Theory of Knowledge - Course Companion for Students Marija Uzunova Dang Arvin Singh Uzunov Dang
Hersh, professor of political science at TuftsEitanand author of Hacking the ElectorateUniversityidea that some additional piece of information inTheoverwhelming wave of data going into people’sthisis going to trick them … It doesn’t give peopleheadscredit.enoughNix’s exclamation at the beginningRecallthis section: “we are thrilled that ourofapproach” helped Trump win.revolutionaryNix failed to mention was how surprisedWhatteam was of the result: “[a] day earlier,hisAnalytica executives told reportersCambridgethought Trump’s likelihood of winning wasthey20 per cent” (Ahmed 2018).athimself, when interviewed on BBCKogan4 in March 2018, said that the accuracyRadiothe data he harvested had been extremelyofHe estimated that, in practice,exaggerated.and his team were six times more likely toheinaccurate information about a person’sgetand likes and dislikes as they were topersonalityaccurate information. In conclusion, Kogangetthat microtargeting was not necessarilythoughtmost effective way to use such data setstheare a few good reasons to be sceptical.Theredata harvested from social media, evenFirst,data, does not necessarily providepersonalityactionable information or insight.additionalother publicly available data points canManya person’s political stance, includingsuggestaddress. Hersh states that while personalitytheirare correlated with political values, thetraitsis generally weak; and that peoplecorrelationwrongly receive advertisements (such aswhointended for a different demographic)thosedo not like them. For example, when hereallyto create a microtargeting modelattemptedidentified people interested in climatethathe found the best proxy is simply partychange,if you don’t know that, everythingaffiliation;very difficult, and if you do, everythingisdoesn’t really matter. Hersh argues thatelseis effective is mobilizing voters throughwhattargeting, rather than persuadingbehaviouralsecond limitation is that almost allThedata is self-reported, whichpsychographicit vulnerable to individuals’ blind spotsleavesinaccurate sense of self: people who repeatandpersonality test often do not return the sameaAdditionally, their tastes and opinions—result.what they like on Facebook—may change,andthey do not often go back to unlike things,butthis sort of behavioural data needs to be fresh.soand most fundamentally, what does itFinally,to say one can “infer” political values frommeanset of personality traits? Can we assume thataif the personality data were accurate, it wouldEvenbe difficult for microtargeting to compete withstillinformation sources in the cluttered andotheronline environment. The total amountfast-movingpolitical content online is so large that it dwarfsofoutput of manipulators. A team of researchersthe2018 released results of an investigation into theinof infamous “Russian bots” on Twitter,influencelooking at their ability of spreading newsWhenand making it viral … we nd that their eectcontentIV. EthicsIV. Ethicsgave the following view.(Hersh quoted in Chen, Potenza 2018)them to vote differently.personalities align with politics?with the following conclusion.on social platforms was minor.(Zannettou et al 2018)55
IV. Ethicsa 2018 article for the New York Times,InNyhan, Professor of Public Policy atBrendanUniversity of Michigan, argues that thetheof times fake news items are likednumbershared or retweeted may seem impressiveandyou look at the complete picture of howuntilinformation is available online. In 2018,muchreported that 2.1 million election-relatedTwitterto examples from this section andReferringdiscuss the following questions.below,What are the implications of microtargeting1.political knowledge?forHow might microtargeting for political2.be different from microtargetingknowledgeWhy do observers and experts disagree3.the impact of behaviouralabout1: Wakefield, J. 2018. “CambridgeSourceCan Targeted Online Ads ReallyAnalytica:a Voter’s Behaviour?” (BBC NewsChangeonline)terms: WakefieldSearchCambridge AnalyticaBBCpowerful influence of emotionalTheis well known; however, the,advertisingthat currently exists for productregulationdoes not, as yet, cover onlinemarketingcampaigns. Chris Sumner, Researchpoliticalat the Online Privacy Foundation, hasDirectorteam simulated a campaign to testSumner’sthey could identify, target and influencewhetheron the EU referendum. For example,votersused language of fear to target“neuroticthey(Wakefield 2018) and morepersonalities”messaging for audiences that wereenergeticfound that people behaved as we“Wethey would. If you get thepredictedUS Presidential election campaign, but in2016these represented just 1% of all election-facttweets. In a separate study with otherrelatedNyhan also found that: “fake newsresearchers,was heavily concentrated among