YDS 2021 in Review

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The buzzwords circulating at the end of 2020 were as nauseating in their number as
they were disappointing in their cliches. Picking a word to summarise the first year
of the pandemic was all too easy. So, at the end of 2021, I was expecting the same
oversaturation of awfully simple tags to capture the year that was. However, this did
not eventuate. I’ve got nothing. At this point, I’d love something as sickeningly
overused as “unprecedented” to help me out.
Instead, at the end of 2021, what we have been left with is a series of incredibly
bleak developments.
2021 was testing for democracy. Six days into the new year, Australians awoke to
scenes of the most major assault on the US Capitol in two centuries (pg. 1) in
extreme efforts to overturn the result of the country’s 2020 Presidential election.
Myanmar erupted into a military coup in February (pg. 73) which has seen the
imprisonment of an icon of the nation’s pro-democracy movement and former
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. There were major student-led protests in Thailand (pg. 69),
crackdowns on journalists in Belarus (pg. 24), and concerning surveillance of human
rights workers in several countries through the use of Pegasus spyware (pg. 128).
Even Biden’s December Summit for Democracy failed to elevate hopes of change,
and instead brought attention to the ill health of the world’s democracies and the
work that is still needed to uphold democratic principles and keep leaders
accountable.
2021 stoked old conflicts and tensions. Airstrikes in Gaza (pg. 114), geopolitical
contests over the Black Sea (pg. 28), Kanak separatism in New Caledonia (pg. 44)
following the final failed independence referendum, and civil war in Ethiopia (pg. 98)
were just some examples. Disturbing images from Afghanistan after the final US
troop withdrawals in August were another unforgettable stain on the year (pg. 86)
and we will no doubt wear the horror of that memory for years to come.
2021 also represented yet another year of new precedents for the climate crisis,
with Europe’s summer afflicted by a series of detrimental fires across the continent
(pg. 41), severe droughts in Central Asia (pg. 56), and increased water scarcity in the
Middle East (pg. 109). A new era of space exploration (pg. 132) left many feeling as if
we had abandoned hopes for our ‘Planet A,’ and repeated shocks to global supply
chains reminded us of the unsustainable nature of global consumption and trade.
(pg. 141).

The 26th COP summit in Glasgow might have provided a bastion of hope for longterm
change, had the years gone by not left us overtly sceptical of world leaders’
commitment to addressing the climate crisis, a scepticism exemplified by the
chairman of the conference breaking down in tears feeling he had failed to do
enough.
It is heart-wrenching to look back on a year so punctuated by human suffering.
These are the stories, images, and events that make the history we will carry with us
into this next year and the year after. The work of that is unmistakeably dark.
But amidst this suffering, I also find cause for hope. Putting global issues under the
microscope not only highlights inequality and injustice where they exist, but calls us
to action and encourages us to do our best to effect even the smallest change. It
challenges us to communicate what is wrong with the world, and to disrupt our
want for comfort and well-meaning ignorance. In doing so, we yearn for something
better, and we are ever-more motivated to chase it.
So, as you comb these pages retelling what was another undeniably challenging
year, get angry.
Be passionate.
Be empathetic.
Be agents of change, and use it to fuel your 2022.
Victoria Cooper
Young Diplomats Society's Editor-in-Chief (2020-21)

1
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE
WORLD'S GREATEST DEMOCRACY
Liep Gatwech
C O N T
E N T S
1 0
THE SUMMIT FOR DEMOCRACY
Satara Uthayakumaran
1 3
BIDEN'S CHINA STRATEGY TAKES SHAPE: A
PLAN TO TACKLE THE EMERGING COLD WAR?
Cameron Smith
1 9
US-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE RISE OF ANTI-
ASIAN SENTIMENTS
Kelly Phan & Bob Mulders
2 4
EUROPE’S LAST DICTATOR: SANCTIONS,
MIGRANTS AND WAR GAMES
Eliza Archer
2 8
HOT POTATO: GEOPOLITICAL CONTEST IN THE
BLACK SEA
Anton Murrell
3 4
AUKUS
Patrick Quinn
3 9
AUF WIEDERSEHEN MUTTI
Eliza Archer
4 1
FIRES AND FLOODS ACROSS EUROPE
Jazmin Wright

4 4
THE FINAL INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM OF NEW
CALEDONIA
Declan Hourd
4 9
FUTURE FOCUSED: AN UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONAL
ALLIANCE
Satara Uthayakumaran
5 2
EAST ASIA IN REVIEW
Chloe Marriott
5 6
THE WASH-UP OF CENTRAL ASIA'S DROUGHT OF 2021
Samuel Garrett
6 0
TURKMENISTAN'S PRESIDENT GURBANGULY
BERDIMUKHAMEDOV'S YEAR IN PICTURES
Samuel Garrett
6 2
A RETURN TO JAPAN’S REVOLVING DOOR OF PRIME
MINISTERS?
Daniel Gage-Brown
6 9
PROTESTS IN THAILAND: A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
VOICING THE ONCE UNTHINKABLE
Aishwarya Gowda
7 3
THE COUP IN MYANMAR: INTERNAL VIOLENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS
Declan Hourd
8 4
CAMBODIAN DICTATOR PUSHED CLOSER TO CHINA
Daniel Gage-Brown

8 6
THE FALL OF AFGHANISTAN
Jacques Joseph
9 0
SUB-SAHARAN IN REVIEW
Ezekiel Dobelsky
C O N T
E N T S
9 5
COUP IN SUDAN
Isabella Currie
9 8
ETHIOPIAN CIVIL WAR AND THE NOBEL
PEACE PRIZE
Liep Gatwech
1 0 3
CHAD BEYOND DEBY
Madeleine Bishop
1 0 6
MALI'S COUP WITHIN A COUP
Liep Gatwech
1 0 9
MODERNISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
MIDDLE EAST'S INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS
UNDER THREAT
Elle Greaves
1 1 3
A SPOTLIGHT ON SAUDI ARABIA'S
COMMITMENT TO GENDER EQUALITY AND
LGBTQIA+ RIGHTS
Elle Greaves
1 1 4
AIR STRIKES IN GAZA
Bella Baker

1 1 6
OFF TO THE RACES: THE 2021 ISRAELI ELECTIONS
Satara Uthayakumaran
1 1 9
IDIPLOMAT: DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COVID
DIGITAL AGE
Sarah Knight
1 2 2
FASTER, HIGHER, STRONGER, TOGETHER: THE
OLYMPICS IN THE TIME OF COVID
Patrick Quinn
1 2 5
INITIALLY A SLOW STARTER, CHINA IS NOW
MAKING WAVES IN SPACE
Belle Davenport
1 2 8
PROJECT PEGASUS: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT
PEGASUS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORLD
Timothy Pinzone
1 3 2
THE PRIVATE SPACE RACE
Jonathan Lim
1 3 9
THE EMERGENCE OF HYPERSONIC WEAPONS
TESTING
Hannah Scallion
1 4 1
CAPITAL AND CONSUMPTION: GLOBAL TRADE IN A
POST-COVID WORLD
Nathaniel Sgambellone

P H O T O B Y R É M I T H O R E L O N U N S P L A S H

P H O T O : G A Y A T R I M A L H O T R A O N U N S P L A S H
TODAY, WE CELEBRATE
THE TRIUMPH NOT OF
A CANDIDATE,
BUT OF A CAUSE,
THE CAUSE OF
DEMOCRACY.
- P R E S I D E N T J O E B I D E N A T H I S
I N A U G U R A T I O N

by Liep Gatwech
Although the US Capitol Hill
Insurrection began on January 6, its
inception took place much earlier. As
President Trump and submissive
Republicans attempted to subvert
democracy for months, they fed the big
lie to their supporters until it blinded
their perceptions of reality, truth and
reason. The United States is
supposedly the world's oldest and
most successful democracy, but the
events of January 6 challenged this
notion. It is a day the world will never
forget. As we look back at the events of
the day, it is more important now than
ever that we continually uphold
democratic institutions, principles and
policies as authoritarianism begins to
gain a foothold in Western society.
8 A M : " A L L M I K E P E N C E
H A S T O D O . . . "
The day begins with an incendiary tweet
sent out by the former President,
spewing the same false rhetoric and
placing the burden of stealing the
election on his Vice President, Mike
Pence.
The tweet reads: “States want to correct
their votes, which they now know were
based on irregularities and fraud, plus
corrupt processes never received
legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to
do is send them back to the States, AND
WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for
extreme courage!”
P A G E 1 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

