2022 Year in Review

Y E A R I N R E V I E W
I S S U E N O . 4

There is no way to neatly package the events of 2022. From the Russian invasion
of Ukraine to femicide in Latin America - 2022 has presented a complex series of
events. All of which this special issue and the team at YDS believe deserve
attention and reflection.
2022 has disrupted and challenged democracy. On 24 February, Russian
aggression against neighbouring Ukraine escalated into a full-scale invasion –
paralysing global relations and representing a profound shift in geopolitics (pg.
1). There was the UK Crisis (pg. 106), Argentina’s IMF loan struggle and the
assassination attempt on Vice President Kirchner (pg. 126), and right-leaning
Netanyahu’s win in the Israel election (pg. 149). In November, rising power
Indonesia successfully hosted the G20 (pg. 65) restoring hope in diplomacy as
world leaders worked together to alleviate global tensions. The much anticipated
meeting between US’ Joe Biden and China’s Xi Jinping also served to ease
tensions over contested Taiwan and reaffirm future dialogue between the two
superpowers. However, significant efforts are still required to revive and reaffirm
the world’s democracies and hold governments accountable.
2022 saw human rights issues take centre stage. The Roe vs Wade decision
shook the United States and stoked outrage across the globe (p. 7), gender
equality was threatened by South Korea’s new president (p. 20), and navigating
solutions to ongoing insecurity in Africa remain elusive (p. 157). In Australia, we
heard renewed calls for a referendum for a First Nation’s Voice to Parliament - a
welcome change and symbolic gesture that shows change is desired and
possible (p. 39).
2022 also saw a continuation of the climate crisis with the Amazon in Latin
America devastated by illegal deforestation, hurricanes and landslides (p. 120),
severe floods in Pakistan (p. 53), and the adverse environmental effects of
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (p. 76). Renewed explorations of nuclear energy
in Europe (p. 112) left some feeling hopeful. However, the changing balance of
power in the international energy market remains one to watch with eyes on the
Middle East and North Africa’s investigation into alternative energy sources (p.
136). The 27th COP summit hosted by Egypt attempted to energise climate
action efforts yet scepticism persists regarding world leaders’ commitment to
see through their promises.

While the events of 2022 are testing they must be remembered. Amidst the
conflict and suffering, there is hope and a willingness to learn from past
mistakes. By investigating global issues in depth we can understand the
ramifications of injustice and feel empowered to effect change, whether small or
large.
So, as you flick through this edition and reflect on the year that was, allow
yourself to feel.
Find comfort in newfound knowledge.
Embrace the discomfort.
Fight for change, and use it to energise your 2023.
Shantelle O’Riordan
Editor-in-Chief
Young Diplomats Society

What a publication! The Year in Review is a product of many, many hours of work
from right across the organisation. Starting with our writers, through the chain
of editors, right up to our Marketing & Communications team who bring the
articles to life, this publication is truly a team effort. Congratulations to everyone
involved, I hope you’re as proud of this publication as I am. It’s fantastic!
I want to extend a particular congratulations and thanks to Shantelle O’Riordan,
Editor-in-Chief, and Deeksha Patil, Director of Marketing & Communications, for
the huge amount of work they’ve put into this publication. I’m very grateful to
work alongside them. The Year in Review would simply not be the same without
them.
I’d also like to thank you, the reader, for supporting YDS. Whether it’s reading our
articles, attending our events, or listening to our podcast, we are so grateful for
your ongoing support.
The Young Diplomats Society’s mission is to “empower, connect and support
students and other young people interested in international relations to build
the skills, networks and experience to thrive in a dynamic and complex industry.”
The Year in Review stands as a testament to this. There are not many places
where you can find a publication as comprehensive, informative, and solely
youth led as this.
I look forward to continuing to deliver on our mission into the new year. 2023 is
shaping up to be an even more exciting, prosperous and successful year for YDS.
But before we turn our attention forward to 2023, let’s reflect on the year that
was. Enjoy!
Cassius Hynam
President
Young Diplomats Society

1
CONTENTS
THE END OF PUTIN? EXPLORING POTENTIAL
OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR
Cameron Smith
7
ROE V WADE
Shajara Khan
1 2
CHINA’S 20TH PARTY CONGRESS: EXPLORING
THE KEY TAKEAWAYS AND BROADER
SIGNIFICANCE FOR AUSTRALIA
Calvin Lu and Patrick Hession
2 0
SOUTH KOREA’S NEW PRESIDENT: VIEWS ON
GENDER EQUALITY
Elisha Watson
2 4
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN CANCELLING
WORLDPRIDE TAIWAN 2025
Samuel Ng
2 7
SHINZO ABE: A REVISIONIST NATIONALIST OR
STABILISING LEADER ? REMEMBERING THE
PROMINENT BUT CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL
FIGURE
Patrick Hession
3 3
THE ELECTION OF ALBANESE
YDS Team
3 7
BOOK REVIEW- TIDES THAT BIND: AUSTRALIA
IN THE PACIFIC
Declan Hourd
3 9
WHAT IS THE FIRST NATION’S VOICE TO
PARLIAMENT AND WHY DO WE NEED A
REFERENDUM ON IT?
Gen Marcocci
P H O T O : G A Ë L G A B O R E L / U N S P L A S H

4 4
BOOK REVIEW: NO ENEMIES NO FRIENDS:
RESTORING AUSTRALIA’S GLOBAL RELEVANCE
Declan Hourd
4 7
CHINA’S “RAILPOLITIK” INTO CENTRAL
ASIA
Samuel Ng
5 3
FUNDING RECOVERY IN PAKISTAN: A CLASH OF
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES?
Soni Porwal
5 6
THE RENEWED DIPLOMATIC PROCESS BETWEEN
ARMENIA AND TURKEY
Martin Makaryan
6 0
SRI LANKA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS
Soni Porwal
6 6
BALI G20 EASES WORLD TENSIONS AS
INDONESIA ASSUMES GREATER
INTERNATIONAL ROLE
Haeril Halim
7 0
MYANMAR IN 2022: AN INTERVIEW WITH DR
TUN-AUNG SHWE, REPRESENTATIVE OF
MYANMAR’S NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
TO AUSTRALIA
Eliza Wilson
7 6
CHINA'S (NOT SO) GREEN SILK ROAD
Fiona De Cuyper
8 1
HOW PHILIPPINE’S PRESIDENT MARCOS
UTILISED YOUTUBE FOR POLITICAL
REBRANDING
Dannica Batoon

8 4
LEGALISATION OF MARIJUANA IN THAILAND
Neha Dayma
8 8
BIDEN’S REPORT CARD: 1 YEAR INTO HIS
PRESIDENCY
Bella Baker and Shantelle O'Riordan
9 4
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY: A COLD WAR FOSSIL
Samuel Ng
1 0 0
RECONCILIATION IN MOURNING: QUEEN’S
DEATH SPARKS RENEWED CALL FOR ACTION
Shajara Khan
1 0 6
SUNAK’S BROKEN BRITAIN
Samuel Ng
1 1 2
NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE IN
EUROPE: COULD NUCLEAR ENERGY HELP
EUROPE REACH ITS GREEN DEAL TARGETS?
Nicolas Buitrago
1 1 6
THE POST-MERKEL ERA
Diane Maria Langeloh
1 2 0
THE POLITICS OF THE AMAZON 2022
Evangelia Wichmann
1 2 6
THE ENDURING INFLUENCE OF PERONISM:
UNDERSTANDING ARGENTINA’S IMF LOANS
AND THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON VICE
PRESIDENT KIRCHNER
Tristan Chatton
P H O T O : N A S A / U N S P L A S H

1 3 1
FEMICIDE PANDEMIC: LATIN AMERICA IS THE
DEADLIEST PLACE TO BE A WOMAN
Hayley Bedson
1 3 6
OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH THE NEW:
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Dominique Jones
1 4 2
LEBANON IN CRISIS
Abby Wellington
1 4 5
IRAQ'S POLITICAL DORMANCY
Sameera Pillai
1 4 9
ISRAEL ELECTION
Benjamin Edmunds
1 5 2
HUMAN INSECURITY IN TALIBAN-RULED
AFGHANISTAN: ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS &
FORCED CHILD MARRIAGES
Mariah Murray
1 5 7
CONFLICT IN AFRICA
Ferdinand Asmah
1 6 2
STARTIMES AND CHINA’S PUSH INTO AFRICA’S
MEDIA LANDSCAPE
Samuel Ng
1 6 8
HOW THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM IMPACTS
LGBTQ+ RIGHTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Ezekiel Dobelsky
1 7 2
THE AFRICAN UNION'S CONDEMNATION OF
MILITARY COUPS
Isha Desai

P H O T O B Y E V O N U N S P L A S H

P H O T O B Y B B C N E W S
Cameron Smith
P A G E 1

Russia's second invasion into Ukraine represents one of the most seismic
geopolitical turning points of the current century. While Russia sacked Crimea in
2014 and has used grey-zone tactics in eastern Ukraine for years, the invasion on
the 24th of February has far greater implications, with the survival of Ukrainian
sovereignty being on the line. To date, at least tens-of-thousands of people have
been killed, millions have been displaced and NATO, and the West more broadly,
have found a new mission in confronting Russian transgressions. For
Washington, it has also offered a chance to solidify its traditional role as a global
leader after both the debacle of the Afghanistan withdrawal and the turmoil of
the Trump presidency.
As the Russo-Ukrainian conflict continues, the narrative has formed one of
‘democracies vs autocracies’ and forms a significant threat to the global rulesbased
order. The West has a significant stake in how the war plays out,
evidenced by the heavy-handed response and the billions of dollars of military
and financial support to Ukraine. As inspiring and effective as the Ukrainian
forces have been in the war against its much larger and capable neighbor, it is
highly doubtful they would be able to do so without Western support.
The outcome of the Russo-Ukraine war is still in doubt and Western
policymakers must plan and prepare for the various potential outcomes. This
could range from a surprise Ukrainian victory to an all-out nuclear confrontation.
These outcomes must be explored, as they will have direct consequences for
Ukraine, the region, the global order and narrative. If Russia prevails, the rulesbased
order will have collapsed and the world dominated by the whims of greatpower
competition will have prevailed. There are many potential endgames for
the war including a Ukrainian victory, a Russian military triumph, the use of
nuclear weapons in Ukraine or a negotiated settlement.
P A G E 2

THE WAR SO FAR AND THE WEST
UNITED
The second Russian invasion of Ukraine was widely speculated to go one way.
The Ukrainian government under President Volodymyr Zelensky was not
expected to last a week against Russia's full-scale invasion of the country. Ten
months later, it is fair to say that Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone to
plan. It has both overestimated the capability of its own armed forces, while
dangerously underestimating the strength of the Ukrainian resistance, and the
unity of the Western response. The outcome of the war, once thought to be a
decisive Russian victory in a matter of hours, is now not so clear.
P A G E 3
P H O T O : Y A L E A L U M N I

For the Russians, this is an existential struggle for all intents and purposes, as
well as a high-risk gamble. Success could restore the role of Russia as a great
power and revert the humiliating setbacks that the Kremlin had to endure after
the implosion of the Soviet Union. For the United States and Western partners,
this crisis has offered an opportunity to bleed Russia dry in a nasty quagmire,
while also representing an opportunity to strengthen the cohesiveness of NATO.
So far, the latter has been more in-line with reality. Russia's military is being
reduced to rubble and NATO is expanding and strengthening its defences.
Indeed, Finland and Sweden’s decision to abandon neutrality and seek NATO
membership, has brought the alliance closer, not further from Russia’s borders.
Likewise, instead of drawing Ukraine closer to Russia, the war has strengthened
Ukrainian nationalism and alienated it from Russia completely. In short, assertive
authoritarianism no longer looks like the wave of the future.
Currently, there seems little prospect
of an end to the war. Neither side is
ready yet to stop fighting or make
the kind of compromises that a
negotiated outcome to war would
require. Kyiv has defied all its
expectations and, in turn, its war
aims have become more ambitious.
It now seeks the return of all
Ukrainian territory occupied by
Russia since 2014, including Crimea.
Yet Russia, despite its recent
battlefield setbacks, has continued to
escalate, ordering partial
mobilisation and annexing four not
entirely occupied regions of eastern
Ukraine. This has signalled that
Moscow is in the conflict for the long
haul.
P A G E 4
P A G E 4

The arrival of winter has led to a decrease in operations. Both Russia and
Ukraine will now focus their efforts to reinforce their troops, as well repair their
equipment. A return to full-blown combat operations is not likely until the
ground freezes, presenting a better opportunity for both sides to use their
heaviest equipment. For Russia, its first priority will be halting Ukrainian
momentum and holding the line defensively in eastern and southern Ukraine.
This would give Russia a chance to consolidate its position and reconstitute its
forces, before any offensive operations in 2023.
Russia will also continue its missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and
utilities, particularly energy. Missile attacks on these sectors have rapidly
increased over coming weeks and the effort appears to be to grind down the
Ukrainian electric grid to break the public’s morale by freezing them into
submission. Similarly in Europe, the loss of much of the Russian natural gas has
meant that energy prices are biting and cracks are appearing on the domestic
political fronts. This demonstrates President Putin's hopes that he can leverage a
cold winter and high energy prices to shape Western public opinion that drives a
European towards accepting a ceasefire. Whatever the case, the war is far from
over.
UKRAINE IN A PLACE OF STRENGTH: THE
NEED FOR CONTINUED WESTERN ASSISTANCE
Regardless of the outcome the region will face real challenges as, one way or
another, the international system will not return to the pre-war status quo.
Furthermore, there is no easy endgame for Ukraine and every realistic solution is
problematic. However, it is essential that Western policymakers consider such
scenarios so they might shape the strategic environment towards their preferred
P A G E 5

P H O T O : K L A U S W R I G H T / U N S P L A S H
outcomes. A negotiated peace in
Ukraine’s favour or even a
Ukrainian ultimate victory over
Russia, is strongly within Western
interests. Not only would it help
maintain Ukraine’s sovereignty,
but the global narrative of the
strength of democracy would be
upheld. It could also send a
warning to China, which might
prompt them to give pause to an
invasion of Taiwan.
For any of this to occur, the key
element will be ongoing Western
military, financial and
humanitarian support. For the
West, this will take time, resources
and strategic patience. The
consequences otherwise, would
not be palatable for Western
policymakers. The implications
are enormous. This is argued
succinctly by Hein Goemans who
states that “this will shape the rest
of the twenty-first century. If
Russia loses, or it doesn’t get what
it wants, it will be a different
Russia afterward. If Russia wins, it
will be a different Europe
afterward.” The West, therefore,
must continue to stand fully
behind Ukraine’s present struggle
for national survival.
P A G E 6

Shajara Khan
P A G E 7
P H O T O B Y H A R R I S O N M I T C H E L L O N U N S P L A S H

P H O T O : J O S H C H R I S T E N S E N / T H E G I D D Y
On May 3rd, 2022, a leaked draft opinion revealed that the U.S. Supreme Court
voted to strike Roe v Wade – a 1973 landmark decision that ruled access to
abortion was a constitutionally protected right federally. When the draft was
leaked, Chief Justice John Roberts asserted that this strike to Roe v Wade was not
confirmation of an actual decision. One month later, in a 6-3 majority ruling, the
Supreme Court overruled Roe v Wade using the precedent set by Dobbs v
Jackson Women’s Health, which argued that a Mississippi law banning abortion
after 15 weeks is prudent for the life of the foetus.
Following the news of the overruling of Roe v Wade, protests erupted across the
country and across the world in solidarity with those affected by the new ruling.
This has led to an over-simplification of the two sides of the argument: prochoice
and pro-life. Both sides present their reasons, primarily with the belief
that one life takes precedence over the other; where pro-choice advocates like
‘Planned Parenthood’ argue that the quality of life for the pregnant person
should be the priority when making this medical decision.
P A G E 5
P A G E 8
In contrast, pro-life advocates such as ‘Focus On The Family’ offer the argument
that as life begins at conception, abortion is taking life away from a person and
therefore an action that creates moral reprehensibility. This debate on abortion
also goes beyond the confines of an issue pertaining to “women” as we include
the experiences of those Assigned Female At Birth (AFAB), but no longer identify
with their assigned gender. In this case, I refer to trans men, non-binary, and
intersex individuals with female reproductive organs as their experiences further
highlight how abortion impacts different demographics of the US population.

P H O T O : T H E N E W A R A B
While the debate around abortion in the US has been a fixture in the sociocultural
sphere for more than 50 years now, the history of abortion laws in the
US extends far further and holds a more complicated interpretation of life,
bodily autonomy, and religious freedom. Before 1840, abortion laws in the US
were far less stigmatised than they are today. According to historian Jennifer
Holland, the factor of limited medical knowledge on foetuses meant that
criminalising abortion was much more difficult for authorities. As such, laws
around abortion relied on a British common law to perform the procedure
known as the ‘quickening doctrine’ — wherein foetal movement can be
detected between 4 to 6 months of gestation, thus defining the cutoff for when
an abortion procedure can be carried out. If the abortion occurred past the 6
month mark, then the pregnant person would be charged with a
misdemeanour. Healthline explains that the change in attitude towards
abortions after 1840 may have been led by male physicians — who established
the American Medical Association (AMA) — who argued that their collective
knowledge of the human body was distinctive and more accurate than the
knowledge held by female healers and midwives.
By 1900, abortion was criminalised when carried out under any means —
medical or chemical — except if the mother’s life was in danger, which came
down to whether a doctor deemed that the mother’s life was at risk. This
however did not stop people from seeking out abortions, it only hampered
efforts to have safe abortions.
P A G E 59

A 2003 report from the Guttmacher Institute
found that up to an estimated 1.2 million people
per year during the 1950s and 60s occurred;
either illegally or self-induced. However, with the
rise of second-wave feminism in the 1960s,
abortion became a major issue in the movement
— as Nancy Rosenstock, a member of Boston
Female Liberation, recounted the push for bodily
autonomy across activist groups grew in
popularity. Rosenstock also noted that the issue
of abortion naturally extended to the issues of
access to contraception and forced sterilisation.
With the social climate paying more attention to
a woman’s right to control her body, Roe v Wade
was able to become a constitutionally protected
right under the 14th Amendment in 1973.
P A G E 1 0
P H O T O : A L E X B R A N D O N / A P
However, this did not stop opponents of the
1973 Roe v Wade decision to express antipathy
to those seeking an abortion. According to
abortion advocate Michelle Kinsey Bruns,
between 1977 and 2015, there were more than
200 attacks and threats to life at abortion clinics
across the US, with the latest of these attacks
occurring in July of this year when a Planned
Parenthood clinic in Michigan was set ablaze.
The suspect equated abortions to genocide in
YouTube videos where he made content on the
topic of abortion. A common trait among the
perpetrators of attacks against abortion clinics is
their reasoning: many use Christian faith-based
arguments, claiming that the procedure of
aborting a foetus — whether it is medically or
chemically performed — is against the will of
God. For example, Catholic Bishops in the US
have come out in support of the pro-life side of
the debate, arguing that life begins at
conception, and thus abortion procedures are
essentially murder. It is necessary to make the
distinction between Christians and other

religions as many Jewish and Muslim advocates and religious leaders have stated
that the repeal of Roe v Wade and subsequent bans on abortion at the state
level are a clear violation of religious freedoms, as protected by the 1st
amendment.
Following the repeal of Roe v Wade, PBS’s Amna Nawaz hosted a panel of three
women — Chelsea Sobolik, Government Affairs Officer with Christian-based
adoption agency Lifeline Child, Rabbi Jen Lader of Temple Israel, and
constitutional and Islamic law professor Dr. Asifa Qureshi-Landes — to get a
better idea of what each faith presents as their position on abortion. Lader
outlined that abortion is mandated in Jewish tradition, which will always support
the welfare of the pregnant person over the foetus. In comparison, Qureshi-
Landes noted that while there are many interpretations of abortion according to
the denomination of Islam one follows, abortion is generally considered
permissible. However, the argument presented by Sobolik contrasts the
arguments of the other two panellists, iterating the belief that Christian scripture
wholly opposes abortion — the Bible makes no explicit mention of abortion, and
yet it is cited as the main resource for Christians who oppose abortion.
Preventing the access to safe abortions on religious grounds has not and will not
decrease the rate of people seeking an abortion; it will only lead to people taking
more risks to seek an abortion. A collaborative report by Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia and Guttmacher Institute detailed the disparities in access to
reproductive healthcare, including abortions. High poverty rates and a lack of
convenient public transportation led to people refraining from seeking any kind
of reproductive healthcare. In states with more restrictive laws on abortion they
are also more likely to enact abstinence-only sex education, in spite of evidence
showing that abstinence-only sex education leads to higher rates of teen
pregnancy. With abortion now illegal in 13 states across the US, following trigger
laws enacted right after the repeal of Roe v Wade, as well as another 13 states
still finalising their definitive abortion laws, many are now left to wonder if their
bodies are still theirs.
P A G E 1 1

P A G E 1 2
Calvin Lu and Patrick Hession

From 16 October to 22 October 2022, the world turned its eye to the 20th
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where the Communist
Party of China (CPC) discussed political developments in a room of around
2,300 delegates. The Party Congress, which occurs every five years, sets the
overarching Party doctrine and selects who the new slate of leaders will be
for a five-year term. The event is designed to be a highly routinised and
choreographed affair as seen by the praising of the party’s achievements and
reaffirmation of broader overarching goals. In spite of this, outcomes from
the Congress can subtly mark preludes to great changes in Chinese domestic
and foreign policy. This necessitated ‘China experts’ to go beyond the ‘official’
rhetoric to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the 20th Party
Congress, including its broader significance. One notable example was the
speculative significance surrounding Hu Jintao being escorted from the
conference, but other aberrations - the “diminution” of Deng Xiaoping’s
“relaxation on ideology” via the four cardinal principles, as well as Xi’s changes
in leadership personnel - were equally significant and provide a more indepth
analysis of China’s domestic and foreign policy agenda over the next
five-to-ten years.
WHAT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED?
Kicking off the week-long event, Xi Jinping delivered a two-hour report where
he covered the achievements of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC and
the Xi administration. Among these achievements include the CPC reaching
its 100th anniversary, China completing its poverty alleviation and thus
reaching its long-desired “moderately prosperous society”, and socialism with
Chinese characteristics entering a new era. Xi also outlined the CPC’s plans
for the future development of China against the backdrop of a slowing
economy due to the strict “zero-covid’ policy and the fall in consumer
confidence after the CPC’s interventions in private markets, such as the
property market.
P A G E 1 3
To achieve the future development goals of China, Xi discussed promoting
the Chinese concept of ‘Common Prosperity’, accelerating green
transformation, and the Dual Circulation Economy approach. Each of these
future development goals will now be explored in more detail.

Common Prosperity
The concept of ‘Common Prosperity’ is a confident, idealistic, but ultimately
vague expression that will guide how China transitions, defining itself from
‘big’ to ‘powerful’ as a modern socialist country. This will be done by
regulating income distribution and wealth accumulation while guaranteeing
employment, and improving the social security and housing systems. This
initiative epitomises both the rhetoric used to define CPC Congress goals and
their highly ambitious plans to lead the country out of its current economic
situation and difficulties.
Green transformation
China plans to accelerate green transformation, and promote green and lowcarbon
industries, controlling pollutant emissions and regulating important
ecosystems. Underpinning their approach is the 30/60 strategy to align with
global sustainability goals: peak carbon by 2030 and neutrality by 2060. To
achieve this, concrete measures were issued in carbon dioxide emissions,
energy consumption, industrial capacities (such as controlling the expansion
of coal industries), campaign support in high-polluting industries to reduce
production capacity, expanding the use of renewable energy such as
hydrogen, gas, bio-liquid fuels, and increased financial support to achieve
these goals.
The Dual Circulation Economy
Xi emphasised again the concept of the Dual Circulation Economy, which was
first referenced in 2020. The concept involves two cycles or markets,
domestic and international. The domestic economic cycle refers to its
domestic activities while the international cycle refers to its economic links
with the outside world. China wants the domestic cycle to play a leading role
and create a self-sufficient economy, whereas the international cycle would
act as an extension and supplement to the domestic market. The concept is
to mitigate the potential ‘decoupling’ from international markets, a very real
possibility if the US continues to ‘weaponise’ economic interdependence -
through restricting technological development for companies that operate in
China via the CHIPS and Science Act 2022 -
P A G E 1 4

or if further dramatic geo-political issues arise that would result in global
sanctions, as has happened with the advent of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
LEADERSHIP CHANGES
The First Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC was held
the following day after the conclusion of the 20th National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party. This is when the CCP’s new leadership was elected.
Unsurprisingly, and unprecedentedly, Xi was granted a third, five-year term.
There were four leadership changes in the Politburo Standing Committee,
which usually reflects the development trend of China in the next five-ten
years and beyond. Two developments from the changes in particular
epitomise Xi’s direction in governance.
Li Qiang
Li Qiang, a senior party official in Shanghai and a former
Chief of Staff to Xi (when Xi was the party leader of the
Zhejiang province), is set to replace outgoing Premier
Li Keqiang. This is extraordinary. Li Keqiang had been in the
role for the past two terms, and with a Western-friendly
worldview, would have made for an easier leader to
negotiate within an international context. However, at the
age of 67 (one year below the normal retirement age), he
was not named in the next iteration of the Politburo and is
expected to retire from politics.
P A G E 1 5
Instead, 63-year-old Li Qiang was appointed to the
Politburo as the next likely premier despite having
no experience in a central-government portfolio,
let alone deputy premier (a normal requirement
for the role of premier). Li was likely
rewarded the role for his past association with
Xi and after having enforced the harsh
months-long lockdowns on Shanghai,
reinforcing the party’s policy on ‘zero-covid’.
P H O T O : K E V I N
F R A Y E R / G E T T Y I M A G E S

Wang Huning
Wang Huning’s promotion from the fifth to the fourth highest-ranking official
manifests Xi’s vision to carve out his political ideology in China’s history
books. Wang is a political theorist who has helped shape the past three
president’s ideologies from behind the scenes. Notably within Xi’s
administration, he has helped craft national concepts such as ‘The Chinese
Dream’, the Belt and Road Initiative, and ‘Xi Jinping Thought’. With Wang likely
to assume the role of Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative
Conference, he will lead the interface between the CCP and the non-Party
elements of Chinese society, and even the Chinese diaspora in countries such
as Canada and Australia. With the promotion into this new role and his
extensive background in shaping strategic party ideologies, he will be in a
very influential position to extend the party’s policies beyond the domestic
political context.
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR
AUSTRALIA?
For Australians, the announcements made in the 20th
Party Congress will pose no significant changes in the
short term. However, Australia’s economic performance is
closely linked with China’s. The strategic and
leadership adjustments may cast light on what to
expect for our economic relationship with China
in the coming years.
P H O T O : T I N G S H U
W A N G / R E U T E R S
P A G E 1 6
One example is the Dual Circulation Economy, which
intends to promote internal economic growth. One way the
Party plans to stimulate the economy is through a top-down
approach by spending money on infrastructure such as
high speed railways, bridges, and other big public works,
which would inevitably require raw materials such as
Australia’s iron ore. This is showcased by the top three
Chinese imports in September 2020; iron and steel
(55.8 per cent), paper (34.8 per cent), and non-ferrous
metals (33.1 per cent).

