Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies

Dominican Republic: Government and Politics
tion and continued commitment to violence among some. In
1986 there were no active political forces committed to the use
of violence. As in his first period as president, Balaguer sought
to place officers he trusted in key places, occasionally rotating
them to keep them off balance. However, far more than in the
1960s and 1970s, he now made a mockery of any sense of military
professionalism or career path. Balaguer also permitted
the budget to decline; paid the military appallingly low salaries,
thus inviting corruption; allowed the armed forces to become
one of the most top heavy on the continent; and made generals
out of individuals such as his personal chauffeur.
The decline in military professionalism continued to deteriorate
the longer Balaguer remained in office. Not surprisingly,
given the low salaries and lack of official functions for many
officers, corruption was alleged to be rampant. For example,
because of their presence along the Haitian border, the
Dominican military played an important role in acquiring Haitian
labor for state sugar mills, for which bribery was often
involved, and also in "facilitating" contraband trade between
the two countries (especially during the period of the international
embargo of Haiti in 1993 and 1994).
Balaguer's policies helped provoke unhappiness within the
ranks of the military, especially among frustrated individuals in
the lower ranks who perceived their chance of advancement as
blocked by individuals who had been brought back from retirement
and remained in place. Although some military might
have been willing to support Balaguer by force of arms if called
to do so, during the 1990s it appears that the Dominican
armed forces were becoming increasingly divided in their political
loyalties. In both the 1994 and 1996 elections, all the major
presidential candidates and parties possessed the support of at
least some military officers. Opposition parties did not complain
of centralized military harassment against them,
although evidence of local-level military bias was present.
In sum, as a result of the actions of the PRD and the more
cautious and cynical steps subsequently by Balaguer, the
Dominican armed forces were largely not a political threat to
democracy. Yet, occasionally, firm action was still required by
the president: soon after assuming the presidency in August
1996, President Fernandez was forced to dismiss the head of
the air force, General Juan Bautista Rojas Tabar, when the general
challenged the president's political authority. President
Fernandez has been seeking to improve the degree of profes-
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