Theory of Knowledge - Course Companion for Students Marija Uzunova Dang Arvin Singh Uzunov Dang
Why do people believe strangeII.3and what should we do about it?thingsphilosophers have long assumed thatPoliticalin democracies focus on values,disagreementsand morals, and that scientific factspreferencesrise to the surface to settle these disputes.willfact, this may be a flawed assumption. FromInthe orists to scientific denialists, someconspiracydeep disagreements occur, they concernWhenonly the “facts” in question but also thenotbehind how we form facts andprocesseswe trust to come up with them. Thewhoare about evidence, expertisedisagreementsauthority. When confronted by someoneanddoes not accept what you accept to bewhodespite all the available evidence, how dofact,balance being intellectually humble with ayouto thetruth?commitmentabout climate change and vaccinationsDebatesin countries around the world, evencontinue2020. These debates shape political discourseinthere is no option to agree to disagree:wherepolicy decision must be taken one way oraanother.would be an obvious way to resolveEvidenceand yet some academicsdisagreements,Julian Baggini argue that peopleincludingevidence—that is, they tend to“cherry-pick”what they want, and select the evidencebelieveexpertise to justify it. Kappel agrees with thisandthat are fundamental to our identities. If abeliefsaligns with our beliefs, we tend to embrace itfactcritically and remember it better than a factlesschallenges our beliefs. Factual beliefs canthatmight be one factor behind politicalThispolarization.add to these challenges, how does one continueTorespect others’ perspectives when they disputetofacts that underpin one’s morality and identity?thedoes one react when these perspectives blockHowprocesses and policy decisions that onepoliticalas essential to the common good?seesII. PerspectivesII. Perspectivesserve as signals of identity and solidarity:by asserting your belief that climate change is amyth, you signal your allegiance to a particular moral,beliefs seem to insulate people from evidence.cultural and ideological community.(Kappel 2018)The pessimistic interpretation of this is that the appealto expertise is therefore a charade. Psychologistshave repeatedly demonstrated the power of motivatedthinking and conrmation bias. People cherry-pick theauthorities who support what they already believe.If majority opinion is on their side, they will cite thequantity of evidence behind them. If the majority isagainst them, they will cite the quality of evidencebehind them, pointing out that truth is not a democracy.Authorities are not used to guide us towards the truthbut to justify what we already believe the truth to be.(Baggini 2017)position, and argues that it is especially true for11
II. Perspectivesto Quassim Cassam, we believeAccordingwe do not because of facts, but because ofwhatwe think: these habits of mind frame howhowevaluate evidence, relate to authority andweto the arguments and beliefs of others.respondasserts that we have long focused tooCassamon reasons, and reasoning, in beliefformationcloselyas opposed to habits of mind, and whatcalls intellectual character traits. It is the natureheintellectual character traits that we often do notofthat we have them. Cassam, for example,knowconspiracy theorists as gullible carelessdescribesreasoning, indifferent to authority and less ableindiscern between evidence and speculation, buttodescribe them as gullible or careless is not tototheir reasons, but their habits of mind.describeattributing problematic reasoningHowever,peoples’ characters is itself problematic:toone, it pathologizes people, and can makeforless empathic and tolerant towards them.othersdoes not, in itself, make it false, but it isThatharmful. An alternative argumentpotentiallyterms: Why people flySearchfacts frombias is a disease and to fight it we need“…healthy treatment of facts and education.afind that when facts are injected into theWethe symptoms of bias becomeconversation,severe. But, unfortunately, we have alsolessthat facts can only do so much. Tolearnedcoming to undesirable conclusions,avoidcan fly from the facts and use otherpeoplein their deep, belief-protecting toolbox.”toolsFriesen2015)(Campbell,by Friesen et al (2015) examined howResearchdistance themselves from facts thatpeopletheir beliefs. They may, of course,contradictdispute the validity of specific facts.simplymay consciously or subconsciouslyTheythe issue in untestable ways that makereframeexplained by circumstances rathercontextual,habits or character traits. People who arethanupset or in a rush may act and thinkhungry,in a given situation than those