German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...

Why unrestricted submarine war in February, 1917?
But why risk a break with America by unrestricted submarine warfare, why
not continue with restricted war?
Historian Karl Birnbaum characterized the brief period of decision-making
in Germany between December, 1916 and January, 1917 as a “a race between peace and
unrestricted warfare.” 60 At the end of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson tried to
mediate a peace between the Allies and Germany. The U.S.’s diplomatic
negotiations with Germany were intense. Germany’s Ambassador in Washington,
Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, was hopeful that Wilson would commence
mediation efforts within a matter of weeks.
In Germany, socialist workers and the liberal minority of the middle-class
supported an end to the war via negotiations (Verständigungsfrieden). They wanted
something on the lines of a status quo ante bellum. Ultra-conservative reaction among
in the army and the senior bureaucracy, Pan-German naval officers, industrialists
and the predominantly right of center middle-class, sought an end to the war
through military victory and a German-directed peace (Siegfrieden). The key to their
ambitions lay with U-boats loosed to pursue unrestricted submarine warfare. Better
to play va banque, all or nothing, in a single decisive action. The U-boat would win
the war.
“In his letter [of 22 Dec. 1916 to Hindenburg and Ludendorff, Admiral Holtzendorff]
maintained that by means of unrestricted U-boat warfare Great Britain could be compelled
to sue for peace within five months [...]” 61
It was reckoned that five or six months was all that was needed to decisively
swing the balance in Germany’s favour.
Moreover, some well-respected military authorities like Admiral von Capelle -
Tirpitz’s successor – voiced almost delusional points of view. Von Capelle told the
Reichstag on February 1, 1917: “From a military point of view I rate the effect of America
coming on the side of our enemies as nil.” 62 Not to be outdone in bluster, Admiral
Holtzendorff swore that no American soldier would ever set foot on the European
continent. 63
Besides decimating the enemy the Navy considered unrestricted submarine
warfare to be a deterrent to neutral shipping (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland
et al), further strangling Britain’s sea-borne lifelines by as much as 30% percent. 64
Victory was anticipated within months. Opponents of unrestricted war
(Bethmann-Hollweg and even the Kaiser had serious misgivings), were simply
swept away in a tzunami of hope and numbers. 65
60 Ibid. p. VIII.
61 Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare, p. 277.
62 Schröder, Uboote des Kaisers, p. 208
63 Ibid. p. 307.
64 Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare, p. 278.
65 Ibid. p. 286.
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