aconsumptiongroup — almost 6 in 10 visits to fake newssmallcame from the 10% of people with thewebsitesconservative online information diets”mostright they can be very powerfulmessagesMessaging works and is reallyindeed.can nudge people oneeffective—andor the other.” (Sumner quoted inway2: Cadwalladr, C. 2016. “Google,Sourceand the Truth About InternetDemocracyterms: GuardianSearchdemocracy truthGoogleCadwalladr, writing in the UK newspaperCaroleGuardian, argues that whether or notthepropaganda influenced the 2016microtargetedreferendum or the US Presidential elections,Brexitproblem remains the lack of transparency andtheabout how voters’ personal data isregulationterms: reasonSearchAnalyticaCambridgeNolan Brown argues that tooElizabethis being made of both the power andmuchof behavioural microtargeting. Peoplenoveltyworried about devious political actorshavevoters throughout the history ofinfluencingincluding political advertisements viapolitics,and robocalls when they were firsttelevisionintroduced.2tweets were posted by Russian bots during the(Guess et al 2018).Box 2.4: The impact of behavioural microtargeting in politicsWakefied 2018)that affects consumer purchase decisions?Search” (the Guardian)microtargeting in politics?targeted online adsbeing mined and used to influence them.3: Brown, E.N. 2018. “CambridgeSourceWasDoing Marketing, Not BlackAnalyticaMagic” (Reason.com)pointed out the significant issues that arise.doing marketingidentified as being motivated byanger.56
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Hersh, professor of political science at Tufts
Eitan
and author of Hacking the Electorate
University
idea that some additional piece of information in
The
overwhelming wave of data going into people’s
this
is going to trick them … It doesn’t give people
heads
credit.
enough
Nix’s exclamation at the beginning
Recall
this section: “we are thrilled that our
of
approach” helped Trump win.
revolutionary
Nix failed to mention was how surprised
What
team was of the result: “[a] day earlier,
his
Analytica executives told reporters
Cambridge
thought Trump’s likelihood of winning was
they
20 per cent” (Ahmed 2018).
at
himself, when interviewed on BBC
Kogan
4 in March 2018, said that the accuracy
Radio
the data he harvested had been extremely
of
He estimated that, in practice,
exaggerated.
and his team were six times more likely to
he
inaccurate information about a person’s
get
and likes and dislikes as they were to
personality
accurate information. In conclusion, Kogan
get
that microtargeting was not necessarily
thought
most effective way to use such data sets
the
are a few good reasons to be sceptical.
There
data harvested from social media, even
First,
data, does not necessarily provide
personality
actionable information or insight.
additional
other publicly available data points can
Many
a person’s political stance, including
suggest
address. Hersh states that while personality
their
are correlated with political values, the
traits
is generally weak; and that people
correlation
wrongly receive advertisements (such as
who
intended for a different demographic)
those
do not like them. For example, when he
really
to create a microtargeting model
attempted
identified people interested in climate
that
he found the best proxy is simply party
change,
if you don’t know that, everything
affiliation;
very difficult, and if you do, everything
is
doesn’t really matter. Hersh argues that
else
is effective is mobilizing voters through
what
targeting, rather than persuading
behavioural
second limitation is that almost all
The
data is self-reported, which
psychographic
it vulnerable to individuals’ blind spots
leaves
inaccurate sense of self: people who repeat
and
personality test often do not return the same
a
Additionally, their tastes and opinions—
result.
what they like on Facebook—may change,
and
they do not often go back to unlike things,
but
this sort of behavioural data needs to be fresh.
so
and most fundamentally, what does it
Finally,
to say one can “infer” political values from
mean
set of personality traits? Can we assume that
a
if the personality data were accurate, it would
Even
be difficult for microtargeting to compete with
still
information sources in the cluttered and
other
online environment. The total amount
fast-moving
political content online is so large that it dwarfs
of
output of manipulators. A team of researchers
the
2018 released results of an investigation into the
in
of infamous “Russian bots” on Twitter,
influence
looking at their ability of spreading news
When
and making it viral … we nd that their eect
content
IV. Ethics
IV. Ethics
gave the following view.
(Hersh quoted in Chen, Potenza 2018)
them to vote differently.
personalities align with politics?
with the following conclusion.
on social platforms was minor.
(Zannettou et al 2018)
55