P H O T O : T H E N E W Y O R K T I M E S
9 A M –
1 1 A M :
T H E
S T I R R I N G
At 9AM, the “Save America” Rally, also known as the “March to
Save America”, commences outside the White House. The rally,
meant to intimidate members of the United States Congress,
heads towards the United States capitol. Representative Mo
Brooks (R-AL) asks, “will you fight for America?”, in a speech
about “kicking ass”.
P A G E 2 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S
P H O T O : S A M U E L C O R U M / G E T T Y I M A G E S

As the rally progresses, at 10:50AM, during his speech, former lawyer and ardent
supporter of the former President, Rudy Giuliani, calls for “trial by combat”. An
estimated 50,000 protestors were in attendance in support of the former President
Trump.
At 10:58AM, members of the far-right militia, the Proud Boys, head towards the Capitol
building. In a conversation with David Grossman, a Newsnight US correspondent, one
member of the Proud Boys asserts that they are “taking their country back.” The group
was equipped with radios and tactical gear, a BBC correspondent says that it “was
clear” that they were communicating and coordinating with other individuals.
1 1 A M - 1 : 3 0 P M : U N P R E P A R E D
At 12PM, President Trump begins his long-awaited speech and uses this opportunity
to further his allegations that the election was wrongly stolen from him, while
constantly attacking his Vice President Mike Pence and the Republican members of
Congress. Pence was named 6 times during this speech. 15 minutes into his speech,
Trump urges his supporters to converge on the Capitol, telling the crowd that he
knows everyone “will soon be marching over”. Although President Trump reassured
the crowd that he would walk with them to the Capitol, he later headed towards the
comfort of the White House.
"We will never give up, we will never concede", Trump told his supporters.
P H O T O : A S S O C I A T E D P R E S S
P A G E 3 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

At 12:49PM, an improvised explosive device is detected outside the Republican
National Committee headquarters, shortly after an identical device, later identified
as a pipe bomb, is found outside the Democratic National Committee headquarters.
At 12:55PM, Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, begins the certification process.
The crowd outside Capitol Hill begins to gain momentum during the President’s
speech. In emails, Federal Protection Service officers note that an estimated 10,000-
15,000 people are moving towards the capitol. At this same time, a mob of
supporters converge on a police barrier and overwhelm officers. Though the police
outnumbered the mob, they were unsuccessful in stopping them. Out the front of
the capitol, the crowd wield makeshift weapons with one man standing on a
makeshift gallows which includes a noose, while the crowd continues to chant “USA!”
and “Fight for Trump!”.
At 1:10PM, President Trump concludes his speech by telling his supporters that if
they don't “fight like hell” they “won't have a country anymore”. Shortly after, Capitol
Police Officers call for backup due to multiple law enforcement injuries.
P H O T O : S H A Y H O R S E / N U R P H O T O / G E T T Y I M A G E S
One officer states that the mob is throwing “metal poles” and with this, the Capitol
Police send out an evacuation warning.
With an estimate of 50,000 supporters violent crowds begin to surround the Capitol,
converging on both sides of the building. The police began to use tear gas and
pepper spray to subdue the protestors.
P A G E 4 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

P H O T O : A P P H O T O
1 : 3 0 P M -
4 P M : C H A O S
At 1:45PM, the mob
overwhelms Capitol Police
who are tasked with
protecting the west entrance
towards the capitol.
Significantly outnumbered,
law enforcement are forced
to retreat up the steps
towards the Capitol. The rally
is officially declared a riot as
a response to the violent
mob who continues to
overwhelm and combat
police. The chief of the Capitol Police requests immediate urgent assistance from
the District of Columbia National Guard.
Meanwhile, President Trump stays silent on the unfolding events.
At 2:05PM, the first death is reported, a man has died of a heart attack.
At 2:10PM, the mob on the western side of the capitol breach the final barricade and
approach one of the entrances located directly below the senate chamber. Rioters
enter the capitol by breaking windows.
P H O T O : R E U T E R S
P A G E 5 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

At 2:13PM, Vice President Mike Pence is suddenly evacuated from the senate floor
and an immediate recess of the senate is called. Protestors break through glass and
push inside the Capitol. The door is opened by the members who first breached the
building. Equipped with tactical gear, the mob progress through the capitol,
vandalising the building as they go.
Capitol Police Officer Eugene
Goodman makes contact with
Senator Mitt Romney and warns
him of an impending crowd of
supporters. Senator Romney
heeds the advice of Officer
Goodman and changes course,
effectively saving his life. Officer
Goodman makes contact with the
mob and leads them away from
the senate chamber while another
mob enters the senate chamber,
which has now been evacuated.
The White House and House
chambers go into lockdown.
President Trump continues to
remain silent.
P H O T O : A B C N E W S
P H O T O : W A S H I N G T O N P O S T
P A G E 6 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S
At 2:24PM, President Trump
breaks his silence to tweet about
Vice President Pence amid the
carnage at the Capitol, stating
Mike Pence, “didn't have the
courage to do what should have
been done.”
More rioters break through police
lines and barricades, making their
way through the main entrance to
the capitol. Rioters spread
through the building, pillaging and
damaging congressional offices,
stealing equipment and
documents. Discourse in the
house is suspended and members
are told to put on their gas masks,
preparing to use them if
necessary, and are told to hide
under their seat.

It is 2:41PM, rioters have been inside the Capitol for almost 30 minutes. Outside of
the House chamber, a mob attempts to break through locked doors to an area
where members of congress are present.
A woman who
attempts to climb
through the glass
is shot by an
officer with a
firearm on the
other side of the
door as seen on
camera. The
woman, later
identified as
Ashley Babbitt,
falls to the ground
and is later
confirmed dead.
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S
Rioters pillage the senate chamber, looking for evacuated senators and going
through confidential documents left behind by senators.
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S
At 3:13PM,
with the
insurrection
still underway,
the Police and
National
Guard are still
unable to
secure the
Capitol.
P A G E 7 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

Mobs with confederate flags, makeshift weapons and cameras continue to litter the
Capitol and its surroundings. President Trump breaks his silence with a tweet, telling
his supporters to “remain peaceful”. The District of Columbia National Guard is fully
mobilized and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi holds a phone call with the
Governor of Virginia, confirming all available assets of the State of Virginia, including
the National Guard, are being sent to Washington D.C. to aid the United States
Capitol.
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S
4 P M : V E R Y S P E C I A L P E O P L E
At 4:05PM, the capitol still unsecured, President-elect Biden holds a press
conference denouncing the insurrection and asking President Trump to “demand”
the end of the siege. 12 minutes later, President Trump uploads a video to social
media wherein he tells his supporters to go home and that “we have to have peace”,
but still continues to maintain that the election was stolen and calls his supporters,
“very special people'' who he loves.
P A G E 8 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

P H O T O : A S S O C I A T E D P R E S S
6 P M : R E S I L I E N C E
By 6:00PM, the United States Capitol Police and the DC National Guard have mostly
cleared the capitol and at 6:01PM. President Trump goes on to tweet that we should
“remember this day forever!” 14 Minutes later, authorities have finally established a
perimeter on the Western side of the capitol.
Following the day’s events, at around 7PM, Twitter suspended the account of the
former President and Facebook removed his posts, citing his role in stoking the
gross violence committed during the day by his supporters.
By 8PM, the US Capitol Police finally declares the building secure, and the siege is
over.
P A G E 9 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

