Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies
by Helen Chapin Metz et al by Helen Chapin Metz et al
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies the date for the first round of municipal and parliamentary elections as November 28. Although a number of political organizations, notably the OPL, refused to commit to the elections, the FL quickly announced that it would participate. The task facing the nascent electoral body was enormous. In addition to the need to obtain the support and participation of the Haitian people, it had to obtain funding and then oversee such complex tasks as voter and candidate registration and the creation of the election's administrative infrastructure, including the appointment of officials to administer the decentralized process. In view of the enormity of these tasks, few were surprised when the election date was changed to December 19 and then to March 19, 2000. As the dates for municipal and parliamentary elections edged into the new century, however, another issue emerged: whether these elections would ultimately be held separate from the end-of-2000 election for the person who would succeed President Preval on February 7, 2001. Delays in progress toward bifurcated municipal/legislative and presidential elections were widely viewed as playing into the hands of the FL, whose leader had already announced his candidacy for the presidency. In spite of widespread speculation that the popularity of President Aristide, who had left the priesthood, married, and had a family, had slipped somewhat from its 1990 levels, political observers in Port-au-Prince still viewed his electoral coattails as long enough to assure an FL municipal and parliamentary sweep in a combined, general election. At issue, also, was that of the level of voter turnout. Having declined to 5 percent in April 1997, election officials, civil society leaders, and politicians faced the need to identify effective strategies to return voter participation to the levels experienced a decade earlier. As the country crept toward either one or two elections in 2000, other issues continued to weigh upon those of politics and governance. The ability of Haiti's National Police force to remain independent from partisan politics was tested repeatedly as various political factions called upon the force to support their position and cause. Although informed observers remained cautiously optimistic that the police, under the leadership of Director General Pierre Denize, were maintaining their autonomy, they also acknowledged the fragility of this status, particularly in view of increased corruption within the force, mostly linked to Haiti's increased role as a conduit for 424
Haiti: Government and Politics international cocaine trafficking, and the late 1999 resignation, following months of pressure from FL partisans, of Robert Manuel, secretary of state for public security and close ally of President Preval. The severe and continuing lack of progress in judicial reform also continued to plague the PNH's ability to conduct its mission. An additional challenge facing the PNH was that of providing security for upcoming elections. Undermanned, thinly spread, and confronting an increasingly armed society, the spectre of isolated or general election-related violence—and the PNH's ability to face it—loomed as a large question mark on the horizon. Concurrently, as Haiti continued to strain under the enormity of the tasks before it, international presence continued to taper off. In August 1999, Washington announced the early 2000 withdrawal of the United States Support Group, a 500-soldier training mission remnant of the 20,000 strong MNF force sent to Haiti in 1994. In December the United Nations announced a final extension of its 280-member Civilian Police Mission in Haiti and the eighty-member International Civilian Mission to March 2000. A new, smaller, and entirely civilian UN umbrella mission with a year-long mandate to cover civilian police, human rights, and judicial reform, functioning in tandem with the UN development mission and under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, however, would follow. In all, Haiti's political landscape at the dawn of the new century could best be described as "fluid and fragile." Toward Municipal, Parliamentary, and Presidential Elections As debilitating as the political crisis that prevailed in Haiti following the April 1997 elections was, it can be viewed as an indicator of considerable progress toward the reform of Haiti's system of government and politics, particularly in the use—or lack thereof—of power or force to resolve a political crisis. Indeed, the absence of the army as the traditional means to resolve political problems has given birth in Haiti to the phenomenon of political gridlock. Unfortunately, however, the ability of Haiti's political leaders to dialogue and use political compromise as a non-violent, democratic means to resolve disputes remains underdeveloped. Nevertheless, the fact that disputes were confronted, if not resolved, by debate and political maneuvering, not by violence or weapons, is a positive change in Haiti's political culture. 425
- Page 406 and 407: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 408 and 409: — Dominican Republic and Haiti: C
- Page 410 and 411: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 412 and 413: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 414 and 415: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 416 and 417: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 418 and 419: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 420 and 421: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 422 and 423: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 424 and 425: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 426 and 427: — Dominican Republic and Haiti: C
