Theory of Knowledge - Course Companion for Students Marija Uzunova Dang Arvin Singh Uzunov Dang
of these profiles contained thousands ofeachpoints. SCL marketing material claimeddatathey had developed sophisticated analyticalthatin order to use these huge data sets to swaytoolsWigmore, the communications directorAndyLeave.eu—one of the two major campaignofsupporting the UK’s withdrawal from thegroupsUnion (EU)—has said that CambridgeEuropeanassisted his group because of theAnalyticainterests of their investors. The Leave.sharedcampaign used social media data and AIeutarget voters with highly individualizedtoof differentadvertisements—“thousandsof advertisements”—depending on theirversionsaccording to Cadallawar (2017).personalities,Banks, founder of the organization Leave.Arronwould later state that Cambridge Analytica’seu,AI won the referendum for thoseworld-classLuntz, American pollster, reacting after theFrankUS Presidential election results commented2016one saw it coming. The public polls, the experts,Nothe pundits: just about everybody got it wrong.andwere wrong-footed because they didn’tTheywho was going to turn out and vote.understandfor Cambridge Analytica … They gured outExceptto win. There are no longer any experts excepthowobservers have since cast doubt on suchSeveralas overstating Cambridge Analytica’sclaimsand influence. But how did Cambridgesuccessobtain all its data? For the USAnalyticaa sizeable amount came via Aleksandrmarket,an assistant professor formerly at theKogan,Psychometric Centre. He developedCambridgeapp called This Is Your Digital Life thatanpsychometric quizzes to Facebookprovidedin exchange for their results and data, andusersdata of their friends. In the summer of 2014,the200,000 people used his app, providingover30 million user records for CambridgeoverAnalytica.an interview on BBC Radio 4 in MarchInKogan said that he had been used as2018,scapegoat, maintaining that Cambridgeahad approached him, written theAnalyticaof service for the app and told him his usetermsFacebook data was legal and appropriate. Heofled to believe that thousands, if not tens ofwasof apps were exploiting their users’thousands,in the same way. He also claimed he haddataprofited from this collaboration personallynotthat the money he received was mostlyandto pay the participants—each participantusedgenerally, Kogan raised concernsMorethe social networking business model.aboutAnalytica had allegedly usedCambridgeFacebook data for micro-targeting, butpeople’swere other platforms and social networkssoTwitter and Instagram, whose profitslikederive from advertising. When someonemostlyan account, they essentially sign ancreatesto be sold to advertisers for microtargetingagreementin exchange for access to a desirablethat costs large amounts of time,productand money to run.expertisethe effectiveness of its political microtargeting,aboutclaims that fuelled a hysteria followingscandal that people were being manipulatedthevote for the “wrong” outcomes in a post-truthtoIV. EthicsIV. Ethicsvoting patterns (Mayer 2017).being paid between $3 and $4.wishing to leave the EU (Cadwalladr 2017).as follows.UsersUnited States70.6 millions1.2PhilippinesIndonesia1.1Cambridge Analytica.1.1United Kingdom0.79(Luntz quoted in Wood 2016)Mexico0.62CanadaIndia0.560.44BrazilVietnam0.43Australia0.31Figure 2.4Where Cambridge Analytica improperly accessedFacebook user data, according to www.theatlas.comCambridge Analytica made extravagant claims53
IV. Ethicsenabled by technology. ProsecutingenvironmentAnalytica, or its campaign clients,Cambridgecomplicated because the nature of theirwasmeant only the people being targetedmediumimproved Cambridge Analytica’s messagingAIIf an advertisement does not getiteratively.on, it is automatically tweaked basedclickedthe personality profile and served again; ifonis clicked on, the person is shown more suchitHow much did this influence politicalcontent.Without controlled experiments it isoutcomes?to know.hardAlbright, assistant professor and dataJonathanElon University, believes the influencescientist,is a propaganda machine. It’s targeting peopleThisto recruit them to an idea. It’s a level ofindividuallyengineering that I’ve never seen before. They’resocialpeople and then keeping them on ancapturingAnalytica’s data allowed campaignersCambridgeoptimize candidates’ campaign movements.toAnalytica claimed that they saw smallCambridgebased on engagement with people’sopenings,posts, in Michigan, Pennsylvania andFacebook—known as the “blue wall”, becauseWisconsinare traditionally democratic states—andtheyTrump scheduled events there. The Clintonsomocked him at the time, but apparentlyanalystswas the small margins in Michigan,“itand Wisconsin that won Trump thePennsylvania(Anderson, Horvath 2017).election”October 2016, Nix made the followingInstatement.in the United States we have somewhereTodayto four or ve thousand data points on everycloseSo we model the personality of everyindividual…across the United States, some 230 millionadulthas been used for centuries,Propagandaonline networks may have increased thebutand efficacy of political persuasion.precisionbeginning of this chapter explored howTheemotions and fake news spread quicklyintensesocial networks. SCL (parent companythroughCambridge Analytica) described itself as “theofelection management agency”, usingpremiersuch as “psychological warfare” andwordsoperations” (Weinberger 2005). SCL“influenceto have influenced elections and otherclaimedoutcomes in Italy, Latvia, Ukraine,politicalAfghanistan, Romania, South