P H O T O : E V A N V U C C I / A P P H O T O
by Satara Uthayakumaran
From December 9 to 10, 2021, US President Joe Biden held the first of two Summits
for Democracy, the first summit of its kind. President Biden, on the International Day
of Democracy stated, “No democracy is perfect, and no democracy is ever final.
Every gain made, every barrier broken, is the result of determined, unceasing work.”
However, it is important to determine whether this event’s purpose is to strengthen
global democracies or cater to US foreign interests. Biden’s promise to hold the
summit, made during his presidential campaign, seemed to be motivated by a
desire to separate the US from Donald Trump’s authoritarian allies, and once again
re-establish America as the world’s champion defender of human rights.
There is no doubt that after the US failure in Afghanistan, and corresponding global
outrage, this event was perceived to be a welcome one. Indeed, one of the main
objectives of the event was to counter the influence of autocratic nations such as
Russia and China, both of which were not invited to the event. The three key themes
of the event were: defending against authoritarianism, addressing and fighting
corruption, and advancing respect for human rights.
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“No democracy is perfect, and no democracy is ever
final. Every gain made, every barrier broken, is the
result of determined, unceasing work.”
T H E S T A T E O F D E M O C R A C Y
In order to best support the summit’s objectives, Freedom House put together
democracy ratings, scores and identified the main areas of concern. The
organisation claims that this information has been sourced from trusted research.
69% of the 113 participants invited to the event are regarded by a Carnegie
Endowment study to be ‘free’. 28% are ‘partly free’ and 3% evaluated as ‘not free’.
Sweden comes in first, with a top score of 100/100, followed closely by countries
including Australia, with a score of 97/100. The state with the lowest score is the
Democratic Republic of Congo, with a result of 20/100.
Hungary was the only EU state not to receive an invite. As such, it attempted to block
the EU from attending the virtual summit. Further, many states throughout the
Middle East were excluded. This may be perceived as unfair, given that countries
including the DRC were included despite their extremely low democracy ratings. The
US Government has been extremely vague about how they formulated the invite
list, though the decision-making process was overseen by Shanthi Kalathil, the
coordinator for democracy and human rights at the National Security Council.
C R I T I C I S M
The biggest ideological and social media backlash against the virtual summit was
initiated by both Russia and China. Both states’ ambassadors to Washington even
co-wrote an article, making the observation that the summit was “a product of cold
war thinking.” Further to this, Russia released a statement, highlighting the failings of
US democracy. The 2000-word piece covered corporate manipulation of the media,
the illegal enforcement of democracy overseas, and the charge that the 2020
election had been ‘stolen’ from Donald Trump. China has also issued its own
criticism, particularly in response to Taiwan being invited. It produced a long white
paper, detailing its perceived superiorities in the Chinese model of democracy.
P A G E 1 1 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

The white paper claims that:
“there is no fixed model of democracy; it manifests itself in
many forms. The principles of One Person, One Vote and party
competition underlying the Western electoral system are
propagated by them as the sole criterion for democracy.”
It must be noted that even though the US is attempting to make Southeast Asia a
priority in diplomatic affairs, only three ASEAN members have been invited to the
summit; Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The issue of ‘virtue-signalling’ has
also arisen in discussions pertaining to the event. The summit has been questioned
by both right and left-wing groups, with Republican-oriented Professor Dr Colin
Dueck arguing that the summit is simply a campaigning position, not a governing
position. Only time will tell whether such an event proves fruitful or simply
tokenistic.
C O N C L U S I O N
Given the nature of the event, a collaboration between political leaders, NGOs and
private sector organisations, there are multiple sets of data, and actors to hold
nations responsible. One can only hope that this multi-faceted approach will result
in greater accountability and a breadth of diverse solutions, to ensure the protection
and creation of democratic systems of government.
In particular, there is a great opportunity for countries in the African continent to
contribute to the discussion, and perhaps dispel a longstanding western definition
of democracy. However, this may be unlikely, given the US’ decision to prevent China
attending the event, seeming hesitant to engage in conversations about re-defining
the meaning of ‘democracy’.
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P A G E 1 3 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

by Cameron Smith | YDS Regional Correspondent
The Biden administration’s strategy to
combat an increasingly assertive China
has started to take shape and signals
greater Sino-US competition. Biden’s
strategy is built on the belief that China
is the only geopolitical rival that truly
threatens the international rules-based
order. China, over recent years, has
repeatedly violated international law
and made clear its regional ambitions. It
has illegally expanded its territory and
maritime zone in the South China Sea,
conducted cyberattacks on foreign
countries (including the US), and
continues to threaten an invasion of
Taiwan.
Over the last ten years, the country has
increased its defence spending by over
750 per cent, and engaged in industrialscale
theft of intellectual property
across the world. Sino-US tensions have
risen sharply since 2017 when the US
declared China a “strategic competitor”
and key areas of competition have
crystallised - trade, technology,
cyberspace and military capability.
The Trump administration, though
clumsy and inflammatory, clearly
articulated the threat of China,
frequently citing ‘China’ as the
malevolent architect of various global
ills, which consequently hardened
American attitudes towards the
country. However, it lacked strategy and
Trump failed to achieve any meaningful
advantage over his competitor. Biden is
attempting to formulate a more
comprehensive and coherent strategy
than his predecessor to compete with
China on multiple fronts. This includes
engaging in multilateralism that utilises
US diplomatic strength, pursues
aggressive economic competition and
repositions US military strength against
China. In this strategy, the groundwork
for a new Cold War is evident, which will
inevitably take place in the Indo-Pacific.
T H E R E A S S E R T I O N
O F A U . S .
M U L T I L A T E R A L
A P P R O A C H
The Biden administration’s attempts to
coordinate with traditional and
emerging US partners clearly
demonstrates its efforts to rally allies
into a coherent bloc against Beijing. This
ambition aims to politically and
economically inhibit China. The goal can
be exemplified in two early actions of
the administration: the first ever headof-government
meeting of ‘the Quad’
and high-profile visits to strategic
partners in Asia.
The Quad is not a military alliance.
However, it is an important cornerstone
of the US regional security architecture.
During the meeting in March, the
partners announced the Quad’s
objective to manufacture and distribute
one billion COVID vaccinations
throughout the Indo-Pacific, which is
P A G E 1 4 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