However, with the falling trend of property developments as a result of the
property crisis and China’s urbanisation, reduced demand for iron ore is an
equally viable outcome given property construction accounts for roughly 35
per cent of China's total steel consumption. Australia is therefore susceptible
to any easing in growth; China accounted for around 40 per cent of Australia’s
resource exports (as of 2018/19). As a result, China’s property sector will be
important to watch over the next few years.
Another part of the Dual Circulation Economy is its ability to be ‘selfsufficient’,
which - when coupled with China’s ‘green transformation’ - would
see a gradual phase-out of Australian resources such as coal and oil. Australia
will therefore need to invest in exporting ‘green metals’ such as lithium,
nickel, and cobalt to mitigate the falling demand for fossil fuels.
FINAL THOUGHTS
Overall, China’s 20th Party Congress provided a potential prelude to great
changes in Chinese domestic and foreign policy through both its ‘official’
rhetoric - common prosperity, green transformation, and the dual circulation
economy - and unofficial - leadership changes and the reemergence of
ideology. Such strategic and leadership changes pose concerns for Australia’s
future economic performance. The broader significance of China’s 20th Party
Congress, therefore, is that Australia cannot sit idly by as the mutually
beneficial economic relationship evolves from the existing status quo.
P A G E 1 7

P A G E 1 8
P H O T O : M A R K U S W I N K L E R O N U N S P L A S H S

Elisha Watson
When South Korea’s new president,
Yoon Suk-yeol, was elected earlier this
year, it was seen as a warning to
women and female-presenting people
everywhere. Yoon rose to power from
the People Power Party where he
capitalised on the growing fear in the
country by appealing to the
grievances of young Korean men who
consider themselves anti-feminists.
Yoon appealed to these groups of
men who believe they are being
discriminated against and in turn
helped turn a fringe online
community into a damaging major
political force.
Yoon called for the Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family to be abolished,
and accused its officials of treating
men like “potential sex criminals.” He
has blamed the country’s low birth
rate on feminism — saying that
feminism prevents
healthy relationships between men
and women. He said that systemic
“structural discrimination based on
gender” doesn’t exist in South Korea
— despite Korean women being at or
near the bottom of the developed
world in a host of economic and social
indicators. Yoon became the
conservatives' "icon" because he was
"seen as the best person to beat the
Democratic Party candidate, despite
his lack of political leadership
experience," Gi-Wook Shin, a
sociology professor at Stanford, told
AFP.
Yoon’s plan to abolish the Gender
Equality Ministry could have a
disastrous impact on the country. The
regional and global implications of
this, particularly in the context of
women’s rights, include a dramatic
increase in sex crimes. Currently,
more than half of homicide victims in
South
P A G E 2 0

Korea are women — one of the
highest gender ratios in the world,
combined with low sentencing
rates for these crimes. In the last
10 years alone 41.4% of
perpetrators were given probation,
around 30% were given a fine and
only 28% of those found guilty
were actually sent to prison.
In the recent “Nth Room '' case, at
least 74 victims, including underage
girls, were blackmailed into
uploading explicit videos of
themselves on Telegram by a man
nicknamed “God God”, who then
sold the images. Moreover, Korean
women are facing a ‘feminist’
backash from Korean men who
think that this movement has
caused “reverse discrimination”
and that the #MeToo movement is
a witch hunt. In a June 2021 poll,
84% of Korean men in their
twenties, and 83% in their thirties,
said they had experienced “serious
gender-based discrimination.”
By abolishing the Gender Equality
Ministry, Yoon is putting the
women and female presenting
people of South Korea at risk.
They are now, more than ever
before, at risk of sex based crimes,
domestic abuse by a intimate
partner/family violence, a 40%
increase in suicide rates, a
significant gender pay gap, and
vicious online trolling from those
who dare to speak out against the
anti-feminism movement. While
there have been modest
improvements in women’s rights –
including the decriminalisation of
abortion in early 2021 and better
enrolment rates in higher
education - with 98% of students
completing high school, it is not
enough.
The global impacts of having men
like President Yoon in government
are already being seen in both
developing and developed
countries alike. Recently in Iran, 22-
year-old Mahsa Amini was brutally
beaten and killed by the regime's
morality police for not wearing a
hijab. This occurred just weeks
after Iran’s hardline president,
Ebrahim Raisi, ordered a
crackdown on women’s rights and
called for stricter enforcement of
the country’s mandatory dress
code,
P A G E 2 1

which has required all women to
wear the hijab head-covering since
the 1979 Islamic revolution. And in
the US, where the historical Roe v
Wade decision was overturned on
24 June 2022 by the Supreme
Court, pregnant people in at least
13 states across the country will
not be able to have the right to a
safe and leal abortion, including in
cases of rape and incest.
HUMAN
RIGHTS ARE
WOMEN'S
RIGHTS
Women of South Korea will be
looking to their new president for
change now more than ever in
these unprecedented times. If Yoon
Suk-yeol wants to effect real
change in his country, he will need
to first acknowledge the centuriesdeep
gender discrimination that
has happened under the guide of
politicians. Yoon can do this by
continuing to educate both himself
and the men in his country on
women’s rights and giving women
positions of equal power, not by
throwing abuse at women he is
threatened by.
Human rights are women's rights.
P H O T O : L E E J I N M A N / A S S O C I A T E D
P R E S S
P A G E 2 2

P A G E 2 3
P H O T O : T E D D Y O O N
U N S P L A S H

Taiwan has been at the forefront of international media attention over tensions
with China. While the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis – as it will be dubbed – has
captured the attention of Western audiences, a lesser-known and perhaps more
unnerving story has emerged.
In 2021, the southern Taiwanese city of Kaohsiung won the bid to host
WorldPride in 2025, which was slated to be held in East Asia for the first time in
the event’s history. However, InterPride, the organiser of WorldPride, dropped
Kaohsiung and Taiwan as hosts due to “political considerations”.
InterPride is in the process of applying to the United Nations to receive
consultative status as a global representative body. In doing so, it must align with
UN requirements, which inadvertently catches the watchful attention of China in
light of Beijing’s ever-increasing influence in the UN human rights system. In this
process, InterPride has compromised its core values to appease a country that
stands in polar opposition to InterPride’s existence, and a government that
would never allow an InterPride event to be held within its jurisdiction.
CHINA'S INFLUENCE
This entire debacle stands to demonstrate China’s hidden influence that extends
to even the most unexpected segments of western society. It is comparable to
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch cancelling a planned
march in Taipei at Beijing’s insistence.
In the past, countries, companies, and international organisations have
P A G E 2 4

shied away from angering China by self-censoring or
conforming to Beijing’s demands.
In 2018, China’s Civil Aviation Authority made
requests for the removal of any mention of Taiwan
to a range of international airlines. Websites now
display “Taipei, China” and “Taichung, China” instead
of the more accurate “Taipei, Taiwan” or “Taichung,
Taiwan”. Major international businesses and law
firms have also avoided establishing a strong, or in
some cases any, Taiwanese presence in fear of
damaging their lucrative access to mainland Chinese
markets.
Taiwan is unrecognised as an independent nation by
much of the world and even the UN. Its participation
on the world stage is so often barred by China’s
influence. On the rare occasion the island does
participate, it is forced to undergo exceptional
naming contortions as a balance between the de
facto independence of Taiwan and the need to avoid
irritating China.
"FOR INTERPRIDE, THE PRE-EMINENT
GLOBAL ORGANISATION IN ADVANCING
THE PRIDE MOVEMENT, TO HAVE PANDERED
TO CHINA IS NOTHING SHORT OF
SHOCKING."
For instance, “Chinese Taipei” is used in the
Olympics, “Taiwan, China” in the World Bank, and
most extravagant of all, the “Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” in
the World Trade Organisation.
These political considerations, created by the People’s
Republic, are accepted as commonplace in Taiwan as
a nod of acknowledgement to its
P A G E 2 5
P H O T O : A N D R E W L E U
O N U N S P L A S H

awkward international position and a price to pay for participation. However, it is
unusual and alarming that such considerations have permeated into the bounds
of human rights and other fields that are typically unassociated with Beijing.
As the first nation in Asia to legalise same-sex marriage, Taiwan, a bright beacon
of liberalism and human rights, stands as an almost antithesis to its cousins on
the mainland. Although no place is free of discrimination, Taiwan has served as a
long-standing haven for LGBTQIA+ persons in East Asia, whilst nearby
democracies in Seoul and Tokyo are flailing in their obligations to offer adequate
legal protection to their respective LGBTQIA+ communities.
On top of censorship and surveillance issues faced by all Chinese citizens, China’s
LGBTQIA+ community is subject to societal prejudice, healthcare discrimination,
and intimidation and detention by law enforcement. Despite the nudge towards
openness and acceptance in the late 2000s, recent years have seen Xi Jinping
mould China into a more conservative, nationalist, and conformist society. In
2021, LGBTQIA+ student societies at several Chinese universities saw their social
media accounts closed and censored for unspecified violations, and cracked
down on non-masculine “sissy” celebrities.
Yet when it comes to WorldPride 2025, China has used its influence and
pressured InterPride to cancel Taiwan’s hosting rights. Industries conducting
business on the mainland understandably conform to Beijing’s demands vis-a-vis
Taiwan and other designed “touchy” issues.
As an example, the NBA drew the ire of Chinese nationalists in 2019 when
Houston Rockets’ general manager Daryl Morey tweeted in support of the Hong
Kong protests. NBA broadcasting, advertising and other activities in China were
immediately halted.
In the wake of InterPride’s cancellation of WorldPride Taiwan 2025, international
organisations must acknowledge and understand that Beijing has a strategy
towards Taiwan and other human rights issues that are the inverse of what these
organisations stand for.
Organisations should take an indispensable moral stance and ensure their
policies and activities do not peddle China’s official line, furthering China’s foreign
policy aim of isolating Taiwan from the international community.
P A G E 2 6

P A G E 2 7

The assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, on July 8 this
year, sent shockwaves across Japan and the globe. This is no embellishment.
World leaders expressed their shock. Japan is also noted for its near nonexistent
gun violence as a result of strict gun protocols, with only ten shooting
instances reported last year. As a result, this comparatively low gun violence rate
has carried over into the political sphere in recent years; Japanese politicians
closely interact with the general public during elections, with security known to
be ‘lax’. With Abe recognised as Japan’s “most influential politician of recent
decades”, the fact that such a prominent political figure was murdered only
compounded this shock.
The fallout from Abe’s assassination has been significant. Top Japanese police
officials - Itaru Nakamura and Tomoaki Onizuka - announced their resignations
after a probing investigation concluded significant security faults resulted in
Abe’s death. Furthermore, the gunman’s - Tetsuya Yamagami - motive, was
revealed to be Abe’s informal “links” with the Unification Church - an
organisation recognised for being a “predatory cult”. Yamagami held a “grudge”
against the group as a result of his mother donating more than $700,000, which
left her family in “financial ruin”. This revelation has caused a firestorm in
Japanese politics, disclosing the true extent of Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP)
politicians’ ties with the Unification Church. A Kyodo News survey has since
found more than 100 of Japan's 712 Diet parliamentarians held links with the
Unification Church - nearly 80% of these 100-plus politicians are LDP members.
Since Abe’s death, it has been revealed that Cabinet's disapproval rose to 41 per
cent (up 17 points since July), whilst the hashtag “the LDP is disgusting” started
trending on Japanese Twitter. Interestingly, the announcement of a state funeral
(for 27 September) only added to domestic division, with recent polls indicating
62 per cent of the Japanese public oppose such a move. Subsequent protests -
including one demonstrator who set themself on fire - object to the
aforementioned scandal, cost and use of taxpayer funds, as well as entrenching
Abe’s nationalistic legacy.
Amidst this backdrop, more than 190 foreign delegations and 50 head-of-state
level VIPs attended the State Funeral. These contrasting attitudes - negative
domestically; supportive internationally - invite a greater reflection of Shinzo
Abe’s legacy.
P A G E 2 8

ABE’S FAMILY INFLUENCE
Two synonymous features of Shinzo Abe’s political legacy include: (1) evoking a
conservative-nationalist agenda, which sought to instil Japanese self-confidence;
and (2) his “sixth sense in foreign policy”. It is clear that Abe’s family background
significantly shaped this political direction. On 21 September 1954, Abe was born
into a prominent political family; his grandfather - Nobusuke Kishi - was a former
PM, whilst his father - Abe Shintaro - was a foreign minister. The Iconoclast, a
2020 biography of Abe’s political career by Tobias S. Harris explores the many
influences - social, cultural, political, economic, demographic - on Abe, but in
particular that of his grandfather - a suspected war criminal - who sought to reestablish
Japan’s sovereignty. This too became Abe’s own political goal. His father
was of equal significance, impressing upon him “the importance of building trust
with foreign leaders”. Abe’s relationship-building is recognised as one of his
greatest achievements, evidenced by his ability to foster working relations with a
wide range of leaders - from Malcolm Turnbull to Donald Trump and Xi Jinping.
P A G E 2 9
A REVISIONIST OR STABILISING LEADER?
Abe’s conservative-nationalist ideals made him a divisive figure. It is for this
reason why critical analyses are important; they reflect the discord surrounding
his complex legacy. This is important to note in light of criticisms directed at
Western media for “eulogising” Abe as a “global statesman”. Indeed, Abe’s
historical revisionism of Japan’s colonial past, as well as his six visits to the
controversial Yasukuni Shrine, have hindered relations with both China and
(more significantly) South Korea. The Yasukuni Shrine honours those who have
died in the service of Japan since 1869. This includes 14 convicted ‘Class A’, as
well as 1,000 executed ‘Class B’ and ‘C’ war criminals - having been inducted in a
secret ceremony in 1978. It was this act that has made Yasukuni so contentious,
as encapsulated by this recent statement from the South Korean foreign
ministry: it “glorifies Japan’s past war of aggression and enshrines war criminals”.
Abe did, however, refrain from visiting the shrine for the remainder of his tenure
in light of the controversial 2013 visit. Abe’s conservative-nationalist agenda
proved controversial domestically too. The ‘Abe Doctrine’ - which sought to move
away from state ‘pacifism’ by “revamping” Japan’s security policies and
institutions - provides the most prominent example. A brief contextualisation of
the issue is needed.

The US occupying force’ two-pronged aim to ‘pacify’ Japan (led by General
Douglas MacArthur) consisted of democratic reform and constitutional change,
the latter of which - through rewriting the Japanese constitution - has been of
most significance, and resulting in this key phrase in Article 9: “the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation”. The “pacifist
clause” subsequently confined Japan’s military posture to self-defence. It was this
subversionary ideal that fuelled Abe’s ambition to re-establish Japan’s
sovereignty. Put simply, Abe viewed Article 9 as a relic of history that continues
to thwart Japan from realising its true potential. However, efforts to alter the
status-quo have been met by considerable public resistance, so much so that
constitutional revision became a ‘bridge-too-far’. Other notable domestic
controversies included ‘Abenomics’, which resulted in increased socioeconomic
disparities, whilst his hypernationalism and close-links with right-wing groups
proliferated social problems including hate crime and concerns for freedom of
speech.
Despite acknowledging the public concerns surrounding Abe’s conservativenationalist
agenda, one cannot refrain from the fact that Abe was Japan’s longest
serving PM. Japanese politics had been in constant flux before Abe’s second
term, having had 16 PMs between 1989 and 2012, averaging 538 day-terms; he
remained in office for more than 2,800 days. This longevity perfused credibility
both domestically and internationally, and “restored Japan to the world stage”.
A “conviction politician” may therefore be the most apt description for Shinzo
Abe.
BROADER IMPLICATIONS: REINVIGORATING THE
‘BALANCE OF POWER’ IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND
AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS
Arguably, Abe’s insistence on a regional security paradigm has been most
consequential for security dynamics within the Indo-Pacific. His ‘Conference of
Two Seas’ speech, in 2007, marked the first reference to a “strategic global
partnership” consisting of four key countries in “broader Asia”: the US, Japan,
India & Australia.
P A G E 3 0

P H O T O : K Y O D A / A P I M A G E S
In 2012, Abe yet again emphasised a regional security paradigm, compiling an
essay reaffirming the importance of a “democratic Asian security diamond” to
counteract a “Lake Beijing” from eventuating. Such advocacy has been pivotal to
both the formation and reinvigoration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,
otherwise known as the QUAD.
P A G E 3 1
In reflecting on Australia, Abe contributed considerably to Australia-Japan
relations. During his first term, Abe “signed the foundational” Japan–Australia
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with John Howard, enabling
comprehensive engagement between the two countries. Furthermore, Abe and
former Australian PM Tony Abbott held a particularly strong rapport, with both
overseeing the formation of a ‘special relationship’ and the Japan-Australia
Economic Partnership Agreement in 2014. Abe therefore laid the foundations
and capitalised on both countries' ever-growing convergence of interests
epitomised by maintaining the rules-based order. As a result, “Australia’s
relationship with Japan has never been more close”.
FINAL THOUGHTS
For a figure synonymous with division and controversy, it seems pertinent that
Abe’s state funeral is clouded in discord. Shinzo Abe will nonetheless remain
Japan’s “most influential politician of recent decades” due to his political
longevity and impact on a global scale. The State Funeral is due recognition of
this.

P A G E 3 2
P H O T O : I A N / U N S P L A S H

YDS Team
P A G E 3 3

In May 2022, Anthony Albanese led the Australian Labor Party to government after nine
years in opposition. The Labor Party’s campaign was far from ambitious, opting for a
‘small target’ approach which left little room for criticism. But while the ALP’s win came
with little that would radically rock the boat domestically, the win ushered in a revised
approach to Australia’s foreign policy.
In contrast to his predecessor Scott Morrison, Albanese along with Foreign Affairs
Minister, Penny Wong, instantly prioritised efforts to ‘repair’ Australia’s international
standing. Both were busy abroad, with August the only month this year that the new
Prime Minister’s calendar didn’t include an overseas trip.
In light of the new government’s efforts to re-establish Australia’s position on the global
stage, here are the three defining characteristics of the government’s foreign policy since
coming to office:
A THAWING OF RELATIONS
It took less than two months in office for
Anthony Albanese to visit the French
President in Paris, seeking to remedy the
rift between the two nations after
Morrison tore up a $90b submarine deal
with the French. Bonding over their joint
distaste for Morrison, the meeting
demonstrated the new Government’s
intent to put out the fires Morrison
started around the world.
“I DON'T THINK,
I KNOW”
F r e n c h P r e s i d e n t E m m a n u e l M a c r o n w h e n
a s k e d i f h e t h o u g h t f o r m e r P M S c o t t
M o r r i s o n l i e d t o h i m a b o u t a s u b m a r i n e
d e a l .
However, Albanese’s meeting with
Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bali in
November marked the most significant
re-thawing of relations since he came to
office. Tensions with China began with
Malcolm Turnbull’s blocking of Huawei’s
5G expansion into Australia in 2019 and
came to a head in 2021 when Australia
P A G E 3 4
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S

led calls for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus.
While Albanese was adamant he was far from backing down on Australia’s commitment
to Taiwan’s freedom, human rights, and China’s actions in the South China Sea, the
resumption of high level communication suggests there may be a way forward for the two
countries who share strong historical and economic bonds.
A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO LEADERSHIP
The Solomon Islands’ security deal with China, an island which lies less than 2000 km
from Australia, sparked a wave of shock and outrage. As the geopolitical struggle in the
region between the world’s two major powers of the USA and China continues into the
21st century, Australia is expected to play an increasingly important regional role. The
Solomon Islands pivot away from Australia indicated one of the greatest foreign policy
blunders in Australia’s history.
Yet we shouldn’t be completely surprised. Under the previous Government, Australia
shied away from taking global leadership. Australia’s refusal to play ball on climate
targets, not only earnt the Government the reputation as a global pariah, alongside
nations such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, but also contributed to greater
disenfranchisement within the Pacific. Pacific nations are already bearing the greatest
brunt of climate change. For a major strategic ally and geopolitical neighbour to be not
only unwilling but appear actively against greater action on climate change was greatly
upsetting.
As a result, Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong and Albanese have set about reassuring
the world that this Government is different. It took Wong less than two weeks before
jetting to the islands of the Pacific.
That a senior Government official
saw the region as a priority,
compared to the previous
Government who sent a junior
Senator, Zed Seselja, goes a long
way to reassuring the Island
states.
“ASLEEP AT THE
WHEEL.”
A B C ’ s G l o b a l A f f a i r s E d i t o r , J o h n L y o n s ,
o n A u s t r a l i a ’ s p o l i c y t o w a r d s t h e P a c i f i c
u n d e r M o r r i s o n .
P A G E 3 5
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S

SMOKE AND MIRRORS?
Despite the Government’s attempts to ‘re-brand’ on the global stage, there have been few
tangible changes in policy to point out.
While Australia may have removed its coal-loving PM in Morrison, the country is still
considered a global laggard in climate action. Rising from last place at 59th to 55th place
in a policy ranking of the world’s largest emitters may be a positive step. However, the
country’s refusal to rule out additional coal mines, its weak 2030 reduction targets, and its
continued subsidies for fossil fuels demonstrate there is still a long way to go for Australia
to be in lock-step with other developed economies.
Additionally, despite the high level chats and conferences, Albanese has towed the same
line as his predecessor. Even following another meeting with Macron in November,
Albanese has remained committed to the AUKUS alliance and the nuclear submarine
deal, much to the continued disappointment of the French. On China, while Albanese may
be less hawkish and has avoided the dangerous “drums of war” rhetoric used by
Opposition Leader, Peter Dutton, Australia has not taken any steps back when it comes to
its China policy. The Chinese Government remains equally stoic.
While Albanese’s may be wise to maintain the status quo, it demonstrates the difficulty
the country faces navigating the issues of the 21st century. For all the new government’s
perceived successes on foreign policy in its first six months in office, it may be too soon to
tell what the long term implications of an Albanese-Wong partnership may be.
P A G E 3 6
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S

B O O K R E V I E W
T I D E S T H A T B I N D : A U S T R A L I A I N T H E
P A C I F I C
Declan Hourd
Tides that Bind: Australia in the Pacific is a short but
passionate declaration that advocates for Canberra to
improve its relations with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs)
and embrace its role as a regional leader. Published in
2021, the book is rooted in the profound personal
experience that Richard Marles has had in the Pacific
region both personally and in his professional capacity as
the Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island Affairs during
the Gillard Government. Now he is the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister for Defence. Sitting in these influential portfolios, Marles is
provided the opportunity to influence Australian foreign policy and advocate his
ideas laid out in this book.
A core theme of the book lies in re-establishing Australia as a prominent fixture
of the Pacific. In recounting interactions with international counterparts, he
highlights that the world views Australia as an expert of Pacific affairs. Yet within
our domestic discourse, we don’t seem to recognise this.
P A G E 3 7
Marles muses on why this dissonance has occurred. He starts at the grass roots
and observes a decline in people to people relationships beginning in the 1970s
as waves of decolonisation and independence saw PICs regain control of their
countries. In retrospect this was an opportunity to facilitate growth and
strengthen our neighbouring democracies. However, as Australians who lived
across the South Pacific returned home, the interest of Canberra policymakers'
in the Pacific waned. This has only recently started to shift with junior diplomatic
staff revitalising interest in the region - viewing it as a launchpad to a more
prestigious posting in Asia, Europe, or the US. There must also be a shift in who
manages Australian relations with the region to avoid a depletion of systemic
knowledge of the region and its people. Currently Australian relations are
managed by first assistant secretaries - rather than the decision makers and
their advisors.

In Australia’s absence a variety of challenges have engulfed the region. Climate
change is the first that comes to mind. Rising sea levels shrink the shallow
coastlines and furious storms devastate homes, cultural sites, and contaminates
drinking water. Moreover, PICs face a variety of governance and economic issues
that range from law and order, political legitimacy, and social development.
These observations are made by Marles' interrogation of the chronic
underachievement of the Millennium Development Goals across the region. The
wealth and standard of living of the average Australian stands in stark contrast
to their Pacific Island equivalent.
Marles argues that if Australia reorients its relationship with PICs it can give
Australia more foreign policy options in the wider world long term. Improving
the Pacific will be a springboard for a more expansive foreign policy that
incorporates small island states around the world. Canberra can look west to its
Indian Ocean coast to work with the Seychelles or Maldives, with the possibility
to embark on joint ventures in those countries with India. Similarly, the
Caribbean provides ample opportunities to enhance intra-Commonwealth
relations and opens avenues to work with the United States. Broadly, success in
the Pacific would mark Australia as a nation that has capacity and expertise in
international development.
Unquestionably, the book is designed to push Australian Pacific policy in a more
fruitful direction. However, this is not a dry telling of a troubled region. Marles
aims to put the human experience at the heart of his pitch. He takes great effort
to describe the school choirs that greet international delegations, his time as a
schoolboy in Papua New Guinea, vibrant cultures, and the toll tropical storms
take on drinking water reserves. Only after establishing this people oriented
narrative does Marles put forward his desired solution. In his view there are four
policy areas where Canberra can quickly provide substantial support: climate
policy, defence cooperation, increasing access to the Australian economy, and
developmental assistance.
The Tides that Bind is an unpretentious entry point into Australia’s relationship in
the Pacific. It is very approachable and offers an insider’s insight into how policy
is formulated. The current federal government has already embarked on
improving its relationship with the region, and this book may have already
outlined what policy watchers could expect to come.
P A G E 3 8

W H A T I S T H E F I R S T
N A T I O N ’ S V O I C E T O
P A R L I A M E N T A N D W H Y
D O W E N E E D A
R E F E R E N D U M
O N I T ?
Gen Marcocci
Scientific evidence shows Indigenous peoples have lived in Australia for more
than 65,000 years. Yet, Australia’s colonial history, which began around 200 years
ago, has set quite a negative tone for First people’s relationship with settlercoloniser
peoples and non-indigenous peoples.
P A G E 3 9
Despite significant pressure on the Australian government throughout history to
sign a treaty with First Nation peoples, there has not been one. Australia is the
only commonwealth country to have not signed a treaty, whilst other treaties
were established early on by New Zealand, Canada and the United States.
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT’S PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT UNITY
WITH FIRST NATIONS PEOPLES
There have been some symbolic gestures, beginning with Former Prime Minister
Paul Keating. He delivered the famous Redfern speech in 1992 addressing the
violent dispossession of the country’s traditional owners. Following this, Former
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd delivered an apology in 2008 for policies that inflicted
incomprehensible suffering on Indigenous peoples. While well-meaning, these
acknowledgements and attempts of offering an olive branch have not transpired
into action or treaty.

