richard_dawkins_-_the_god_delusion
R O t ' i l s O F M d l t A I I'I'V : W H Y A t t I W 1 - < , 0 O l > ? 2 2 5heavy enough to stop the trolley. Should Ned change the points anddivert the train? Most people's intuition is that he should not. Butwhat is the difference between Ned's dilemma, and Denise's?Presumably people are intuitively applying Kant's principle. Denisediverts the trolley from ploughing into the five people, and theunfortunate casualty on the siding is 'collateral damage', to usethe charmingly Rumsfeldian phrase. He is not being used by Deniseto save the others. Ned is actually using the fat man to stop thetrolley, and most people (perhaps unthinkingly), along with Kant(thinking it out in great detail), see this as a crucial difference.The difference is brought out again by the dilemma of Oscar.Oscar's situation is identical to Ned's, except that there is a largeiron weight on the diversionary loop of track, heavy enough to stopthe trolley. Clearly Oscar should have no problem deciding to pullthe points and divert the trolley. Except that there happens to be ahiker walking in front of the iron weight. He will certainly be killedif Oscar pulls the switch, just as surely as Ned's fat man. Thedifference is that Oscar's hiker is not being used to stop the trolley:he is collateral damage, as in Denise's dilemma. Like Hauser, andlike most of Hauser's experimental subjects, I feel that Oscar ispermitted to throw the switch but Ned is not. But I also find it quitehard to justify my intuition. Hauser's point is that such moralintuitions are often not well thought out but that we feel themstrongly anyway, because of our evolutionary heritage.In an intriguing venture into anthropology, Hauser and hiscolleagues adapted their moral experiments to the Kuna, a smallCentral American tribe with little contact with Westerners and noformal religion. The researchers changed the 'trolley on a line'thought experiment to locally suitable equivalents, such ascrocodiles swimming towards canoes. With corresponding minordifferences, the Kuna show the same moral judgements as the restof us.Of particular interest for this book, Hauser also wonderedwhether religious people differ from atheists in their moralintuitions. Surely, if we get our morality from religion, they shoulddiffer. But it seems that they don't. Hauser, working with the moralphilosopher Peter Singer, 87 focused on three hypothetical dilemmasand compared the verdicts of atheists with those of religious people.
226 1 II K (< O l> I) T i 1 siIn each case, the subjects were asked to choose whether ahypothetical action is morally 'obligatory', 'permissible' or'forbidden'. The three dilemmas were:1 Denise's dilemma. Ninety per cent of people said it waspermissible to divert the trolley, killing the one to save the five.2 You see a child drowning in a pond and there is no other helpin sight. You can save the child, but your trousers will beruined in the process. Ninety-seven per cent agreed that youshould save the child (amazingly, 3 per cent apparently wouldprefer to save their trousers).3 The organ transplant dilemma described above. Ninety-sevenper cent of subjects agreed that it is morally forbidden to seizethe healthy person in the waiting-room and kill him for hisorgans, thereby saving five other people.The main conclusion of Hauser and Singer's study was that thereis no statistically significant difference between atheists and religiousbelievers in making these judgements. This seems compatible withthe view, which I and many others hold, that we do not need Godin order to be good - or evil.IF THERE IS NO GOD, WHY BE GOOD?Posed like that, the question sounds positively ignoble. When areligious person puts it to me in this way (and many of them do),my immediate temptation is to issue the following challenge: 'Doyou really mean to tell me the only reason you try to be good is togain God's approval and reward, or to avoid his disapproval andpunishment? That's not morality, that's just sucking up, applepolishing,looking over your shoulder at the great surveillancecamera in the sky, or the still small wiretap inside your head,monitoring your every move, even your every base thought.' AsEinstein said, 'If people are good only because they fear punishment,and hope for reward, then we are a sorry lot indeed.' Michael
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226 1 II K (< O l> I) T i 1 si
In each case, the subjects were asked to choose whether a
hypothetical action is morally 'obligatory', 'permissible' or
'forbidden'. The three dilemmas were:
1 Denise's dilemma. Ninety per cent of people said it was
permissible to divert the trolley, killing the one to save the five.
2 You see a child drowning in a pond and there is no other help
in sight. You can save the child, but your trousers will be
ruined in the process. Ninety-seven per cent agreed that you
should save the child (amazingly, 3 per cent apparently would
prefer to save their trousers).
3 The organ transplant dilemma described above. Ninety-seven
per cent of subjects agreed that it is morally forbidden to seize
the healthy person in the waiting-room and kill him for his
organs, thereby saving five other people.
The main conclusion of Hauser and Singer's study was that there
is no statistically significant difference between atheists and religious
believers in making these judgements. This seems compatible with
the view, which I and many others hold, that we do not need God
in order to be good - or evil.
IF THERE IS NO GOD, WHY BE GOOD?
Posed like that, the question sounds positively ignoble. When a
religious person puts it to me in this way (and many of them do),
my immediate temptation is to issue the following challenge: 'Do
you really mean to tell me the only reason you try to be good is to
gain God's approval and reward, or to avoid his disapproval and
punishment? That's not morality, that's just sucking up, applepolishing,
looking over your shoulder at the great surveillance
camera in the sky, or the still small wiretap inside your head,
monitoring your every move, even your every base thought.' As
Einstein said, 'If people are good only because they fear punishment,
and hope for reward, then we are a sorry lot indeed.' Michael
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