undoubtedly aimed at countering
China’s own vaccine rollout in the
region. This is one part of the US
strategy to “win hearts and minds” in its
soft power competition with China. The
announcement of an in-person meeting
later this year suggests further action
will likely be taken to counter China
through this framework.
In his Asian diplomatic tour, US
Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin
visited India, Japan and South Korea. In
particular, his visits to Tokyo and Seoul,
where he was joined by the US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken were
self-admittingly aimed at boosting
military cooperation with American
allies and fostering “credible
deterrence” against China. This marks a
clear departure from the ‘America First’
approach and the renewal of traditional
US multilateralism.
As explained in their Washington Post
op-ed before they embarked to Asia,
Blinken and Austin stated that “our
alliances are what our military calls
‘force multipliers’. We’re able to achieve
far more with them than we could
without them”. The incredible size of
the network of alliances and
partnerships, as they point out, is
something unique to the US in the Indo-
Pacific. This has allowed them to
coordinate with their partners to
impose sanctions over alleged human
rights abuses in Xinjiang, which the
Biden administration recently declared
as genocide.
“Our alliances are what our
military calls ‘force
multipliers’. We’re able to
achieve far more with them
than we could without them”
The US multilateral approach is
something that Beijing cannot match.
China maintains few tentatively held
alliances, and its partnerships are
mostly with pariah states. This is
something that China is attempting to
change, as seen with its warming
relations with Cambodia and Pakistan.
However, these are the last picks for a
team, and the quality and value of the
alliance is an issue. Moscow remains
China's most powerful partnership, but
this relationship is poisoned by a long
history of mutual suspicion. Similarly,
while North Korea would be the closest
to a military alliance for China, Kim
Jong-un and Xi Jinping hardly see eye-toeye.
A lack of reliable partnerships will
remain a major challenge for Beijing if
great power competition continues to
ramp up.
E C O N O M I C
C O M P E T I T I O N A N D U . S .
S T R A T E G I C
I N F R A S T R U C T U R E
Efforts to economically out-compete
China also appear to be central tenants
of Biden’s emerging strategy. As
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economist William H. Olverholt
theorises, modern weaponry has
become so lethal that gaining power
through conquest is no longer an
option. Instead, the path to global
hegemony runs through the economy,
which depends on capable
infrastructure.
Biden appears to agree with this
assessment, arguing that he expects
the rivalry with China will take the form
of “extreme competition” rather than
conflict. Under this thinking, Biden
recently unveiled a major US
infrastructure plan, costing over $2
trillion, which he argued would create
the “most resilient, innovative economy
in the world.” In doing so, he contends
that America “will win the future” and
the “global competition with China.”
This is not simply crafty messaging to
drum up political will to overcome
Washington’s long-standing struggles
with major buildouts, it is a strategic
issue that the plan attempts to
overcome.
When it comes to infrastructure, the US
is forced to play catch-up with China in
key areas including high-speed rail
network, renewable energy and 5G
networks. If implemented, Biden’s plan
could spur the US to compete more
effectively with China. Biden has also
floated the idea of US-aligned
democratic countries creating an
initiative to rival China’s Belt and Road.
This will both fund infrastructure
development and act as a source of
influence in developing countries. The
administration is also working to boost
government-directed investment in
technology sectors crucial to US
economic advancement. The policy has
rising bipartisan support, due to a belief
that China's civil-military fusion will
overwhelm American efforts unless it is
matched. At the same time, the US is
ramping up targeted measures to limit
exports of sensitive technologies that
empower China’s own technology and
the People’s Liberation Army. This will
be one major responsibility of the
Pentagon’s new China Task Force, as
well as stamping out backdoor Chinese
financing and hardware in the defense
industry supply chain.
S U S T A I N I N G M I L I T A R Y
E N G A G E M E N T
When it comes to the Biden
administration’s military approach, they
will continue the Obama
administration’s attempts to reorient
towards a military strategy purpose
built for the Indo-Pacific and great
power conflict. This involves shifting the
US Marine Corps from a second land
army, generated by the War on Terror,
to smaller amphibious units ready to
conduct an island-hopping campaign.
The Biden administration is also
ramping up joint-military exercises in
the Indo-Pacific, displayed in a recent
French-Quad naval exercise in the Bay
of Bengal.
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Furthermore, the administration is
facing pressure from both sides of
Congress to increase defence
spending, as China’s own military
capability rapidly advances and
becomes more assertive in the region.
In his recently unveiled first proposed
budget, he has only committed to a
marginal increase in defence spending
that would see the Pentagon’s budget
rise to $715 billion for the fiscal year
2022.
While some have argued that the
proposed budget is too meager to
“keep America and our allies safe”,
Biden may be reluctant to increase
spending as he faces several other
economic priorities at home, including a
growing national debt and ambitious
policy agendas. However, he may not
have much choice. Admiral Philip
Davidson, Chief of US Indo-Pacific
Command, stated that the military
balance in the region has “become
more unfavourable” to the US and
warned that China may attempt to seize
control of Taiwan within the next six
years. China is already ramping up
military activity in its neighbourhood
and is boosting defence spending.
These realities make, at the very least,
any reduction in US defence spending
politically non-viable for the Biden
administration.
Biden has also sustained US military
engagement with China, as exercised by
previous administrations. Freedom of
navigation operations have continued,
both in the South China Sea and the
Taiwan Strait. Under Biden, Americans
have sent warships to transit the
Taiwan Strait on three separate
occasions. These are viewed as hostile
by China and signal Biden’s support for
Taiwan. Advancing Taiwan’s security has
been labelled a ‘vital national security
interest’ to the US and the proposed US
Strategic Competition Act has called for
the US to support building the capability
in Taiwan’s defenses. Biden’s military
approach to China will centre on
deterring them from miscalculating,
while preparing to win a ‘hot war’ in the
event that it fails to succeed.
United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and United
States Forces Japan Commander Lieutenant General Kevin
Schneider at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan during Austin visit
to Japan on March 15, 2021.
W H A T D O E S T H E F U T U R E
H O L D ?
Currently, Biden’s China strategy is
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more multifaceted than that of
his predecessor. Trump was
successful in rebuilding
initiatives, such as the Quad,
and jolting the US into a more
combative posture, but his
approach was lacking in
substance and grand strategy.
Conversely, Biden continues
on with some of his
predecessors' policies, while
also combining it with a
multifaceted approach that will
create a more united and
sustained approach in defence
of US interests in the region. At
a time that future historians
might call the Second Cold
War, this is good news.
Still, the Biden administration
remains untested by China
and it is unclear what the US
will do in the event of an attack
on Taiwan. Would the US risk a
global war and economic
catastrophe for Taipei? These
types of calculations are
essential to US operational
and contingency planning in
the region. So far the waters
are relatively calm, but is there
a storm on the horizon?
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P A G E 1 9 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S
Protestors at a Stop Asian Hate rally at Art Gallery by
GoToVan. Licensed under Creative Commons.

by Kelly Phan and Bob Mulders
The Atlanta spa shootings on 16 March
have sparked #StopAsianHate
movements across the United States
and around the world, calling for
awareness about growing anti-Asian
sentiments and hate crimes.
Predecessor movements, such as
#JeNeSuisPasUnVirus (I’m Not a Virus),
highlights the existence of anti-East and
anti-Southeast Asian across the world
since the pandemic took hold.
There are many facets to the anti-Asian
discourse that are important to discuss,
such as: the intersection of racism and
sexism in cases of violence against East
Asian women, the problematic model
minority myth, the contribution of
COVID-19 politics or the nuances of
prosecuting hate crimes in the US.
Moreover, it is important to
acknowledge from the outset the wide
diversity of people who are classed as
“Asian” in the US and other Western
nations. The homogenisation of an
incredibly diverse group of people often
results in discussions about racism that
attempts (and fails) to capture the
myriad of factors that contribute to
racist discourse.
This article aims not to capture the
movement in its entirety but rather
focuses on the rising violence and racist
discourses faced by East Asian and
Southeast Asian diaspora communities
due to COVID-19.
Protestors at a Stop Asian Hate rally at Art Gallery by GoToVan. Original photo has
been cropped and transparency reduced. Licensed under Creative Commons.
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T H E I M P A C T O F C O V I D -
1 9 P O L I T I C S
The US-based Stop AAPI Hate reporting
centre recorded 3,795 incidents from 19
March 2020 to 28 February 2021. It is
noted that this is a fraction of the real
number of hate incidents, but it offers a
useful demonstration of national
trends. For example, women report
hate incidents 2.3 times more than men
and Chinese people are the largest
ethnic group reporting hate (followed
by Koreans, Vietnamese and Filipinos).
In 2015, the World Health Organisation
(WHO) acknowledged that disease
names can ‘provoke a backlash against
members of particular religious or
ethnic communities’, which was why
they recommended using the term
“COVID-19” in February 2020. On 24
February 2020, they issued a statement
saying, “Don’t attach locations or
ethnicity to the disease, this is not a
‘Wuhan Virus,’ ‘Chinese Virus’ or ‘Asian
Virus’.
Yet, the WHO’s warning only
foreshadowed the racialisation of
COVID-19 that was to come. In May
2020, United Nations Secretary-General
Antonio Guterres tweeted that “the
pandemic continues to unleash a
tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
scapegoating and scare-mongering”.
Former President Trump’s tweets about
COVID-19 are quintessential examples
of how COVID-19 caused an increase in
anti-Chinese sentiment. A recent study
concluded that former President
Trump’s use of the phrases “Chinese
Virus”, “Wuhan virus”, or “Kungflu” on
Twitter coincided with a rise of anti-
Asian hashtags from about 12,000 to
almost half a million. More than 50% of
tweets with #chinesevirus were
associated with anti-Asian sentiment,
compared to 1 in 5 of tweets with
#covid19.
Although former President Trump and
other commentators have downplayed
the role of COVID-19 in anti-Asian
sentiment, research indicates that data
from Twitter can be used to detect
changes in societal attitudes that lead
to mass public opinions, including
ethnocentric hate. If so, the institutional
support for racialised and politicised
language demonstrated by former
President Trump and other US
Senators’ use of “Chinese Virus” clearly
inflamed the rise of anti-Asian
sentiment.
H O W D I D T H E T R U M P
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N ’ S
R E L A T I O N S H I P W I T H
C H I N A A F F E C T A N T I -
A S I A N S E N T I M E N T ?
When Trump ran for President in 2015,
he expressed the view that China was
manipulating its economy to the US’
detriment. Soon after being elected, he
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kept true to his word; a China-US trade
war was born. The relationship with
China further deteriorated amidst the
pandemic when Trump blamed China
for his low re-election chances.
Although anti-Asian sentiment in the
West predates the Trump
administration and the pandemic, the
Trump administration regards shared
culture and identity as key to good
mutual cooperation and seems to view
China as an entirely different society,
one that inherently threatens the US
society.
This view goes back to the fear that the
‘rise of Asia’ would result in a
degradation of the hegemony of
Western nations in the 19th and 20th
century. That period saw the
emergence of the so-called ‘yellow peril’,
where the presence of East Asians in
the West was seen as a threat to
Western society. East Asians were seen
in the Western world as morally inferior
and incapable of adjusting to Western
society, remaining loyal to their nations
of origin.
In recent times, the resurgence of some
of these ‘yellow peril’ political views has
created a paranoia for anything that
might be a sign of the influence of the
Chinese government. These old views
have contributed to anti-Asian
sentiment by blurring the distinction
between the Chinese government,
Chinese people and other people of
Asian descent.
W H A T I S T H E
# S T O P A S I A N H A T E
M O V E M E N T C A L L I N G
F O R ?
A large part of the #StopAsianHate
movement is fuelled by a desire to shed
light on the issue of anti-Asian violence
and racism. The model minority myth
encourages Asian subjects to be the
model (i.e. obedient) minority group,
leading to severe underreporting of
racist incidents. Asian-Canadian and
Asian-American success has typically
also been touted by leaders as evidence
against systemic racism and the
existence of a “colour-blind” society.
The House Judiciary Subcommittee’s
hearing on Discrimination and Violence
Against Asian Americans, which began
on 18 March, is significant in this
regard. As the first examination of anti-
Asian discrimination and violence in
three decades, it aims to examine anti-
Asian discrimination from a historical
and contemporary lens to inform future
legislative change.
One example is the COVID-19 Hate
Crimes Act (passed since this article was
written) which would:
Create a position at the Department
of Justice to facilitate expedited
review of COVID-19 hate crimes.
Support state and local
governments to improve hate
crimes reporting
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Ensure that hate crimes information
is more accessible to Asian-
American communities
Connect federal agencies to
community-based organizations to
encourage COVID-19 discourse that
is not racially charged.
such as the Atlanta spa shootings, are
enabled by a climate of racism marked
by racial stereotypes. These political
campaigns stigmatise ethnic groups
and also silence victims. It will take a
diverse range of efforts to combat anti-
Asian hate - the journey for justice and
In Massachusetts, a bill has been
proposed to address bias-related crime.
Most relevantly, it adds immigration
status and gender as two protected
categories. One of the bill’s co-sponsors,
State Representative Tram Nguyen,
stated the normative significance of the
bill: “That’s how we communicate to
communities that we see them and that
these crimes are unacceptable.”
The new Biden administration has
taken a markedly different stance on
COVID-19 and racism. The President
and Vice-President have openly
supported the COVID-19 Hate Crimes
Act. Most notably, it set the tone for an
administration that condemns anti-
Asian racism since January 2021
through the issuance of a Presidential
Memorandum that said:
“The Federal Government must recognize
that it has played a role in furthering
these xenophobic sentiments through the
actions of political leaders, including
references to the COVID-19 pandemic by
the geographic location of its origin.”
J U S T I C E : O N E S T E P A T A
T I M E
Major acts of violence fuelled by racism,
P H O T O B Y J A S O N L E U N G O N U N S P L A S H
equality will not end with just one
prosecution of one shooter nor a social
media movement.
Instead, legislative amendments to
address gaps in hate crime prevention
and punishment, as well as a new Biden
administration that addresses China’s
rise with a different tone, might be the
first step towards a decline in anti-Asian
sentiment in the near future.
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P H O T O B Y J A S O N L E U N G O N U N S P L A S H

