2022 Year in Review

Azerbaijan, which received substantial military and unconditional diplomatic support
from its key ally Turkey, claimed victory in the decades-old conflict as the majority of the
disputed region’s territory came under Azerbaijani control. Since then, Armenian forces
have gradually withdrawn from the region as Russian peacekeepers were stationed to
provide a security guarantee to the remaining Armenian population.
The war had a devastating impact not only because of the enormous casualties that both
sides suffered, especially Armenia, but also because it caused an unprecedented
domestic crisis in a politically, economically, and militarily weakened Armenia. The
geopolitical implications of the war were also undeniably significant: under the veil of an
incomplete Azerbaijani victory, the influence of Russia and especially Turkey in South
Caucasus grew exponentially. After the war ended, Erdogan and Azerbaijan’s President
Ilham Aliyev have further deepened their cooperation based on the “one nation, two
states” model. They have escalated their threats against Armenia in a campaign of
maximum pressure to score gains that would be hardly imaginable a few years ago.
HIGH HOPES, MAXIMALIST EXPECTATIONS
Both sides have demonstrated political willingness to engage in a process that can result
in tangible steps towards normalisation: Armenia because it is forced to, given the
geopolitical circumstances and the ever-growing threats, Turkey because it sees a unique
opportunity to settle the “Armenian question” once and forever, with the help of
Azerbaijan. But willingness to negotiate and launch intensive diplomatic talks, as
evidenced by the past and by the lack of tangible steps today, is hardly enough to bring
positive results. The reason is not only because of Pashinyan’s lack of support from a key
stakeholder, the Armenian diaspora, but also because of the maximalist expectations on
the Turkish side.
The most pressing and dangerous expectation on the Turkish side, in fact, is not the
demand to give up any claims related to the Armenian Genocide, but the so-called
“Zangezur corridor” that both Erdogan and Aliyev want from Pashinyan. The Azerbaijani
President has constantly threatened to use force to open this extraterrestrial corridor
that will link mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan, and thus Turkey, in what
reminds many of the pan-Turkish ideas that were prevalent in the beginning of the 20th
century. While Pashinyan has suggested practical steps to open up communication lines
in the region, including through Armenian territory, the Armenian side and Iran have
clearly indicated that any land grab in the name of a transportation corridor is
unacceptable.
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