Africa,Albania,Kenya, Mauritius, India, Indonesia,Nigeria,Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Colombia,theSt Vincent and the Grenadines, StAntigua,and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago. AnKittsfor Politico stated that SCL used “militaryarticlecampaigns to social mediadisinformationand voter targeting” (Vogel, Parti 2015).brandingis also alleged to have operated extensivelySCLdeveloping countries to manipulate publicinand claimed to be able to instigateopinionIt certainly sounds like something fromcoups.James Bond or Mission Impossible filmstheit did not help that SCL and Cambridgeandwere backed by a reclusive hedge fundAnalyticacalled Robert Mercer.billionairePotter, President of Campaign Legal Center,Trevornon-profit organization that works to reduceainfluence of money in politics and to supporttheaccess to voting, reacted as follows.unrestricteda random billionaire can change politicsSuddenly,public policy—to sweep everything else oandtable—even if they don’t speak publicly, andtheif there’s almost no public awareness of his orevenmany observers, including politicalHowever,academic experts, have voiced scepticismandthese claims. It is a big leap to go fromaboutpersonalities to influencing votingunderstandingCould behavioural microtargetingdecisions.be powerful enough to sway elections andreallyThere is some evidence to suggestreferendums?its influence has been grossly exaggerated.that2on social media could see them.is substantial.emotional leash and never letting them go.(Albright quoted in Cadwalladr 2016)herviews.(Potter quoted in Mayer 2017)people.(Nix 2016)54
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IV. Ethics
enabled by technology. Prosecuting
environment
Analytica, or its campaign clients,
Cambridge
complicated because the nature of their
was
meant only the people being targeted
medium
improved Cambridge Analytica’s messaging
AI
If an advertisement does not get
iteratively.
on, it is automatically tweaked based
clicked
the personality profile and served again; if
on
is clicked on, the person is shown more such
it
How much did this influence political
content.
Without controlled experiments it is
outcomes?
to know.
hard
Albright, assistant professor and data
Jonathan
Elon University, believes the influence
scientist,
is a propaganda machine. It’s targeting people
This
to recruit them to an idea. It’s a level of
individually
engineering that I’ve never seen before. They’re
social
people and then keeping them on an
capturing
Analytica’s data allowed campaigners
Cambridge
optimize candidates’ campaign movements.
to
Analytica claimed that they saw small
Cambridge
based on engagement with people’s
openings,
posts, in Michigan, Pennsylvania and
—known as the “blue wall”, because
Wisconsin
are traditionally democratic states—and
they
Trump scheduled events there. The Clinton
so
mocked him at the time, but apparently
analysts
was the small margins in Michigan,
“it
and Wisconsin that won Trump the
Pennsylvania
(Anderson, Horvath 2017).
election”
October 2016, Nix made the following
In
statement.
in the United States we have somewhere
Today
to four or ve thousand data points on every
close
So we model the personality of every
individual…
across the United States, some 230 million
adult
has been used for centuries,
Propaganda
online networks may have increased the
but
and efficacy of political persuasion.
precision
beginning of this chapter explored how
The
emotions and fake news spread quickly
intense
social networks. SCL (parent company
through
Cambridge Analytica) described itself as “the
of
election management agency”, using
premier
such as “psychological warfare” and
words
operations” (Weinberger 2005). SCL
“influence
to have influenced elections and other
claimed
outcomes in Italy, Latvia, Ukraine,
political
Afghanistan, Romania, South Africa,
Albania,
Kenya, Mauritius, India, Indonesia,
Nigeria,
Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Colombia,
the
St Vincent and the Grenadines, St
Antigua,
and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago. An
Kitts
for Politico stated that SCL used “military
article
campaigns to social media
disinformation
and voter targeting” (Vogel, Parti 2015).
branding
is also alleged to have operated extensively
SCL
developing countries to manipulate public
in
and claimed to be able to instigate
opinion
It certainly sounds like something from
coups.
James Bond or Mission Impossible films
the
it did not help that SCL and Cambridge
and
were backed by a reclusive hedge fund
Analytica
called Robert Mercer.
billionaire
Potter, President of Campaign Legal Center,
Trevor
non-profit organization that works to reduce
a
influence of money in politics and to support
the
access to voting, reacted as follows.
unrestricted
a random billionaire can change politics
Suddenly,
public policy—to sweep everything else o
and
table—even if they don’t speak publicly, and
the
if there’s almost no public awareness of his or
even
many observers, including political
However,
academic experts, have voiced scepticism
and
these claims. It is a big leap to go from
about
personalities to influencing voting
understanding
Could behavioural microtargeting
decisions.
be powerful enough to sway elections and
really
There is some evidence to suggest
referendums?
its influence has been grossly exaggerated.
that
2
on social media could see them.
is substantial.
emotional leash and never letting them go.
(Albright quoted in Cadwalladr 2016)
herviews.
(Potter quoted in Mayer 2017)
people.
(Nix 2016)
54