by Eliza Archer | YDS Regional Correspondent
Belarus, a previously relatively
unknown European country, has been
ever-present in international headlines
over the last year and a half.
It all began when Belarusian President
Aleksandr G. Lukashenko was reelected
last year, perpetuating his reign
as Europe’s last dictator. The
announcement of his re-election, a
victory he claimed came from more
than 80 per cent of the votes, resulted
in mass protests. Some estimate the
crowds of protesters in August last year
neared two hundred thousand, making
them the largest in Belarusian history.
There were whispers of NATO military
action and a leadership overthrow that
never eventuated. While observers had
hoped this action, the single biggest
threat to his power in almost three
decades of rulen, would end Europe’s
last dictatorship, the momentum failed
to last the distance.
Instead, the year 2021 was dubbed the
“Year of National Unity” by Lukashenko.
However, as the protest movements
have been driven underground, high
profile dissidents and border tensions
to the West ensured Belarus remained
in the headlines. The regime continued
to “purge” journalists, opposing media,
and activists in an operation aimed at
eliminating opposition and critics of his
regime. As a result, more than 35,000
peaceful protesters have been detained
since his reelection. For example, well
known journalist and dissident, Roman
Protasevich, was seized while on a flight
from Greece to Lithuania. Similarly, prodemocracy
leader, Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya was exiled, and
prominent opposition figures Maria
Kolesnikova and Maksim Znak were
sentenced to more than a decade in
prison. Human rights organisations in
Belarus have been decimated, with at
least forty-six such organisations
already shut down, leading to vocal
international condemnation. Add to this
the very public defection of an Olympic
runner who sought refuge while
representing Belarus in Tokyo, it is clear
that popular dissatisfaction in Belarus
has been noticed abroad.
As a result, the protests, defections and
arrests have triggered a wave of
sanctions from Western democracies.
However, given the geographical and
political positioning of Belarus, this has
caused further tensions.
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Nestled between East and West,
Belarus has often leaned on Moscow.
Lukashenko turned to Putin for
assistance in the face of prolific
sanctions from the West, and suggested
that the momentum of the protests
would spread to Russia, resulting in an
offer from Putin for “comprehensive
help” in addressing Belarusian civil
unrest.
In August 2021, in an eight-hour press
conference, Lukashenko preached to a
select audience about his reign, regime,
and success. He forcefully declared that
the actions taken against opponents
were a preservation of world peace and
condemned those who acted against
him. In this press conference, he
proceeded to pronounce Britain an
“American lapdog” and claimed that
those who participated in the protests
were seeking to further divide Eastern
Europe and the West.
In September 2021, Lukashenko and
Putin held a summit during which they
discussed coordinating their countries’
macroeconomic policies, instituting
common tax and customs measures,
and harmonising other financial
controls as part of a twenty-eight-point
roadmap that is expected to increase
Russia’s influence over its neighbour.
Russia will provide Belarus with
discounted supplies of natural gas while
also providing large loans. This financial
help from Russia sought to ease the
burden that continued sanctions have
had on the Belarusian economy.
Further, military exercises, which
according to Russian reports involved
two hundred thousand Belarusian and
Russian troops, have participated in
drills on Europe’s eastern borders. The
drills are designed to replicate a
scenario in which NATO and Russia
engage in kinetic warfare. Similar
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P H O T O : S H A M I L Z H U M A T O V / R E U T E R S

