German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...

against its Grand Fleet foe. Planners projected that the Royal Navy’s battlecruisers
would sortie hours in advance of the Grand Fleet. U-boats would scout naval bases
to report cruiser departures and possibly make some kills of their own.
Battlecruisers were not heavy cruisers. In fact, they were a variant of the
dreadnought but with less armour and fewer guns and more speed. Size and
construction cost were the same as for a dreadnought battleship. In the High Seas
Fleet and Grand Fleet battlecruisers served as an advance guard of the battle fleet
and were integral to the line of battle. Churchill called battlecruisers the “strategic
cavalry of the Royal Navy”. 51 Freiherr von Spiegel, U-32, reported on the morning of
May 31, 1916 the day of the Battle of Jutland:
“At the time I was lying off May Island, and reported to the German Fleet the departure of
the British Light Cruiser Squadrons. Another German submarine sighted the Battle
Squadron coming down from Scapa Flow; this was also reported to the German Fleet. The
German Admiral worked the distance both fleets had travelled, and calculated that he
would be able to engage the Light Cruiser Squadron four hours before the Battle Fleet
arrived.” 52
“The British light cruiser squadrons” were Beatty’s battlecruisers running out from
the Firth of Forth, passing U-32. Beatty made contact with the German
battlecruisers in the afternoon, and then with the rest of the High Seas Fleet. In the
ensuing engagement, Scheer sank three battlecruisers. She had made the most of
his limited options but decided to withdraw his forces and proceeded to
Wilhelmshaven on the morning of June 1, leaving the Royal Navy in control of the
blockade of Germany. Despite alarming casualties, especially on the British side,
the battle had not altered the strategic stalemate one whit. An American reporter
wryly commented ‘The German Fleet has assaulted its jailor but it is still in jail.’ 53
In a subsequent memorandum to the Kaiser, Scheer confessed the inferiority
of the High Seas Fleet and requested priority for the submarine merchant war as
the only means of beating the English at sea. Response came in the fullness of time.
It took months and another sortie of the High Seas Fleet in August – again,
supported by U-boats - before the submarine merchant war in the North would be
taken up gain.
In summary, Scheer stopped the submarine merchant war in the Atlantic from
May to mid-September, 1916 for the very great gamble of a victorious High Seas
Fleet. It is tempting to speculate that instead of siphoning away his assets in pursuit
of a grand scheme, the deployment of all available U-boats in the North Sea would
have cost the Allies at least one million BRT in lost assets 54 which might have been
enough to topple Britain in the spring of 1917, either on terms favourable to
German or as an outright victory.
51 Churchill, World Crisis, p. 57.
52 NA, ADM 137/3872, Prisoner of War Freiherr von Spiegel, here printed on page 382.
53 Kenndy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 246.
54 The number here is based on 25% cruise activity and 600 BRT sunk per boat and day at sea.
Halpern, p. 309 gives 1.6 million BRT possible sinkings for this period.
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