Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies
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Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies

by Helen Chapin Metz et al by Helen Chapin Metz et al

tainolibrary
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19.06.2022 Views

Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies tures averaged about US$40 million annually under the military regime. In 1994, the final year of the military government, the spending level of US$45 million amounted to 30.2 percent of central government expenditures and 2.3 percent of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary). However, because of the deteriorating economy resulting from government mismanagement and the international embargo, the share assumed by the military was relatively higher than in more normal times. Any analysis of spending data is subject to many uncertainties. Portions of the nation's expenditures for military purposes probably have been unrecorded, or allocated funds may have been siphoned off by corrupt officers. Between 1975 and 1985, under the Duvaliers, military spending averaging US$30 million a year represented about 8 percent of government expenditures. Between 1987 and 1991, when Aristide was ousted by the military, the share of military expenditures in the national budget rose from 10.6 percent to 15.3 percent. Recorded military outlays did not exceed 2 percent of GNP during the Duvalier era or under any subsequent regime. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States was the primary source of foreign military support in terms of materiel and financing. United States military missions to Haiti during and after World War II helped to maintain links between the two countries. Overall, between 1950 and 1977, the United States provided US$3.4 million in military aid, which included the cost of training for 610 Haitian students in the United States. During the 1980s, no direct military aid was provided, although some credits were advanced to permit commercial military purchases. The financing program amounted to about US$300,000 a year, but the Duvaliers spent a much greater amount in direct commercial transactions, primarily for crowd-control equipment. All forms of military assistance ended when the elections of 1987 failed. ACDA has recorded no imports of military equipment since 1987, when US$500,000 worth of military items entered the country, presumably acquired through commercial channels. Role of the Army in Law Enforcement Prior to 1995 Although the 1987 constitution mandated a separate police corps and a new police academy under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, political realities pre- 472

Haiti: National Security vented the implementation of these changes. The army feared that a separate police would compete for funds and influence and would threaten its opportunities for profit. The armed forces continued to act as the nation's ultimate law enforcement agency in spite of their lack of competence in this area. The only identifiable police force in Haiti operated in Port-au- Prince, its members assigned to it by the armed forces. This 1,000-member force had few operational or technical capabilities, even though it was responsible for criminal investigations, as well as narcotics and immigration control. Members of the FAd'H detailed for police duties received no specific training in police methods. They did not have regular beats, investigate crimes, or carry out other normal police functions. The police could be hired to arrest persons on flimsy evidence. Warrantless arrest was common, as was incommunicado detention. There was no true rural police. Small garrisons, operating under military department command, with some cooperation from the lowest central government administrative heads, the military section chiefs, were responsible for rural security. In effect, the 562 section chiefs functioned not only as police chiefs but also as primary government representatives in rural areas. Thus, with little or no oversight from the capital and without special training, the officers assigned to keep order often acted as prosecutors, judges, and tax assessors in a brutal system whose main purpose was to prevent any grassroots opposition from developing. In addition to its failure to establish a nationwide police force as called for in the constitution, the military leadership failed to subdue the VSN and other vigilante groups. Direct links between the senior army command and remnants of the VSN enabled many VSN agents to infiltrate FAd'H units and the cadres of the Port-au-Prince police force. Many of the paramilitary groups simply were engaged in a career of banditry with no political motivation. The Avril government made some effort to crack down on abuses in the internal security services, but members of the FAd'H and its various affiliates continued to use their monopoly of power to subjugate and mistreat the Haitian citizenry. It has been estimated that some 3,000 Haitians died in the 1991-94 period as a result of the FAd'H's oppressive governance. Haiti's External and Domestic Security Concerns Defense of the nation against external threats was never a 473

<strong>Haiti</strong>: National Security<br />

vented the implementation of these changes. The army feared<br />

that a separate police would compete for funds <strong>and</strong> influence<br />

<strong>and</strong> would threaten its opportunities for profit. The armed<br />

forces continued to act as the nation's ultimate law enforcement<br />

agency in spite of their lack of competence in this area.<br />

The only identifiable police force in <strong>Haiti</strong> operated in Port-au-<br />

Prince, its members assigned to it by the armed forces. This<br />

1,000-member force had few operational or technical capabilities,<br />

even though it was responsible for criminal investigations,<br />

as well as narcotics <strong>and</strong> immigration control. Members of the<br />

FAd'H detailed for police duties received no specific training in<br />

police methods. They did not have regular beats, investigate<br />

crimes, or carry out other normal police functions. The police<br />

could be hired to arrest persons on flimsy evidence. Warrantless<br />

arrest was common, as was incommunicado detention.<br />

There was no true rural police. Small garrisons, operating<br />

under military department comm<strong>and</strong>, with some cooperation<br />

from the lowest central government administrative heads, the<br />

military section chiefs, were responsible for rural security. In<br />

effect, the 562 section chiefs functioned not only as police<br />

chiefs but also as primary government representatives in rural<br />

areas. Thus, with little or no oversight from the capital <strong>and</strong><br />

without special training, the officers assigned to keep order<br />

often acted as prosecutors, judges, <strong>and</strong> tax assessors in a brutal<br />

system whose main purpose was to prevent any grassroots<br />

opposition from developing.<br />

In addition to its failure to establish a nationwide police<br />

force as called for in the constitution, the military leadership<br />

failed to subdue the VSN <strong>and</strong> other vigilante groups. Direct<br />

links between the senior army comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> remnants of the<br />

VSN enabled many VSN agents to infiltrate FAd'H units <strong>and</strong><br />

the cadres of the Port-au-Prince police force. Many of the paramilitary<br />

groups simply were engaged in a career of b<strong>and</strong>itry<br />

with no political motivation. The Avril government made some<br />

effort to crack down on abuses in the internal security services,<br />

but members of the FAd'H <strong>and</strong> its various affiliates continued<br />

to use their monopoly of power to subjugate <strong>and</strong> mistreat the<br />

<strong>Haiti</strong>an citizenry. It has been estimated that some 3,000 <strong>Haiti</strong>ans<br />

died in the 1991-94 period as a result of the FAd'H's<br />

oppressive governance.<br />

<strong>Haiti</strong>'s External <strong>and</strong> Domestic Security Concerns<br />

Defense of the nation against external threats was never a<br />

473

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