exercises conducted in 2017 raised red
flags in the West, however this round of
exercises have caused less fanfare.
Despite this, the increasing Russian
presence on the Russia-Ukraine border
which has emerged following these
exercises has made the “scenarios”
seem more and more realistic.
Add to these heightened tensions a
migrant crisis which seems to have
been manufactured by Lukashenko,
and Belarus has well and truly ensured
it stays in international headlines.
Lukashenko has been accepting
numerous planes from countries in the
Middle East, including from Iraq and the
recently Taliban occupied Afghanistan,
enticing refugees with false claims that
the country is a path into the European
Union. As a result, Poland, Lithuania
and Latvia have all declared a state of
emergency as large numbers of
migrants flood to their borders, with
Poland reporting more than 11,500
refugees trying to cross the border this
year, scores of which have died.
Lukeshenko is accused by Poland,
Lithuania and Latvia of sending these
people to EU borders as punishment
for the West’s sanctions. These
accusations have been backed up by
other states, and EU officials have
described Belarus’ part in the crisis as
“state-sponsored migrant smuggling”,
and “hybrid warfare”. EU Commission
President Ursula von der Leyen claims
Lukashenko has “instrumentalised
human beings”, with people being used
as political pawns. The European
Commission has claimed that the
migrants are paying as much as
€10,000 to people smugglers who are
organising their stay in Belarus and
transportation to the border. As a
result, many in the EU have begun to
speculate the deliberate movement of
migrants is retribution for the EU’s
sanctions, while also profiting off the
migrant crisis. Many of the migrants
have been left at the border without
adequate food, shelter, or clothing.
While fewer migrants are making their
way to Europe’s eastern border,
worryingly there are reports that Minsk
has been sending people on return
flights back to Iraq.
Western countries, including the UK
and US, have since imposed further
sanctions on Belarus, which in some
cases make it as many as eight rounds
of sanctions. These countries justify the
sanctions through claims that, in
orchestrating the crisis, Belarus has
committed humanitarian abuse. The
Western sanctions targeted the airlines
that were facilitating the flights, hotels
and tour companies, blocking the route
to Europe. This is in addition to a
suspended program which shortened
the visa process for Belarusian officials,
further limiting visas from Belarus more
broadly. Belarus has retaliated, stating
that the sanctions are economically
strangling and will result in
proportionately tough responses. Just
days ago, Belarus imposed a food
embargo on numerous countries which
they deem to be "unfriendly".
Numerous countries across the globe,
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from the EU to the USA, are impacted.
So where to from here? The tit-for-tat sanctions do not look like they will slow down
anytime soon, particularly if Russia continues to prop up Belarus. One would
imagine that the economic might of the West will impact Belarus in ways Belarus’s
retaliatory sanctions cannot match. The migrant crisis has in part achieved its goal –
causing tensions in the EU and highlighting flaws in European unity and crisis
response. As for responses to the military exercises, well ,that’s got commentators
sitting on the edge of their seats. As Ukraine’s eastern border is increasingly lined
with Russian troops, the possibility of Belarus triggering a war between the east and
west of Europe increases. Whether Belarusain public dissatisfaction with Europe’s
last leader will allow for these machinations to play out it is a different question.
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P A G E 2 8 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S
by Antony Murrell

