Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies
by Helen Chapin Metz et al by Helen Chapin Metz et al
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies function to the executive branch. Subsequently, a CEP was formed and, working with massive international assistance, gradually oversaw the creation of a framework for parliamentary, municipal, and communal section elections. Between June and September 1995, the elections were held. International observers deemed the elections "free, fair, and flawed," the latter characterization resulting principally from the commission's mixed performance (see Democracy Restored, 1994- 96, ch. 6). Thousands of candidates from dozens of political parties stood for election to communal section councils, municipal councils, and the parliament—a total of 2,192 positions. Few incumbents won re-election. Swept into office was a new generation of political leaders, practically all of whom ran either as candidates of Lavalas Political Organization (Organisation Politique Lavalas—OPL) or one of the three other political parties that had joined the OPL to form the Lavalas Political Platform (Plate-forme Politique Lavalas—PPL), or simply as Lavalas independents. In a break with Haiti's political past, the victorious candidates were residents of the constituencies they were elected to represent or to govern, and few counted themselves as members of the traditional political class ( classe politique) . Presidential Transition, October 1995-March 1997 As Haiti's newly elected officials took office, Smarck Michel resigned in October 1995, largely over issues linked to economic policy. Michel had endorsed macroeconomic policies promoted by the multilateral and bilateral donors who in January 1995 had pledged approximately US$2.8 billion in aid for Haiti's recovery. That policy, based largely on such reform measures as the divestiture of state enterprises ("privatization") and reduced tariffs ("free trade"), became a contentious issue among Lavalas partisans who did not want to undermine the state, but rather to make it finally render services to citizens. Michel was quickly replaced by Claudette Werleigh, the sitting minister of foreign affairs, nominated by Aristide, whose position on macroeconomic policies was enigmatic, and confirmed by the new, pro-Lavalas parliament. Werleigh's government, however, did not move on economic reform policies, thus precipitating a slow-down in aid flows, as internationally identified conditionalities to disbursements went unmet. Attention to this crisis was diverted, however, by a growing focus on the status of the presidential election scheduled for 418
Haiti: Government and Politics late 1995. As the election date drew near, speculation centered around two questions: would President Aristide seek to extend his term by three years to make up for the time spent in exile, and, if not, to whom would he give the Lavalas nod as candidate. Both questions remained unanswered until several weeks prior to the election date. Ultimately, Aristide did not respond to pressure from among his partisans for his additional three years and endorsed his close friend and first prime minister, Rene Garcia Preval, as the Lavalas candidate. Running under the Bo Tab la (Everyone Around the Table) symbol of Lavalas, Preval easily defeated the handful of barely known opposition candidates from small political groups. Although his margin of victory was huge, voter turnout, at just 28 percent, was significantly lower than the 51 percent for the parliamentary and municipal elections held just months earlier. Haiti experienced the first peaceful transition in its history of democratically elected presidents at Preval's inauguration on February 7, 1996. As Jean-Bertrand Aristide handed over the presidential sash, his successor assumed the difficult roles of leading a country still reeling from decades of bad governance and of succeeding an enormously popular, and young, national hero. Preval chose agronomist and OPL partisan Rosny Smarth as his prime minister nominee. Smarth easily won parliamentary confirmation as the post-intervention international military presence continued to diminish. The MNF had already withdrawn on March 31, 1995, handing over its authority to a much smaller UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), whose mandate was set to end a year later. Through a series of UN Security Council resolutions responding to requests from the government of Haiti, however, UNMIH's mandate was extended to July 1996. The UN peacekeepers ultimately remained in Haiti until November 1997, however, through a vastly scaled down United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) between July 1996 and July 1997, and an even smaller United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) from August to November 1997. While the international military presence was diminishing and the PNH was assuming complete responsibility for Haiti's public safety, the Preval/Smarth government enacted programs and policies aimed at addressing Haiti's most pressing social and economic problems. To emphasize its advocacy of decentralization, the government spotlighted programs that would move resources out of Port-au-Prince to the countryside. 419
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<strong>Haiti</strong>: Government <strong>and</strong> Politics<br />
late 1995. As the election date drew near, speculation centered<br />
around two questions: would President Aristide seek to extend<br />
his term by three years to make up for the time spent in exile,<br />
<strong>and</strong>, if not, to whom would he give the Lavalas nod as c<strong>and</strong>idate.<br />
Both questions remained unanswered until several weeks<br />
prior to the election date. Ultimately, Aristide did not respond<br />
to pressure from among his partisans for his additional three<br />
years <strong>and</strong> endorsed his close friend <strong>and</strong> first prime minister,<br />
Rene Garcia Preval, as the Lavalas c<strong>and</strong>idate. Running under<br />
the Bo Tab la (Everyone Around the Table) symbol of Lavalas,<br />
Preval easily defeated the h<strong>and</strong>ful of barely known opposition<br />
c<strong>and</strong>idates from small political groups. Although his margin of<br />
victory was huge, voter turnout, at just 28 percent, was significantly<br />
lower than the 51 percent for the parliamentary <strong>and</strong><br />
municipal elections held just months earlier. <strong>Haiti</strong> experienced<br />
the first peaceful transition in its history of democratically<br />
elected presidents at Preval's inauguration on February 7,<br />
1996. As Jean-Bertr<strong>and</strong> Aristide h<strong>and</strong>ed over the presidential<br />
sash, his successor assumed the difficult roles of leading a<br />
country still reeling from decades of bad governance <strong>and</strong> of<br />
succeeding an enormously popular, <strong>and</strong> young, national hero.<br />
Preval chose agronomist <strong>and</strong> OPL partisan Rosny Smarth as<br />
his prime minister nominee. Smarth easily won parliamentary<br />
confirmation as the post-intervention international military<br />
presence continued to diminish. The MNF had already withdrawn<br />
on March 31, 1995, h<strong>and</strong>ing over its authority to a much<br />
smaller UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission<br />
in <strong>Haiti</strong> (UNMIH), whose m<strong>and</strong>ate was set to end a year later.<br />
Through a series of UN Security Council resolutions responding<br />
to requests from the government of <strong>Haiti</strong>, however,<br />
UNMIH's m<strong>and</strong>ate was extended to July 1996. The UN peacekeepers<br />
ultimately remained in <strong>Haiti</strong> until November 1997,<br />
however, through a vastly scaled down United Nations Support<br />
Mission in <strong>Haiti</strong> (UNSMIH) between July 1996 <strong>and</strong> July 1997,<br />
<strong>and</strong> an even smaller United Nations Transition Mission in <strong>Haiti</strong><br />
(UNTMIH) from August to November 1997.<br />
While the international military presence was diminishing<br />
<strong>and</strong> the PNH was assuming complete responsibility for <strong>Haiti</strong>'s<br />
public safety, the Preval/Smarth government enacted programs<br />
<strong>and</strong> policies aimed at addressing <strong>Haiti</strong>'s most pressing<br />
social <strong>and</strong> economic problems. To emphasize its advocacy of<br />
decentralization, the government spotlighted programs that<br />
would move resources out of Port-au-Prince to the countryside.<br />
419