Since coming to government after the 9 years of Liberal Coalition, the Labor party has
started serious discussions about an Indigenous Voice to parliament. This has renewed
hopes for a stronger relationship yet it has also created a point of tension for groups of
interest.
WHAT IS A VOICE TO PARLIAMENT?
A Voice to parliament is a body that will become recognised and enshrined in the
constitution. It will enable Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to provide advice
to the parliament on policies that impact their lives.
There would be a Local and Regional Voice, designed to be led by communities at a state
level providing advice to all levels of government. There would also be a National Voice,
where advice would be provided to the Australian Parliament and Government. This
Voice would be engaged early on in the policy process. There would be a structural link
between the Local and Regional Voice with the National Voice. Elections would be held at
the national level for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to elect National Voice
members directly. Both levels have a broad scope as the Voice can give informal and
formal advice. There is a slight difference between the Local Voice and National Voice as
the Australian Government is obliged to consult the National Voice on narrow proposed
laws which exclusively relate to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians.
The Voice would not advise on every national issue – it would prioritise, focusing on
matters that are important to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The proposal
for the National Voice has not tried to prescribe these matters. The priorities of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people change over time and are diverse. The Voice
would work in conjunction with current laws, as it would not be able to deliver or
administer government programs and their advice would not affect the validity of any
law.
HOW IS THE VOICE BENEFICIAL?
The purpose of this is to give the Australian Government the opportunity to make
policies with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, rather than for them. This is
different to standing committees such as the one on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Affairs. Standing committees inquire into, and create reports on certain issues to be
tabled for policy discussions such as the Report on Indigenous Youth and the Criminal
Justice System. Whereas, the Voice will give specific advice on proposed policies and that
advice will help develop policies.
P A G E 4 0

HOW DID THE VOICE COME ABOUT?
The Voice was a key recommendation from the Uluru Statement from the Heart. The
statement from the Heart was first brought to life in 1937. It has been a long journey
since its conception.
In 2007 Prime Minister John Howard promised he would hold a referendum to
recognise the special status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders as first nations
people. In 2010 Prime Minister Julia Gillard established the Expert Panel on the
Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the Constitution. In 2015
the Referendum Council was established under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull; it
built on previous works by other committees and engaged Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples on their views on real and meaningful recognition in the constitution.
Now the Voice aims to solidify the shifts in the relationship between non-indigenous
and indigenous people. It is working to answer, how can settler-colonial government
benefit First Nations peoples?
WHAT OPINIONS ON THE VOICE HAVE ARISEN?
This political undertaking has been fervently opposed by Victorian Greens senator Lidia
Thorpe. Thorpe said a referendum on an Indigenous Voice to parliament is a ‘complete
waste’ of money. The Voice is seen by opponents as symbolism rather than practical
action. NT Coalition senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price said she would not support the
proposal as it is very vague. She stated that it was just “another federal-funded
bureaucracy” that will not deliver.
Price said housing, violence against women and children, and alcohol-related social
harm were the biggest issues in the territory. She asserts there needs to be immediate
action on these ‘real’ issues rather than having a referendum on the Voice.
Victoria’s First Peoples Assembly co-chair Marcus Stewart leads the complex treaty
negotiations in Victoria. Stewart believes the Voice is above politics. The Uluru
Statement from the Heart and a Voice of First Nations People is a once-in-a-generation
change, bringing the country together for reform. Treaty and truth-telling are essential
for reconciliation even though they take a long time to negotiate and implement.
Anthony Albanese has also recently travelled to remote islands and communities
discussing and hearing from Aboriginal Elders and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.
P A G E 4 1

The collective narrative theme was the experience of denial in having a voice and being
heard. Albanese stressed that it is not about compensating for past wrongs, but it is
about creating a common understanding of Indigenous issues to ensure a better
future.
HOW ARE OPINIONS BEING BALANCED?
The reasoning for opposition to the referendum raises interesting questions about
balancing interests through policy. On one hand, the referendum is an opportunity to
enhance the Australian government and non-indigenous person relationship with
Indigenous communities. A Voice signals a genuine commitment to truth-telling and
treaty. Whilst on the other hand, the Voice is argued to provide insubstantial decisionmaking
power which ultimately does not justify the means and cost of creating it.
HOW WILL THE VOICE BE CREATED?
Enshrining a Voice in parliament requires a referendum. This is the only way the
constitution can be changed. The constitution organises the principles and procedures
public institutes follow. It enables social, judicial and political functionality. Yet a
referendum is one of the most expensive procedures to exist. It requires every eligible
voter to poll their opinion on the change to the constitution. The last referendum was
held in 1999 costing the government $66.8 million. Thus, in a time of extreme budget
deficit coupled with the insubstantial power the Voice gives, it will be a hard bargain to
drive.
Unanimous approval of the Voice is unlikely, a successful referendum will require the
proper wording. Minister for Indigenous Australians Linda Burney has set up a working
group of 22 Indigenous leaders helping to share the referendum plan and to refine the
question that will be put to voters.
Ultimately, having a transparent and meaningful body in parliament signals Australia’s
first tangible, genuine and thought-out steps toward a treaty with First Nations People.
The level of consultation and connection that is occurring in this space due to the
proposed referendum shows we are on a path, as a country, to better understanding,
listening and respect.
P A G E 4 3

With the victory of the Australian Labor Party in the 2022
Australian Federal Election, No Enemies No Friends may have
become one of the most useful books to get a sense for the
direction of Australia’s foreign policy in the next three
years. Author Allan Behm maintained a 30-year career in
the APS. During that time he was the Chief of Staff for the
minister for climate change in the Rudd-Gillard government
and from 2017 to 2019 he was the Senior Adviser to the
Shadow Foreign Minister, Penny Wong.
The book is structured in two parts, beginning with an unflinching examination
of Australia’s present foreign policy, then moving to an exploration of how future
policymakers may seek to improve Canberra’s place in the future. Wong was a
clear influence on the concluding chapters of No Enemies No Friends and it stands
to reason that Behm will have influenced the Foreign Minister’s outlook.
Behm’s analysis is wide reaching, highlighting the peaks and valleys of
Canberra’s engagement with its allies, neighbours and rivals. At its best,
Australia’s foreign policy focuses on activism and engagement with the
international community. At its worst, it is sluggish, disinterested, and too readily
relies on the status quo.
No Enemies No Friends is a part of the growing foreign policy literature that is
demanding Australia to find a more independent foreign policy to grapple with
the challenges of the present. In Behm’s words “Australia is not aggressive
enough to have enemies, nor attractive enough to have friends. But it does not
have to be that way.” To cure an increasingly middling international presence, No
Enemies No Friends calls for imaginative, well funded and multidisciplinary foreign
policy to grapple with the many vicious problems that face the world today.
P A G E 4 4

Herein lies what I think are the most
valuable lessons of this book: how do
we change our foreign policy? Behm’s
solution lies in structural change
starting within the domestic sphere and
means understanding Australian
identity, values and interests. This is an
incredibly nuanced discussion that
warrants reading the book. Some topics
have quite clear connections with this
goal like increasing foreign language
education, and others are more oblique,
such as reconciliation with our
Indigenous communities and
rearticulating Australian values.
Cleverly written, Behm weaves together
current trends and ongoing challenges,
and puts it within the context of our
regional environment and political
peculiarities. No Enemies No Friends is a
thought provoking read and attacks the
foreign policy status quo. It represents
the influences that are acting upon our
current cohort of policymakers, and
broadly looks to interrogate how the
character of Australian policy came to
be.
P A G E 4 5

P A G E 4 6
P H O T O : I R E N E S T R O N G / U N S P L A S H

P H O T O : X I N H U A N E W S
Samuel Ng
Off the back of Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-
Europe Railway (CER) was launched nearly ten years ago. The railway formed the
“belt” of the BRI, forming the flagship land connection between the two
continents, running from Northeastern China along the Trans-Siberian Railway,
through to Belarus and into Europe.
In 2020, lockdown-induced disruptions to air and sea routes, combined with
exorbitantly high ocean shipping fees, culminated to divert freight traffic to rail.
China’s National Rail Group saw a 22 percent increase in freight trains sent from
China to Europe between 2020 and 2021 and overall a nine-fold increase from
2016 to 2021.
P A G E 4 7

Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine abruptly disrupted East-West rail traffic, and
the Russia-dependent CER was dust-binned due to European avoidance of
Russia and its sanctioned-related stigma. With Moscow’s aggressiveness on full
display, European and Chinese exporters and logistics firms transporting a
myriad of goods between the two continents looked to avoid land routes passing
through Russia or the combat area. The need for alternative routes began to
mount among both East and West, particularly among a possible European
boycott of products transported via Russian rail.
As the Chinese proverb reads, “opportunity knocks only once” (
), and in late September 2022 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation summit in Samarkand, opportunity knocked for Beijing. China,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan resuscitated plans for a new railway link bypassing
Russia. The CKU will form the southern arm of the CER, with the northern and
middle routes traversing through Russia. Once the CKU southern route is
completed, it will establish an even shorter transit time, looping southward to
connect China and Europe via the Caspian Sea, Iran, and Turkey. The CKU is
more than 500 kilometres shorter than its northern and middle counterparts,
decreasing transit time by approximately one week.
The idea of the CKU was first floated in 1997, but was stymied by Russian
geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia, with Moscow apprehensive
of China’s growing role in the region. With the Kremlin now preoccupied with its
flailing war against Kyiv, Beijing has received Moscow’s go-ahead to proceed with
the project, and now more than two decades later, China has the
opportunity to proceed with the CKU. Another Chinese
proverb sums up Beijing’s opportunities: “the best
time to plant a tree was 20 years ago, the second best
time is now.”
P A G E 4 8

Xi Jinping’s decision to visit Central Asia as his first destination since the
pandemic indicates Beijing’s intention to strengthen ties with its neighbouring
region. The Central Asian states have grown in strategic significance in terms of
trade and location, particularly considering their crucial geographic location visà-vis
China’s BRI.
As a region of historical Russian influence, forming parts of the Russian Empire
and later the Soviet Union, the international position of the Central Asian “stans”
have been inseparably tied to Moscow for centuries. However, with Russia seen
to be on a downward decline, the region has sought greater independence in
foreign policy decision-making and moved to diversify economic partners.
Faltering Russian influence in the region now provides Zhongnanhai the
opportunity to deepen its own influence. In this regard, Beijing acknowledges
that the CKU will not only carry cargo and economic benefits to the region, but
also carry the geostrategically important cargo of China’s railpolitik.
Prior to Xi’s visit, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi visited Tashkent, meeting with
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov pledging to deepen China’s cooperation with not
only Kyrgyzstan but all the former Soviet “stans” in infrastructure, transport,
energy, agriculture, finance, and regional security, among others. The meeting
also affirmed the commencement of the CKU’s construction in 2023 via a
memorandum signed in September 2022.
In response to the CKU agreement, Japarov commented, “there will be jobs. Our
economy will boom.” This mood is widely reflected across Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, where many, including Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, view the
CKU as their ticket to economic advancement and a crucial connection to the
global market. There is also a possibility for the host nations to generate transit
fee revenue for the anticipated freight traffic, forming a new source of muchneeded
income.
P A G E 4 9

"FOR BISHKEK AND TASHKENT,
THE CKU EMERGES AS A NEW
CONCRETE LINK TO THE
GREATER EURASIAN MARKETS,
OPENING ACCESS TO REGIONS
SUCH AS SOUTHEAST ASIA,
THE MIDDLE EAST AND
EUROPE."
There are also prospective socio-economic
benefits, including the modernisation of
the countries’ domestic transportation
infrastructure and rail services. Chinese
Deputy Minister of Commerce Wang
Shouwen noted that Beijing is eager to
implement the CKU memorandum and
has pledged to increase Kyrgyz agricultural
imports and to assist in upgrading the
country’s highways and roads.
However, this positive view is not shared by all. Despite
government-level support, some Kyrgyz and Uzbek residents
are sceptical toward the CKU. It is their view that their
countries are included only as a means to an end for China
and co-opted simply out of geography.
Many in Central Asia believe China is more interested
in shipping its own freight through the region,
rather than economically engaging in the host
countries by investing locally or creating jobs.
Former U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and
Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu observed
evidence of local resentment of the Chinese
presence in the country, with the view on
the ground being that China is “exploitative,
corrupt, and non-transparent.” Kyrgyz citizens
also fear that Chinese loans create unsustainable
debt and Chinese workers who are flown in
displace jobs for local workers.
Kyrgyzstan watcher Sovetbek Zikirov recognises that
“China is an economic superpower in the region,”
arguing that Bishkek could do little to insist on its
own national interests and needs, instead kowtowing
to Beijing for the ostensible benefits the CKU may bring.
P A G E 5 0

Beyond public sentiment and opinion, there are other hurdles in the way of
China’s railpolitik. The shallow fiscal strength of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,
combined with the backward transport infrastructure system may delay the
realising the dream of a 15-day Eurasian transport corridor that bypasses Russia.
Not only does Kyrgyzstan still rely on Soviet-era narrow gauge railway, itself
incompatible with China’s international gauge, Kyrgyzstan is woefully short of
any rail infrastructure entirely. In a recent demonstration of the CKU’s proposed
route, the Kyrgyz portion of the rail relied on trucks.
Bishkek’s 280-kilometre section also faces engineering and logistical challenges.
Kyrgyz officials have admitted that their portion may prove costlier, given that
nearly 100 tunnels and weather-resistant infrastructure may be necessary to
traverse the country’s unforgiving mountainous and desert topography.
U z b e k , K y r g y z a n d C h i n e s e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t
a u t h o r i t i e s s i g n a m e m o r a n d u m o n m o v i n g t h e j o i n t r e g i o n a l
r a i l w a y p r o j e c t f o r w a r d , i n S a m a r k a n d , U z b e k i s t a n , S e p t . 1 4 , 2 0 2 2 .
P H O T O : V O A N E W S
P A G E 5 1

The CKU’s touted benefits have been widely reported, shared, and embraced by
those in power in Bishkek and Tashkent. The supposed economic benefits and
intangible advantages have seemed to win over the Kyrgyz and Uzbek
governments. Nonetheless, the CKU faces the same challenges as the CER prior
to the Ukraine War.
Most of the CER’s freight stems from Russian orders and PRC imports of Russian
commodities, including crude oil, coal, fertiliser, gas and agricultural goods. In
2021, the CER made up only 4.45 percent of all China-Europe oceanic trade.
Prospects for trade-by-rail have been further clouded by slowing EU demand,
economic certainly, and declining confidence in China. The imbalance between
eastbound and westbound trains leaves many containers empty on their return
leg to China.
With the CKU forming the southern route of the CER, it will inevitably inherit the
already limited traffic previously flowing through Russia. But given the sorry
state of the CER, sceptics in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may have valid and
legitimate arguments in their apprehensiveness towards the railway project. The
CKU, similar to other Chinese infrastructure projects abroad, may be relegated
to white-elephant status, with a financially tolling effect on Bishkek and
Tashkent.
Be that as it may, the CKU undeniably provides a crucial gateway for Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan to reach the wider regions of the world, and allows their
products and goods to be shipped to previously inaccessible markets. If realised,
further expansion of the CKU may carve out a route for China to reach the
Persian Gulf and other transportation links in Europe.
The railway also provides Beijing with unique inroads into the Central Asian
region, all while the region’s own historic hegemon is distracted. Despite the
risks and unfavourable economics, Zhongnanhai will likely persist with the
project, viewing it from a geopolitical rather than economic lens. After all, as the
Chinese proverb reads, “it is foolish to refuse to eat just because of a chance of
choking.” ( )
P A G E 5 2

Soni Porwal
As it stands, Pakistan’s economic situation is quite dire. The country recently
managed to avert a default by securing $1.1bn in funds from the International
Monetary Fund in August. The floods, however, have worsened conditions with
the poverty rate expected to rise between 2.5 to 4 percent when nearly 20
percent of the population is already below the poverty line.
P A G E 5 3
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S

Lacking the capacity to self-finance its recovery, Pakistan’s Federal Minister for
Climate Change, Sherry Rehman, urged for international help and aid from the
United Nations (UN) and other organisations. Having already dispatched “cash
handouts worth $264 million” to over two million people affected by the disaster,
Minister Sherry has called for more. The UN increased its humanitarian aid
appeal to $816 million from $160 million, five-fold the money promised earlier.
Pakistan has received aid from the European Union, China, United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Uzbekistan, India, and the United States to
tackle the disaster and rehabilitate the people. UAE, Turkey, Uzbekistan sent
fresh supplies and relief goods. Both the US and the EU provided $30 million
worth of aid for the flood-affected population.
P A G E 5 4
F o o d a s s i s t a n c e i s u n l o a d e d n e a r Q u e t t a .
P H O T O : B A L A C H J A M A L I S / W F P
Key to recovery, however, requires future-proofing initiatives that can help
mitigate the extent of these kinds of flood events. Resilient infrastructure – in
particular, drainage systems – plays a huge role. This was readily demonstrated
in the city of Karachi, near Pakistan’s southern coast, where urban streets were
inundated with flood waters as the drainage systems failed to cope.

A c o u p l e s e e k s s a f e t y i n f l o o d - h i t P e s h a w a r - t h e r e i s a ' d e s p e r a t e '
n e e d f o r t e n t s .
P H O T O : H U S S A I N A L I / A N D O L U A G E N C Y V I A A F P
While this is apparently a regular occurrence, with “eighty percent of Karachi’s
commercial areas” flooding during monsoon season, the impact is worsening
with each consecutive flood. The Korangi Association of Trade and Industry
(KATI) have laid the blame squarely on “administrative failures”. Residents, too,
have complained of the lack of services – including ambulances – being able to
operate during these events.
However, even with mitigable failures identified, it is questionable whether the
amount of aid required will be met – and, indeed, if it will be enough. A
significant barrier to funding recovery is the domestic aspect of international
politics. Governments and political parties in rich countries, such as China, the
United States, and even Australia, face significant internal pressures from
business and industry lobbies to advance policy decisions that favour their own
advantage. This has been evinced by the discourse at the COP27 Summit held in
Egypt this year, with developed countries refraining from contributing to “loss
and damage” funds – in short, climate finance that aims to “compensate states
for damage suffered due to the impacts of climate change” and help prevent
future climate risks.
P A G E 5 5
Yet, overall, the viability of such funding is further jeopardised by the lack of
international political will to achieve emission reduction targets. As noted by the
Conversation, a disappointing outcome of the recent deliberations at COP27 saw
the hope for keeping the average temperature of the planet limited to 1.5
degrees has been put “on life support”. For developing countries like Pakistan, it
is little wonder why scepticism for a hopeful future remains.

T H E R E N E W E D
D I P L O M A T I C P R O C E S S
B E T W E E N A R M E N I A A N D
T U R K E Y
N O R M A L I S A T I O N O F R E L A T I O N S O R P R E C U R S O R T O
R E N E W E D C O N F R O N T A T I O N ?
Martin Makaryan
Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan held their historic first official meeting in Prague on October 6, 2022.
The first face-to-face meeting between the leaders of the two historic foes in 13
years, the meeting came after months of diplomatic talks to normalise relations
and restart the effectively dead Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process. But the
central question, like before, is whether this time will be any different from
previous attempts to establish diplomatic relations between two nations whose
interwoven traumatic past and the dark history of the genocide go back more
than a hundred years? Despite some positive indicators, the potential of a failed
process that might further deteriorate the situation hangs over the two
countries and the region in general.
P A G E 5 6

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Genocide and deep-seated ethnic hatred have defined the relations between Armenians
and Turks, and consequently the two countries (even when Armenia was part of the
Soviet empire) for decades. The genocide against Ottoman Armenians that started in
1915 and resulted in the massacre and expulsion of around 1.5 million Armenians from
their indigenous lands controlled by the Ottoman empire is the root cause of the conflict
that persists today. The established orthodoxy in Turkish society and the official
government position since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 has been to
deny the genocide, calling it an allegation meant to stain the country’s record and
misrepresent history, in order to avoid any possible legal, political, and cultural
repercussions.
However, the issue at stake today is not simply the Armenian pursuit of recognition and
justice for one of the worst crimes against humanity in the last century. While Armenia’s
first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan tried establishing friendly relations with Turkey after
the Soviet collapse, Turkey shut off its border with Armenia in 1993, imposing an
economic blockade, in solidarity with Azerbaijan after the Armenian-Azerbaijani ethnic
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh turned into an all-out war in the 1990s.
Despite ambitious attempts to take steps towards normalisation in the past, such
initiatives have all failed. Before Pashinyan came to power in Armenia through mass
protests that led to a peaceful transition of power, his predecessor Serzh Sargsyan was
involved in the intensive process of the formulation of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols
which were eventually signed in 2009 but never ratified. Then Foreign Minister Erdogan
was key in stopping the Turkish ratification of the Protocols by tying the ratification of the
document to Armenia’s withdrawal from what he called “occupied Azerbaijani territory.”
Erdogan’s position on the Armenian-Turkish normalisation, as shown by Turkish
demands today, has not changed from the time he blocked the process moving forward.
P A G E 5 7
DIFFERENT FROM PAST ATTEMPTS?
What distinguishes the new round of diplomatic talks between Turkey and Armenia is the
precursor that created the context and circumstances in which the new process is carried
out: the outcome of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. After the 44-day war ended with
the signing of a tripartite ceasefire agreement in November 2020,

Azerbaijan, which received substantial military and unconditional diplomatic support
from its key ally Turkey, claimed victory in the decades-old conflict as the majority of the
disputed region’s territory came under Azerbaijani control. Since then, Armenian forces
have gradually withdrawn from the region as Russian peacekeepers were stationed to
provide a security guarantee to the remaining Armenian population.
The war had a devastating impact not only because of the enormous casualties that both
sides suffered, especially Armenia, but also because it caused an unprecedented
domestic crisis in a politically, economically, and militarily weakened Armenia. The
geopolitical implications of the war were also undeniably significant: under the veil of an
incomplete Azerbaijani victory, the influence of Russia and especially Turkey in South
Caucasus grew exponentially. After the war ended, Erdogan and Azerbaijan’s President
Ilham Aliyev have further deepened their cooperation based on the “one nation, two
states” model. They have escalated their threats against Armenia in a campaign of
maximum pressure to score gains that would be hardly imaginable a few years ago.
HIGH HOPES, MAXIMALIST EXPECTATIONS
Both sides have demonstrated political willingness to engage in a process that can result
in tangible steps towards normalisation: Armenia because it is forced to, given the
geopolitical circumstances and the ever-growing threats, Turkey because it sees a unique
opportunity to settle the “Armenian question” once and forever, with the help of
Azerbaijan. But willingness to negotiate and launch intensive diplomatic talks, as
evidenced by the past and by the lack of tangible steps today, is hardly enough to bring
positive results. The reason is not only because of Pashinyan’s lack of support from a key
stakeholder, the Armenian diaspora, but also because of the maximalist expectations on
the Turkish side.
The most pressing and dangerous expectation on the Turkish side, in fact, is not the
demand to give up any claims related to the Armenian Genocide, but the so-called
“Zangezur corridor” that both Erdogan and Aliyev want from Pashinyan. The Azerbaijani
President has constantly threatened to use force to open this extraterrestrial corridor
that will link mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan, and thus Turkey, in what
reminds many of the pan-Turkish ideas that were prevalent in the beginning of the 20th
century. While Pashinyan has suggested practical steps to open up communication lines
in the region, including through Armenian territory, the Armenian side and Iran have
clearly indicated that any land grab in the name of a transportation corridor is
unacceptable.
P A G E 5 8

Yet, Erdogan still ties the outcome of the Armenian-Turkish process to this corridor and
to Armenia’s relinquishment of any claims or demands for self-determination in what
remains from Nagorno-Karabakh.
YET ANOTHER FAILED ATTEMPT
Erdogan’s unconditional support of Azerbaijan has emboldened Azerbaijan’s long-time
autocratic leader to not only voice threats, but to carry them out. On September 13,
Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military attack on the sovereign territory of Armenia, in
the South and in the East where Azerbaijan envisions the “Zangezur corridor.” The attack
was condemned by some actors of the international community, and the U.S. called on
Azerbaijani forces to return to its original positions while activating diplomatic efforts for
the signing of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty.
Thus, Turkey has not only failed to contain its ally and act as an unbiased mediator in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but has given carte blanche to Aliyev to use force if the
collective Turkish and Azerbaijani demands are not met. Such a maximalist stance on the
Turkish side that neglects any Armenian positions on pressing matters and interests is
bound to take the process to a dead end. In return for the list of Turkish and Azerbaijani
demands, which amount to nothing less than a total and unconditional capitulation of
Armenia and the loss of state sovereignty, Turkey seems to offer only the opening of
borders and increased economic activity - Turkey will undoubtedly benefit from such an
opening.
The belligerent rhetoric on the Turkish side, with a Turkish legislator threatening to
“exterminate” Armenia as a country, coupled with the state of the negotiations and
Armenia’s lack of a credible, reliable security guarantor mean that the current diplomatic
process is nothing more than the exercise of Erdogan’s coercive diplomacy. Over the last
few years, Erdogan has shown incredible aptness at conducting expansionist foreign
policy that is imperialistic in nature and that relies on force, as shown in Syria, Iraq, Libya
etc. Unfortunately for the region and the world, this means that the current Armenian-
Turkish diplomatic talks are likely to be remembered by history as yet another failed
attempt at normalisation. Given the role of Turkey in the region and its grip over
Azerbaijan, this also means that the possibility of renewed armed conflict in the region
will increase.
P A G E 5 9

SRI LANKA'S
ECONOMIC
CRISIS
P H O T O : R E U T E R S
A N D T H E R O L E P L A Y E D B Y
F O R E I G N C R E D I T O R S
S o n i P o r w a l
P H O T O : C H A M I L A
K A R U N A R A T H N E / A A P
P H O T O : I S H A R A S K O D I K A R A / A F P
Sri Lanka is facing its worst economic crisis
since World War II. This crisis has driven
millions of people into poverty and is directly
impeding on their basic human rights due to
a shortage of food, medication and
electricity. From April 2022, citizens
protested for months against the
government led by former President
Gotabaya Rajyapaksha. The controversial
drama of the former President fleeing the
country, resigning and then another
President being appointed exposes the
political instability and fails to provide any
solution to the economic crisis.
Sri Lanka was considered a ‘donor darling’ in
the decades after independence with a
relatively high standard of living, good social
and medical services, an increasing tourism
sector and robust economic growth. The civil
war between majority Sinhalese Buddhists
and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelum started
in the 1980s and dragged on for two
decades, ending in 2009.
P A G E 6 0

After the civil war, then President Mahinda Rajyapaksha took out foreign loans
from both western institutions and China to increase economic growth and
attract investors through infrastructure projects. In 2019, Mahinda’s younger
brother, Gotabaya Rajyapaksha, was elected President. Under his rule, he cut
taxes and banned the use of chemical fertilisers, which affected Sri Lanka’s
textile and tea production industries. Furthermore, the 2019 Easter bombings
followed by the COVID-19 pandemic hit the tourism industry, which had served
as Sri Lanka’s main source of foreign exchange reserves. The Ukraine-Russia war
caused a shortage in food and fuel supply, which acted as the last blow to the
already crumbling Sri Lankan economy.
As of May 2022, Sri Lanka’s debt was
USD 51 billion after all foreign exchange
reserves dried up. In July, inflation rose
to an all-time record high of 54.6 per
cent while food inflation rose 81 per
cent. Sri Lanka’s sovereign debt is
mainly held by China, commercial
institutes, India and Japan. In 2019, 56
per cent of the country’s debt was held
by commercial lenders and private
banks such as the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank. China
individually holds about 10 per cent of
the total country’s debt. On top of this,
more debt is held by Chinese banks
including the EXIM Bank of China and
the China Development Bank, which
brings Sri Lanka’s total debt to China to
around 26 per cent.
P A G E 6 1
P H O T O : A F P

China’s investment in Sri Lanka during the Rajyapaksha brothers’ rule was mainly for
strategic infrastructure projects to boost growth and bring in foreign investments as
sources of revenue. China invested $1.4 billion in the Colombo Port City project, $104
million in Lotus towers and $209 million in Mattala Airport. All these investments
were in large-scale infrastructure projects with increasing losses and limited
opportunities to generate profit. Some economists believe that this modus operandi
creates ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ where developing countries cannot repay their loans to
Chinese institutions that help China acquire equity in such countries. China’s One Belt
One Road (OBOR) initiative, now referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
launched in 2013 and has facilitated more infrastructural investment in developing
countries across Asia, Africa and the Pacific.
An example of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ is Hambantota port in Sri Lanka where China’s
Exim Bank offered $307 million to Colombo in 2007 for phase 1 and another $757
million in 2012 for phase 2 of the project. The port struggled to generate tax revenues
for years and was losing money. This resulted in Chinese state-owned corporations
China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd and China Merchants Group stepping in to
jointly operate the port for 99 years with the Sri Lankan Ports Authority. Some
economists contradict the view that China is creating debt traps. Instead, they claim
that it was Sri Lanka’s last resort to accept China’s investment after they were turned
down by Canada, the US and India. In 2015, Sri Lanka owed more to Japan, the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank than to China. However, one cannot overlook
the millions of dollars invested by Chinese institutes when the Rajyapaksha brothers
were in power.
P A G E 6 2