Geopolitical tension in the Black Sea is nothing new. Wedged between the European
Plain, Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, the region has long played host to
various conflicts and regional power-plays.
These tensions have again flared up in recent years, especially in the wake of
Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and ongoing speculation surrounding its
designs for Ukraine. So why is the region so prone to conflict? And how did this play
out in 2021?
C O N T E X T
Russia's interest in the Black Sea stems from the area’s abundance of warm-water
ports. Though numerous ports such as Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are situated on
Russia's northern coastline, the surrounding waters tend to freeze in winter. This
renders their use by surface vessels impractical, if not impossible.
Therefore, access to the Black Sea is of crucial strategic interest to Russia's ability to
engage in maritime trade year-round, and in bolstering its naval capabilities in the
region. Unfortunately, this fact has often brought Moscow into conflict with its
neighbours. In particular, it has led to tensions with Turkey, which controls the
checkpoint of the Bosphorus Strait connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean
Sea.
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Historically, Russia has sought to secure its interests in the region by controlling
Crimea. This peninsula provides Moscow with a platform to project power into the
Black Sea. The naval base at Sevastopol serves as home to Russia's southern fleet.
Meanwhile, the narrow Kerch Strait which divides the Black Sea from the Sea of Azov
also grants maritime access to eastern Ukraine and to central Russia via the Don
River. As such, control over the Kerch Strait is of vital economic importance to both
Moscow and Kyiv.
In 1936, the Montreux Convention codified the Black Sea's geopolitical order. The
agreement placed limitations on warships entering the area via the Turkish Straits.
These included restrictions on fleet size, tonnage, and duration of stay. Fleets native
to the Black Sea were given preferential treatment, and commercial vessels were
granted unfettered access to the sea during peacetime. Even though the Soviet
Union attempted to revise the international agreement, the region generally
remained stable throughout the Cold War.
P O S T - S O V I E T T E N S I O N S
More recent tensions in the Black Sea can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. The conclusion of the Cold War caused a paradigm shift in
international relations, reopening questions of regional power dynamics. Following
the dissolution of the former superpower into 15 smaller states, Russia was
deprived of access to much of its Black Sea shoreline.
To make matters worse, the US seemingly moved to capitalise upon Russia’s
vulnerable state through its active incorporation of various former Warsaw Pact
states into NATO. In 2004, both Romania and Bulgaria joined the NATO alliance.
With half the Black Sea's neighbours now under Washington's sway, Moscow began
to fear encirclement.
These fears were realised in April 2008 during a conference in Bucharest, where
NATO declared its long-term intention to incorporate the two remaining Black Sea
states of Georgia and Ukraine into the organisation. This decision was viewed as
controversial, even within the Western bloc - with German, French, and Italian
officials expressing concerns that the move could provoke confrontation with
Russia.
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T H E C R I S I S B E G I N S
As predicted, armed conflict resulted in August 2008 when Russian forces
intervened in the Georgian region of Abkhazia to prop up a separatist movement.
The operation achieved two of Moscow’s strategic goals. Firstly, it allowed Russia to
secure four of Georgia's warm-water ports along the Black Sea, ensuring its relative
seapower. Second, it strengthened pro-Russian and separatist elements within
Georgia, greatly diminishing the country’s stability and viability as a potential NATO
member.
Moscow deployed the same strategy in 2014 during the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict. As
the Euromaidan movement threatened to expel Russian influence in Ukraine,
Moscow again intervened to secure its Black Sea interests. This time, it used its naval
base in Sevastopol to annex the Crimean peninsula - a move that encountered little
resistance due to the region's predominantly Russian population. Simultaneously,
the Kremlin propped up pro-Russian and separatist forces in Donbas, weakening
Ukraine by drawing it into a costly war of attrition. By doing so, Moscow also
hampered Kyiv's attempts to gain NATO membership.
Russia later secured its territorial gains by constructing a bridge across the Kerch
Strait. The bridge stretches 12-miles in length and possesses a clearance of 35-
metres, sufficient to allow the passage of military and civilian vessels. The
construction of the bridge limited access to the Sea of Azov, tightening Russia's hold
on both Crimea while also strengthening its influence over eastern Ukraine.
D E V E L O P M E N T S I N 2 0 2 1
What had settled into a frozen conflict received a jolt in 2021. In February, Kyiv
announced its intention to retake Crimea. Ukrainian officials also stepped up their
lobbying efforts, pressuring Washington to fast-track Ukraine's application to join
NATO. NATO also bolstered its presence in Eastern Europe, including through a
series of large-scale interoperability exercises known as "DEFENDER-Europe 2021."
These were the largest wargames conducted by the organisation in Europe since the
Cold War.
Predictably, Russia voiced its displeasure concerning the exercises, and began
amassing arms and military equipment near the Ukrainian border in late March. The
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US initially moved to dispatch two warships to the Black Sea in response, but
canceled its plans on 15 April. Instead, Washington imposed additional sanctions on
Russia and expelled ten Russian diplomats, ostensibly for election hacking. Shortly
thereafter, Moscow used its leverage over eastern Ukraine by partially closing the
Kerch Strait for six months, hampering Kyiv's ability to conduct maritime trade.
A cordial meeting between the American and Russian leaders on 16 June did little to
resolve the deadlock. Subsequently, following the signing of a new UK-Ukraine naval
agreement in Odessa on 24 June, the HMS Defender ventured into disputed waters
off the coast of Crimea. Classified British Defence Ministry documents discovered at
a bus stop in Kent revealed that the manoeuvre was intended as a show of support
to Kyiv.
What happened next is a matter of controversy. According to Moscow, the HMS
Defender sailed within three kilometres of the Crimean coastline. Russian border
guards then fired warning shots at the vessel before a fighter jet dropped bombs
along the ship's path. London disputed this version of events, claiming the ship was
still in Ukrainian waters, and contended that the shots fired did not constitute
warning shots because they took place three miles astern of the boat. In either case,
the incident served to further inflame tensions, with Russia's Deputy Foreign
Minister threatening that the bombs would be "on target" next time.
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NATO remained undeterred. A few days later, the alliance carried out its largest-ever
interoperability exercises in the Black Sea. An official announcement also repudiated
"Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea." This was followed in
September by the first meeting of the "Crimean Platform," a Kyiv-led diplomatic
initiative that aims to reverse the annexation.
By November, a standoff between Poland and Belarus saw tensions rise for the
third time in a year. After Moscow was accused once more of amassing forces on
the Ukrainian border, Washington assigned two Coast Guard boats to the Ukrainian
Navy to strengthen its position in the Black Sea. Under diplomatic pressure,
Germany also suspended approval of Nord Stream 2, a Russian gas pipeline that
aims to provide the country with low-cost energy. Washington has also threatened
to cancel the project in the event of war.
C O N C L U S I O N
Despite increased tensions over 2021, geopolitical competition in the Black Sea
remains in a state of deadlock. The need to ensure warm-water ports across its
south frontier remains a pressing strategic concern for Russia, one intimately tied to
its ability to project military strength and access international maritime trade routes.
Simultaneously, Ukraine and Georgia continue to express an active interest in
joining NATO, which remains the only sure-fire way to safeguard their national
interests, protect their territorial integrity, and maintain sovereign independence in
the face of an increasingly assertive Russia.
From a realist perspective, these two outcomes appear mutually exclusive, where
one’s success will come at the failure of the other. Consequently, leaders on all sides
face a seemingly insurmountable challenge to balance national security priorities,
meet the requests of regional partners, and preserve regional peace and stability.
Unfortunately, in such circumstances, there are limits to what even the most agile
diplomacy can accomplish.
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P H O T O : O L I V E R C O N T R E R A S / P O O L / S H U T T E R S T O C K
“It’s not just a Franco-Australian affair, but
a rupture of trust in alliances.
It calls for serious reflection about the very
concept of what we do with alliances.”
- French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian
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by Patrick Quinn
On 15 September 2021, Australia, the United States and the
United Kingdom announced a new trilateral security
partnership. The new ‘AUKUS’ pact, negotiated in secrecy over
several months, will see extensive diplomatic and technological
collaboration for the purpose of promoting a “safer and more
secure Indo-Pacific.” The trilateral partnership will
predominantly focus on military capability, thereby
distinguishing it from both the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing
alliance, which also includes Canada and New Zealand, and the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue encompassing Australia, the US,
India, and Japan.
Without a doubt, the most striking component of the AUKUS
partnership is the revelation that Australia will acquire a fleet of
at least eight nuclear-powered submarines. The announcement
supplants the pre-existing plan to construct 12 conventional
diesel-electric submarines signed with French majority-owned
Naval Group in 2019. Following an 18-month scoping period, the
new submarine fleet is set to be built at the Osborne Naval
Shipyard in Adelaide, South Australia, for a price tag likely to be
in the tens of billions of dollars.
While the strategic logic underpinning the announcement is
relatively straightforward, the significance of such a partnership
should not be understated. Simply put, the centrepiece of the
deal – the development of an Australian nuclear-powered
submarine fleet – offers a fleet with superior range and greater
endurance than conventionally-powered alternatives. They are
quieter, can stay submerged for longer, and can travel at much
faster speeds, even out-pacing surface vessels in some cases.
Generally speaking, submarines offer a unique form of ‘strategic
weight’ that cannot be attained via the use of other surface
vessels. Submarines can remain concealed anywhere their
range allows, yielding a disproportionate deterrent effect over
large areas due to the uncertainty this creates in the strategic
calculations of adversaries. For the new AUKUS partnership, this
'weight' is considerably 'heavier' when those submarines are
nuclear-powered, as the combination of greater speed, range,
and endurance results in a superior deterrent effect.
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Crucially, the announcement is significant not only in terms of
military hardware but also signals a serious shift in Australia’s
broader regional strategy. The very fact that the US and UK have
opened the nuclear vault to Australia speaks volumes about the
shift in Canberra’s strategic imperatives. The United States has
only once shared this formidable technology, with the UK in
1958. It has never offered this capability to another third party,
not even its closest allies. Consequently, the construction of a
nuclear-powered submarine fleet will make Australia only the
seventh country to boast such a fleet, behind the US, UK, France,
Russia, China, and India. Australia, furthermore, will be the only
country in the world to operate a fleet of nuclear submarines
without also having a domestic nuclear capability of its own.
Indeed, as all three leaders were quick to clarify, this new
partnership only concerns the propulsion system of these new
submarines and does not equate to the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, nor the establishment of a civil nuclear capability in
Australia.
As an arms deal, the new partnership is colossal. Despite this,
when viewed in terms of its broader significance, the strategic
and geopolitical implications for the region are larger still. While
statements from the three leaders did not mention it directly,
AUKUS is undoubtedly aimed squarely at the perceived need to
contain an increasingly assertive China, a motive implied by the
recurrent affirmation that this new partnership will seek to
ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While seeming to add yet
another acronym to the proliferation of regional groupings, this
move, more than any other, reflects a hardening of policy
towards Beijing. Moreover, it recognises that while cooperation
and dialogue remain crucial, there is also a need for a serious
and tangible strategic counterweight. For better or worse, the
logic underpinning AUKUS ultimately boils down to an attempt
to reduce the likelihood of regional conflict by strengthening
and showcasing a credible level of deterrence.
Unsurprisingly, the announcement met with a fervent response
from China. Beijing has condemned the partnership as an active
threat to regional security, accusing the US, UK and Australia of
perpetuating a counterproductive “cold war mentality.” At the
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same time, however, perhaps the biggest diplomatic casualty so far has been Australia’s
short-term relations with France, which was completely blindsided by the announcement.
The AUKUS agreement means the concomitant cancellation of the $90 billion contract
with Naval Group, a company in which the French government has a majority stake. As
such, French President Emmanuel Macron, in a clear indication of French outrage,
withdrew ambassadors from Canberra and Washington, accusing all three nations of
stabbing France in the back. It is worth emphasising that the diplomatic fallout between
AUKUS partners and France is not something to be brushed off lightly as a secondary
concern. France, as one of Europe’s primary international powers, has long been an
ardent advocate of a robust European security posture, and still retains considerable
influence in the region.
Other regional partners were likewise caught on the back foot, though the response has
been mixed. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, of which Australia and the US are
members, has been largely welcoming of the new partnership. Despite concerns being
voiced by some Japanese and Indian commentators that AUKUS will sideline the Quad, it
may be more reasonable to assume the new partnership may actually take pressure off
the Quad insofar as future tensions with China are concerned. Indeed, AUKUS and the
Quad may come to complement each other, as an increase in US and Australian military
capabilities will thereby also increase the sum capabilities and the strategic relevance of
the Quad as a whole. Japan was among the first to welcome AUKUS, viewing the trilateral
partnership as the means “to strengthen engagement with the Indo-Pacific region”. While
India, at least publicly, has maintained a measured silence due to “sensitivities related to
the strategic situation in the region and ties with key partners,” its lack of open criticism
signals at least a tacit level of support.
Meanwhile, ASEAN, well-known for its consensus approach, has been marked by a
distinct lack of agreement concerning AUKUS. Some ASEAN countries, such as the
Philippines and Vietnam, have welcomed the partnership as a needed corrective for
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balancing an increasingly assertive China. Others, such as
Indonesia and Malaysia, have expressed concerns about
escalating regional competition. In particular, Jakarta has issued
a five-point response, cautioning that “Indonesia is deeply
concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection
in the region.” Such concerns reflect a desire to avoid regional
instability, a reality that many see as being driven in equal parts
by both Washington and Beijing. Essentially, the shared
sentiment of all ASEAN members expresses caution and seeks
to avoid any spiral of tension, suspicion and division that could
pull the region apart.
While the geopolitical implications of the AUKUS partnership will
continue to play out for years to come, a somewhat overlooked
fact is that the first of these new submarines will not arrive until
the 2040s. This will inevitably mean that Australia’s current fleet
of Collins-class submarines, already extended beyond their
original shelf-life, must remain in service until that time. The
construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, much like the AUKUS
partnership as a whole, is not purely an exercise in building the
best submarines possible, but rather seeks to provide a robust
and explicit military deterrent. AUKUS is a long-term strategic
investment designed to reduce future risk by providing a
countervailing force consistent with Australia’s foreseeable
strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific. While it is reasonable to
assume a fleet of 8 nuclear-powered submarines can help
achieve this goal, the lack of such capability until at least the
early 2040s raises important strategic and diplomatic questions
in the interim.
On the surface, the attraction of gaining a nuclear submarine
fleet may be relatively straightforward. However, the broader,
and perhaps more significant, geopolitical implications remain
complex, with the goal of regional ‘stability’ being anything but
guaranteed. Avoiding miscalculation and misinterpretation is
essential, and must be done in a way which is capable of
establishing a stable peace that a non-hegemonic Beijing may
eventually join. What will be crucial is the need to balance this
drive towards tangible strategic capability with measured
diplomatic engagement. This will be the most crucial deciding
factor as to whether or not AUKUS is able to achieve the stated
goals it has set for itself.
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After 16 years of ruling Europe’s largest
economy, and being the first woman to
do so, Angela Merkel has retired from
German politics. Her strong presence
on the world stage, which often saw her
be the only woman in the room, has left
some big shoes to fill.
Affectionately known as “Mutti” by her
constituents, the “Empress of Europe”
to others, and the “Iron Chancellor” at
times, she is a woman of many names.
Friends with Obama and foe to Trump,
Merkel was a principal actor on the
global stage. Vladimir Putin notoriously
tried to intimidate Merkel with his dog
— knowing her fear of them — but
despite this she was known for her
positive relationship with him, which
many attribute in part to her seamless
Russian language skills. These global
relations also earned her the greatest
title — “leader of the free world”.
Raised in the Eastern German town of
Templin, in what was then the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), she did not
come from a life of privilege.
Merkel studied physics at university
and, following graduation, continued
her academic career as a member of
faculty in the Central Institute of
Physical Chemistry of the Academy of
Sciences. She continued to study and
received a PhD in 1986. Following the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, she joined
the Democratic Awakening, which
would go on to form a conservative
alliance with the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) that she would later lead.
Merkel was appointed Minister for
Women and Youth in 1991, and moved
on to the position of Minister for Family
Affairs in 1992. Between the start of her
political career and her assumption of
power as chancellor, she would serve as
Minister for Environment, Conservation
and Reactor Safety and as Secretary-
General of the CDU. As those in her
by Eliza Archer |
YDS Regional Correspondent
P H O T O : G E T T Y I M A G E S
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party were ushered from politics as
subjects of scandal, her ability to hold
her own left her as one of the only
remaining members of the party
eligible for chancellorship. In 2002, she
assumed the position of CDU party
leader. The 2005 general election came
down to a 1 per cent difference, but
that would be all she needed to secure
her leadership for the next sixteen
years. She was the first woman, first
person from the East, and also the
youngest person to lead Germany.
Merkel acknowledged that her sixteen
years were fraught and “often very
challenging […] politically and humanly
and, at the same time, they were also
fulfilling.”
Across wider Europe, her popularity has
not always been assured. Merkel
strongly supported austerity measures
that directly targeted Greece following
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and as
a result, Nazi flags were waved in
protest through the streets of Athens.
In 2015, in the face of a migrant crisis
impacting all of Europe, Merkel
accepted 1 million refugees, largely
from Syria, despite much political
division and opposition. Her speech
declaring “[w]ir schaffen das”, or “we
can do this”, would become one of the
most iconic of her career. The migrants
arrived, with some thanking Merkel by
carrying photos of her to show their
appreciation.
However, her acceptance of the
migrants further fractured political
divides, sparking what was an already
growing far right movement — largely
captured by the Alternative For
Deutschland (AfD) party. A number of
terrorist attacks across Germany
exacerbated these divides and saw
fringe movements gain more
prominence in political rhetoric and
discussion.
In the final act of her political career,
Merkel was faced with her largest crisis
yet, which once again saw political
divides deepen. Despite already
announcing that she would not seek
another term in 2021, the COVID-19
pandemic occurred. Germany was
initially the most successful country in
Europe in addressing the outbreak, with
low case numbers and few
hospitalisations allowing it to assist
other countries and to take in the sick
from its neighbours. However,
Germany could not outrun the virus for
long. Like the rest of the globe, it was
forced into lockdowns and now faces
the ever-growing problem of how to
manage vaccine rollouts, antivaccination
movements, and enduring
societal division.
Merkel leaves the chancellorship in an
environment of uncertainty. What is to
come for Europe in the face of growing
populism, extremism and COVID-19?
What will the fall out of the pandemic
look like and how will Germany
recover? While it is clear that French
President Emmanuel Macron is
posturing himself to be the next
European leader, many remain
unconvinced. What is certain, however,
is that this is the end of an era.
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F I R E S A N D
Europe’s summer of 2021
was shaped by a series of
detrimental fires and
floods across the region.
Europe has had previous
encounters with natural
disasters, as seen with the
2018 forest fires in Attica,
Greece, or the 2015
flooding in Albania.
However, the region’s
recent experience was its
most extreme and
unprecedented yet.
F L O O D S
A C R O S S
E U R O P E
by Jazmin Wright
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P H O T O G R A P H B Y A N A D O L U A G E N C Y V I A G E T T Y I M A G E S

