richard_dawkins_-_the_god_delusion
WHY THERE ALMOST CERTAINLY IS NO GOD 157virgin?" Don't you know that in polite society we don't ask suchquestions? That sort of question went out in the nineteenthcentury.' But think about why it is impolite to ask such direct,factual questions of religious people today. It is because it is embarrassing!But it is the answer that is embarrassing, if it is yes.The nineteenth-century connection is now clear. The nineteenthcentury is the last time when it was possible for an educated person toadmit to believing in miracles like the virgin birth without embarrassment.When pressed, many educated Christians today are too loyalto deny the virgin birth and the resurrection. But it embarrassesthem because their rational minds know it is absurd, so they wouldmuch rather not be asked. Hence, if somebody like me insists onasking the question, it is I who am accused of being 'nineteenthcentury'.It is really quite funny, when you think about it.I left the conference stimulated and invigorated, and reinforcedin my conviction that the argument from improbability - the'Ultimate 747' gambit - is a very serious argument againstthe existence of God, and one to which I have yet to hear a theologiangive a convincing answer despite numerous opportunities andinvitations to do so. Dan Dennett rightly describes it as 'an unrebuttablerefutation, as devastating today as when Philo used it totrounce Cleanthes in Hume's Dialogues two centuries earlier. A skyhookwould at best simply postpone the solution to the problem,but Hume couldn't think of any cranes, so he caved in.' 74 Darwin,of course, supplied the vital crane. How Hume would have loved it.This chapter has contained the central argument of my book, andso, at the risk of sounding repetitive, I shall summarize it as a seriesof six numbered points.1 One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect, over thecenturies, has been to explain how the complex, improbableappearance of design in the universe arises.2 The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of designto actual design itself. In the case of a man-made artefact suchas a watch, the designer really was an intelligent engineer. It istempting to apply the same logic to an eye or a wing, a spideror a person.
158 T H E G O D DFLUS) O N3 The temptation is a false one, because the designer hypothesisimmediately raises the larger problem of who designed thedesigner. The whole problem we started out with was theproblem of explaining statistical improbability. It is obviouslyno solution to postulate something even more improbable. Weneed a 'crane', not a 'skyhook', for only a crane can do thebusiness of working up gradually and plausibly from simplicityto otherwise improbable complexity.4 The most ingenious and powerful crane so far discovered isDarwinian evolution by natural selection. Darwin and hissuccessors have shown how living creatures, with theirspectacular statistical improbability and appearance of design,have evolved by slow, gradual degrees from simple beginnings.We can now safely say that the illusion of design in livingcreatures is just that - an illusion.5 We don't yet have an equivalent crane for physics. Some kindof multiverse theory could in principle do for physics the sameexplanatory work as Darwinism does for biology. This kind ofexplanation is superficially less satisfying than the biologicalversion of Darwinism, because it makes heavier demands onluck. But the anthropic principle entitles us to postulate farmore luck than our limited human intuition is comfortablewith.6 We should not give up hope of a better crane arising in physics,something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology. But even inthe absence of a strongly satisfying crane to match thebiological one, the relatively weak cranes we have at presentare, when abetted by the anthropic principle, self-evidentlybetter than the self-defeating skyhook hypothesis of anintelligent designer.If the argument of this chapter is accepted, the factual premiseof religion - the God Hypothesis - is untenable. God almost certainlydoes not exist. This is the main conclusion of the book so far.Various questions now follow. Even if we accept that God doesn'texist, doesn't religion still have a lot going for it? Isn't it consoling?
- Page 108 and 109: A R G U M E N T S F O R G O D ' S E
- Page 110 and 111: A R Ci U M E N T S F O R G O D ' S
- Page 112 and 113: ARGUMENTS F O R G OD'S E X I S T E
- Page 114 and 115: W H Y T II E R E A L M O S T C E R
- Page 116 and 117: W H Y T H E R E A I. M O S T C E R
- Page 118 and 119: W H Y T H ERE AL.MOS T C E R TAINL.
