish that everybody wouldadopt selfish parasitism as a moral principle, if only because then Iwould have nobody to parasitize.* This is the standard interpretation of Kant's views. However, the noted philosopherA. C. Grayling has plausibly argued (New Humanist, July-Aug. 2006) that, althoughKant publicly went along with the religious conventions of his time, he was reallyan atheist.
232 i 11 r <; oThe Kantian imperative seems to work for truth-telling and someother cases. It is not so easy to see how to broaden it to moralitygenerally. Kant notwithstanding, it is tempting to agree with myhypothetical apologist that absolutist morals are usually driven byreligion. Is it always wrong to put a terminally ill patient out of hermisery at her own request? Is it always wrong to make love to amember of your own sex? Is it always wrong to kill an embryo?There are those who believe so, and their grounds are absolute. Theybrook no argument or debate. Anybody who disagrees deserves tobe shot: metaphorically of course, not literally - except in the caseof some doctors in American abortion clinics (see next chapter).Fortunately, however, morals do not have to be absolute.Moral philosophers are the professionals when it comes tothinking about right and wrong. As Robert Hinde succinctly put it,they agree that 'moral precepts, while not necessarily constructedby reason, should be defensible by reason'. 89 They classify themselvesin many ways, but in modern terminology the major divideis between 'deontologists' (such as Kant) and 'consequentialists'(including 'utilitarians' such as Jeremy Bentham, 1748-1832).Deontology is a fancy name for the belief that morality consistsin the obeying of rules. It is literally the science of duty, fromthe Greek for 'that which is binding'. Deontology is not quite thesame thing as moral absolutism, but for most purposes in abook about religion there is no need to dwell on the distinction.Absolutists believe there are absolutes of right and wrong,imperatives whose Tightness makes no reference to theirconsequences. Consequentialists more pragmatically hold that themorality of an action should be judged by its consequences. Oneversion of consequentialism is utilitarianism, the philosophyassociated with Bentham, his friend James Mill (1773-1836) andMill's son John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Utilitarianism is oftensummed up in Bentham's unfortunately imprecise catchphrase: 'thegreatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation ofmorals and legislation'.Not all absolutism is derived from religion. Nevertheless, it ispretty hard to defend absolutist morals on grounds other thanreligious ones. The only competitor I can think of is patriotism,especially in times of war. As the distinguished Spanish film director
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232 i 11 r <; o
The Kantian imperative seems to work for truth-telling and some
other cases. It is not so easy to see how to broaden it to morality
generally. Kant notwithstanding, it is tempting to agree with my
hypothetical apologist that absolutist morals are usually driven by
religion. Is it always wrong to put a terminally ill patient out of her
misery at her own request? Is it always wrong to make love to a
member of your own sex? Is it always wrong to kill an embryo?
There are those who believe so, and their grounds are absolute. They
brook no argument or debate. Anybody who disagrees deserves to
be shot: metaphorically of course, not literally - except in the case
of some doctors in American abortion clinics (see next chapter).
Fortunately, however, morals do not have to be absolute.
Moral philosophers are the professionals when it comes to
thinking about right and wrong. As Robert Hinde succinctly put it,
they agree that 'moral precepts, while not necessarily constructed
by reason, should be defensible by reason'. 89 They classify themselves
in many ways, but in modern terminology the major divide
is between 'deontologists' (such as Kant) and 'consequentialists'
(including 'utilitarians' such as Jeremy Bentham, 1748-1832).
Deontology is a fancy name for the belief that morality consists
in the obeying of rules. It is literally the science of duty, from
the Greek for 'that which is binding'. Deontology is not quite the
same thing as moral absolutism, but for most purposes in a
book about religion there is no need to dwell on the distinction.
Absolutists believe there are absolutes of right and wrong,
imperatives whose Tightness makes no reference to their
consequences. Consequentialists more pragmatically hold that the
morality of an action should be judged by its consequences. One
version of consequentialism is utilitarianism, the philosophy
associated with Bentham, his friend James Mill (1773-1836) and
Mill's son John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Utilitarianism is often
summed up in Bentham's unfortunately imprecise catchphrase: 'the
greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of
morals and legislation'.
Not all absolutism is derived from religion. Nevertheless, it is
pretty hard to defend absolutist morals on grounds other than
religious ones. The only competitor I can think of is patriotism,
especially in times of war. As the distinguished Spanish film director
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