Sri Lanka isn’t the only country with a failing economy and growing foreign debt.
Developing countries in Asia such as Pakistan, Laos, Maldives, and Bangladesh are
following similar trajectories. According to Laos officials, China undertook 813
projects worth more than $16 billion in 2021. Laos is facing a shortage of food and
fuel supplies, which is concerning given one-third of the population lives in poverty.
Laos’ public debt amounted to 88 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP), owing
almost half of it to China, according to reports from the World Bank. In July 2022,
Pakistan’s inflation surged to 25 per cent and it too is struggling to meet fuel and
food demands for its population. Pakistan’s current government is increasingly
seeking negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic
bailouts to decrease its foreign debts.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine-Russia
war are increasing inflation, causing shortages
in global supply and creating a further divide
between low-and-middle-income countries.
Such external factors increase the foreign debt
of developing countries, hindering their ability
to meet the basic human rights of their
population. Any investment either from Chinese
institutions or western institutions is going to
increase their foreign debt and domestic
political and economic policies offer limited
scope and resolution. These foreign creditors
are essential for developing countries including
Sri Lanka to maintain their economy and flow of
resources, however, ineffective economic and
domestic policies are bound to collapse. With
Sri Lanka’s new President Ranil Wickremesinghe
trying to restore ‘law and order’ by arresting the
protest movement’s leaders, there is no
indication of an effective and progressive
economic recovery for a country where the
population is losing hope and seeking
desperate measures to survive.
P A G E 6 3

P A G E 6 4
P H O T O : Z A C H A R Y T A N / U N S P L A S H

P A G E 6 5
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S

BALI G20 EASES WORLD
TENSIONS AS INDONESIA
ASSUMES GREATER
INTERNATIONAL ROLE
H a e r i l H a l i m
It was a massive undertaking for a middle
power like Indonesia to host the G20 amid
global uncertainties caused by
unprecedented calamities: the coronavirus
pandemic, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine and the US-China heightened
tensions over Taiwan.
Despite the huge task, the G20 in Bali
appears to have acted as a temporary balm
to current global tensions, as world leaders
worked around the clock to restore global
order, particularly in the absence of Russian
President Vladimir Putin.
Indeed, the G20 Bali Leaders’ Declaration
condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
and its battering of the global economy in
“the strongest terms”, sending a strong
message to the international community
that such a flagrant violation of
international law should never be
normalised.
The much anticipated meeting between Xi
Jinping and Joe Biden on the sidelines of
G20 also helped ease tensions between
China and the United States, sparked by the
controversial August visit of US House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan that
precipitated a new crisis in the Taiwan
Strait.
P A G E 6 6
P H O T O : L E O N N E A L / G E T T Y
I M A G E S

November also signifies the importance of
Southeast Asia as world leaders attended
three back-to-back major summits in the
region, including the 40th ASEAN Summit,
the G20 and the APEC meeting in Thailand
to address regional as well as global
challenges.
MESSAGE OF PEACE FROM
THE ISLAND OF PEACE
The Leader’s Declaration may appear
overtly political for an economic forum like
the G20, but the devastating impact of the
war on the global economy has unavoidably
made the majority of the bloc’s leaders
demand that Russia get out of Ukraine.
Indonesia was initially criticized for its
perceived “neutrality” by resisting to comply
with western powers’ call to exclude Putin
from the summit, and instead initially
inviting Ukraine President Volodymyr
Zelensky as an observer.
The Bali Declaration calls for the resolution
of any conflicts or crises through peaceful
means, not war, urging respect for
international law and the multilateral
system to ensure peace and stability.
Indonesia’s initiative to push for the
Leader’s Declaration after the door for Joint
Communique was closed, due to constant
disagreements, deserves an applause, as it
boosts the country’s credentials as a
rational decision-maker while under
significant international pressure.
Earlier, Widodo humiliated himself after he
claimed that he had a message from
Zelensky to deliver to Putin after meeting in
Kyiv with Zelensky, whose office denied
such a claim.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo flew
10,000 kilometres to Moscow and Kyiv to
deliver the invitations to Putin and Zelensky
in person, with the hope that the two
warring parties could meet in Bali to discuss
peace - a failed self-declared peace mission
by Indonesia.
Attending the summit at the Island of Peace
- Balis unofficial name - through a video link,
Zelensky outlined 10 points of his peace
plan before G20 leaders, including Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who came
on behalf of Putin.
P A G E 6 7
P r e s i d e n t V o l o d y m y r
Z e l e n s k y d u r i n g h i s v i d e o
s p e e c h t o G 2 0 l e a d e r s i n
B a l i .
P H O T O : C N N

But the unanimous condemnation of the
invasion and strong calls for peace and
unity with the presence of the Russian
representative during the G20 Summit
prove that Widodo can assert his influence
internationally, a good legacy to wrap up his
second presidential term in 2024.
Should Putin have been there, the summit
could have been chaotic with G20 leaders
potentially walking out or gravely
expressing their anger towards him.
Instead, Lavrov took his seat, acting as a
punching bag in Putin’s defence.
G20 PANDEMIC FUND TO
ANTICIPATE FUTURE
PANDEMIC
As the chair of this year’s G20, Indonesia
proposed three areas of priority namely
strengthening global health architecture,
digital transformation, and energy
transition as key factors to achieve
sustainable recovery after the Coronavirus
pandemic.
Inflation in many parts of the world hit a
new record of high in 40 years due to rising
energy prices caused by Russian initiated
war and disruption of supply chains caused
by China’s zero covid policy.
However, this does not mean that this
year’s priority set by Indonesia has been
sidelined.
Indonesia’s presidency of the G20 saw the
establishment and launch of the G20
P A G E 6 8
Pandemic Fund, the first of its kind, which
will be used to prevent, prepare and
respond to future pandemics in low-and
middle-income countries.
Through the scheme, the G20 host, still
arguably a developing country itself,
appears to have channeled the frustration
of the developing world over their
experience of being left behind - especially
in late receivals of Covid-19 vaccines that
were seen to be hoarded by richer nations.
Now with the Pandemic Fund, which is
managed by the World Bank, the targeted
countries will be able to use the money to
support efforts like research, surveillance,
vaccine development to help prevent a
future pandemic.
Regardless of how the money will be
distributed, the Pandemic Fund, which
needs $31 billion yearly, is a win for the
developing world as it can be more
prepared in case of a global health crisis in
the future.
TOUGHEST REGIONAL CRISIS
AHEAD AWAITS INDONESIA
AFTER G20
However, while Indonesia may have passed
the international test by successfully
holding the G20 amid global uncertainties,
the real test for the country lies ahead when
it will chair the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) next year.
Expectations are high for Indonesia to take

concrete actions to solve the Myanmar
crisis during its presidency after Cambodia
made little progress on the cause this year.
The Indonesian way of mediating conflicting
interests during this year’s G20 can be
implemented in ASEAN next year when
establishing a solution for the Myanmar
crisis.
This will be useful as there is compelling
evidence that the way ASEAN handles the
situations in Myanmar is going nowhere -
and even, arguably, allows the
humanitarian crisis to continue.
The UN has accused the Junta of
committing crimes against humanity in the
country in which the death toll has risen to
over 2,400.
Both ASEAN chairs Brunei Darussalam in
2021 and Cambodia in 2022 have so far
failed to produce significant progress in
their efforts to solve the crisis.
Thus, as the chair of ASEAN next year,
Indonesia should take a more proactive
approach, evolving into an honest and
independent broker of peace in Myanmar,
an option overlooked by undemocratic
Brunei and authoritarian Cambodia.
Importantly, Indonesia does not have
historical baggage with Myanmar, and the
country is a success story of transitioning
from an authoritarian to democratic regime
back in 1998, an experience that could be
adapted in Myanmar.
Only by successfully establishing a concrete
solution for the Myanmar crisis next year,
can Indonesia proclaim itself as a new
player in international peace mediation.
P A G E 6 9
P H O T O : A S S O C I A T I O N O F
S O U T H E A S T A S I A N N A T I O N S

MYANMAR IN
2022
P H O T O : G A Y A T R I M A L H O T R A O N
U N S P L A S H
P A G E 7 0
AN INTERVIEW WITH DR TUN-AUNG SHWE
Representative of Myanmar's National Unity
Government to Australia
E L I Z A W I L S O N

2022 marks the second year of the military junta’s most recent takeover of
Myanmar. The coup began on the 1st of February 2021 when the military
declared the results of the 2020 election invalid. The junta arrested senior
officials of the governing party – National League for Democracy (NLD),
including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and her economic advisor,
Australian Professor Sean Turnell.
Myanmar has had a tumultuous past 70 years in and out of military rule. In
2011, the country transitioned to civilian rule, with a power-sharing agreement
reached between the military and the elected civilian government. The 2020
general election resulted in significant losses for the military-aligned political
party, and hence the military feared they were losing their power.
To understand this situation better, I sat down with the National Unity
Government’s Representative to Australia, Dr Tun-Aung Shwe.
The National Unity Government (NUG), for which Dr Tun is an appointed
representative, has two main objectives- “to end the military dictatorship and
build a democratic union in Myanmar.” Currently, The NUG controls around
40 per cent of Myanmar, with the military only controlling 17 per cent.
CURRENT SITUATION IN MYANMAR
We began by discussing the situation on the ground in
Myanmar. Dr Tun emphasised “the brutality of the junta’s
rule has increased this year as they try to stamp out the
resistance movement.” According to Dr Tun, since the
beginning of the coup “5-6 civilians are killed, 1500
civilians flee their homes, and 50-60 civilian properties
are burned daily.” Many civilians have been arbitrarily
detained, and over 1 million are internally displaced. The
anti-coup movement’s strength threatens the military’s
rule, and as such the junta wishes to “annihilate” it. The
military is undertaking “air strikes on civilian areas,
including schools and hospitals.” Despite this, and despite
limited access to modern weapons, the anti-coup
movement continues to fight back against the military.
"SINCE THE
BEGINNING OF THE
COUP 5-6 CIVILIANS
ARE KILLED, 1500
CIVILIANS FLEE
THEIR HOMES, AND
50-60 CIVILIAN
PROPERTIES ARE
BURNED DAILY.”
P A G E 7 1

SANCTIONS AND CHINA IMPLICATIONS
The question of sanctioning Myanmar brings back memories from the late
1990s for the United States, the European Union, and their allies. As Dr Tun
explained, “one school of thought is that the sanctions against Myanmar
drove the military junta closer to China. The fear for the US and Australia is if
they put too much pressure on the junta, such as by imposing sanctions, it will
result in the junta moving even closer to China, which is not in their national
interests. They believe the military will continue to rule for the time being, and
due to Myanmar’s strategic geographical position in the Indo Pacific, they wish
to keep the option of dialogue open.”
The 1990s sanctions imposed bans on supplying weapons and foreign
investment in Myanmar. The purpose was to reduce the military’s power and
promote progress towards a civilian-led democracy. In response to these
sanctions, Dr Tun explained, the military turned to China for weapons and
investment. It is important to understand China’s motivations for engagement
with Myanmar. Myanmar is a resource-rich country, particularly in metal ores,
petroleum, and natural gas. As an economic powerhouse, these resources are
vital for Chinese production. In addition, due to Myanmar's proximity to the
Indian Ocean, China imports energy supplies through the country to avoid the
U.S.-dominated Malacca Strait and shortens transport times by almost a week.
Dr Tun argues the fears from past sanctions are short-sighted as it ignores the
push and pull factors. In the 1990s, the sanctions pushed the junta closer to
China. As a result, the military is already as close as it can be to China.
Therefore, this push factor of the past is not applicable to the current
circumstances. Instead, Dr Tun argues, China’s significant interest in Myanmar
should be considered as a pull factor. He suggests China does not care who
oversees Myanmar, as they are more interested in its natural resources and
geostrategic position. If the NUG were to be in charge, China would still
attempt to engage with Myanmar. As such, would it not be more
advantageous for foreign governments to support the NUG?
P A G E 7 2

ASEAN'S 5 POINT PLAN
In 2021, Dr Tun explained, “the world hoped ASEAN would resolve this
conflict”, and on ASEAN’s part, they announced the '5-point plan' to rein
in the junta. According to Dr Tun, and ASEAN itself, this plan has failed.
The junta have not followed any of the conditions set, arguably as “they
know ASEAN has no real power over them”. Moreover, the makeup of
ASEAN, namely its consensus requirement and its non-interventionism,
means it is unlikely to progress in resolving the issue. According to Dr
Tun, this has not stopped other foreign governments, including the US
and Australia, from placing the burden of resolution solely on ASEAN. In
November 2022, ASEAN met to try to formulate a realistic plan that
would make inroads to a resolution. The outcome was an announcement
that “Myanmar should make progress towards peace”, and not much
else. ASEAN has resisted calls to impose sanctions or expel Myanmar
from the Association.
L e a d e r s o f A S E A N c o u n t r i e s a t t e n d a m e e t i n g t o d i s c u s s t h e M y a n m a r c r i s i s a t t h e A S E A N S e c r e t a r i a t B u i l d i n g ,
J a k a r t a o n 2 4 A p r i l 2 0 2 1 .
P A G E 7 3
P H O T O : A S E A N S E C R E T A R I A T

AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE
As mentioned by Dr Tun, the junta has arbitrarily detained citizens, including
Australian Professor and Economic Advisor Sean Turnell. In November of this
year, Turnell was released from Myanmar prison. He, along with three other
foreigners and 6,000 Myanmar prisoners, was released by the junta to “mark
National Day”. Earlier this year he was sentenced to 3 years in a closed court
trial. The Australian Government publicly rejected the sentencing.
Australia has provided limited assistance to Myanmar in wake of the coup.
Australia has focused on providing humanitarian assistance through trusted
third-party agencies, including the United Nations, ASEAN and International
Red Cross. On the political and diplomatic front, Australia is engaging
minimally with both the military and the NUG. Dr Tun suggests this reflects
Australia’s current foreign policy, which incorporates Australia’s democratic
values and national interests.
P r o f e s s o r S e a n T u r n e l l a n d h i s w i f e w e l c o m e d
i n p a r l i a m e n t a f t e r r e l e a s e f r o m a M y a n m a r
p r i s o n .
P H O T O : L U K A S C O C H / A A P P H O T O S
LOOKING FORWARD
2023 will be a significant year for
Myanmar. The military is planning an
election so as to move from the
aggressors of a coup d’état to an
elected government. The NUG and
most of Myanmar has rejected the
prospective election. Further, the NUG
has set up a 12-step political roadmap
to lead to a sustainable and peaceful
resolution to the 70-years long conflict
in Myanmar. The US has cautioned the
election would not be free or fair. It is
yet to be seen how the junta will
respond. To stop the senseless killings
and mass displacement, this crisis
needs to have a definitive end, sooner
rather than later.
P A G E 7 4

P A G E 7 5
P H O T O : G A Y A T R I M A L H O T R A O N
U N S P L A S H

P H O T O : P A N G X I N G L E I / X I N H U A V I A A P
CHINA’S (NOT SO) GREEN SILK ROAD: THE ADVERSE
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE BELT AND ROAD
INITIATIVE AND THE WAY FORWARD
FIONA DE CUYPER
Sri Lanka isn’t the only country with a failing economy and growing foreign debt.
Developing When B y thinking S o n i countries P oabout r w a l in Chinese Asia such history, as Pakistan, one ought Laos, to Maldives, think about and its Bangladesh legendary are
following trade routes similar such trajectories. as the Silk Road According stemming to from Laos the officials, Han Dynasty, China undertook an ancient 813
projects grid of trade worth routes more running than $16 all billion the way in from 2021. China Laos to is Europe. facing a The shortage Belt and of Road food and
fuel Initiative supplies, ('BRI'), which established concerning 2013, given is one-third inspired of by the these population trade routes lives in poverty. and
Laos’ comprises public a debt transcontinental amounted to corridor 88 per cent over of land its gross and over domestic sea, connecting product (GDP), China owing
almost with South half of East it to and China, South according Asia, the to South reports Pacific, from the Central World Asia, Bank. Russia, In July the2022,
Pakistan’s Middle East, inflation Eastern surged Africa and to 25 Europe. per cent It is and a global it too infrastructure is struggling development
to meet fuel and
food strategy demands aimed at for improving its population. regional Pakistan’s integration, current stimulating government economic is increasingly
growth
seeking and increasing negotiations trade with through the extending International loans Monetary to a range Fund of (IMF) countries for economic and
bailouts international to decrease organisations, its foreign codified debts. in bilateral Memoranda of Understanding
with China.
P A G E 7 6

The BRI has supported large projects including ports, roads, railways, power
plants, telecommunications networks and airports, but since 2019, lending has
been in decline. China has been putting greater emphasis on “high quality
investment”, including green finance. It is important to note that China is having
trouble financing all the loans, resulting in unfinished projects such as the
railroad connecting the port of Mombasa to Uganda. Nevertheless, the BRI still
remains the largest infrastructure programme in the world since the US Marshall
Plan, and Morgan Stanley estimated that the total investment could be close to
US$1.3 trillion by 2027. This has also sparked lots of controversy around the
world with environmental protests and other states being worried that China is
using the BRI as a foreign policy tool, with many worrying about China debttrapping
developing countries.
ENVIRONMENTAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BRI
Various studies have already been conducted on the environmental impacts of
the BRI, proving that this is a pertinent issue that deserves our attention. Many
issues have been identified and there are simply too many to enumerate here,
so a selection of the most pressing issues has been made.
1
The
P A G E 7 7
first issue is not that surprising. The
BRI entails large-scale projects which
require a lot of energy and a lot of
material, resulting in skyrocketing rates
of pollution and emissions. A study
conducted by the International Energy
Agency in 2016 concluded that the CO2-
emission in BRI-countries had increased
by 5% due to the maintenance and
operation of these projects and related
industries. Between 2001 and 2016,
China has placed 240 coal power plants
in 65 BRI countries. In addition,
increased tourism rates from China to
the BRI countries also account for a
significant share of transportation and
related emissions.
P H O T O : K O L A R I O O N
U N S P L A S H

2
Secondly,
some of the areas through
which the BRI routes are running are
vulnerable to landslides, flooding,
sedimentation in rivers and soil erosion,
such as the Karakoram Highway that
crosses a highly geodynamic area,
increasing the risks for natural
disasters. Deforestation also increases
the chances on floods and landslides.
An example is the Pan Borneo Highway
which crosses through Malaysia,
Indonesia and Brunei.
A c a r g o t r u c k l i e s f l i p p e d o n a h a i r p i n t u r n
o n a f a r n o r t h e r n s e c t i o n o f t h e K a r a k o r a m
H i g h w a y n e a r t h e b o r d e r w i t h C h i n a . T h e
r o a d i s o f t e n n a r r o w , c l i n g s t o s t e e p s l o p e s
a n d i s b a t t e r e d b y l a n d s l i d e s a n d f l o o d s .
P H O T O : D I A A H A D I D / N P R
3
Thirdly,
there can also be effects on the livelihoods of fauna and flora. The
Sambor hydroelectric dam, for example, reportedly obstructed fish migration
and caused changes to the river flow, also affecting the communities that lived
from the river. Furthermore, WWF listed more than 265 threatened species (incl.
giant pandas and tigers) and 1,739 critical biodiversity areas that will be
negatively impacted by the BRI. In Indonesia, for example, the Tapanuli
orangutan - the most rare ape on earth - is endangered by a hydroelectric power
plant that is being constructed in Sumatra’s Batang Toru forest highlands.
Moreover, the ecosystems of the BRI countries are also under threat as there
are over 800 alien invasive species that might be introduced by the BRI which
can also have dire effects on agricultural exports.
P A G E 7 8
F o r e s t i n B a t a n g T o r u , N o r t h S u m a t r a , I n d o n e s i a .
P H O T O : A N D R E W W A L K M S L E Y , S U M A T R A N O R A N G U T A N S O C I E T Y

GREEN SILK ROAD
In response to heavy criticism, China wanted to rebrand the BRI as
the ‘green silk road’ by stating that China would aim to become
carbon neutral by 2060 and that the BRI must become more
sustainable. In 2017, at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road
Forum for International Cooperation, Chinese President Xi Jinping
stated that “[w]e should pursue the new vision of green
development and a way of life and work that is green, low-carbon,
circular and sustainable. Efforts should be made to strengthen
cooperation in ecological and environmental protection and build a
sound ecosystem so as to realize the goals set by the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development.” In addition, China promised to stop
sponsoring coal power plant projects. In March 2022, China’s
National Development and Reform Commission issued a directive
committing to raise construction and financing norms for Chinese
developers and banks. The directive stated that environmental risk
prevention would be bolstered by 2025 and that by 2030 the green
BRI should be realised. Nevertheless, these guidelines are not
binding and can also not be monitored as the BRI is not governed
centrally.
HOW CAN THE GREEN SILK ROAD BE
MATERIALISED?
It is no secret that the BRI has a massive impact on the projectcountries.
Nevertheless, there are opportunities to make the BRI
more environmentally friendly. A green Silk Road would, however,
require efforts from both China and the contracting countries.
One such way would be to strictly adhere to the domestic
environmental laws of the project-country. However, it could be
argued that these domestic laws are not up to par with international
environmental standards and provide only baseline protection, so
the host countries
P A G E 7 9

should make an effort to effectively strengthen domestic
environmental standards and support local enforcement. This
might not always be realistic given the immense economic gains
that the BRI-sponsored infrastructure can bring to a country.
Nevertheless, China could provide financial incentives to these
countries’ local governments or could also implement binding
regulations to which Chinese investors and developers should
adhere.
An alternative would be to align the implementation of the BRI with
the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This was already
mentioned during China’s 2017 speech on the BRI, but in order to
achieve tangible results, monitoring is necessary. This could be
done by an independent body or perhaps a UN-agency or the
creation of a watchdog that would publish periodical reports on the
matter and bring it under scrutiny.
Transparency is another important element. Increasing the output
of publicly available information about the planning, financing and
procurement of BRI projects in the form of periodical reports would
give the media, legal practitioners and environmental or climate
activists as well as the general public the opportunity to scrutinise
the government and the involved companies. This not only
encourages community engagement but also poses benefits to
China as it would reinforce public trust in investment and might
result in more positive attitudes regarding the BRI. It is thus
definitely in China’s interest to start strictly adhering to
environmental standards.
P A G E 8 0

DANNICA BATOON
With 2.72 million YouTube subscribers, President
Bongbong Marcos’s (BBM) internet fame is
unique. Marcos came to power by (1) consciously
rearranging the presentation of his tainted
family on YouTube to counteract traditional
media which reinforced his family’s corrupt
image, and (2) people’s ascription of his
debatable political accomplishments. After all,
some proponents claim Marcos is endowed with
his father’s legacy by those complicit in
corruption.
BBM garnered attention and treated his
followers as a fan base by labeling them as
Loyalists, fortifying the cult of personality his
father had in the two decades of his dictatorship.
Bongbong Marcos strategically utilized YouTube
to rebrand his family’s political image, tapping
into the concept of “authenticity” and “achieved
status”. Research reveals vlogging, BBM’s only
visible line of work from 2016 to 2022, is
significant in his victory during the 2022
Philippine presidential election.
MOTIVATION AND VISION
Marcos’s motivation for becoming a YouTube
influencer originated from the media’s one-sided
coverage of his family.
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P H O T O : J A M S T A R O S A / R E U T E R S

BBM continuously reframed historical
narratives about his family since 2009
with animations about his experiences as
a presidential son. A striking example is
Marcos's' 2009 YouTube vlog which
portrays him as a naive and curious child,
isolating him from the knowledge of his
father’s atrocities, a disinformation
strategy. Marcos’s YouTube vlogs also
revised history; one of the most
controversial was a collaboration with
Juan Enrile, a Marcos-era Defense
Minister who rebelled against the
Marcoses. Enrile debunked human rights
abuses during Martial Law.
YouTube subverted negative narratives
about Marcos — the international media
portrays him as a villain and his
opponent, Robredo, as a democratic
hero. This legitimisation serves as a
status symbol for Filipino political
vloggers, to which Marcos belongs, as
they associate with a state-sanctioned
body; it circulates knowledge favoring
him.
HOW DID MARCOS SHAPE
CITIZEN SENTIMENT DURING
THE 2022 PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN?
Direct interaction with audiences is
consistent in BBM vlogs and is crucial
because Marcos did not attend most
debates hosted by professional media
organisations.
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YouTube allowed Marcos' team to filter
public questions, unlike the debates with
on-the-spot inquiry, mostly about his
family’s corruption issues. Marcos’s use
of YouTube for voter engagement
allowed him to focus more on electoral
platforms and image rebranding than on
answering controversies, which can sway
audiences to believe professional media’s
framing of his family.
Further, questions answered were not
purely political; they had “deeply
personal information,” displaying
authenticity. One of which was BBM’s
interview with his son, Sandro. The video
aimed to promote BBM as the nation’s
father through his parental experience
with his most successful son, a London
School of Economics graduate, now
serving as a legislator. Noticeably, many
elements presented in the vlog, for
example the first dish Marcos learned,
movie, and albums, were Westernized.
Audiences also noticed how well both
Marcoses speak English. These are
attempts to appease Western audiences
disdaining Marcos because the
international media negatively frame his
image.
T h u m b n a i l f r o m P r e s i d e n t M a r c o s ' s '
Y o u t u b e c h a n n e l .
P H O T O : Y O U T U B E

ACHIEVING STATUS AND
AUTHENTICITY
Marcos had a high political status before
entering YouTube—he was the son of the
longest-ruling Philippine president found
guilty of corruption, a former senator,
and a vice presidential candidate who
almost won during the 2016 elections.
Nonetheless, Marcos’s status was
achieved, with YouTube as a rebranding
tool, transforming his corruption-tainted
image into an authentic, humble, and
approachable public servant. The content
category “family” was mainly about the
YouTube comments on his parents’
legacies, such as the infrastructures used
during the pandemic, the “nutribun”
symbolizing the Marcos family’s
commitment to ending hunger, and
agrarian reform. From another
perspective, Marcos’s political status was
relatively low; even the popular former
President Duterte described him as “a
weak leader relying on dad’s name”.
Interestingly, Duterte’s daughter initially
topped the presidential survey before
deciding to run as Marcos’s vice
president. It was crucial to project unity.
Marcos and Duterte’s televised shift in
their relationship made their tandem
authentic and answered prospective
questions, such as how candidates from
the far north and south developed
political alliances.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The Philippine Media Monitoring
Laboratory and Rappler argues that
Marcos aims to spread disinformation
and propaganda through YouTube by
detaching its channel from the
professional media - to isolate audiences
from mainstream news reports.
Audiences moving away from
mainstream news media are more likely
to receive videos supporting Marcos,
some of which are disinformation,
because of YouTube’s personalized
algorithm. Removing advertisements also
served to reduce distractions, thereby
focusing the audience on consuming the
vlog messages, a continuous spoonfeeding,
elaborated with feel-good
elements audiences will not get from
toxic typical journalistic commentaries
and reports.
Experts and journalists argued that the
disinformation network of Bongbong
Marcos enabled his electoral victory.
Marcos created a humble, intelligent, and
caring public persona by sharing
personal information about his family,
experiences as a presidential son, and
alliance with the popular Dutertes’.
Marcos acknowledged audiences as
Loyalists, reaching out by mobilizing
prospective voters to ask questions for
his YouTube vlogs - thus audiences
construct his vlogs, making them
relatable.
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Neha Dayma
Cannabis sativa, usually referred to as marijuana, ganja,
or cannabis, is perhaps the most controversial plant in
the history of mankind. People have been consuming it
since the beginning of time, both for medicinal and
recreational purposes. The use of marijuana, however,
is still controversial due to the numerous negative effects
it has on the body, including short-term memory loss,
poor concentration, confusion and an altered heartbeat.
Due to these detrimental effects, many countries have criminalized the use,
possession, and manufacturing of it. However, Thailand, a country with a long
history of restricting and punishing marijuana use, has just opted to legalise it,
making it the first Southeast Asian country to do so. However, it has only been
legalised to a certain extent. Therefore, it is crucial to take a cursory look at
what is now legal or prohibited.
T h a i a u t h o r i t i e s g i v e a w a y c a n n a b i s p l a n t s t o e n c o u r a g e c u l t i v a t i o n .
P A G E 8 4
P H O T O : B B C N E W S

