Little General Store Propane Explosion - US Chemical Safety and ...

Little General Store September 2008
Key Findings
1. The propane service technicians, emergency responders, and store employees did not evacuate the
area as recommended by nationally accepted guidance for propane emergencies.
2. A defect in the existing tank’s liquid withdrawal valve caused it to malfunction and remain in an open
position.
3. The junior propane service technician who was servicing the tank on the day of the incident had no
formal training and did not recognize the defect in the withdrawal valve. He was also working
unsupervised, even though he had been on the job for only one and a half months.
4. The placement of the 500-gallon propane tank against the building’s exterior back wall provided
releasing propane a direct path into the store’s interior.
5. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s and National Fire Protection Association’s
propane standards require training but do not include curricula, practical exercises, or knowledge
evaluation.
6. 911 operators in the United States lack propane emergency guidance to help them collect important
information from callers, offer life-saving advice, and convey relevant information to first responders.
7. Firefighters in West Virginia are required to attend a minimum of four hours of hazardous materials
emergency response training as part of their initial training sequence, but refresher training is not
required. The responding Ghent Volunteer Fire Department captain last attended a hazardous
materials response course in 1998.
8. Propane safety and emergency training is voluntary for fire department personnel in West Virginia.
None of the responders from the Ghent Volunteer Fire Department had specific propane emergency
training.
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