German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...
German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...
German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes - British Naval ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
vessels were sunk by UB-12; and UB-2 got a steamer of 672 BRT <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North Sea,<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g it a total of 765 BRT for February.<br />
These were <strong>the</strong> modest results of coastal patrols by Flanders based UB-boats<br />
with<strong>in</strong> five months (except for U-24). The only High Seas Fleet submar<strong>in</strong>es out <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> first two months of 1916 were U-44, U-32, U-70 and U-22, all on military patrol<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Grand Fleet <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North Sea.<br />
For five whole months <strong>the</strong>re was no concerted merchant war at all <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Atlantic. The s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of some small fish<strong>in</strong>g vessels and coastal steamers seemed to<br />
have been <strong>the</strong> basis for Falkenhayn’s calculations, and perhaps also stirred <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>German</strong> public to support <strong>the</strong> notion “that unrestricted submar<strong>in</strong>e warfare causes eight to<br />
ten times more s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gs.”<br />
Holtzendorff, Chief of <strong>the</strong> Admiralty Staff, jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> chorus when he<br />
declared that by 1 March, 1916 “enough U-boats would be available for a submar<strong>in</strong>e<br />
campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st Great Brita<strong>in</strong> which, if conducted without restrictions, would <strong>in</strong>duce <strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />
to make peace with<strong>in</strong> four months.” 50<br />
In light of <strong>the</strong> twenty-six ocean-go<strong>in</strong>g boats available <strong>in</strong> March, 1916 with an<br />
average of six or seven on cruise per day <strong>the</strong> pronouncement was, at best, wishful<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Less than thirty percent of available boats were on Atlantic merchant war<br />
cruises, and <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean suffered from <strong>in</strong>sufficient dockyard capabilities for<br />
repair and ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. In April a passenger l<strong>in</strong>er, Sussex, was torpedoed without<br />
warn<strong>in</strong>g. Among <strong>the</strong> casualties were American citizens. Aga<strong>in</strong>, American protests<br />
made it clear that resumption of unrestricted submar<strong>in</strong>e warfare threatened a very<br />
high price, likely even war with <strong>the</strong> United States.<br />
The <strong>Submar<strong>in</strong>e</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> High Seas Fleet, May to October 1916<br />
The merchant campaign stopped at <strong>the</strong> end of April at <strong>the</strong> directed of Admiral<br />
Scheer, <strong>the</strong> new Commander of <strong>the</strong> High Seas Fleet, despite resistance from <strong>the</strong><br />
Admiralty. However, ocean-go<strong>in</strong>g submar<strong>in</strong>es based <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> North Sea were now<br />
dedicated exclusively for military patrols, scout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> North Sea for <strong>the</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />
Grand Fleet. Only Mediterranean boats cont<strong>in</strong>ued to prosecute restricted<br />
submar<strong>in</strong>e warfare.<br />
What was beh<strong>in</strong>d Scheer’s ‘merchant war strike’? Consider his situation: costly<br />
dreadnoughts of <strong>the</strong> High Seas Fleet were not quite a match for <strong>British</strong> Grand<br />
Fleet supremacy. The navy was challenged by <strong>the</strong> army to do more to support <strong>the</strong><br />
war effort. Indeed, soldiers mocked <strong>the</strong> fleet with, “Lieb Vaterland magst ruhig se<strong>in</strong>, die<br />
Flotte schlaeft im Hafen e<strong>in</strong>.” (“Dear Fa<strong>the</strong>rland rest calmly <strong>the</strong> fleet sleeps safely <strong>in</strong><br />
port.”) If <strong>the</strong> war ended with a <strong>German</strong> Army victory, naval budgets on <strong>the</strong> prewar<br />
scale were unlikely to be approved by <strong>the</strong> Reichstag. In such a grim<br />
environment it was perhaps better to risk a great battle than f<strong>in</strong>ancial asphyxiation<br />
at some later date. Tactics were developed to give <strong>the</strong> Imperial Navy an edge<br />
50 Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-boat <strong>Warfare</strong>, p. 56, memo Holtzendorff to chancellor Bethmann-<br />
Hollweg, 4 Jan. 1916.<br />
xxviii