German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...
German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...
German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...
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aga<strong>in</strong>st its Grand Fleet foe. Planners projected that <strong>the</strong> Royal Navy’s battlecruisers<br />
would sortie hours <strong>in</strong> advance of <strong>the</strong> Grand Fleet. U-boats would scout naval bases<br />
to report cruiser departures and possibly make some kills of <strong>the</strong>ir own.<br />
Battlecruisers were not heavy cruisers. In fact, <strong>the</strong>y were a variant of <strong>the</strong><br />
dreadnought but with less armour and fewer guns and more speed. Size and<br />
construction cost were <strong>the</strong> same as for a dreadnought battleship. In <strong>the</strong> High Seas<br />
Fleet and Grand Fleet battlecruisers served as an advance guard of <strong>the</strong> battle fleet<br />
and were <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e of battle. Churchill called battlecruisers <strong>the</strong> “strategic<br />
cavalry of <strong>the</strong> Royal Navy”. 51 Freiherr von Spiegel, U-32, reported on <strong>the</strong> morn<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
May 31, 1916 <strong>the</strong> day of <strong>the</strong> Battle of Jutland:<br />
“At <strong>the</strong> time I was ly<strong>in</strong>g off May Island, and reported to <strong>the</strong> <strong>German</strong> Fleet <strong>the</strong> departure of<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong> Light Cruiser Squadrons. Ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>German</strong> submar<strong>in</strong>e sighted <strong>the</strong> Battle<br />
Squadron com<strong>in</strong>g down from Scapa Flow; this was also reported to <strong>the</strong> <strong>German</strong> Fleet. The<br />
<strong>German</strong> Admiral worked <strong>the</strong> distance both fleets had travelled, and calculated that he<br />
would be able to engage <strong>the</strong> Light Cruiser Squadron four hours before <strong>the</strong> Battle Fleet<br />
arrived.” 52<br />
“The <strong>British</strong> light cruiser squadrons” were Beatty’s battlecruisers runn<strong>in</strong>g out from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Firth of Forth, pass<strong>in</strong>g U-32. Beatty made contact with <strong>the</strong> <strong>German</strong><br />
battlecruisers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> afternoon, and <strong>the</strong>n with <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> High Seas Fleet. In <strong>the</strong><br />
ensu<strong>in</strong>g engagement, Scheer sank three battlecruisers. She had made <strong>the</strong> most of<br />
his limited options but decided to withdraw his forces and proceeded to<br />
Wilhelmshaven on <strong>the</strong> morn<strong>in</strong>g of June 1, leav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Royal Navy <strong>in</strong> control of <strong>the</strong><br />
blockade of <strong>German</strong>y. Despite alarm<strong>in</strong>g casualties, especially on <strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong> side,<br />
<strong>the</strong> battle had not altered <strong>the</strong> strategic stalemate one whit. An American reporter<br />
wryly commented ‘The <strong>German</strong> Fleet has assaulted its jailor but it is still <strong>in</strong> jail.’ 53<br />
In a subsequent memorandum to <strong>the</strong> Kaiser, Scheer confessed <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>feriority<br />
of <strong>the</strong> High Seas Fleet and requested priority for <strong>the</strong> submar<strong>in</strong>e merchant war as<br />
<strong>the</strong> only means of beat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> English at sea. Response came <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fullness of time.<br />
It took months and ano<strong>the</strong>r sortie of <strong>the</strong> High Seas Fleet <strong>in</strong> August – aga<strong>in</strong>,<br />
supported by U-boats - before <strong>the</strong> submar<strong>in</strong>e merchant war <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North would be<br />
taken up ga<strong>in</strong>.<br />
In summary, Scheer stopped <strong>the</strong> submar<strong>in</strong>e merchant war <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Atlantic from<br />
May to mid-September, 1916 for <strong>the</strong> very great gamble of a victorious High Seas<br />
Fleet. It is tempt<strong>in</strong>g to speculate that <strong>in</strong>stead of siphon<strong>in</strong>g away his assets <strong>in</strong> pursuit<br />
of a grand scheme, <strong>the</strong> deployment of all available U-boats <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North Sea would<br />
have cost <strong>the</strong> Allies at least one million BRT <strong>in</strong> lost assets 54 which might have been<br />
enough to topple Brita<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>g of 1917, ei<strong>the</strong>r on terms favourable to<br />
<strong>German</strong> or as an outright victory.<br />
51 Churchill, World Crisis, p. 57.<br />
52 NA, ADM 137/3872, Prisoner of War Freiherr von Spiegel, here pr<strong>in</strong>ted on page 382.<br />
53 Kenndy, Rise and Fall of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Naval</strong> Mastery, p. 246.<br />
54 The number here is based on 25% cruise activity and 600 BRT sunk per boat and day at sea.<br />
Halpern, p. 309 gives 1.6 million BRT possible s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gs for this period.<br />
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