1912: Thailand became one
of the Original Signatories
to the League of Nations
International Opium
Convention of 1912
1922: Introduction of the
Narcotics Act B.E. 2465
1937: Introduction of the
Marijuana Act B.E. 2477 to
criminalise Cannabis
2019: Amendment in the
Narcotics Act (No. 7) to
legalise medical Marijuana
within certain limitations
1979: Thailand Narcotics Act
B.E. 2522 to penalise the
possession of Marijuana
1976: Proclamation of the
Narcotics Control Act B.E.
2519 to lay down the
foundations of the Office of
Narcotics Control Board
2020: The Ministry of Public
Health of Thailand issued a
notification to delist
Cannabis from the narcotics
list
June 9 2022:
Decriminalisation of
Cannabis in Thailand
It is now legal to import, export, produce, distribute, consume (only for
health and medical purposes), and possess marijuana. Both commercial
and individual growers are now allowed to cultivate marijuana; however,
the former must first receive a cultivation permit, while the latter must
register on the PlookGanja government app.
The announcement has rendered a few other things illegal. Marijuana, for
example, cannot be used recreationally; doing so would be a violation of
the law. If anyone gets caught smoking marijuana in public, they will
receive a 3-month prison sentence and a fine of 25,000 baht. Furthermore,
marijuana extracts such as oil will be illegal if the THC content exceeds
0.2%.
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The reasons behind legalisation can be broadly categorized into two categories:
cultural and political factors. First, Thailand has had a long history of using
marijuana not just as a medicine but also as food, spice, and fiber.
Apart from this cultural connection, there are political factors at play too.
Currently, Thailand is led by a coalition government, with Bhumjaithai Party
(BJTP) holding the most power. More importantly, the leader of BJTP party,
Anutin Charnviraku, is currently the Health Minister, and is a fervent advocate
for the legalisation of marijuana. His support for legalisation stems from his
desire to promote the plant's medicinal use and to create a commercial business
to meet this medical demand. Additionally, by making marijuana legal, he also
intends to gain the support of farmers as a constituency in the upcoming
elections.
Lastly, the vision to increase national income, expand small-scale cannabis
farming, and position the nation as a wellness tourism destination all
contributed to the legalisation of marijuana.
However, the announcement of its legalisation has been met with strong
criticism. The main criticism is that the government announced the legalisation
without first passing a comprehensive cannabis regulation law. In the absence of
a law, hundreds of cannabis shops, mobile dispensaries, and marijuana-infused
gummies have sprouted up in Thailand, boosting the recreational marijuana
industry. Further, though the government has been trying to introduce the
Cannabis Control Bill, the lack of a quorum in Parliament is still preventing any
debate on the law.
In light of these concerns, many people, including the Opposition Party and
some members of the ruling government, are calling for cannabis to be
reinstated on the list of scheduled narcotics until a more robust legal framework
is in place.
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P H O T O : K E V I N R A J A R A M O N U N S P L A S H

Bella Baker and Shantelle O'Riordan
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PHOTO: GAYATRI MALHOTRA /UNSPLASH

In less than two years as President of the United States, Biden has made
significant moves to reaffirm the US’ international standing and ensure
domestic growth. Although his approval rating has remained well below
50 per cent for over a year – largely driven by the messy US withdrawal
from Afghanistan and the consequences of the ongoing pandemic – Biden
has accomplished more than many of his detractors thought possible.
Below we detail the Biden administration’s wins and shortcomings.
BIDEN'S MOST IMPORTANT
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
While the media narrative of Biden’s accomplishments remains
inconsistent at best, he has undoubtedly achieved more than many
expected. Upon taking office in 2021 Biden promised three main domestic
policy goals – investment in America’s strained infrastructure, definitive
action against climate change, and an expansion of social security.
Arguably he has made impressive headway on the first two objectives and
has begun progress on the third. Let’s look at this in more detail:
P H O T O : G A Y A T R I M A L H O T R A / U N S P L A S H
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INFRASTRUCTURE BILL - THE
INFRUSTRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND JOB ACT
Biden has accomplished what the previous administrations of
Barack Obama and Donald Trump failed to achieve. With the
passing of the infrastructure bill, Biden has provided a USD $1.2
trillion bipartisan infrastructure package to reinvigorate America’s
infrastructure and ensure future industry security. The package will
increase investment in nationwide bridges and roads, airports,
public transport, and national broadband internet, as well as
energy systems and waterways - safeguarding the nation for future
growth and mobility.
CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION
Following Trump’s highly controversial withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement, a landmark legally binding international treaty on
climate change adopted by 196 Parties at COP 21 in Paris, Biden
has recommitted America to the global fight against climate change
and rejoined the Paris Agreement. Through the Inflation Reduction
Act of 2022, the Biden administration also made a USD $369 billion
investment in Energy Security and Climate Change programs over
the next ten years – the largest in American history. There is hope
this climate law and investment will have a catalytic effect in
promoting a transition to clean and renewable energy.
Further at COP 27 in Egypt, Biden reiterated America’s role as a
global leader on climate change and its commitment to supporting
developing countries to tackle climate change. He affirmed his 2021
pledge to provide USD $11.4 billion annually by 2024 to assist
developing nations’ make the transition to wind, solar, and other
renewable energy sources. However, it should be noted that Biden
secured only USD $1 billion from Congress last year toward this
goal. While Biden’s remarks were met with enthusiasm and praise
at COP 27, there are undeniably hefty expectations for US action
and leadership - a mighty feat for a nation facing inflation.
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GUN SAFETY BILL
In June 2022, President Biden signed into law the first major gun
safety legislation passed by Congress in almost 30 years. The bill
serves to: expand background checks for buyers younger than 21,
provide federal funding to encourage states to implement “red flag”
laws to remove firearms from individuals deemed a threat, USD $15
billion in national funding for mental health support and school
security upgrades, as well as a closure of the “boyfriend loophole”
by banning all convicted domestic abusers from owning a gun.
Although the Biden administration had pursued several other
reforms - these reforms are unprecedented and encouraging given
the Republican party has historically blocked gun reform efforts.
COVID-19 RELIEF
Biden’s USD 1.9 trillion Covid-19 relief package has received
immense attention and support. As of October 2022, sixty-seven
per cent of Americans are now fully vaccinated - an impressive rise
in vaccinations considering the Trump administration’s
misinformation and poor handling of the Covid pandemic. Further,
Biden engineered the temporary Child Tax Credit – an initiative to
ease the burden on families dealing with Covid-induced
unemployment and child poverty.
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BIDEN'S SHORTCOMINGS
SOARING INFLATION
Biden’s USD $2 trillion American Rescue Plan, designed to stimulate
economic growth after the pandemic, saw inflation skyrocket in
2022. The day before Biden announced the Plan, the Labor
Department put annual inflation at a mild 1.7 percent. Today,
annual inflation sits close to a 40 year high at 8.3 percent,
triggering significant jumps in consumer prices which hit working
classes the worst. Other Plans Biden introduced in 2022 such as the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, The CHIPS Act, and his
student loans forgiveness executive order were all designed to
stimulate economic activity through generous government
handouts.
However, economists argue that such Plans which flood the
economy with cash are counter-productive, positing that the
legislation has the potential to create numerous economic
distortions via subsidies and tax credits. Indeed, whilst the longterm
impacts of Biden’s economic measures are not yet clear, it is
important to note that Bidenonomics cannot be solely blamed for
increases in inflation this year; with outbreaks of coronavirus
variants and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine aggravated tight markets
also contributing to stagflation.
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RISING ENERGY PRICES
Furthermore, Biden’s climate policy, which focuses on
moving away from fossil fuels and towards more renewable
energy sources, involved major cuts to US gas and oil
production. Analysts suggest that this has contributed to
major increases in the cost of energy, with electricity and
gas bills for American consumers 15.8% higher compared to
this time last year. Biden’s cuts to oil and natural gas,
sources that meet 68 percent of Americans’ total energy
needs for heat, power, and transportation, coupled with the
impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War, have created an energy
crisis for American consumers and industries alike.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
Since taking office, the Biden administration has taken
measures to reverse Trump's restrictions on immigration to
the United States by boosting refugee admissions,
preserving deportation relief, and not enforcing the ‘public
charge’ rule. This has resulted in a tremendous increase in
illegal immigration to the US, with Customs and Border
Protection data revealing that more than 2.76 million
undocumented immigrants crossed the southwest border in
the fiscal year 2022 - a number that breaks the previous
annual record by more than 1 million.
WHAT COMES NEXT?
The question on everyone’s lips appears to be whether
Biden will run for re-election in 2024. Biden has affirmed his
intention to run again despite turning 80 in November,
however, he stated he won’t confirm this decision until early
next year. Exit polls from the US midterm elections highlight
more than two-thirds of Americans do not support him
seeking a second term. The rumour mill will undoubtedly
run hot as we move into the New Year with speculations of
who could replace the ageing President well underway.
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P H O T O B Y A N N W A N G / R E U T E R S
STRATEGIC
AMBIGUITY –
A COLD WAR
FOSSIL
The coming years are crucial in
determining Taiwan’s future. The
island stands at a cross-roads, with
the direction to be determined in
Washington D.C. Will Taiwan
persevere as a free democracy, or
will the world witness another
vibrant liberal society atrophy into
the abyss of Chinese totalitarianism?
Samuel Ng
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Taiwan’s situation is tricky to say the least, and the American position regarding its
defence obligations is not any less complicated. Taiwan has been an international
anomaly since 1949 when the Republic of China (ROC) government fled the mainland
onto the island. The 1952 San Francisco Treaty further complicated the island’s legal
status when Japan renounced its sovereignty over Formosa without designating in
whose favour the renouncement was directed.
ACKNOWLEDGE VS RECOGNISE
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has adamantly claimed sovereignty over Taiwan
and has coerced nations, institutions, and businesses to adhere to its ‘One China
Principle’. Western nations, including Australia, “acknowledge” but do not “recognise”
the PRC’s claim over Taiwan. Here’s the complication: to recognise is to understand
something as a fact or truth, or to declare a belief in. To acknowledge is to admit
knowledge of something. In practice, this translates to countries like the United
States and the United Kingdom saying, “yes we know the PRC claims Taiwan”, and not
“the PRC claims Taiwan period”.
Although it may seem semantical or a mere twist on words, this disparity between
“acknowledge” and “recognise” makes a world of difference, as it provides the United
States and others with room to manoeuvre and formulate policy with ambiguous
defence obligations regarding Taiwan.
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY HAS EXPIRED
Strategic ambiguity, at its core, assumes that shrouding the US’ policy vis-a-vis an
invasion would minimise the probability of war and decrease the PRC’s willingness to
invade. But even apologists of the existing policy have admitted that the approach no
longer deters China effectively, as Beijing’s strength and military build-up has
stretched beyond American predictions and expectations.
Developed in the 1970s, strategic ambiguity was formed when the US was
attempting to cleave the PRC away from the USSR and required a strong yet vague
policy regarding Chinese ambitions towards Taiwan.
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The possibility of the Americans lending their titanic political, economic, and military
aid to Taiwan against China kept Beijing in check and maintained peace in the strait.
This deterrence was effective, until now. RAND Corporation, an American policy
research organisation with links to defence, assessed that China may be able to
successfully invade Taiwan by 2030, with some predicting even earlier. President of
the US Council on Foreign Relations noted in September 2020 that the gap between
Chinese and American military capabilities in the Taiwan Strait means the
effectiveness of strategic ambiguity has “run its course”.
THE US HAS BEEN ‘LYING FLAT’
US policies since the Cold War toward Taiwan have not changed: the Taiwan
Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances have remained
in place, almost frozen in time numb to changes in reality.
Meanwhile, the PRC passed its Anti-Secession Law in 2005, conducted multiple
invasion exercises off the Taiwanese coast, enacted a threatening new coast guard
law, and has begun near daily intrusions into the Taiwanese air defence zone since
August 2022. Internal Chinese military literature has also indicated the People’s
Liberation Army’s top three war plans are regarding Taiwan.
Yet, with such clear indication of the PRC’s intentions, the US has not shifted its policy
at all, instead ‘lying flat’. With the rise of the PRC’s military power and assertiveness,
strategic ambiguity makes Washington appear weak and confused, no doubt
stressing its regional allies. This has the complete opposite effect of strategic
ambiguity’s intention.
Deterring Chinese invasion is paramount to the US’ effort in managing competition
with the PRC. With the geostrategic calculus shifting away from the American favour,
the United States must rejig its cross-strait policies to match its rhetoric in protecting
and upholding the rules-based order and global democracy.
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A PIVOT TOWARDS STRATEGIC CLARITY
Supporters of strategic ambiguity argue that the policy allows other countries to
balance their ties between Beijing and Washington. Increasingly, this argument is
losing merit. From the outset, the PRC has forced nations to adopt its ‘One China
Principle’ before establishing any diplomatic or commercial ties with it. On the
world stage, any efforts by nations to advocate for Taiwan’s participation in
international organisations have also drawn
the ire of China. With the Communist Party
continuously shifting the goalposts to fit its
interest, it is extremely difficult for nations to
manage their relationship with China and the
US.
In this light, the US must also recognise that
the game and the players have changed
since the Cold War. Any conflict surrounding
Taiwan will now predictably draw a
multilateral response affecting the entire
region and the world in more ways than one.
Partners have demonstrated their
willingness to combat the PRC’s
incrementalism. The US has effectively
enacted and coordinated clear policy
strategies and responses to Chinese actions,
including creating the AUKUS alliance
between the United Kingdom, Australia, and
itself. Japan has also indicated Taiwan’s
integral importance to its security equation.
More recently, former British Prime Minister
Liz Truss also affirmed the UK’s commitment
to improve Taiwan's self-defence ability and
re-highlighted the importance of Taiwan to
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Britain; a move that is not expected to change under the premiership of Rishi
Sunak.
Recently, the Taiwan Policy Act has made headway in the US Congress, and has
been signed off by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The proposed Act
designates the island as a major non-NATO ally, paving way for further arm sales
and defence cooperation.
Though the law has been sidelined by
American domestic politics, it nevertheless
demonstrates a clear appetite to upgrade
ties with Taiwan.
Shifting to strategic clarity will only officiate
what is already in place, and pave the way
for the US to solidify defence ties and its
commitment to defend Taiwan – and, by
extension, the rules-based order. The policy
shift will also dispel any Trump-era doubts
on the level of US commitment to the
region’s security and Washington’s multiple
bilateral defence treaties in the Indo-Pacific.
THE FINE PRINT: TERMS AND CONDITIONS
But as important as strategic clarity may be, any guarantee must inevitably
include caveats and conditions. The PRC previously escalated a jurisdictional
dispute over Scarborough Shoal with the Philippines by outright taking the island
located in the South China Sea. The US watched idly as the island laid beyond the
scope of the US-Philippines defence treaty.
Similar to this, the PRC may seize Taiwanese islands close to mainland shores,
for instance Kinmen, Matsu, or even the Penghu Islands. Whether the US will go
to war with China over these islands or just over Taiwan proper needs to be set
straight in any shift.
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Strategic clarity also should not be used by the Taiwanese as an excuse or
indication of Washington’s support of independence. The aim of strategic clarity
is simply to prevent the PRC from invading Taiwan, changing the status quo by
force, and maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait.
MOVING FORWARD
A shift to an unambiguous policy signals the US’ sense and grasp of urgency,
prioritisation, and purpose. Allies will be reassured, protections of the rulesbased
order will be strengthened, and the status quo will be maintained. While
clarity does not necessarily guarantee deterrence, it would at its root minimise
the possibility of war through miscalculation. Strategic clarity aims to stop an
invasion before it occurs; strategic ambiguity, a fossil of the Cold War, provides
room for an invasion to occur.
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P H O T O B Y T A I W A N P R E S I D E N T I A L O F F I C E / V I A A P

P A G E 1 0 0
Shajara Khan
P H O T O : R O Y A L F A M I L Y

With the passing of Queen Elizabeth II on September 8, 2022, there has
been a reignition of the debate surrounding her family’s imperial legacy.
At the centre of this debate is the question of how Commonwealth
countries can meaningfully reconcile the impacts of past colonial
atrocities with the shared aspirations of their populations moving into
the future.
This has been an extreme point of contention for indigenous
communities in countries that are still part of the British Commonwealth.
In Canada, for example, University of Toronto Assistant Professor
Michelle Daigle has argued that reconciliation efforts have failed to
address the enduring structures of colonialism, having been focussed
instead on “hollow performances of recognition and remorse” that seek
to excise past wrong-doings from Canada’s colonial history rather than
account for them.
This article offers a brief exploration of the history of colonial oppression
in Canada, the complexity of conceptualising and delivering programs of
reconciliation, and what challenges lie ahead on the road into the future.
BRIEF HISTORY OF COLONIAL OPPRESSION IN
CANADA
Indigenous communities in Canada
fall under three main titles: First
Nation peoples, those native to
sub-Arctic Canada; the Inuit
communities, who are native to the
Arctic territories; and the Metis, a
multi-ethnic community descended
from First Nation peoples who
married French settlers. The
impact of British colonisation on
these communities may be
analysed in two primary periods of
Canadian history. The first
concerns Great Britain’s territorial
acquisitions between 1600 and
1867, and the second from 1867
onwards when the British colonies
of Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia
P A G E 1 0 1
P H O T O : T A N D E M V I S U A L S / U N S P L A S H

and Quebec were officially proclaimed the ‘Dominion of Canada’ and a selfgoverning
state within the British Empire.
During the first period, the largest impact on these communities stemmed from
the British legal doctrine of terra nullius — Latin for ‘unoccupied land’. This
permitted British colonists, in the eyes of
British law, to annex fertile, indigenous
lands and settle them for their own
purposes. During the second period, as
social and political structures across the
Dominion were codified into formal
colonial government, legislation was
implemented that aimed to assimilate
indigenous communities into the new
‘Canadian’ way of life.
P H O T O : A N D R E W J A M E S /
U N S P L A S H
Primary among these was the ‘Indian Act’
of 1876. This legislation implemented a
system of governance that barred
indigenous electoral participation and
processes of leadership selection —
notably dismissing the leadership role
played by women in First Nation
communities. Perhaps the most
devastating of the legislative measures
was the forced relocation of indigenous
children into British-styled residential
schools, which were deliberately
established several hundred kilometres
away from their communities to
indoctrinate the children into British
customs. These schools were operated by
churches with financial support from the
colonial government. From 1884, it is
estimated that more than 150,000
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children between the ages of 4 and 16 were placed into the residential schools,
with an estimated 4,100 students dying in their custody. Testimonies from
students revealed that they were routinely prohibited from practising their
culture and made to live in substandard conditions. In some cases, students
were abused at these institutions. The last of these schools was shut down in
1996.
WHAT IS RECONCILIATION AND HOW HAS IT BEEN
ATTEMPTED IN CANADA?
Reconciliation is a broad concept
that encompasses a variety of
measures. Many groups and
individuals have their own ideas and
perspectives on what is needed to
reconcile past wrong-doings,
ranging from the material to the
symbolic. Since the final closure of
the schools by the late 1990s,
multiple lawsuits have been
pursued to seek monetary
compensation for survivors of these
institutions. In 2006, for example, a
class action lawsuit provided
settlements of CAD 10,000 to
survivors of Indian Residential
Schools (IRS) who had spent one
year at a school, and CAD 3,000 for
each subsequent year.
However, indigenous activist groups
have argued for other approaches
that supplement monetary
compensation yet also deliver
emotional and cultural restitution
via recognition of past wrongdoings.
This has been particularly salient
following the discovery of a mass
grave at the Kamloops IRS in British
Columbia that contained the remains
of 215 children. Activist groups have
called on the churches who operated
the schools, the Canadian
government who financed the
schools, and the British Royal Family
to make a formal and sincere
apology to the survivors and the
families of the deceased who
suffered at IRSs across Canada.
Indeed, in May of this year during
then-Prince Charles’ tour of Canada,
the National Chief of the Assembly of
the First Nations, RoseAnne
Archibald, made a direct appeal to
the former Prince of Wales to
petition Queen Elizabeth II to issue
an apology on behalf of the Church
of England. The former Prince
responded that he “acknowledged”
the suffering, but refrained from
offering a formal apology.
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THE PATH FORWARD
As it stands, reconciliation is a
complicated process — one that is
enmeshed within, yet appears to
often be at odds with, other facets
of Canadian law. Some
communities believe litigation still
to be a viable avenue, as
demonstrated by the class action
lawsuit previously mentioned.
However, for others, such as the
Wet’suwet’en People who have
created the rallying cry
“Reconciliation is dead”, it is
apparent that the legal system is
set against them.
Wet’suwet’en land falls squarely in
the path of the Coastal GasLink, a
natural gas pipeline owned by TC
Energy which “will span 670
kilometres across northern [British
Columbia]” upon completion. As of
August 2022, the pipeline is twothirds
complete. In 2019, TC Energy
was granted a legal injunction
against the Wet’suwet’en
protestors who were blocking
access to construction sites along
the pipeline. According to legal
experts, the use of such injunctions
demonstrates how Canada’s legal
system is aligned against the needs
of indigenous groups. A study of a
hundred applications revealed
“that 76% of injunctions filed
against First
Nation groups were granted, while
81% filed by First Nation groups
against corporations were denied”.
Yet this disparity, according to
University of Ottawa Associate
Professor Aimee Craft, is not one
that can necessarily be fixed
through the courts, but through
political change, as this is where
the “underlying issues” between
indigenous and Canadian law exist.
Such is the importance of King
Charles III’s ascension in the
current moment. As the world, and
particularly Commonwealth
countries, look on, indigenous
peoples across the world, and
especially in Canada, are leading
the movement towards
independence from the British
monarchy. However, some have
speculated that the longevity of the
relationship between Canada and
the United Kingdom is likely to be a
significant barrier in the push for
change. For now, the indigenous
peoples are left in suspense,
waiting to see if the new Head of
State for Canada will usher in a
new era of reconciliation and
independence, or whether he will
continue to acknowledge but not
apologise on behalf of his family.
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P H O T O : T O M A S G A L / U N S P L A S H

Samuel Ng
Leaping from crisis to crisis, the revolving
door of British prime ministers have
neglected the UK’s strategic foreign policy,
instead focussing on putting out fires and
controversies. Rishi Sunak must first
address the immediate domestic concerns
before committing to ‘Global Britain’ or risk
projecting a broken and disunited kingdom
instead of a return to British grandeur.
With Rishi Sunak having entered Number
10, the United Kingdom is witnessing its
fifth Conservative prime minister in six
years across four general elections. The
premierships of David Cameron, Theresa
May, Boris Johnson, and Liz Truss were all
mired in controversy and crisis. The recent
political chaos undermines the United
Kingdom’s pursuance of any long-term
foreign policy strategy.
Now Sunak has the weighty responsibility to
steer HMS Britannia along its charted
course, as the beleaguered country
attempts to shake off the anchoring effects
of the pandemic, Brexit, and Ukraine,
P H O T O : S A B R I N A M A Z Z E O /
U N S P L A S H
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all on top of a domestic cost-of-living
crisis. Amid the headwinds, Sunak risks
presenting a broken instead of a Global
Britain back on the world stage.
A REACTIONARY BRITAIN
Since the 2016 Brexit Referendum, UK
politics has entered into a period of
chaos and uncertainty. From May to
Johnson, different views over Brexit
have amplified divisions, not only in the
Tory Party, but also in the greater British
polity. The revolving door of British PMs
is merely a symptom of the nation’s
confusion as it struggles to follow a
straight path forward in a post-Brexit
world.
Exiting the European Union, Johnson’s
newly liberated Britain was “unshackled
from the corpse that is the EU,” as one
pro-Brexiteer put it. The UK was free to
seek out alliances, manage individual EU
relations, and strike new and beneficial
trade deals across the world; but this
did not pan out as envisioned.
The UK has been gravely impacted by
the pandemic, facing both economic
and social challenges. Failures in Iraq
and Afghanistan have neutered any
remaining interventionism lingering
from the Tony Blair years.
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Former US President Donald Trump
and his brand of American
isolationism and protectionism
upended the Atlantic pillar of security
the UK dearly relied on. Britain has
also been caught off guard with
Russia’s opportunistic aggression in
Ukraine. Rounding up these pressing
issues is the British indecisiveness
over whether China’s role is one of a
security threat or an economic lifeline.
Overall since 2016, whoever occupied
the tenancy at Whitehall has been in
damage control addressing the above
mentioned issues – acting in damage
control mode – rather than
strategising and formulating a longterm
foreign policy direction in this
increasingly turbulent world.
That is not to say the prime minister
of the day fully neglected foreign
policy. There have been shifts in this
sphere, with Britain concluding the
controversial trade negotiations with
Australia and Japan. The UK has also
demonstrated its willingness to
engage in the Indo-Pacific region’s
security further through the AUKUS
pact and the recent UK-Japan
Reciprocal Access Agreement with
Tokyo. But these agreements and
negotiations clearly have taken a back
seat compared to acute domestic and
economic issues.
A GLOBAL BRITAIN
As part of the post-Brexit “freedom”,
the UK is no longer tethered to
Brussels’ foreign policy. In March
2021, London released its ‘Integrated
Review’ of its engagement with the
world – particularly addressing the
Indo-Pacific – titled ‘Global Britain’.
This vision was first championed by
many political Brexit supporters as a
shibboleth, but has since morphed to
involve a cosmopolitan, outwardlooking
UK aiming to re-engage with
the world. Global Britain
encompasses heavy investment in
several notable sectors, including the
UK’s armed forces, trade, political and
diplomatic ties, and science and
technology fields.
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Despite its heavy marketing, constant
homages by political figures, and a
phalanx of advertisements, the vision
presented is vague and imprecise.
Apart from the name, there is nothing
concretely global about Global Britain.
In practice, Global Britain ostensibly
involves the UK navigating the small
gaps between larger state actors,
rather than exercising its touted selfdetermination
in driving global events.
ICEBERGS IN THE WAY
Just as his predecessors were engulfed
by internal challenges, Sunak is now
presented with a domestic economic
crisis courtesy of Truss. Regarding
foreign policy, his office has noted that
the Prime Minister’s immediate focus is
to “call out Putin’s regime” while
collaborating with partners by
“cementing relationships”. If this is all
Sunak is presenting in foreign policy, he
risks repeating a reactionary approach
adopted by previous Conservative PMs,
hindering the pursuit of Global Britain.
As ambitious as Global Britain seems,
before Sunak can deliver his version of
the vision and (re)offer British
leadership on the world stage, he first
needs to restore economic stability back
home.
A Downing Street official aptly notes,
“the only good foreign policy that is
made, is off the back of a strong
economic footing.”
Assuming the PM is able to rein in
Britain’s economic issues, he faces more
acute and practical icebergs in
implementing Global Britain – he does
not have much cash to splash. Global
Britain hinges on the state of the UK’s
finances, and currently, it is severely
constrained. David Lawrence at the
Chatham House appropriately
summarises, “whether it’s the Indo-
Pacific tilt, making Britain into a science
and technology superpower, of funding
defence and diplomacy – whatever it is
you want to do in terms of global
ambitions, you need to be able to pay
for it…And it’s a lot harder if you’ve got a
weak economy.”
“THE ONLY GOOD
FOREIGN POLICY
THAT IS MADE, IS
OFF THE BACK OF A
STRONG ECONOMIC
FOOTING.”
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SUNAK'S HMS
BRITANNIA INTO
OBLIVION
The past Conservative
premierships under May,
Johnson, and Truss have all acted
similar to transitional
governments, focussed on
addressing immediate concerns
instead of realising long-term
strategic goals. Sunak has an
opportunity between now and
the next general election to
cement his credibility, the
nation’s credibility, and chart his
own course for HMS Britannia.
Should the new Prime Minister
fail in navigating between the
icebergs of internal damage
control and political infighting,
the UK’s Global Britain will
remain an unrealised dream and
a mere propaganda tagline of
Brexit supporters.
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P H O T O B Y D A N M E Y E R S O N U N S P L A S H

T H E N U C L E A R
R E N A I S S A N C E I N
E U R O P E
C O U L D N U C L E A R E N E R G Y H E L P E U R O P E
R E A C H I T S G R E E N D E A L T A R G E T S ?
Nicolas Buitrago
In a controversial vote, the European Commission green-labelled
nuclear and gas energy projects, possibly to counter the prolonged
effects of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Many of us may still remember where we were when the Fukushima nuclear disaster
made news headlines around the world in March 2011. Fearing another potential
radioactive catastrophe in Europe, some industrialised nations, namely Germany,
Belgium and Switzerland, have committed to a nuclear power phase-out by 2034
while also developing ambitious green projects reliant on renewable energy sources
in response to the climate crisis.
Nuclear energy has been championed as an alternative to fossil energy sources to
deliver sustainable energy transitions. Today, nuclear energy accounts for 10% of the
world’s electricity and one-third of low-carbon electricity, which is roughly equivalent
to removing one-third of all cars from the world’s roads.
In February 2022, the invasion of Ukraine brought about an energy crisis across
Europe, prompting the latter to consider sourcing natural gas from outside Russia or
doubling down on renewable sources. In support of Ukraine, the EU began to impose
sanctions on Russia's exports, reducing the bloc's dependency on Russian fossil fuels,
which in 2021 accounted for 40% of its total gas consumption, more than 25% of its
oil imports, and nearly 46% of its coal imports.
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T H E E U R O P E A N G R E E N D E A L I N A
N U T S H E L L
In compliance with the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, the EU developed the
world’s most ambitious green project to date, the EU Green Deal, coined
“Europe’s man on the moon moment” by EU Commission Chief Ursula Von Der
Leyen. Adopted in 2020, the deal is intended to be the EU’s new growth strategy
to transition the 27-nation bloc’s economy to a sustainable economic model.
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Ranging across 8 policy areas, the deal’s overarching goal is for the EU to
become the world’s first “carbon-neutral continent” by 2050 through a profound
overhaul of nearly every aspect of the European economy, from energy
generation to consumption, transport, manufacturing and construction. Nearly
€1 trillion of sustainable investments is expected to fund the EU Green Deal over
the next decade. Further, The Just Transition Mechanism will mobilise at least
€100 billion from the EU budget and InvestEU to focus on the regions most
affected by the transition, financing various projects – from the creation of new
workplaces to investments in renewable energy and sustainable transport.
Despite Europe cutting greenhouse gas
emissions by 31% from 1990 to 2020,
critics of the Green Deal estimate that
current measures are nowhere near
reaching the 2050 carbon neutral goal.
Poland and Hungary, whose economies
heavily rely on fossil fuels, have openly
opposed the green agenda, with the
former stating that they will reach carbon
neutrality “at their own pace”. On the
contrary, at least 8 countries, including
Spain, Sweden and Latvia, have expressed
the initiative to increase their 2030
emissions reduction targets. This has
prompted a debate of possible divisions
for when hard choices must be made -
from stricter emission limits for the car
industry, tougher agricultural policies, to
the cessation of coal mines.

