German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...

Imperial Navy optimism was not entirely ill-founded.
66 NA, ADM 116/3421, p. 280.
67 NA, ADM 116/3421, p. 281.
68 Salter, Allied Shipping Control, p. 122.
69 Churchill, World Crisis, p. 719.
70 Still, Crisis, pp. 16-17.
71 Ibid. pp. 177-178.
xxxiv
Initial success in Spring 1917
Recognition of submarine effectiveness could also be found in Britain. In
October, 1916 when restricted submarine warfare resumed, Jellicoe wrote to the
Admiralty that there was “a serious danger that our losses in merchant ships, combined with
the losses in neutral merchant ships, may by the early summer of 1917, have such a serious effect
upon the import of food and other necessaries into the allied countries, as to force us into accepting
peace terms which the military position on the Continent would not justify, and which would fall
far short of our desires.” 66 In November, 1916 the Admiralty informed His Majesty’s
government of the U-boat menace that “No conclusive answer has as yet been found to this
form of warfare; perhaps no conclusive answer ever will be found. We must for the present be
content with palliation.” 67 The alarm heightened in April, 1917: “In a single fortnight in
April, 122 ocean-going vessels were lost. The rate of British loss in ocean-going tonnage during this
fortnight was equivalent to an average round-voyage loss of 25% percent – one out of every four
ships leaving the United Kingdom for an overseas voyage was lost before its return. The
continuance [at] this rate . . . would have brought disaster upon all Allied campaigns, and might
well have involved an unconditional surrender.” 68 Admiral Lord Fisher was prompted to
ask “Can the Army win the war before the Navy loses it?” 69
Churchill recorded a conversation between American Admiral Sims and
Admiral Jellicoe:
Sims: “It looks as though the Germans [are] winning”
Jellicoe: “They will win, unless we can stop these losses – and stop them soon.” 70
The threat extended to the Grand Fleet: “By the outbreak of the war in 1914, 45%
percent of the British fleet burned oil, including nearly all the destroyers. The British Navy’s
monthly oil requirement jumped from 80,500 tons in January, 1915 to 190,000 two years later .
. . Tanker losses to U-boats further lowered the oil supply. ‘As demands went up, tankers went
down.’ Fuel oil stores were so low in February, 1917 that Lord Curzon admitted, ‘the Fleet had
to restrict its exercises.’ In June, the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, was informed that the oil
situation was ‘most critical’, that all oil-burning vessels ‘except in great emergency were to be
limited to three-fifths power.’ In July, British foreign secretary Lord Arthur Balfour cabled . . .
that unless three hundred thousands tons of fuel oil could reach Britain, immobilization of the
British Fleet was threatened.” 71
U-boats, indeed, were bringing Britain to ruin.