richard_dawkins_-_the_god_delusion
THE R O O T S O F R E L I G I O N 183making in dangerous circumstances, and in crucial social situations.It is less immediately clear that dualism is a necessary concomitantof the intentional stance. I shan't pursue the matter here, but I thinka case could be developed that some kind of theory of other minds,which could fairly be described as dualistic, is likely to underlie theintentional stance - especially in complicated social situations, andeven more especially where higher-order intentionality comes intoplay.Dennett speaks of third-order intentionality (the man believedthat the woman knew he wanted her), fourth-order (the womanrealized that the man believed that the woman knew he wanted her)and even fifth-order intentionality (the shaman guessed that thewoman realized that the man believed that the woman knew hewanted her). Very high orders of intentionality are probably confinedto fiction, as satirized in Michael Frayn's hilarious novel TheTin Men: 'Watching Nunopoulos, Rick knew that he was almostcertain that Anna felt a passionate contempt for Fiddlingchild'sfailure to understand her feelings about Fiddlingchild, and sheknew too that Nina knew she knew about Nunopoulos's knowledge...' But the fact that we can laugh at such contortions ofother-mind inference in fiction is probably telling us somethingimportant about the way our minds have been naturally selected towork in the real world.In its lower orders at least, the intentional stance, like the designstance, saves time that might be vital to survival. Consequently,natural selection shaped brains to deploy the intentional stance asa short cut. We are biologically programmed to impute intentionsto entities whose behaviour matters to us. Once again, Paul Bloomquotes experimental evidence that children are especially likely toadopt the intentional stance. When small babies see an objectapparently following another object (for example, on a computerscreen), they assume that they are witnessing an active chase by anintentional agent, and they demonstrate the fact by registeringsurprise when the putative agent fails to pursue the chase.The design stance and the intentional stance are useful brainmechanisms, important for speeding up the second-guessing ofentities that really matter for survival, such as predators orpotential mates. But, like other brain mechanisms, these stances can
184 T H E GOD D E L U S I O Nmisfire. Children, and primitive peoples, impute intentions to theweather, to waves and currents, to falling rocks. All of us are proneto do the same thing with machines, especially when they let usdown. Many will remember with affection the day Basil Fawlty'scar broke down during his vital mission to save Gourmet Nightfrom disaster. He gave it fair warning, counted to three, then gotout of the car, seized a tree branch and thrashed it to within an inchof its life. Most of us have been there, at least momentarily, with acomputer if not with a car. Justin Barrett coined the acronymHADD, for hyperactive agent detection device. We hyperactivelydetect agents where there are none, and this makes us suspectmalice or benignity where, in fact, nature is only indifferent. I catchmyself momentarily harbouring savage resentment against someblameless inanimate such as my bicycle chain. There was apoignant recent report of a man who tripped over his untiedshoelace in the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge, fell down thestairs, and smashed three priceless Qing Dynasty vases: 'He landedin the middle of the vases and they splintered into a million pieces.He was still sitting there stunned when staff appeared. Everyonestood around in silence, as if in shock. The man kept pointing to hisshoelace, saying, "There it is; that's the culprit." ' 83Other by-product explanations of religion have been proposedby Hinde, Shermer, Boyer, Atran, Bloom, Dennett, Keleman andothers. One especially intriguing possibility mentioned by Dennettis that the irrationality of religion is a by-product of a particularbuilt-in irrationality mechanism in the brain: our tendency, whichpresumably has genetic advantages, to fall in love.The anthropologist Helen Fisher, in Why We Love, has beautifullyexpressed the insanity of romantic love, and how over-the-topit is compared with what might seem strictly necessary. Look at itthis way. From the point of view of a man, say, it is unlikely thatany one woman of his acquaintance is a hundred times morelovable than her nearest competitor, yet that is how he is likely todescribe her when 'in love'. Rather than the fanaticallymonogamous devotion to which we are susceptible, some sort of'polyamory' is on the face of it more rational. (Polyamory is thebelief that one can simultaneously love several members of theopposite sex, just as one can love more than one wine, composer,
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THE R O O T S O F R E L I G I O N 183
making in dangerous circumstances, and in crucial social situations.
It is less immediately clear that dualism is a necessary concomitant
of the intentional stance. I shan't pursue the matter here, but I think
a case could be developed that some kind of theory of other minds,
which could fairly be described as dualistic, is likely to underlie the
intentional stance - especially in complicated social situations, and
even more especially where higher-order intentionality comes into
play.
Dennett speaks of third-order intentionality (the man believed
that the woman knew he wanted her), fourth-order (the woman
realized that the man believed that the woman knew he wanted her)
and even fifth-order intentionality (the shaman guessed that the
woman realized that the man believed that the woman knew he
wanted her). Very high orders of intentionality are probably confined
to fiction, as satirized in Michael Frayn's hilarious novel The
Tin Men: 'Watching Nunopoulos, Rick knew that he was almost
certain that Anna felt a passionate contempt for Fiddlingchild's
failure to understand her feelings about Fiddlingchild, and she
knew too that Nina knew she knew about Nunopoulos's knowledge
...' But the fact that we can laugh at such contortions of
other-mind inference in fiction is probably telling us something
important about the way our minds have been naturally selected to
work in the real world.
In its lower orders at least, the intentional stance, like the design
stance, saves time that might be vital to survival. Consequently,
natural selection shaped brains to deploy the intentional stance as
a short cut. We are biologically programmed to impute intentions
to entities whose behaviour matters to us. Once again, Paul Bloom
quotes experimental evidence that children are especially likely to
adopt the intentional stance. When small babies see an object
apparently following another object (for example, on a computer
screen), they assume that they are witnessing an active chase by an
intentional agent, and they demonstrate the fact by registering
surprise when the putative agent fails to pursue the chase.
The design stance and the intentional stance are useful brain
mechanisms, important for speeding up the second-guessing of
entities that really matter for survival, such as predators or
potential mates. But, like other brain mechanisms, these stances can
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