- Page 428 and 429: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 430 and 431: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 432 and 433: — Dominican Republic and Haiti: C
- Page 434 and 435: — Dominican Republic and Haiti: C
- Page 436 and 437: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 438 and 439: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 440 and 441: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 442 and 443: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 444 and 445: Figurefrom a painting by Dieuseul P
- Page 446 and 447: . Dominican Republic and Haiti: Cou
- Page 448 and 449: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 450 and 451: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 452 and 453: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 454 and 455: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 458 and 459: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 460 and 461: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 462 and 463: . Dominican Republic and Haiti: Cou
- Page 464 and 465: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 466 and 467: . Dominican Republic and Haiti: Cou
- Page 468 and 469: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 470 and 471: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 472 and 473: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 474 and 475: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 476 and 477: . — Dominican Republic and Haiti:
- Page 478 and 479: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 480 and 481: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 482 and 483: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 484 and 485: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 486 and 487: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 488 and 489: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 490 and 491: Figurefrom a painting by Prosper Pi
- Page 492 and 493: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 494 and 495: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 496 and 497: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 498 and 499: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 500 and 501: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 502 and 503: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
- Page 504 and 505: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Count
<strong>Haiti</strong>: Government <strong>and</strong> Politics<br />
international cocaine trafficking, <strong>and</strong> the late 1999 resignation,<br />
following months of pressure from FL partisans, of Robert<br />
Manuel, secretary of state for public security <strong>and</strong> close ally of<br />
President Preval. The severe <strong>and</strong> continuing lack of progress in<br />
judicial reform also continued to plague the PNH's ability to<br />
conduct its mission. An additional challenge facing the PNH<br />
was that of providing security for upcoming elections. Undermanned,<br />
thinly spread, <strong>and</strong> confronting an increasingly armed<br />
society, the spectre of isolated or general election-related violence—<strong>and</strong><br />
the PNH's ability to face it—loomed as a large<br />
question mark on the horizon.<br />
Concurrently, as <strong>Haiti</strong> continued to strain under the enormity<br />
of the tasks before it, international presence continued to<br />
taper off. In August 1999, Washington announced the early<br />
2000 withdrawal of the United States Support Group, a 500-soldier<br />
training mission remnant of the 20,000 strong MNF force<br />
sent to <strong>Haiti</strong> in 1994. In December the United Nations<br />
announced a final extension of its 280-member Civilian Police<br />
Mission in <strong>Haiti</strong> <strong>and</strong> the eighty-member International Civilian<br />
Mission to March 2000. A new, smaller, <strong>and</strong> entirely civilian UN<br />
umbrella mission with a year-long m<strong>and</strong>ate to cover civilian<br />
police, human rights, <strong>and</strong> judicial reform, functioning in t<strong>and</strong>em<br />
with the UN development mission <strong>and</strong> under the auspices<br />
of the UN General Assembly, however, would follow. In all,<br />
<strong>Haiti</strong>'s political l<strong>and</strong>scape at the dawn of the new century could<br />
best be described as "fluid <strong>and</strong> fragile."<br />
Toward Municipal, Parliamentary, <strong>and</strong> Presidential Elections<br />
As debilitating as the political crisis that prevailed in <strong>Haiti</strong><br />
following the April 1997 elections was, it can be viewed as an<br />
indicator of considerable progress toward the reform of <strong>Haiti</strong>'s<br />
system of government <strong>and</strong> politics, particularly in the use—or<br />
lack thereof—of power or force to resolve a political crisis.<br />
Indeed, the absence of the army as the traditional means to<br />
resolve political problems has given birth in <strong>Haiti</strong> to the phenomenon<br />
of political gridlock. Unfortunately, however, the<br />
ability of <strong>Haiti</strong>'s political leaders to dialogue <strong>and</strong> use political<br />
compromise as a non-violent, democratic means to resolve disputes<br />
remains underdeveloped. Nevertheless, the fact that disputes<br />
were confronted, if not resolved, by debate <strong>and</strong> political<br />
maneuvering, not by violence or weapons, is a positive change<br />
in <strong>Haiti</strong>'s political culture.<br />
425