N U C L E A R A N D G A S E N E R G Y P R O J E C T S
D E C L A R E D G R E E N B Y T H E E U R O P E A N
C O M M I S S I O N
Recently, the European Parliament voted to endorse labelling some gas and
nuclear energy projects as green, potentially hindering Europe’s race to a longterm
switch to more renewable sources and undermining emissions-cutting
goals. Mairead McGuiness, the EU Commissioner for financial services,
expressed that this new labelling is not greenwashing, as nuclear and gas are
classified as transitional energy sources under the new taxonomy. However,
Finland is on track to open the world’s first permanent disposal site in 2024-
2025, aiming to store high-level nuclear waste for around 100,000 years, 430
metres belowground. Once operating, Finland’s initiative will provide insight into
a possible solution to the nuclear waste problem. If successful, other nations
may follow suit.
Nonetheless, environmentalists argue that the impacts of nuclear energy
outweigh its benefits. Given the risks natural catastrophes and geopolitical
conflicts pose, evidenced by Fukushima and the embattled Zaporizhzhia plant in
Ukraine, the potential of a nuclear accident is unpredictable. Nuclear reactors
remain a capital-intensive technology as their construction costs may run into
the billions and may also take too long to contribute to the 2050 neutrality goals.
The environmental organisation, the Climate Action Network, suggests that the
EU Commission’s new vote fails to redirect financial flows towards authentic
climate-positive investments, sacrificing the scientific integrity of the taxonomy
at the feet of fossil fuel, gas and nuclear lobbies.
The new law has divided EU nations, investors and lawmakers. Nuclear energy
provides about 70% of France’s electricity. With 56 reactors, France is currently
leading the pro-nuclear fraction in Europe, with the support of Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Finland. President Macron also
announced a €51.7 billion plan to rebuild France’s nuclear program, investing in
the construction of up to 14 next-generation pressurised water reactors by 2035,
as well as small modular reactors.
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E U R O P E ’ S F E A S I B I L I T Y T O F U L L Y
C O M M I T T O A F O S S I L F U E L T R A N S I T I O N
A M I D T H E U K R A I N E W A R
In the wake of the Ukraine war, Europe’s ambitions to become global leaders in
the transition to climate neutrality remains uncertain, with coal plants being refired
across the continent and the use of atomic energy moving to the forefront
of the conversation. The Netherlands is considering gas fracking, and like
Germany, Belgium has turned to delaying its nuclear plant phase-out. As the war
escalates, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that closing their 3 last
nuclear power plants is no longer viable, insisting that a series of tests on the
German power system would determine whether their use is necessary past
their decommissioning dates.
As Putin’s aggression reshapes Europe’s energy security considerations, nuclear
energy advocates agree that it can assist in bridging Europe’s fuel deficit,
accompanying an already underway shift to integrate wind, solar and other
renewable energy resources to meet the Green Deal’s ambitious targets. While it
may take longer for Europe to achieve carbon neutrality, it is clear that nuclear
provides promising homegrown energy and reliable electricity amid increasing
energy prices.
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Diane Maria Langeloh
GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
On August 8th 2022, Angela Merkel, former chancellor of Germany, was replaced
by Olaf Scholz. As one of the most influential European countries, Germany
holds significant international standing and responsibility, especially within the
European Union. Instability in Germany has the potential to create dissonances
in foreign policy and impact the international system. In this way, a
consideration of arising issues that Germany continues to respond to, as well as
its relations with France, Russia and China is crucial to understanding its foregin
policy behaviour.
CONTINUITY OF GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY
Angela Merkel’s long tenure solidified her as a key part of Germany’s
international identity. Her (re)actions and decision-making became predictable
and cemented Germany’s position as a reliable and stable partner in
international affairs. Since the new coalition government’s term, Merkel as the
German identity figure in international relations has vanished, both
internationally and nationally. Chancellor Scholz will now have to prove he is
worthy of international and national trust before he can truly become a
spokesperson for German citizens. Scholz, however, has indicated foreign policy
continuity, stressing that the government will strive for a stable European Union
and nourish the transatlantic partnership. Nonetheless, new opportunities for
international partnership may arise with the new coalition government.
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P H O T O : F A B I A N S O M M E R / D P A / P I C T U R E
A L L I A N C E

FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS
France and Germany are the European Union's two largest economies and two
of the organisation’s founding members. Their cooperation is critical for EU
policy making. Their relationship has become fraught with disagreement amid
tensions surrounding a worsening energy crisis. Whilst France has advocated for
a European gas price restriction, the German government only consented to do
so a few weeks ago — and with various conditions. Germany has also been
chastised for agreeing to a 200 billion euro rescue package aimed at assisting
German businesses and families while blocking EU-level efforts to raise extra
funds and assist European nations with limited funding. As a consequence, the
image of the German Federation is starting to shift to a more selfish one. “The
relationship [between Germany and France] is obviously strained, a
development I blame mostly the German government for,” Jacob Kirkegaard,
senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund think tank, said to CNBC.
HOW GERMANY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
GARNERS INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM
With the current war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, the relationship
between Germany and Russia has exposed some of Germany’s current morality
issues in international relations. Following Putin’s 2012 announcement to run for
President again, Germany responded with an affirmation of their commitment to
keep friendly relations towards Russia. The former German strategy was
reasonable, even promising. It was built on conversation, a high level of
tolerance, and the belief that trade and investment would eventually alter
Russia. The Kremlin regime's actions, however, only got worse, culminating in
the current war. As a direct consequence of the war against Ukraine, Germany,
following other EU states, imposed sanctions on Russia. Chancellor Scholz
pronounced a shift in action towards the Kremlin, but the dependency on Nord
P H O T O : K E V I N W O B L I C K / U N S P L A S H
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Stream, which was founded during the Merkel tenure, has made it difficult for
Germany to impose impactful sanctions. This raises international critique stating
that Germany has made too few adjustments in policies in relation to Russia and
thus is undermining international efforts to end the war. This shows that even
though Merkel’s tenure ended, her handling of international affairs prevails.
Moreover, it highlights Scholz’s current incapacity to act according to his
coalition’s moral standards - freedom, justice and solidarity.
UPCOMING SHIFTS IN GERMANY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH
CHINA
With respect to the relationship between Germany and China, small political
changes to moral intervention politics are starting to come into action. Given
that China is its top commercial partner, German foreign policy is in a bind.
Berlin may run the risk of a serious crisis, especially from an economic
standpoint, if it takes a strong stance against Chinese attempts to reclaim
Taiwan. However, if Germany remains silent, it would likely disprove its assertion
that its foreign policy is values-based. The Scholz cabinet shows efforts to slowly
distance itself from the Indo Pacific superpower and apply higher moral
standards to international partners. At a meeting of the G7 economic ministers
in September, German vice chancellor Robert Habeck declared: "The naivety
toward China is over." This risky undertaking is highly critiqued even by coalition
partners, and mostly supported by the German Greens. Considering China's vast
economic activities, this relationship is increasingly important.
THE FUTURE
Since the inauguration of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, shifts in foreign policies have
occurred. Up until now, the changes have been minor, thus preserving the status
quo, but could lead to a shift in Germany’s status in the international arena. In
particular, its relationships with France and Russia are being put to the test.
Depending on the future actions of China, this might be a relationship to keep an
eye on.
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P H O T O : N O R B E R T B R A U N / U N S P L A S H

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P H O T O : A N G E L L O P R O O N
U N S P L A S H

Evangelia Wichmann
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P H O T O : J O N A T H A N L A M P E L O N
U N S P L A S H

2022 saw the Amazon in Latin
America once again devastated by
ongoing illegal deforestation and
human-caused fires, with the region
also suffering from deadly hurricanes
and landslides. These environmental
destructions caused by climate
change and illegal human activity
have resulted in a number of regional
conservation and development
issues. The ongoing exploitation of
nature prioritising economic interests
increasingly puts the region and the
world at risk of losing unique
archaeological heritage, indigenous
communities, and the Amazon's
unique biodiversity.
The Brazilian election reflected
concerns surrounding destruction
and losses in the Amazon, which
when coupled with significant sociopolitical
upheaval, illuminated the
dire need for political change and an
affirmation of political will to reduce
the ongoing harm done to the
Amazon rainforest. With Lula de Silva
- Brazil's recently re-elected President
- promising to protect the Amazon
rainforest, accountability has been
demanded, hoping that some of the
irreversible harm done to the
Amazon may be reduced.
THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
The Brazilian Amazon, which holds
60% of the Amazon basin,
is home to many of Brazil's
indigenous communities and over 3
million species of flora and fauna.
This region is also critical to the
global fight against climate change
and has suffered greatly in the
months leading up to the Brazilian
election.
Deforestation rates were at their
highest since 2009, notably increasing
in the last months of Bolsonaro's
Presidency due to the prospect of his
election defeat in October. In October
alone, the highest clearing per month
occurred since tracking began in
2015, with approximately 904 sq km
being cleared.
This significant amount of
deforestation was possible due to the
reduction of the punitive powers of
Brazil's environmental protection
agencies under Bolsonaro's
Presidency. Bolsonaro, who
unofficially supported deforestation,
repeatedly demonstrated his
ignorance towards illegal logging and
forest burning.
As well as calling for more farming
and mining in the Amazon region,
resulting in deforestation soaring to a
15-year-high during his Presidency,
he simultaneously defended his
policies as "balancing environmental
protection with fair and sustainable
economic growth."
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FIRES IN THE AMAZON
This blatant ignorance resulted in
Brazil accounting for more than 70%
of the 983 major Amazon fires
recorded by the Monitoring of the
Andean Amazon Project (MAAP)
during the fire season. In fact, 71% of
these major fires in Brazil were
caused by humans and burned in
areas that had been deforested
within the last three years.
These fires are often linked to
deforestation for soy farming by
companies who are yet to commit to
zero deforestation contractually.
Brazil's space research agency INPE
showed proof of these criminal
activities with satellite images,
showing that illegally deforested land
in the Amazon rainforest had been
replaced with row crops rather than
grass pastures.
The ongoing expansion of soy
plantations has resulted in Brazil
becoming the world's largest
exporter of soybeans.
DEMARCATION OF
INDIGENOUS LANDS
This destruction of the Amazon
rainforest in Brazil was not limited to
nature; it also affected the forest's
P H O T O : M I K H A I L S E R D Y U K O V O N
U N S P L A S H
citizens - Brazil's Indigenous
communities.
The interests of these ancient
civilisations were continuously
disrespected by Bolsonaro's
government, an administration
characterised by some of the most
significant setbacks in the
demarcation of Indigenous lands in
favour of "an integrationist vision that
focuses on 'civilising' the Indigenous
Peoples." Illegal gold mining on the
lands of the indigenous people by socalled
Garimperiros has been most
significant in driving these setbacks.
Illegal mining has further contributed
to environmental destruction.
The environment in numerous regions
in the Amazon, the source of the
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communities' livelihood, is
being destroyed by illegal
miners who use mercury to
separate the gold from grit.
Activists say that this
mercury poisons the water
and food chains by leaking
into rivers and can harm
organs and the
development of children
who consume it. The
number and activities of
these 'Garimpeiros'
increased in 2022 and
throughout Bolsonaro's
administration, which had
vowed to support and
develop the Amazon economy and
exploit the forest's mineral resources.
This increase in illegal human
destruction and Bolsonaro's inaction
and ignorance saw frantic
deforestation occurring before the
Brazilian election and then again
during the current government
transition. President Lula da Silva, who
takes office on January 1, 2023,
pledges to undo environmental
degradation and fight for 0
deforestation in the Amazon. Lula will
provide further funding to state
agencies to increase environmental
safeguards and protections for the
Amazon. The Amazon and the world
are in
P H O T O : M A R T I N S C H O E L L E R / N A T I O N A L
G E O G R A P H I C
desperate need of these promises
being actioned.
THE DESTRUCTION OF LOST
AMAZON CIVILISATION
ARCHEOLOGY
Another effect of illegal logging and
deforestation, apart from the severe
environmental concerns and the risk
of losing the traditions and cultures of
once isolated indigenous tribes, is the
destruction of antique remains buried
in the forest. Unchecked cutting down
of trees in Bolivia's Beni is destroying
evidence of the lost Amazon
civilisation that used to live there. Pre-
Colombian peoples lived in Bolivia's
Amazon region, whose bones and
ceramic remains are being destroyed
by unchecked logging.
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These indigenous remains, belonging
to former complex communities
based in the region known as the
Llanos de Mojos, are only now being
found.
There is an ongoing battle against
deforestation destroying these sites
before archaeologists can study
them. Unchecked and illegal
deforestation causes the loss of
artefacts of human history.
THE AMAZON AND
POLITICS
The long-term survival of the Amazon
rainforest, which is tens of million
years old, is essential for helping to
conserve a significant part of the
earth's biodiversity, indigenous
communities' existence and stabilise
the earth's climate. The effects of
unregulated deforestation, currently
occurring at damaging historical
rates, show the urgent need for
international support, regulations,
and policies if the Amazon rainforest
is to survive. This need for action has
been vocalised by many worldwide
and influenced 2022 political
elections, as well as contributed to
the increase of indigenous voices.
Despite experiencing dire setbacks in
2022, hope remains for the Amazon:
the election of Brazil's incoming
President,
Lula da Silva who has promised to
fight for the protection of the Amazon
and for zero deforestation, prompts
opportunities for reform and change.
Lula da Silva has shown in the past
that he can deliver this goal – during
his first Presidency deforestation
decreased by 70%.
LULA AND THE AMAZON
FUND
Lula's support for the Amazon has
been strengthened by the Brazilian
Supreme Court, which recently ruled
against outgoing President
Bolsonaro's freeze of the Amazon
Fund. The biggest fund for the
protection of forests, according to
one of the fund architects, Tasso
Azevedo. The court stated that
Bolsonaro's decision to suspend the
fund - based on the argument that to
reduce the region's poverty levels,
commercial farming, mining, and
logging were needed
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P H O T O : A N D R E P E N N E R / A P P H O T O

- was unconstitutional and careless
during a time when deforestation and
fires were increasing. This
reinstatement of a fund, started by
Lula during his Presidency in 2008,
will provide access to over $800
million. This decision will help
reinstate forest protection by fighting
against deforestation and promoting
sustainable development. Lula's win
will also see a change in policy,
security, government, and
international support for
conservation, with Germany, a past
major donor to the Amazon Fund,
agreeing to provide support again.
COLOMBIA’S HOPE TO
DECREASE DESTRUCTION
These positive government actions
were also recently seen in Colombia,
which announced its ambitious plan
and commitment to reduce
deforestation in the Colombian
Amazon. This news also saw
Colombia receive international
support and funding from Germany,
Norway, and the UK. This comes after
the new minister for the environment
Susana Muhamad, within her first 100
days of office, signed the agreements
to reduce deforestation in
cooperation with the communities.
The new internationally supported
strategy would see the Colombian
government work
with indigenous people and
communities - particularly in the
"deforestation hotspots"- to reach
agreements that would strengthen
these areas' economic, social, and
environmental conditions.
WILL 2023 ACT TO SAVE
THE AMAZON?
The deforestation of vast areas of
unique ecosystems, the disruption of
indigenous communities, and the
destruction of archaeological
evidence of ancient civilisations has
created irreparable damage. While
the end of 2022 promises some hope
for 2023 and beyond, the damage
done is not completely reversible.
2022 is a year that cannot be
repeated if the conservation of the
Amazon rainforest and all its
ecological and cultural treasures is a
serious goal for global policymakers.
Conservation and close cooperation
with indigenous groups living in this
area must be the top priority for
those in government. As 2022 and the
years past have shown, civil society
and well-meaning individuals cannot
solely protect the Amazon to survive;
good, environmentally conscious
governance is required.
P A G E 1 2 5

The Enduring Influence of Peronism:
Understanding Argentina’s IMF Loans and the
Assassination Attempt on Vice President Kirchner
Tristan Chatton
P A G E 1 2 6
P H O T O : A N G E L I C A R E Y E S /
U N S P L A S H

Economic and political instability have
plagued contemporary Argentina, with
2022 presenting a particularly volatile and
challenging year. Currently, Argentina faces
a cost of living crisis that disproportionately
affects 36.5% of the population living in
poverty. Inflation sits at 88% and expected
to reach 100% by year's end.
Detrimentally, Argentina has had 3
successive Ministers of Economy in 2022
due to an unmanageable economy. Amidst
the economic crisis, the Government has
negotiated a $45 billion IMF deal to
refinance the failed $57 Billion 2018 loan.
Argentina is no stranger to political
violence, however, the assassination
attempt on Vice President Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner warns of a potential
resurgence of politically stratified brutality.
While 2022 has provided a litany of
challenges, Argentina's current crises are
merely evolutions of existing problems and
influences. Integral in comprehending the
aforementioned events is a familiar
phenomenon, the enduring influence of
Peronism.
WHAT IS PERONISM?
Peronism has been Argentina's most
influential and enduring political movement
since President Juan Peróns 1946 election.
Ideologically, Peronism is influenced by
both the far right and left in an attempt to
straddle between capitalism and socialism.
Peronism is undeniably a populist
movement, with notions of nationalism
infused throughout the ideological tenets of
social justice, economic independence,
P A G E 1 2 7
P H O T O : F I N A N C I A L T I M E S

and political sovereignty. Since the 1976-
83 dictatorship’s collapse, Peronist parties
have governed for sustained periods of
time. Frente de Todos currently governs
as a Peronist coalition between President
Alberto Fernández and Vice President
Kirchner. Despite intermittent periods of
non-Peronist government, Peronism has
unequivocally dictated Argentina's
economic and political trajectory.
Accordingly, many despise and blame
Peronism for Argentina's problems.
ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC
DEMISE
Based upon current economic
circumstances it is difficult to fathom how
Argentina was once a wealthy country
with a comparable economy to Australia.
Possessing vast natural resources and
fertile agricultural land, Argentina enjoyed
economic development through an
export driven model in the 19th to early
20th century. However, negligent and
sporadic Peronist fiscal policies since
1946 have squandered Argentina’s
omparative advantage, eroded
confidence from international investors,
and caused successive economic crises.
Carlos Menem's Government’s Presidency
during the 1990s is the most notable era
of Peronist economic mismanagement
when analysing today's crisis.
A Peronist with neoliberal characteristics,
Menem infamously privatised state assets
and pegged the Argentine peso to the
U.S dollar on a 1 to 1 basis. This aimed
to combat inflation, stabilise prices and
promote investment by restoring
confidence in the peso. Initially
flourishing, the economy grew by 6.1%
per annum between 1991-1997 with $24
billion of foreign investment.
Menem subsequently increased state
expenditure by 50%. However, Menem
refused to remove the currency peg
despite the economy's eventual
deterioration, as uneven conversion
rates, capital flight, and overwhelming
debt bankrupted Argentina.
Menem is therefore causally responsible
for an Argentine economy that never
rebounded. For foreign investors and
markets, Argentina’s economy is too
risky, thus creating precarious
conditions for economic recovery
because of negligible capital circulation.
THE 2022 IMF
AGREEMENT
Argentina was already economically
vulnerable before the flow on effects of
the 2022 War in Ukraine. Consequently,
conditions influenced by Peronist
economic mismanagement and Covid-19
worsened. To avoid defaulting on
repayments, in early 2022 Argentina
negotiated an agreement with the IMF to
refinance their 2018 loan.
P A G E 1 2 8

Negotiated by former President Mauricio
Macri, the 2018 $57 billion loan intended
to prevent capital flight, reinforce the
peso, and promote foreign investment.
Notably, these issues have persisted since
Menem, and unsurprisingly the
programme failed. Upon assuming the
Presidency in 2019 Fernández cancelled
the loan, with subsequent private creditor
negotiations failing to refinance the
already disbursed $45 billion. With
encroaching debt repayments and
insufficient funds, the Government was
forced to broach a new deal with the IMF.
Under the refinancing agreement, debt
repayments were postponed until 2026,
with targets including rebuilding
international reserves and reducing fiscal
deficit. The agreement was approved by
Argentina’s Senate and the IMF in March.
In October the IMF completed its second
review of the agreement, allowing the
release of $3.8 billion and contributing to
a total of $17.5 billion of disbursements.
Argentina's GDP is forecasted to increase
by 0.5% in 2023 and 1.8% in 2024, well
below IMF expectations. Signifying the
inevitable difficulties in improving
Argentina's economy and repaying the
loan.
P o l i c e o f f i c e r s a r r e s t a m a n w h o p o i n t e d a
f i r e a r m a t V i c e P r e s i d e n t C r i s t i n a F e r n a n d e z d e
K i r c h n e r o u t s i d e h e r h o m e i n B u e n o s A i r e s
P H O T O : T O M A S C U E S T A / G E T T Y
I M A G E S
THE ATTEMPTED
ASSASSINATION OF VICE
PRESIDENT KIRCHNER
Despite enjoying electoral success,
Peronism is nonetheless hated by many
Argentines. Peronist economic
mismanagement and the current cost of
living crisis have exacerbated political
polarisation, possibly explaining the
attempted assassination of Kirchner.
On September 1st, Brazilian national
Fernando Sabag Montiel pointed a pistol
at Kirchner outside her residence, which
miraculously failed to fire. A member of
the far right, Montiel had Neo-Nazi
tattoos, yet his political motivations for
the attack remain nebulous.
P A G E 1 2 9

However, it is clear that for many
Argentines Kirchner epitomises
everything wrong with Peronism.
Kirchner is a proponent of Kirchnerism,
a left-wing Peronist iteration founded by
her late husband Nestor Kirchner,
Argentina's President from 2003-2007.
Kirchner was President from 2007-2015,
became Vice-President in 2019, and is
viewed by many as Argentina’s most
powerful politician.
Currently, Kirchner faces 12 years in
prison over corruption allegations that
during her Presidency, she syphoned
state funds by awarding public contracts
to family friends. Kirchner strenuously
denies all allegations, which she
considers politically motivated as she
intends to run for President again in
2023. Regardless, Kirchner and
Peronism remain highly divisive and
targets of constant scrutiny.
ARGENTINA AND
PERONISM'S FUTURE
Peronism is unequivocally responsible for
Argentina's current economic crisis, but as
shown by history, the movement is adaptive
and persistent. Until the Government can
tackle inflation and promote investor
confidence, debt will increase and the
economy will further deteriorate, thus
increasing the chances of Argentina
defaulting on its IMF loans.
Additionally, political stratification amidst
economic instability is imminent. Whilst the
assassination attempt on Kirchner could be
an outlier, a resurgence of political violence
is possible. Argentina’s future is uncertain,
yet despite economic mismanagement,
innumerable controversies, and
polarisation, it is clear that Peronism will
continue playing a pivotal political role for
decades to come.
P A G E 1 3 0

P H O T O : N I D I A M E L I S S A
B A U T I S T A / R E F I N E R Y 2 9
It was the photograph of an 18-
year-old girl, alone, in the dark,
standing on the side of a highway
that haunted women across the
globe.
Hayley Bedson
TW: CONTAINS GRAPHIC DESCRIPTIONS OF
MURDER AND VIOLENCE
It’s the middle of the night in
Nuevo León, Mexico. The taxi
driver, thought to be driving
Debanhi Escobar home that
night, took this photograph to
prove Escobar was alive when he
‘left’ her, claiming she got out on
her own accord. Her body was
found a week later in the water
tank of a nearby motel, with
injuries to her skull. She had been
suffocated.
P A G E 1 3 1

IIngrid Escamilla, a 25-year-old, was killed by
her male partner in Mexico City. Her
alarming discovery found parts of her body
had been skinned, and organs removed.
26 year old Rita de Kássia Nogueira’s body
was found in an empty house in Bento
Ribeiro, Brazil. Her limbs were bound, and
lacerations were found on her body. Torture
wounds.
7-year-old Fatima Cecelia Aldrighett Anton
went missing in Xochimilco, Mexico City as
she was waiting to be picked up from school.
Her body was later found in a plastic bag
near Los Reyes, Tlahuac.
These are all too familiar narratives in
communities across Central America, the
Caribbean and South America.
The Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean reports that
an average of 12 women are murdered
a day across the region. In Mexico alone,
data shows that 3,825 women died
because of violence in 2021.
This is 10 women a day.
The violence perpetuated towards
women and girls in places like El
Salvador and Honduras are so extreme,
that it exceeds the combined rate of
male and female homicides of some of
the 40 countries with the highest
murder rates in the world (Ecuador,
Tanzania, Nicaragua).
While Latin America has battled with a longhaul
issue of gender-based violence, the
term ‘Femicide’ is a relatively new legal
concept to the region, and the laws defining
its legal conceptualisation are inconsistent in
scope and recognition.
SO, WHAT IS FEMICIDE?
Femicide is the intentional killing of women
and girls because of their gender,
overwhelmingly perpetrated by men. It
involves ongoing abuse in the home, threats
or intimidation, sexual violence, and
situations where women have less power
and fewer resources than their male partner.
P A G E 1 3 2
P H O T O : N I D I A M E L I S S A
B A U T I S T A / R E F I N E R Y 2 9

A 2022 study released by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and
United Nations Women reports that
globally, 81,000 women and girls were
intentionally killed this year. 56% (or
45,000) of women met with death as a
result of their intimate partner or family
members.
But it is Latin American countries that
present the largest exacerbator, taking out
8 of the top 10 spots of countries with the
highest femicide rate of the year. Mexico
trailed in at number 11.
Political science professor Alejandro Hope,
when asked why, following Ingrid
Escamilla’s death, remarked ‘a violent and
machismo culture killed Ingrid, our
indifference killed her, our failure to
demand that things changed killed her’.
This indifference is ever-present in Latin
American justice systems. Police remiss
adequate investigations into reports and
the follow-through of the judiciary in
prosecuting offenders are slim. A lack of
peremptory action by crime enforcement
in addressing gendered violence facilitates
an inconsequential attitude to human
rights, with women and girls at the bottom
of the pecking order.
Politically, there is reluctance to address
the issue. Shockingly, Mexico’s current
President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador,
blamed ‘femicide’ as a provocation of
media sensationalism.
When questioned on Mexico’s influx of
emergency calls reporting violence against
women in 2021, the middle of the COVID-19
lockdown, López Obrador supposed that
‘90% of those calls that you’re referring to
are fake’.
López Obrador well and truly placed salt in
the wounds of women, dishonouring such
reports as ‘pranks’ analogous to ‘calls the
metro gets about sabotage or bombs’.
The liberty to feel safe is not
afforded to women and girls in
Latin America. Home does not
pledge safety. Neither can a
public street, being at school,
or catching a taxi ride home.
This has not gone unchallenged. Women
across the region were mobilised again after
the shocking circumstances surrounding
Dehbani Escobar’s disappearance and death
early this year, as the world saw huge
human rights protests and marches.
‘I’m marching today so that I
don’t die tomorrow’ was the
message plastered amongst
the crowds.
To mark the loss of blood of the victims of
femicide in Mexico City, protesters tinted
the water red of the fountain to the Roman
goddess Diana. The same was done to the
fountain of the Roman goddess of wisdom
in Minerva, Guadalajara.
P A G E 1 3 3

Any legal recognition of femicide is a
welcome cry. However, it is only the first
step, in what is a broader subcultural
problem. Femicide prevalence is
intrinsically linked to Latin America’s
complex colonial past.
Political instability, the rifle nature of
drug mafia conflicts, sexism, criminality,
socioeconomic inequalities and
humanitarian crises.
These are all factors pointing towards a
culture of impunity over violence
perpetrated against women and girls.
Male power and dominance is the
communal theme. It has desensitised
many to its prevalence and enabled
defiance of legal change.
Unified laws against femicide, and its
recognition must include intimate, nonintimate
and family violence
circumstances.
The significance of such a unification
cannot be understated.
Promoting public awareness, facilitating
policies that help address its prevalence
and aid prevention measures, assisting
and normalising women and girls
coming forward in reporting their abuse,
upholding their basic human right to
justice and dignity, allowing improved
statistics for law enforcement and policy
development…
P H O T O : I S A B E L K E N N O N A N D G R A C E
V A L D E V I T T / A T L A N T I C C O U N C I L
P A G E 1 3 4
But most of all, it demands perpetrators
be accountable for such heinous crimes.

