Theory of Knowledge - Course Companion for Students Marija Uzunova Dang Arvin Singh Uzunov Dang

II. Perspectives
to Quassim Cassam, we believe
According
we do not because of facts, but because of
what
we think: these habits of mind frame how
how
evaluate evidence, relate to authority and
we
to the arguments and beliefs of others.
respond
asserts that we have long focused too
Cassam
on reasons, and reasoning, in beliefformation
closely
as opposed to habits of mind, and what
calls intellectual character traits. It is the nature
he
intellectual character traits that we often do not
of
that we have them. Cassam, for example,
know
conspiracy theorists as gullible careless
describes
reasoning, indifferent to authority and less able
in
discern between evidence and speculation, but
to
describe them as gullible or careless is not to
to
their reasons, but their habits of mind.
describe
attributing problematic reasoning
However,
peoples’ characters is itself problematic:
to
one, it pathologizes people, and can make
for
less empathic and tolerant towards them.
others
does not, in itself, make it false, but it is
That
harmful. An alternative argument
potentially
terms: Why people fly
Search
facts from
bias is a disease and to fight it we need
“…
healthy treatment of facts and education.
a
find that when facts are injected into the
We
the symptoms of bias become
conversation,
severe. But, unfortunately, we have also
less
that facts can only do so much. To
learned
coming to undesirable conclusions,
avoid
can fly from the facts and use other
people
in their deep, belief-protecting toolbox.”
tools
Friesen2015)
(Campbell,
by Friesen et al (2015) examined how
Research
distance themselves from facts that
people
their beliefs. They may, of course,
contradict
dispute the validity of specific facts.
simply
may consciously or subconsciously
They
the issue in untestable ways that make
reframe
explained by circumstances rather
contextual,
habits or character traits. People who are
than
upset or in a rush may act and think
hungry,
in a given situation than those who
differently
relaxed, for example. The values and beliefs
are
the people around them also matter. This is
of
“situationist” argument, assertively put forth
the
the Princeton philosopher Gilbert Harman,
by
argues that “we need to convince people
who
look at situational factors and to stop trying
to
explain things in terms of character traits”
to
(2000).
almost certainly matters, but this does
Context
mean that habits of mind do not. What
not
we do as individuals and communities to
can
effective habits? If someone accused
cultivate
of being gullible because you believe a
you
science story, how would you
mainstream
It is an obvious trap, and you should
respond?
not immediately abandon your views,
certainly
being aware of the possibility of your own
but
is almost always a good thing.
fallibility
researchers provide the example of samesex
The
marriage, still a contested issue in some
in 2020. The researchers investigated
countries
scientific evidence could sway
whether
beliefs about the issue, using fake
people’s
about the beneficial impact on children
studies
researchers presented these made-up facts
The
participants who supported or opposed
to
marriage, and found that when the
same-sex
opposed their views, participants “were
facts
likely to state that same-sex marriage
more
actually about facts, it’s more a question of
isn’t
opinion”. However, when these made-up
moral
were on their side, participants were more
facts
to assert that “their opinions were factbased
prone
and much less about morals” (Campbell,
2015 ). This result showed not the denial
Friesen
facts, but the denial of the relevance of facts,
of
participants on both sides of the issue. The
for
summarized that:
researchers
1
is that human behaviour at any given time is
Box 1.2: How we run away from facts
of same-sex versus opposite-sex parents.
scientific evidence less relevant.
12