- Page 120 and 121: W H Y T H f ' R i . A L M O S T C 1
- Page 122 and 123: W H Y T l i l - I U ; A L M O S T C
- Page 124 and 125: W H Y r i-i r R r A I M O S T C t R
- Page 126 and 127: W H Y '11IKRK A L M O S T (.: F R T
- Page 128 and 129: no evidence of its own, but thrives
- Page 130 and 131: W H Y r H E RE A 1. M O S T C F.RTA
- Page 132 and 133: I ! T R t AI.M15S I' ('. I R !' A f
- Page 134 and 135: W H Y T H E R E A I . M O S T C H R
- Page 136 and 137: A I. M O S I C 1 R I'A I N M is X <
- Page 138 and 139: W i I Y 1 II F. R F A 1 Vi (.) S T
- Page 140 and 141: W H Y r 11 r u r -\ i. \i o s r c r
- Page 142 and 143: W 11 Y '1 11 !•; R I. A I VI () S
- Page 144 and 145: !' R I ALMOST l' I U '[ A I \ I Y i
- Page 146 and 147: W H Y T H !• R E A I. M O S "I" C
- Page 148 and 149: extravagant God hypothesis and the
- Page 150 and 151: W H Y T H K R K A L VI O S I C E R
- Page 152 and 153: W H Y T H H R B A L M O S T C E R T
- Page 154 and 155: WHY T H E R K A L. M O S T C R R T
- Page 156 and 157: W H V T H t R t A I M O S T C E R T
- Page 160 and 161: W H Y T H E R i ; A L M O S T C E R
- Page 162 and 163: T H E R O O T S OF R K 1. i G I ()
- Page 164 and 165: THE ROOTS OF RELIGION 165themselves
- Page 166 and 167: THE ROOTS ()1 ; R fc L I G I O N 16
- Page 168 and 169: T H 1-; R O O T S O F R E I 1 C 1 O
- Page 170 and 171: T H E R O O T S OF R E L I G I O N
- Page 172 and 173: T H I', R O () T S OF R K I. I G I
- Page 174 and 175: THL R O O T S OF R E L I G I O N 17
- Page 176 and 177: T H E R O O T S OF R I: I. I (i I O
- Page 178 and 179: T 11 E R O O T S O F R K L 1 (. 1 O
- Page 180 and 181: THE ROOTS OF RELIGION 181psychologi
- Page 182 and 183: THE R O O T S O F R E L I G I O N 1
- Page 184 and 185: THE R O O T S O F RELIGI O N 185boo
- Page 186 and 187: T H E ROOTS OF RELIGION 187Breakfas
- Page 188 and 189: T H E R O O T S O F R E L I G 1 0 N
- Page 190 and 191: T H E R O O T S O F R E L \ G I O N
- Page 192 and 193: T H E ROOTS OF RELIGION 193the prob
- Page 194 and 195: T H E R O O T S O F R E L I G I O N
- Page 196 and 197: T H E R O O T S OF RELIGION 197'mem
- Page 198 and 199: T HE ROOTS OF RELIGION 199ambiguity
- Page 200 and 201: T H E R O O T S OF R E L I G I O N
- Page 202 and 203: T H E ROOTS OF RELI G I O N 203They
- Page 204 and 205: T HE R O O T S O F R E L J G 1 O N
- Page 206 and 207: T H E R O O T S O F R E L 1 G I O N
WHY THERE ALMOST CERTAINLY IS NO GOD 157
virgin?" Don't you know that in polite society we don't ask such
questions? That sort of question went out in the nineteenth
century.' But think about why it is impolite to ask such direct,
factual questions of religious people today. It is because it is embarrassing!
But it is the answer that is embarrassing, if it is yes.
The nineteenth-century connection is now clear. The nineteenth
century is the last time when it was possible for an educated person to
admit to believing in miracles like the virgin birth without embarrassment.
When pressed, many educated Christians today are too loyal
to deny the virgin birth and the resurrection. But it embarrasses
them because their rational minds know it is absurd, so they would
much rather not be asked. Hence, if somebody like me insists on
asking the question, it is I who am accused of being 'nineteenthcentury'.
It is really quite funny, when you think about it.
I left the conference stimulated and invigorated, and reinforced
in my conviction that the argument from improbability - the
'Ultimate 747' gambit - is a very serious argument against
the existence of God, and one to which I have yet to hear a theologian
give a convincing answer despite numerous opportunities and
invitations to do so. Dan Dennett rightly describes it as 'an unrebuttable
refutation, as devastating today as when Philo used it to
trounce Cleanthes in Hume's Dialogues two centuries earlier. A skyhook
would at best simply postpone the solution to the problem,
but Hume couldn't think of any cranes, so he caved in.' 74 Darwin,
of course, supplied the vital crane. How Hume would have loved it.
This chapter has contained the central argument of my book, and
so, at the risk of sounding repetitive, I shall summarize it as a series
of six numbered points.
1 One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect, over the
centuries, has been to explain how the complex, improbable
appearance of design in the universe arises.
2 The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design
to actual design itself. In the case of a man-made artefact such
as a watch, the designer really was an intelligent engineer. It is
tempting to apply the same logic to an eye or a wing, a spider
or a person.
Change language