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German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...

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Navy Staff concurred. By January, 1917 it was projected that <strong>the</strong> war would be won<br />

with<strong>in</strong> six months. Additional submar<strong>in</strong>es were unnecessary. 92 By June, 1917 it was<br />

clear that unrestricted submar<strong>in</strong>e war had failed. Victory was distant. N<strong>in</strong>ety-five<br />

new submar<strong>in</strong>es were ordered and all shipyard work on new capital ships ceased.<br />

<strong>German</strong> <strong>Submar<strong>in</strong>e</strong> Construction <strong>1914</strong>-<strong>1918</strong><br />

Orders for ocean-go<strong>in</strong>g submar<strong>in</strong>es rose steadily and exponentially but<br />

shipyard capacity could not keep up with demand.<br />

“Thus metal prices doubled and tripled, while <strong>the</strong> labour force dw<strong>in</strong>dled with each battle.” 93<br />

“The basic problem of <strong>the</strong> shortage, distribution, and fluctuation of <strong>the</strong> labor force plagued<br />

<strong>the</strong> entire [shipyard] <strong>in</strong>dustry.” 94<br />

”In 1917 <strong>the</strong> labor shortage reached epidemic proportions.” 95<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

101<br />

1748<br />

20<br />

Table 21: Ocean-go<strong>in</strong>g submar<strong>in</strong>es 1915–<strong>1918</strong> 96<br />

Commissioned On yard Open orders Orders<br />

123<br />

28<br />

108<br />

108<br />

246<br />

1915 1916 1917 <strong>1918</strong><br />

The result was a bottleneck <strong>in</strong> submar<strong>in</strong>e construction due to <strong>in</strong>sufficient yard<br />

capacity and a skilled shipyard labour force that was too small to meet <strong>the</strong> demand.<br />

Add<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> problems were priority allocations for High Seas Fleet repair <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> Battle of Jutland, organisational disruption caused by <strong>the</strong><br />

“H<strong>in</strong>denburg program,” and <strong>the</strong> hard w<strong>in</strong>ter of 1916/1917 when unusually<br />

wretched wea<strong>the</strong>r caused a breakdown of transport systems. Laced throughout was<br />

loss of efficiency and flagg<strong>in</strong>g morale among under-nourished workers, grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

domestic social tensions and <strong>in</strong>creased strikes. The social fabric was com<strong>in</strong>g<br />

undone.<br />

92 Granier, Seekriegsleitung, p. 203.<br />

93 Weir, Kaiser's Navy, p. 205.<br />

94 Weir, Kaiser's Navy, p. 161.<br />

95 Weir, Kaiser's Navy, p. 180.<br />

96 Numbers based on: Groener, Deutsche Kriegsschiffe; and on: Roessler, Ubootbau.<br />

56<br />

127<br />

87<br />

148<br />

124<br />

182<br />

84<br />

xli

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