M
M I D D L E
E
E A S T
N
N O R T H
A
A F R I C A
P A G E 1 3 5
P H O T O : W H O ’ S D E N I L O ? /
U N S P L A S H

OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH THE
NEW: ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
SOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH AFRICA
Dominique Jones
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the vulnerability that arises
from neglecting energy resource diversification. A scramble has
ensued to find alternative energy sources, resulting in a renewed
interest in some Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states.
Which MENA states are the most well-positioned to make the most of
the changing balance of power in the international energy market?
P A G E 1 3 6
P H O T O : C H R I S L I V E R A N I O N
U N S P L A S H

Qatar is a major gas exporter. Specifically, in 2020 it was the second-largest
exporter of natural gas in the world. This is because the emirate holds the thirdlargest
gas reserves in the world after Russia and Iran. It also shares the world’s
largest gas reserve with Iran. Earlier this year Qatar opened the Barzan gas plant,
which has been responsible for driving the Middle East’s growing energy exports.
Between January and September of this year, Qatar was the third largest
liquified natural gas (LNG) exporter to the European Union (EU) behind the
United States and Russia. However, Doha has been stern in its
acknowledgement that Qatari gas will not be able to replace Russian gas. The
reason for this is two-fold.
Firstly, there are no direct pipelines between Qatar and Europe through which to
transport LNG. This means that Qatari energy would have to be shipped to
Europe in liquefied form, which is an energy-intensive process that considerably
offsets the climate benefits of using natural gas. The lack of infrastructure was
brought up by Qatar at the Gas Exporting Countries Forum. It was noted that
significant investment and long-term contractual certainty were essential to
supply Europe with gas.
Secondly, Qatar must uphold its contractual obligations of non-diversion to its
Asian consumers. Approximately 80% of Qatar’s LNG is exported to Asia with
South Korea, India, China and Japan as its biggest importers. With LNG exports
already allocated to these states, Qatar must produce more LNG to meet the
demands of both its Asian and new European clients. This muddies Qatar’s
capacity to become Europe’s outright energy saviour.
P A G E 1 3 7

However, an LNG supply deal struck between Qatar and Germany in November
has been able to provide a long-term diversification plan. The 15-year contract to
buy two million tonnes of LNG is set to launch Qatar into the top position as the
world’s largest LNG exporter. Whilst unable to immediately replace Russian gas
as deliveries won’t begin until 2026, plans for two direct terminals between
Germany and Qatar can address infrastructure concerns.
With the second largest gas reserves in the world, Iran was seen as a major
contender to provide Europe with LNG. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman
Nasser Kanaani maintained in September that Iran had the potential to meet
Europe’s gas needs.
Many are rightfully cautious about the credibility of this claim. Despite a 3.1%
growth in natural gas production in 2021, making Iran the fourth largest gas
producer in the world, an increase in domestic consumption saw Tehran run a
gas deficit.
Regular gas shortages have seen domestic disruptions including the closure of
public services, like bakeries and water distributions, and cuts to heating in
households and businesses. Furthermore, when domestic consumption in
January increased, Iran cut off gas exports to Turkey, evincing the instability of
Iranian gas management. With 94% of Iranian gas consumed domestically,
Tehran’s future appears to be one of an energy importer rather than an exporter
to Europe.
This is largely due to the crippling technical effect of international sanctions on
Tehran. The lack of foreign investment and technological support has left Iran
unable to take advantage of its mass reserves. Existing terminals are outdated,
and new pipelines would be required to export to Europe.
Considering its tense political climate, catapulted by Mahsa Amini’s death, Iran is
ill-equipped to allocate already dire resources to alleviate Europe’s energy
debacle.
P A G E 1 3 8

Another LNG supplier to mostly Asian markets, Egypt is looking to divert 15% of
its domestic gas usage for European export. Such ambition comes at a time of
economic turmoil for Egypt. Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly hopes to take
advantage of the high gas prices to bring in an extra $450 million a month in
foreign currency to Cairo. Such funds would be pivotal in allowing Egypt to cope
with the wheat crisis since over 80% of its wheat supply comes from Ukraine and
Russia.
Egyptian gas production has been growing since December 2017 after the
discovery of the Zohr gas field, the largest in the Mediterranean. This has
boosted Cairo as a significant exporter. In the first seven months of this year
alone, Egypt has exported 9.45 million cubic metres of LNG, up 44% from 2021’s
figures. In 2021, it provided 15% of European energy imports, most notably to
Spain, France and Belgium.
In June, Egypt and Israel signed an agreement that will oversee an increase in gas
exports to Europe. The Memorandum of Understanding notes that the trio will
work together to ensure the stable and long-term delivery of natural gas to the
EU that does not compromise decarbonisation targets. The natural gas will be
liquefied in Egypt before being shipped to Europe. Although observers have
noted that the agreement has not relieved the EU of its reliance on problematic
governments, citing both Egypt and Israel’s questionable human rights records.
Thus far, Egypt has appeared to be a ‘trustworthy supplier’ - but Egyptian citizens
are paying the price. As part of its gas export plan, Egypt has rationed domestic
energy consumption and has reintroduced the use of mazut - a polluting fuel oil
that contains sulphites and heavy metals. A reduction in street lighting and
public
P A G E 1 3 9

spaces, the complete shutdown of lighting in all state administrative apparatuses
after hours, as well as the setting of a minimum temperature of 25 degrees
Celsius for cooling systems in shopping centres came into effect in August.
The second strategy of the gas export plan is the replacement of domestic gas
with mazut. Mazut was on its way to being phased out due to its harmful health
and environmental impacts. However, in October, Mazut consumption in Egypt
reached 20.95%, up from 11.46% in June. Climate organisations have
condemned the partial return to Mazut in power plants and have labelled it a set
back to the important progress that was being pursued in Egypt’s energy
sustainability.
Whilst Cairo is making the most of the volatile energy market, positioning itself
as one of the major exporting benefactors in the region, the domestic longevity
of its energy policy may provide future problems.
As Africa’s largest natural gas exporter, Algeria stands among the most capable
of taking advantage of the EU’s energy diversification mission. In 2021, Algeria
was Europe’s third largest gas supplier, providing 11% of its gas needs, trailing
Russia and Norway. Italy and Spain received 65% of Algeria’s total gas exports.
Algeria’s appeal also derives from the fact it has direct undersea gas pipelines to
Spain and Italy and an LNG terminal. The country can also export via ship which
many believe may be the best method through which to increase LNG exports.
P A G E 1 4 0

As an exporter with substantial reserves and most of the required infrastructure,
high gas prices are likely to protect Alegria from the economic impact of Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine. Estimates find that Algeria is expected to earn an additional
$15 billion USD from energy exports this year alone.
Outright optimism regarding Algeria’s capacity as a dominant exporter has been
cautioned against by those who cite Algeria’s tendency to use gas as a ‘political
weapon.’ In the past, Algeria has cancelled gas contracts with Spain over its
support for Western Saharan autonomy. Furthermore, in 2021, due to escalating
tension with Morocco, the Maghreb-Europe pipeline which connected the two
states to Spanish and Portuguese gas grids was closed.
This did not stop the Italian oil and gas company, ENI, from finalising a deal with
the Algerian state-owned Sonatrach in July. Overseen by former Italian Prime
Minister Mario Draghi, Algeria will export an extra 9 billion cubic metres of gas
by 2023 via the Transmed pipeline. The deal makes Algeria Italy’s primary gas
supplier.
Much like Egypt and Qatar, Algeria looks promising and is projected to benefit
immensely in comparison to its North African neighbours. But the successful
expansion of Algerian gas production, particularly considering increasing
domestic demand, is something that must be monitored closely.
As Qatar, Iran, Egypt and Algeria vie for prominence in the energy market, it is
indisputable that none of these states can provide the quick fix that Europe is
looking for. Due to years of dependency on Russia and the subsequent disregard
of MENA exporters, infrastructure and funding issues have tainted attempts to
replace Russian gas in the short term.
P A G E 1 4 1

PHOTO: PATRICK BAZ / AFP
LEBANON IN CRISIS
Abby Wellington
Labelled a “deliberate depression” by the World Bank, the situation in Lebanon
continues to progress from bad to worse. In July earlier this year, the nation was
redefined as a lower-middle income country, a condemning fall from its upper
middle-income status. The reclassification is emblematic of the reality for
Lebanon, a nation in the midst of one of the three worst economic collapses in
the past two centuries. What’s worse? It was all avoidable.
P A G E 1 4 2

T H E S I T U A T I O N
Where there was once a bustling middle class population, the UN now estimates that 80%
of Lebanon is living at or below the poverty line. At the same time, their currency, the Lira,
has lost 95% of its value since 2019, greatly reducing purchasing power while fuelling
hyperinflation. The World Food Programme estimates that food prices have increased by
550% leaving 46% of the nation facing food insecurity. Following a period of capital flight
during the onset of the crisis in 2019, banks placed strict limits on what people could
withdraw. Many are now barred from withdrawing their deposits due to banks facing
bankruptcy.
Lebanese citizens can expect to queue for hours to buy only small amounts of food. Some
are sleeping overnight just to put fuel in their car. Blackouts have become a regular
occurrence, often lasting days. Medical supplies are hard to come by and mostly
unaffordable. Just a few months ago, Bassam Al Sheikh Hussein broke into his local bank
branch with a machine gun threatening to set himself on fire. His father had fallen sick and
he needed to access his savings account holding $210,000 to afford the treatment. The
bank refused to allow him to withdraw. Eventually, after hours of holding up the bank, they
agreed to allow him to withdraw $35,000 (of his own money) and stated they would
facilitate $400 daily withdrawals. The latter they have failed to provide.
H O W D I D S U C H A D I R E S I T U A T I O N
O C C U R ?
W H Y I S I T “ D E L I B E R A T E ” ?
Although the crisis began in 2019, the root of the tragedy can be traced back to the
end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. Under the Taif Agreement, the end of the war
saw the government split evenly between Christians and Muslims. Under these
conditions, the President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni
Muslim, and the House Speaker a Shia Muslim. Despite the Taif Accords intending this
structure to only be temporary, with a more democratic government as the aim, this
structure still has not changed. What has resulted from it is a dysfunctional sectarian
government that rules a patronage-based system.
Immediately after the war, the government embarked on a major spending spree
aimed at rebuilding infrastructure destroyed by the civil war. Most of this however
was funded through internal loans and supported by a huge trade deficit. A trade
deficit fuelled by imports made possible by the pegging of the Lira against the US
dollar. Investments were also enticed through the lowering of internal tax rates.
Although the scheme was successful and much of the nation was rebuilt it was at the
cost of the development of extensive debt. In 2019, debt was 170% of GDP. In 2021
their debt was estimated to be 183% of GDP, the 4th highest ratio in the world.
Naturally, such a high level of debt left the nation extremely vulnerable to even just a
slight sneeze in global trade.
P A G E 1 4 3

The first hit came from the Global Financial Crisis. As prices ballooned, Lebanon’s debt
skyrocketed. Then came the war in Syria in 2011. Despite productive GDP growth in
previous years, it fell to less than 1% in the year following the war. Since 2014, growth has
stagnated to below 2% annually. At the same time, the war produced an enormous refugee
crisis. The UN and World Bank estimated that 35% of Lebanon’s population in 2014 were
refugees fleeing from Syria. For a nation with already high debt and slowing growth, this
placed immense strain on the financial system.
In 2019 the currency collapsed, and the crisis officially began. Currency hoarding, capital
flight, and bank runs fuelled hyperinflation and exacerbated the issue. Things went from
bad to worse. In 2020, COVID arrived. Prices increased even more while incomes fell. Many
could not afford medical supplies while those on ventilators feared power outages. The
same year, the Beirut Port exploded, destroying the majority of the nation’s grain reserves.
They became heavily reliant on wheat imports from Ukraine. Of course, Ukraine is now
embroiled in war with Russia.
Nonetheless, it was a problem that could have been avoided. The key reason Lebanon
allowed the piling of debt and the long-term pegging of the currency was because it suited a
highly corrupt system. Many of those in government awarded valuable contracts to
companies they often owned themselves. The low tax rates and currency also allowed them
to import and invest their profits overseas. All the while, the middle class was paying for a
system that did not serve them.
I S I T T O O L A T E F O R L E B A N O N ?
Time is truly ticking for Lebanon. Both the IMF and World Bank have asserted that they
will support Lebanon in its recovery and provide significant financial aid. However, this
is only on the condition that the nation conducts a complete audit of its financial and
banking sector, reforms the electricity sector, decreases public spending, improves tax
collection and floats the currency. It is no surprise however that parliament has not
passed any law dealing with the given recommendations. To do so would require
respective sections to relinquish power and their ability to finance their own projects.
This is compounded by the very structure of the government. With such a divided
religious parliament, it is difficult to get anything through.
Their dysfunction runs so deep that aid already provided by the World Bank in January
2021 is yet to be distributed. The citizens of Lebanon and the wider world no longer
have any trust in the government or the financial system. Hopefully, the reforms can be
established before the already dire situation gets worse.
P A G E 1 4 4

IRAQ'S POLITICAL
DORMANCY
Sameera Pillai
For over a year, Iraq had been in a state of political limbo. In October 2022, the
Middle Eastern country broke its year-long political deadlock after the nation’s
legislators finally voted for a new president.
Abdul Latif Rashid, a Shiite politician, won the election earlier this year,
effectively ending the year-long impasse. This political deadlock had been
regarded as the longest government formation process in Iraq.
P A G E 1 4 5
PHOTO: MEI

W H A T W E R E T H E C I R C U M S T A N C E S T H A T L E D T O
S U C H P O L I T I C A L I N E R T I A I N T H E C O U N T R Y ?
Fuelled largely by the Iraqi leaders’ inability to form a coalition government, this crisis
has brought considerable attention to the power struggle between certain factions in the
country. Iraq’s status as the OPEC’s second-largest oil producer intensifies the power
rivalry between these factions.
At the heart of last year’s political crisis was Moqtada al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric whose party
won the most number of votes in the country’s October 2021 election. Although his party
won the largest share of seats, they failed to secure a majority. In other words, the
results were inconclusive, and the elections did not deliver a majority government.
On the other hand, the Sadrist Movement, led by al-Sadr, promotes an anti-Western and
nationalist ideology. Its rival bloc, the Coordination Framework, comprises other Shiite
parties including the Al-Fatah alliance and State of Law Coalition. Nouri al-Maliki, a longtime
rival of al-Sadr, is the most influential member of the pro-Iran Coordination
Framework.
In last year’s election, the infighting between these rival political groups prevented the
formation of government in the conflict-ridden country. The factions failed to reach an
agreement on the composition of the government. The Shiite scholar al-Sadr refused to
negotiate with the Coordination Framework to form a government. Since then, the
country has witnessed turmoil, and citizens have had to deal with the consequences of
this protracted political instability.
V I O L E N C E I N I R A Q ’ S G R E E N Z O N E
Frustrated with the deadlock, months after winning the largest share of seats in
the 2021 election, al-Sadr announced his exit from politics. He withdrew his
lawmakers, triggering violent protests in Baghdad.
P A G E 1 4 6
In August 2022, his loyal supporters, who were until that point staging a sit-in in
Baghdad’s Green Zone, stormed cabinet headquarters and fired grenades in the
Zone. This sparked violent clashes with the security forces and reports stated
that nearly 300 people were left injured, with the death toll rising to 22 Iraqis.
The Zone hosts multiple government buildings and foreign embassies. Many
countries were forced to act in response to these violent clashes and protests.

The Netherlands had to evacuate its embassy from this International Zone, and officials
from Kuwait advised Kuwaiti citizens residing in Iraq to leave the country amid the
unrest. For a brief period, its neighbouring country Iran closed its borders and halted
flights to Iraq.
Al-Sadr’s armed militia, Saraya al-Salam, also stormed the headquarters of their rival
Iran-backed groups. Following this bloodshed, al-Sadr condemned the protest, and
urged his Sadrist loyalists to call off the protests and to disperse from the Green Zone.
Along with the exit from politics, al-Sadr also announced the closure of other Sadrist
institutions barring some religious sites.
Moreover, the Sadrist Movement has refused to join the new Iraqi government. But,
given al-Sadr’s history of announcing withdrawal from politics only to re-enter later,
many expect him to make a comeback.
Al-Sadr, who portrays himself as an Iraqi nationalist, is backed by a legion of faithful
advocates who support his ideologies. The dominant role he has played in the history of
the country cannot be understated, and his influence among Iraqis is unlikely to end.
T H E P O L I T I C A L S Y S T E M A N D
F O R M A T I O N O F G O V E R N M E N T I N 2 0 2 2
Iraq’s political system is designed such that power is shared among each sect or
ethno-religious group of the country. According to this Muhasasa system, the
position of president is reserved for the Kurds, the position of prime minister for
Shia Muslims, and that of speaker of the parliament for Sunni Muslims.
After a two-round vote in October 2022, the Iraqi parliament elected Abdul Latif
Rashid as the new president after he secured more votes than the incumbent
President Barham Saleh.
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The newly elected Kurdish President then named Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as
Prime Minister. Al-Sudani – a nominee of Coordination Framework – will lead
the newly formed government. He has proposed to combat corruption, address
poverty and accelerate economic reforms. With the backing of many dominant
Shia parties and the Coordination Framework, the al-Sudani-led government can
achieve substantial results if it is able to accommodate the interest of all actors
in the process.

T H E C H A L L E N G E O F
D E M O C R A T I S A T I O N
The recent formation of a government has provided temporary
relief to the nation, but the widening gap between the people of
Iraq and the political elites remains a pressing issue. The low turnout
of voters in the October 2021 elections reflects the citizen’s
growing dissatisfaction with the broken political system. Iraqis have
lost faith in the system, with many denouncing the power-hungry
elite.
The citizens have borne the brunt of the political paralysis in the
country as it hampered much-needed economic reforms and
growth. In the past year, the absence of government and lack of
budget stymied the progress of necessary infrastructure projects
leaving citizens with a fragile healthcare and education system.
With the new grand coalition government of the Coordination
Framework, Kurdish parties and Sunni parties, can citizens expect a
meaningful change? The government still remains unstable and it
will need to make great efforts to promote democracy, and
ultimately, to achieve social and political harmony in the country.
P A G E 1 4 8

PHOTO: THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
ISRAEL ELECTION
What does right-wing Netanyahu’s win mean for Israel’s future
stability ?
Benjamin Edmunds
The triumphant comeback of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the
top political seat in Israel signals one of the most right-leaning governments in
history.
Netanyahu, Israel's longest-serving Prime Minister, is a steadfast right-wing
politician who has historically run on his promise to guarantee the Israeli
people's safety - securing Israeli people from threats to their cultural and
religious identity.
The Likud party, which Netanyahu leads, successfully garnered the support of
several minority political parties in Israel, ultimately resulting in a tightly
contested victory.
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A C O N T R O V E R S I A L R I G H T - W I N G V I C T O R Y
The victory comes at a controversial
time for Netanyahu. Although
Netanyahu has undertaken
celebrations as the newly appointed
Prime Minister, he has recently been
charged with bribery, fraud and
breach of trust, all of which he
refutes.
Additionally, support for Netanyahu’s
new government from the Religious
Zionism party and its primary
candidate Itamar Ben-Gvir has
generated significant concern from
Western analysts who speculate Israel
could be heading toward its most
extremist government to date.
Ben-Gvir is positioned to become
Israel's Minister for National Security,
traditionally held by those committed
to public safety and the rule of law.
However, in 2007, Ben-Gvir was
convicted of incitement to racism as
well as his support of a terrorist
organisation. This support is
evidenced by his devotion to the
former leader of the Katch party, Meir
Kahane, whose party was deemed a
terrorist organisation by the United
States. Ben-Gvir's history and public
views on Palestinians lead one to
believe that a shift towards a more
nationalistic Israel is inevitable.
Further, the Religious Zionist success
can be attributed to Israeli youth
becoming increasingly right-wing. The
Israeli Democracy Index 2018
highlights that roughly 64% of Jewish
Israelis aged 18-34 identify as rightwing.
This statistic contrasts with the
47% of Israelis aged 35 and over that
identify as the same.
The recent threats by Hamas, a
movement governing over two million
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, may
have further exacerbated right-wing
tendencies. The attempted evictions
of Palestinian people in 2021,
amongst other acts in Jerusalem,
sparked violent actions by Hamas,
potentially prompting increasing fears
among Israel's impressionable youth.
Furthermore, voters see the unity
government formed by right-wing
politician Naftali Bennett as a betrayal
of Israeli sovereignty.
The desire for right-wing policies
amongst Israeli youth was so strong
that Netanyahu came out on top
despite battling bribery, fraud and
breach of trust charges.
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A T W H A T C O S T ?
Yair Lapid, a centre-left official
whose government had only been in
power since June 2021, was defeated
by Netanyahu. Since Netanyahu was
told to step down from duties as
Prime Minister, the acting Prime
Minister, Lapid, showed similar
political temperament and policy
priorities to the United States and its
president, Joe Biden.
Lapid facilitated the "Change
Coalition", which many have argued
is the most ethnically and
ideologically diverse Israeli party in
decades.
The United States under Biden
shared comparable policy priorities
with Lapid. One core priority was
ensuring an enduring liberal
democracy, evidenced by Lapid's
time as Foreign Minister, where he
was careful to distance Israel from
illiberal European states. Moreover,
Lapid was willing to call out the
illiberal acts in Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, despite Israel having a
significant monetary interest in
pursuing the contrary.
Lapid is on record for backing a two-
State solution with Palestine. In his
first and only address at the UN
assembly, Lapid stated that "most
Israelis supported the vision of a two-
State solution". A progressive
statement, which is likely to be only a
flicker of hope considering the recent
election's outcome.
C O N C L U S I O N
Fear is one of the greatest motivators
in people, and when fear is used to
mobilise impressionable youth, it can
make a significant impact within
society. The 2021 riots have reignited
the fear of an erosion of the Jewish
identity. The unity government
formation between right-wing and
Arab Islamists further fueled this fear.
The formation is considered a
betrayal by many traditional voters,
which far-right leaders, such as Ben-
Gvir, have used to win contested
political seats. Thus, the West will
likely have to deal with a return to the
norm when it comes to Israeli affairs.
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HUMAN INSECURITY IN TALIBAN-RULED
AFGHANISTAN: ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS &
FORCED CHILD MARRIAGES
Mariah Murray
The Taliban took control of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. With the fall
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the reinstallation of the
Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Afghans now face harsh new
realities and dire economic conditions within this humanitarian
catastrophe. The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has exacerbated the
nation’s disastrous economic and humanitarian crisis, particularly
endangering human security and rights of Afghan women and children.
BRIEF HISTORY
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In 1994, the Taliban, a Sunni Islamic
fundamentalist group, was founded.
Two years later in 1996, the Taliban
seized power in Afghanistan,
maintaining its rule until 2001 when the
U.S. launched a military campaign. The
presence of the U.S. remained until
September 2021, in which the U.S.
began its military withdrawal in
accordance with the 2019 Doha
Agreement between the U.S. and the
Taliban. However, before the U.S. fully
withdrew their troops, the Taliban
began swiftly seizing major Afghan
provinces and cities. The nation rapidly
fell to the Taliban, who quickly
announced the establishment of the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and
details of their interim government.
H e a d o f t h e T a l i b a n d e l e g a t i o n A b d u l S a l a m
H a n a f i a n d o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e d e l e g a t i o n
t a k e p a r t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a l k s o n A f g h a n i s t a n
i n M o s c o w , R u s s i a , O c t o b e r 2 0 , 2 0 2 1
P H O T O : A L E X A N D E R
Z E M L I A N I C H E N K O / R E U T E R

ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS
Afghanistan has experienced extreme economic consequences due to economic
mismanagement by the Taliban regime including sanctions applied by the
international community, and the loss of international aid. Although there were
pre-existing factors that contributed to the current crisis, the level of economic
distress that was produced as a direct result of the Taliban siege has been
recorded as the primary driver of the situation within Afghanistan.
The new leadership and their economic mismanagement has led to various
observable consequences. For instance, Afghanistan experienced a significant
loss of human capital. By the close of 2021, the UNHCR stated that 3.5 million
Afghans were internally displaced and around 2.6 million fled Afghanistan and
were hosted as refugees. A vast majority of those forcibly displaced were
reported to be women and children. Additionally, there was a significant loss of
skills and productivity due to the removal of women from the national economy.
The Taliban has heavily reduced and continues to severely regulate women’s
participation in the public and private sectors.
Further economic hardships can be felt by individual households across the
nation, with rising food and fuel prices, as well as other impacts stemming from
international sanctions and the termination of international aid. With great
increases in unemployment, increased food prices, and decreases in household
incomes, it has become difficult for families to afford and have access to basic
goods. The humanitarian crisis within Afghanistan is so distressing that the
International Rescue Committee has stated that it “could kill far more Afghans
than the past 20 years of war.” The majority of the nation is experiencing
insufficient food consumption and therefore has had to make difficult decisions
in order to survive. With a spike in economic hardships and diminished access to
social services and healthcare, among other factors, women and children are
two of the most threatened and impacted by this humanitarian crisis.
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS
Although child marriages have been a historical tradition within rural regions of
Afghanistan, the Taliban and their views on women’s rights, education, and
forced marriages are vastly different than those displayed and enforced by the
previous government. The Taliban acknowledges a different policy, allowing any
female who has reached the age of puberty to be legally married. It has been
recorded that the number of forced child marriages are rising dramatically
under the Taliban regime. This can be attributed directly to the dire economic
conditions within the nation. Families are becoming increasingly desperate and
turning to child marriages to assist their financial situations and chances of
survival. Rangita De Silva de Alwis, a lawyer and women's rights expert,
expresses that there is a “financial aspect, where girls have become commodities
and are used as barter by families in an environment where economic security is
at peril.” Babies as young as a few days to a month old, and even sometimes
“before the child is born,” have their destinies “already decided” for them,
offered and sold into child marriages.
UNICEF expresses that children who
are forced into underage marriages
are exposed to various risks, such as
domestic violence, sexual abuse, poor
mental health, reduced education
retention, complications with
childbirth and risks of maternal
mortality. It is also acknowledged that
such young girls will have to “face a
future they are not physically,
emotionally and psychologically ready
for, which has a devastating impact
on their health and mental wellbeing.”
De Silva de Alwis further states that
though child marriages are a product
of economic circumstances, there is
also now a current “fear of violence
against girls, and girls are being
forced into marriage by their families
as a way of protecting a girl and a way
of saving a family’s so-called honor.”
P A G E 1 5 4
P h o t o o f G h u l a m H a i d e r , 1 1 , w h o i s t o b e m a r r i e d t o F a i z
M o h a m m e d , 4 0 . S h e h a d h o p e d t o b e a t e a c h e r b u t w a s f o r c e d
t o q u i t h e r c l a s s e s w h e n s h e b e c a m e e n g a g e d .
P H O T O : S T E P H A N I E S I N C L A I R / T H E N E W Y O R K T I M E S

Families have been selling their
daughters into early marriages in
attempts to have them receive
routine meals and a secure future. If
women and girl’s access to
education continues to be restricted
by the Taliban, the current
humanitarian crisis will continue to
decline. Restricting women's rights
and access to education, as well as
their inclusion within the national
economy, will continue to
exacerbate the economic crisis and
simultaneously infringe Afghan
women and children’s human rights.
Selling babies, young boys, and
primarily underage girls into forced
marriages must be challenged by
the international community.
P H O T O : V I C T O R J . B L U E / N E W Y O R K T I M E S
WHAT NEXT?
The international community must strive to understand the extent of the humanitarian
crisis within Afghanistan, as well as the specific causes and effects of forced early child
marriages. Only when this catastrophe and the environment in which it proliferates is
understood, can it then be applied to produce productive and influential solutions.
Action must be taken by the international community to support, protect, and advocate
for the rights of the world’s most vulnerable. Established policies must be revisited and
discussed through international dialogue, expressing how to better assist the Afghan
population. The United Nations must be engaged and involved in such dialogue,
especially when discussing upholding human rights, the rights of children, and the role
of international aid and humanitarian support. Action must be taken to provide
Afghanistan with crucial humanitarian aid, as well as external pressures on the Taliban to
uphold human rights, in order to save millions of Afghan lives.
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P H O T O : A L E X A Z A B A C H E O N U N S P L A S H

P H O T O : U N P H O T O L I B R A R Y
CONFLICT IN
Ferdinand Asmah
AFRICA
“Peace, dignity and equality on a healthy planet” is the core mantra of the United
Nations. The UN has promised “to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war” as established in the preamble of the UN Charter in 1945,
however, establishing peace and security in African nations appears evasive.
Conflicts coupled with humanitarian crises continue to impact the livelihoods of
vulnerable civilians, women and children.
Currently, the African continent is plagued with conflicts and insecurity
emanating from border disputes, poor leadership, corruption, struggles for
power, competition over resources, ethnocentrism, religious-motivated
insurrections, and more. Between August, 2020 and September, 2022 coup
d’états have occurred in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Congo,
Central Africa Republic, Niger, and South Sudan. As of 2022, the UN Human
Rights Commission reported almost one-third of the world’s refugee population
lives in Africa.
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In addressing peace and security, the following highlights some ongoing armed
conflicts in Africa and the basis of their eruption:

Let us take a look at the Ethiopian-Eritrean War, also
known as the Badme War, which occurred between
1998 - 2000. This war was as a result of a border
dispute between both countries after Eritrea gained
independence from Ethiopia. Lacking an amicable
solution - these nations have been impacted by the
involvement of militias, separatists and bandits -
issues which still persist today.
The war resulted from a misunderstanding among
clans, coupled with power competition in an archaic
state following dictator Siad Barre being overthrown
in 1991. With no stable government in control of the
country, warlords competed for power and control.
Between 1998-2006, there existed a number of selfacclaimed
autonomous states within Somalia.
Today the Somali government is still working to
uproot the existence of malicious sects, especially
Al-Shabab who occupy regions of Somalia. In
November this year, the capital Mogadishu
experienced two car bombing attacks that killed at
least 100 people and wounded 300. The current
state of Somalia prompts doubts peace and security
can be established in the near future.
P H O T O : A F P
P A G E 1 5 8
There is also an ongoing civil war in the CAR - with
armed conflict between the government and rebels
from Muslim group, Seleka Coalition, and Christian
group, Anti-balaka militias. The Seleka rebels
accused the government, led by President Francois
Bozize, of a broken peace agreement signed in
2007. The rebels eventually seized power prompting
Bozize to flee the country and be replaced by the

self-declared President and Seleka rebel leader,
Michel Djotodia. In protest, Anti-balaka retaliated,
leading to a religious-motivated conflict which
forced Djotodia to resign and disband the Seleka
Coalition. Despite this, members of the former
Seleka Coalition mounted counterattacks - killing
and displacing thousands of citizens. Today the
country remains embroiled in chaos and ongoing
violence.
In December 2013, following the removal of Vice
President, Riek Machar, violence erupted between
presidential soldiers from South Sudan’s two largest
ethnic groups. Soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group
aligned with President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir
Mayardit, and those from the Nuer ethnic group
supported Machar. In the midst of evolving violence,
Kiir accused Machar of attempting a coup -
prompting violence to spread to Jonglei, upper Nile,
and Unity states. During the conflict, armed groups
targeted civilians on ethnic grounds committing:
rape and sexual violence, the destruction of
property and looting of villages, and recruitment of
child soldiers. Despite a peace agreement being
signed in 2018 - the country remains highly volatile
with fears South Sudan is on the brink of further
civil war.
P H O T O : A H M E D
M U S T A F A / G E T T Y I M A G E S )
P A G E 1 5 9

History plays a vital role in a country’s identity, values and culture, as well as
dictates a State’s interaction with other States. In peace building, mutual
understanding must be the focal consideration between parties. In other words,
without mutual understanding peace talks cannot proceed. When history forms
a part of a country’s identity, culture and values, all future decision making,
foreign policy, economic and bilateral agreements becomes subjective to the
indelible marks made in the past.
In the case of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War, the Eritrean people still feel power had
been stolen from them by the Ethiopian people when King Menelik was
enthroned as Amhara King and shifted power from the traditional base in Tigray
to Amhara in 1889. Fighting has continued for decades, with multiple treaties
signed and broken, yet both countries seem unable to relinquish hostilities of
the past.
Further, African nations often rely on consulting external powers due to bilateral
agreements and existing treaties. Turkiye is a long-standing ally of Somalia.
Ankara is a longtime supporter of Mogadishu, providing humanitarian relief
during Somalia’s worst famine. Somalia has benefited greatly from its
relationship with Turkiye; from the construction of Mogadishu airport,
remodeling of hospitals, opening of the largest embassy in Africa, and as the
main destination for Turkish goods including construction materials, processed
food and other consumables. However, Turkish ground-rooting in Somalia has
been criticised as a political agenda - paving the way for interference in internal
Somali affairs. These include election processes and the provision of weapons to
Turkish-trained Special forces in Somalia who oppose separatists and militia
groups - effectively resulting in Somalia becoming indebted to Turkiye. Somalia
appears to have its lips and hands tied when it comes to decision making and
foreign policy.
This and other similar scenarios can be traced to other African countries where
conflicts are still ongoing. Corruption and poor leadership are key instigators of
the unending wars in Africa. In delivering keynote address, President Sirleaf,
former president of Liberia emphasised “the record is clear that the root causes of
civil conflicts in Africa are bad governance, lack of respect for human rights, socioeconomic
and political inequality and grinding poverty. Liberia is no different”.
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Approaching conflict resolution in Africa must use an African approach. Powerful
non-African nations cannot continue to make back-room decisions on African
issues to protect their interest in the region. Without this, solving African issues
in the African setting will remain unsuccessful. Powerful nations, including
permanent members of the UN Security Council, have interest in most ongoing
African conflicts - often due to the opportunities conflict provides in exploiting
minerals and raw materials. Making firm decisions to force peace, which falls
within their mandate, thus remains stuck in a stalemate.
The root causes of conflict and interest of warring parties must be considered
and form a part of all conflict resolution in the region. Conflicts and wars in
Africa can be resolved but without a holistic approach to address all
fundamental factors, reproach corrupt leaders, and eliminate interests of
external powers, war would continue unabatedly in Africa.
P H O T O : D W
P A G E 1 6 1

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PHOTO: CHINA MERCHANTS GROUP / GETTY IMAGES

“China in Africa” has been a highly contentious debate in Western policy circles
over the past years. But Beijing has long played a leading role on the continent,
stretching back decades and into the complex web of Cold War geopolitics. While
much of the focus has been on China’s investment in infrastructure, so-called
“debt trap diplomacy”, and political interference, there has been less attention
on China’s soft power and influence on Africa’s media landscape.
COLD WAR POLITICS
From the pivotal 1955 Bandung Conference onward, China has shown its
willingness to engage with Africa when other nations have not.
Its early involvement on the continent took a two-pronged approach. The first
sought to limit the recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan as the
legitimate representative of China internationally, and the second was to counter
both Western and Soviet influence in Africa.
In the 1960s, China built the TAZARA Railway, connecting newly independent and
landlocked Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The railway
provided a much needed connection for Zambia to take part in international
trade while providing China with a boost in its image and influence in Africa.
From the perspective of developing nations and those emerging from
colonialism, China was seen as a partner when the West was disinterested and
disengaged.
China’s interest in Africa increased further following Beijing’s brutal crackdown in
the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, which abruptly ended its honeymoon
relationship with the West and the Western panglossian hope of China’s
eventual democratisation. Isolated, Beijing re-doubled its engagement on the
continent and found support from African nations in international organisations
and multilateral forums.
CHINA IN AFRICA'S DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION
P A G E 1 6 3
This engagement has carried on into the 21st century, with China pouring
billions into developing Africa’s resources industry, public infrastructure, and
importantly, its digital sphere.

In 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping introduced the “10,000 Villages Project”, an
ambitious vision to bring digital television to impoverished regions of Africa to
tackle the burgeoning digital divide between urban and rural regions of Africa by
upgrading telecommunications infrastructure and providing discounted or free
TV to low-income communities by StarTimes. Previously, television access was a
reserved privilege of the wealthy, and even so, was unreliably connected by
satellite with analogue reception.
With China’s well-established reputation on the continent, the 10,000 Villages
Project further cast a philanthropic light on the People’s Republic’s activities in
Africa. The project provided more than just positive reception; it crucially gave
China an inroad in Africa’s communication infrastructure and media landscape.
STARTIMES: FROM BEIJING TO 30 AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Under Jiang Zemin, China’s leader from 1989 to 2002, the “Go Out Policy”
encouraged Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Africa and forge stronger ties
with nations on the continent. This saw Pang Xinxing take his then fledgling
telecommunications company StarTimes away from the saturated Chinese
market and into Africa in 2002. He saw a demand for low-cost TV, and today,
StarTimes still provides one of the world’s most affordable digital TV packages
for as little as US$4.00 per month.
StarTimes penetration of the African market coincided with the United Nations’
2006 push for Africa to switch from snow analogue signals to digital TV by 2015,
a goal difficult to achieve for most African nations, thus pivotally providing
StarTimes an opportunity to lend its expertise and capability to expand its
operations.
The Beijing-headquartered company currently carries hundreds of African
stations, as well as providing Chinese and international channels. The cheapest
package offered bundles together Chinese and African channels, including CGTN,
China’s state-owned English news broadcaster established as part of Xi Jinping’s
soft power push to “tell the China story well”.
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Concerningly, telling the China story well often translates to relaying the news
with a pro-China tint to such an extent that the United States has demanded
CGTN be registered as a foreign agent under domestic anti-propaganda
legislation, the United Kingdom has banned the broadcaster, and France is
mulling withdrawing the channel’s broadcasting licence.
Access to BBC, DW, or Al Jazeera often costs more and is beyond the financial
means of most viewers. More expensive packages afford viewership to soap
operas and international channels, including Chinese dramas. Although Chinese
dramas are not overtly political, they are mindfully curated to portray the
People’s Republic as a modernised and urban country.
STARTIMES REACH INTO AFRICA
Chinese programming offered by StarTimes has become so popular that African
broadcasters have raised concerns that the company is edging out local
companies out of the media market. In 2018, the Ghana Independent
Broadcasters Association apprised that “if StarTimes is allowed to control
Ghana’s digital transmission infrastructure and satellite space … Ghana would
have virtually submitted its broadcast space to Chinese control and content.”
From its entrance, StarTimes was able to undercut its competitors by offering
more channels than previous market leaders for half the price, relegating the
likes of MultiChoice from South Africa to Anglophone Africa and Canal+ to
Francophone Africa to second place. With the backbone of African digital
television propped up by StarTimes, the company has control and influence over
what is seen and what is not on African TV by millions, potentially affecting the
worldview and political opinion of millions.
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In Tanzania and Kenya, StarTimes has partnered with state broadcasters to
upgrade the countries’ analogue technology to digital networks. The company
holds such an important position that some observers, such as Dani Madrid-
Morales from the University of Houston, have commented that “if StarTimes
pulled out of some countries…the country’s TV stations would stop working.
Essentially, StarTimes has the power to black out some countries’ TV networks, if
it wants.”
In Zambia, StarTimes has likewise collaborated with Zambia’s state broadcaster
ZNBC to create a joint venture called TopStar. Under this agreement, StarTimes
holds a 60% share in ZNBC for 25 years, drawing accusations that the company
has effectively taken control of Zambia’s television network. Further, China’s
state-owned Export-Import Bank provided the loan for the US$271 million
needed for the Zambian government to seal the joint venture contract – a prime
example of how Beijing benefits while StarTimes profits.
Building its operations and total reach off the back of the 10,000 Villages Project,
StarTimes as the sole provider of television through the initiative has significant
control over the content broadcasted on its network.
A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP
Although StarTimes is officially a private corporation, it is the only private
enterprise with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce authorisation to operate in
foreign countries radio and television industries. It has also been designated as a
“key national cultural export company”, and many of its projects in Africa,
including those part of the 10,000 Villages, have been noted to be “key national
cultural export projects”, indicating state subsidies.
The current scenario where a private corporation with a close relationship with
Beijing has such a high level of leverage and control over many African nations’
television networks naturally draws concern. Haggai Kanenga at the University of
Zambia echoes this concern: the “loan shows the money for this project is
coming from the Chinese government itself, so these two – StarTimes and the
Chinese government – cannot be separated. In Zambia, they are widely viewed
as one.”
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Indeed, StarTimes and the Chinese government act in uniformity. Under the
10,000 Villages Project, in many villages where StarTimes connects digital
television, a mural is painted with the flags of the host nation and China side by
side.
In the same light, Beijing and StarTimes enjoy mutually beneficial relations, with
StarTimes paid by the host nation and China to further the 10,000 Villages
Project while gaining more customers and market reach. Simultaneously, the
Chinese government increases the viewership and audience of its pro-Beijing
messaging, spreading it deeper into households across Africa.
INFLUENCE AND IMPACT
StarTimes’ reach into Africa’s media landscape has allowed the Chinese
government to advance its agenda in the continent whilst the company profits
off the monopoly over the market. This powerful corporation with shrouded
links to Beijing has come to dominate the flow of information on the African
continent, providing China with a digital highway to influence public opinion in
Africa and the potential to affect democracy, sovereignty, and security.
Sarah Cook from Freedom House aptly summarises, “the real brilliance of it is
not just trying to control all content – it’s the element of trying to control the key
nodes in the information … It might not be necessarily clear as a threat now, but
once you’ve got control over the nodes of information you can use them as you
want,” and how China and StarTimes wish to use these nodes is anyone’s guess.
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PHOTO: THE ECONOMIST/GETTY IMAGES
How the legacy of colonialism
impacts LGBTQ+ rights in Sub-
Saharan Africa
Ezekiel Dobelsky
Of the 69 countries where same-sex
relationships are considered a crime, just
under half are found in Africa. In four
countries, it is punishable by death, and jail
terms can last over a decade in six more.
Even in countries which are generally
considered respectful of human rights,
such as Ghana, members of the LGBTQ+
community face criminalisation for their
relationships.
The rhetoric against homosexuality in
Africa is among the most vociferous in the
world, and the dehumanisation of gay
African people by their own leaders is not
unusual. The stigma surrounding
homosexual relations has massive health
consequences, and thousands of gay
African men die annually due to difficulties
accessing HIV testing and medicine.
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A 2016 Afrobarometer survey indicates
that whilst African people are, in general,
more tolerant of differing ethnicities and
religious beliefs, this tolerance does not
exist for homosexual behaviour. Some
commentators have labelled Africa the
‘most homophobic continent’, but this risks
ignoring the colonial origins of these
attitudes.
Why is Africa so homophobic?
The prevalence of
homophobia in Africa
traces its roots to the
colonial practices of the
19th and 20th centuries.
Colonisation enforced the
notion that homosexual
behaviour was immoral,
with European empires
implementing
homophobic legislation
and criminal codes
throughout their
colonies. European
colonies enacted
‘sodomy’ laws that sought
to punish ‘immoral’
sexual behaviour.
Prior to colonisation, homosexual
relationships were more widely accepted,
although there were regions where it was
still outlawed (such as those with a strong
religious presence).
Religious identity is another source of
homophobia. The major religions in Africa,
Christianity and Islam, typically have strong
doctrinal anti-gay stances.
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There is discussion of a breakaway in the
United Methodist Church, with many
African church bodies willing to join a split
with the central, global body over
tolerance to same-sex marriage. The
Christian Association of Nigeria has
threatened any church that tolerates
same-sex relationship with sanctions.
States that implement Sharia law (an
interpretation of Islamic religious law),
such as Somalia and Sudan, also use that
as justification for homophobic legislation.
P H O T O : C N N
Homosexual relations are
also
frequently
characterised as ‘un-
African’. This narrative
argues
that
homosexuality was
introduced to Sub-
Saharan Africa by either
Arabs or Europeans, and
that the promotion of gay
rights is an attempt from
former colonial masters
to maintain control over a
weak continent. Although
this claim has been
disproven, it is commonly
repeated, especially amongst populist
leaders looking to cement votes and
power.
Gay Rights as Human Rights
Conversely, safeguarding the rights of
same-sex couples has become more
prominent in the West, which has resulted
in the occasional and haphazard attempts
at protecting these rights around the
world.

The role of the US and the EU in promoting
human rights in SSA is vexed, and the
advocacy of LGBTQ+ rights is no exception.
Since 2010, Western nations have used the
threat of aid withdrawal, and rhetorical
condemnations to overturn homophobic
legal decisions.
Although no doubt a noble idea, the
effectiveness of Western attempts to
pressure and coerce homophobic African
countries to amend laws and protect gay
rights often fails to consider the colonial
overtones, especially the role of colonial
legal codes in the outlawing of homosexual
relations.
It has become increasingly common for
Western countries to promote LGBTQ+
rights in non-Western countries. In 2011,
the Obama administration announced that
the USA would promote gay rights through
diplomatic means throughout the world,
stating that ‘gay rights are human rights
and human rights are gay rights’.
These methods involved two main
practices in the African context: diplomatic
denunciation and shaming from Western
nations, and the threat or actual
withdrawal of aid.
Criticism of homophobic African legislation
is common, and can lead to diplomatic
rows: in 2019, the US ambassador to
Zambia was recalled after criticising the
jailing of a homosexual couple.
However, the threat of withdrawing aid is
presumed to be more impactful, given the
reliance of many Sub-Saharan African
states on foreign aid. In the early 2010s,
Britain and America threatened the
withdrawal of aid in response to
homophobic legislation in Malawi, Ghana
and Uganda.
However, these threats were unsuccessful
and counterproductive. In Malawi, there
was a severe backlash against members of
the LGBTQ+ community, for the perception
that they were responsible for the decline
in aid.
The colonial legacy greatly impacts the
perception of Western LGBTQ+ rights
advocacy. When homosexuality is viewed
as an inherently ‘un-African’ behaviour that
was imported from the West, Western
support for LGTBQ+ rights becomes
perceived as a threat that undermines the
creation of a strong and unified African
identity.
The perception that the West is attempting
to coerce African nations into adopting
policies that undermine Africa is especially
potent for populist leaders looking to
cement power. This was Ugandan
president Yoweri Museveni’s strategy when
Western nations cut aid in 2014. The threat
of outside political interference from
powerful Western countries can be
leveraged and used to reinforce
homophobic attitudes.
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A New Strategy
Learning from the failures of these efforts
in the early 2010s, new methods to
promote the safety and rights of the
LGBTQ+ community must be devised.
One important contribution could be from
the continued promotion of regional
charters. The African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, whilst not explicitly
recognising LGBTQ+ groups as deserving
protection, has nevertheless been used to
create safeguards. Importantly, as it is the
African Charter created by the African
Commission, the argument that it is
foreign bodies that are undermining
African culture doesn’t hold up.
Further funding and support for African
civil society and African-based NGOs, who
understand the local context and
environment, is also critical. Western
influence in these matters, which are
viewed as moral and cultural issues, are
counter-productive and serve to reinforce
the notion that gay rights is a Western
issue. Acknowledging and addressing this
legacy of colonialism will prove crucial in
overcoming it in the years ahead.
PHOTO: CBS INTERACTIVE INC.
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Isha Desai
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PHOTO: BADA YUSUF AMOO, PILOT NEWS

The African Union (AU) has suspended several countries after being affected by
subsequent coups in the last two years. The Union chose to suspend Mali, Guinea, Sudan,
and Burkina Faso from participating in all activities as an incentive for restoring a civilian
democratic rule. However, the AU has chosen to prioritise the recent suspensions instead
of underlying structural issues such as Israel’s role in the union and the Ethiopian conflict.
THE SUSPENSIONS
MALI
Mali was under a transitional
government following a coup d’état in
August 2020 when President Bah Ndaw
and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were
arrested on May 24th, 2021, by the
military, known as the National
Committee for the Salvation of the
People (CNSP). The coup was sparked by
a cabinet shuffle on May 14th, 2021,
where the military was informed by the
media that their Minister for Defence and
Minister of Security and Civil Protection
had been removed. Within an hour of the
announcement, Ndaw and Ouane were
arrested and taken to a military camp in
Kati. The AU suspended Mali on June 1st
2021, urging that the military ‘refrain
from further interference in the political
processes.’
Malian soldiers were cheered by crowds as they
reached the capital Bamako during the coup
PHOTO: BBC NEWS
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SUDAN
PHOTO: THE INDEPENDENT
Democracy in Sudan is at risk after
General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan overthrew
the transitional government in a military
coup on the 25th of October 2021. Prime
Minister Abdalla Hamdok was detained
along with other ministers over their
stance against the coup. Citizens
expressed civil resistance against the
military and Prime Minister Hamdock was
reinstated a month later before ultimately
resigning on the 2nd of January 2022 over
the conflict and fragility of the nation. The
AU suspended Sudan on the 27th of
October 2021 until the transitional
authorities were restored, a prospect that
seems unlikely in the near future.
GUINEA
On the 5th of September 2021, Colonel
Mamady Doumbouya led the overthrow of
Guinean President Alpha Condé over his
erosion of democracy and his autocratic
behaviours. Notably, President Condé
altered the Guinean Constitution to allow
him to run for a third term, a catalyst for
public outcries and the 2019-2020 Guinean
protests. Doumbouya claimed that ‘the
duty of the solider is to save the country’ as
the National Committee for Reconciliation
and Development announced that Condé’s
altered constitution had been dissolved to
allow for a more inclusive one. The AU
condemned the coup and swiftly
suspended Guinea from the union by
September 10th, 2021.
PHOTO: THE GUARDIAN
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BURKINA FASO
President Roch Kabore was overthrown in a
military coup on January 24th 2022, for lack
of action against growing Islamic and Al-
Qaeda groups in Burkina Faso. Despite
citizen-led celebrations for the removal of
their leader, Burkina Faso was suspended
from the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the African
Union (AU) on January 28th and 31st,
respectively, until constitutional order was
restored. The coup was undertaken by the
Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and
Restoration (MPSR),
led by Paul-Henry Sandaogo Damiba who
released an initial charter for the country
and declared himself the transitional
President of Burkina Faso. After the coup,
the MPSR ultimately reinstated the
constitution but nullified the clauses
contradicting the new charter.
A Soldier on the lookout in a desert area in Northern Burkina Faso.
PHOTO: MICHELE CATTANI / UN NEWS
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STABILITY IN THE REGION
The union’s future stability is at risk as it has not been able to adequately
address underlying issues within the AU due to its focus on various coups. Issues
unaddressed by the AU include Israel’s role as an observer, the ongoing conflict
in Ethiopia and their inconsistency in their standard procedures after refusing to
act on the 2021 Northern Chad offensive.
The suspensions have also had wider effects on stability in the region as
discussions on whether Israel should remain in its role as observer to the bloc
have continued to be a point of contention. AU Commission Chairperson Moussa
Faki believes that Israel’s role can be ‘an instrument of peace’ whilst the
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh encouraged the AU to remove
Israel, stating that they should ‘never be rewarded for its violation and for the
apartheid regime’ towards the Palestinian people. Ultimately, the discussions
were paused to avoid further state tensions following the series of suspensions.
The AU held its annual summit in Ethiopia this February, a decision that sparked
further controversy over the AU’s neglect of Ethiopia’s 15-month war against
fighters from the Tigray region. The nation was unsuccessful in maintaining a
seat on the Peace and Security Council and African advocacy director at Humans
Rights Watch, Carine Kaneza Nantulya, expressed that the AU should not ignore
crimes committed in Ethiopia, including those by the Federal Government.
Furthermore, the AU has been criticised for its inconsistency after failing to
suspend Chad when the Transitional Military Council (TMC) took over the
government after the President’s death. The union’s Peace and Security Council
(PSC) endorsed the military’s plan to establish civilian rule in 18 months which
ultimately contradicted its responses to other coups in African nations.
Thus, the series of coups across the continents not only eroded the strength of
the AU through the suspension of countries but also hindered their ability to
address overdue internal structural issues and to focus on other key areas in the
region.
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