whodifferentlyrelaxed, for example. The values and beliefsarethe people around them also matter. This isof“situationist” argument, assertively put forththethe Princeton philosopher Gilbert Harman,byargues that “we need to convince peoplewholook at situational factors and to stop tryingtoexplain things in terms of character traits”to(2000).almost certainly matters, but this doesContextmean that habits of mind do not. Whatnotwe do as individuals and communities tocaneffective habits? If someone accusedcultivateof being gullible because you believe ayouscience story, how would youmainstreamIt is an obvious trap, and you shouldrespond?not immediately abandon your views,certainlybeing aware of the possibility of your ownbutis almost always a good thing.fallibilityresearchers provide the example of samesexThemarriage, still a contested issue in somein 2020. The researchers investigatedcountriesscientific evidence could swaywhetherbeliefs about the issue, using fakepeople’sabout the beneficial impact on childrenstudiesresearchers presented these made-up factsTheparticipants who supported or opposedtomarriage, and found that when thesame-sexopposed their views, participants “werefactslikely to state that same-sex marriagemoreactually about facts, it’s more a question ofisn’topinion”. However, when these made-upmoralwere on their side, participants were morefactsto assert that “their opinions were factbasedproneand much less about morals” (Campbell,2015 ). This result showed not the denialFriesenfacts, but the denial of the relevance of facts,ofparticipants on both sides of the issue. Theforsummarized that:researchers1is that human behaviour at any given time isBox 1.2: How we run away from factsof same-sex versus opposite-sex parents.scientific evidence less relevant.12
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Why do people believe strange
II.3
and what should we do about it?
things
philosophers have long assumed that
Political
in democracies focus on values,
disagreements
and morals, and that scientific facts
preferences
rise to the surface to settle these disputes.
will
fact, this may be a flawed assumption. From
In
the orists to scientific denialists, some
conspiracy
deep disagreements occur, they concern
When
only the “facts” in question but also the
not
behind how we form facts and
processes
we trust to come up with them. The
who
are about evidence, expertise
disagreements
authority. When confronted by someone
and
does not accept what you accept to be
who
despite all the available evidence, how do
fact,
balance being intellectually humble with a
you
to thetruth?
commitment
about climate change and vaccinations
Debates
in countries around the world, even
continue
2020. These debates shape political discourse
in
there is no option to agree to disagree:
where
policy decision must be taken one way or
a
another.
would be an obvious way to resolve
Evidence
and yet some academics
disagreements,
Julian Baggini argue that people
including
evidence—that is, they tend to
“cherry-pick”
what they want, and select the evidence
believe
expertise to justify it. Kappel agrees with this
and
that are fundamental to our identities. If a
beliefs
aligns with our beliefs, we tend to embrace it
fact
critically and remember it better than a fact
less
challenges our beliefs. Factual beliefs can
that
might be one factor behind political
This
polarization.
add to these challenges, how does one continue
To
respect others’ perspectives when they dispute
to
facts that underpin one’s morality and identity?
the
does one react when these perspectives block
How
processes and policy decisions that one
political
as essential to the common good?
sees
II. Perspectives
II. Perspectives
serve as signals of identity and solidarity:
by asserting your belief that climate change is a
myth, you signal your allegiance to a particular moral,
beliefs seem to insulate people from evidence.
cultural and ideological community.
(Kappel 2018)
The pessimistic interpretation of this is that the appeal
to expertise is therefore a charade. Psychologists
have repeatedly demonstrated the power of motivated
thinking and conrmation bias. People cherry-pick the
authorities who support what they already believe.
If majority opinion is on their side, they will cite the
quantity of evidence behind them. If the majority is
against them, they will cite the quality of evidence
behind them, pointing out that truth is not a democracy.
Authorities are not used to guide us towards the truth
but to justify what we already believe the truth to be.
(Baggini 2017)
position, and argues that it is especially true for
11
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