B L A Z I N G
- O U T - O F - C O N T R O L
This summer saw the highest temperatures on record, with average temperatures across Europe
being 1°C higher than in previous years. These above average temperatures, combined with
drought and more intense heat waves, created the ideal, dry environment for fires to ignite and to
spread rapidly. The catalyst for these wildfires across Southern Europe varied, ranging from arson
to lightning strikes. However, the climatic conditions of the region exacerbated the issue, resulting
in more severe and uncontrollable wildfires. While most of Southern Europe was impacted by
these fires, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy were most heavily affected.
48.8°C
During summer, Greece’s temperatures often ranged between 42-45°C,
which increased the intensity of the blazes. According to the European
Forest Fire Information System, in less than two weeks, more than
100,000 hectares of forestry and farmland were burned. The ferocity
and unpredictability of Greece’s fires led to calls to enlist the assistance
of firefighters from other European countries. Over 800 firefighters
responded to tackle the fires. Cyprus saw a similar wildfire situation,
and the state was on high alert for fires from June. Despite these
concerns, the worst of Cyprus’ fires were in July, moving through forests
near the Troodos Mountains and resulting in the deaths of four people.
P H O T O G R A P H B Y
A L E K S A N D R L E S I K
V I A A D O B E S T O C K 2 0 2 0
The summer period also saw Italy reach temperatures of 48.8°C, which
is considered a European record. Southern Italy, particularly Calabria
and Sicily, experienced hundreds of fires over the summer due to hot
and dry conditions. However, burning inland areas added another
dimension to the existing challenge, as there was a lack of sea winds to
mitigate the fires. Italy’s heat wave period and hotter temperatures
eventually shifted westward which impacted Spain and France,
although to a lesser degree.
Southern Europe’s fires led to loss of life, the displacement of thousands of people, and rendered
hundreds of people homeless. The fires caused irreparable damage to homes and workplaces,
which directly affected the resilience and wellbeing of the European population. For those on
farmland, the fires wiped out significant sources of revenue and created issues within the local
and regional supply chain, which was already strained due to COVID-19. Scientists consider
wildfires to e a necessary and significant occurrence for forests, as they can promote renewal of
biodiversity and improve soil nutrients. However, wildfires also destroy habitats and vegetation,
while polluting the surrounding air and releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. As such,
fires such as those seen in Southern Europe can have significant impacts on the biosphere and
detrimental effects on humans.
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T H E O T H E R E X T R E M E : W I D E S P R E A D F L O O D I N G
In contrast to the fiery conditions in Southern Europe was the extreme rainfall
experienced Western Europe. According to FloodList, there were more than 40 flood
events in over 135 locations across Europe during the summer. However, July saw
the most intense rainfall and flooding in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The 14th to 15th July floods saw the worst-hit areas suffer as much as two months
worth of rain within 24 hours, resulting in 196 deaths and injuring thousands of
people.
Over the summer, the heavy rainfall in Western Europe
saturated soils, rendering them unable to take in large quantities
of water. Continual heavy rainfall on saturated soils means that
on a lower scale, there would be increased water run-off.
However, the scale of the floods in Western Europe resulted in
the extreme flooding of land and overflows of rivers. The areas
of Rhineland-Palatinate and North Rhine-Westphalia were most
affected by the heaviest rainfall in Germany, which saw small
streams and minor rivers become torrential waterways with the
capacity to destroy villages.
At the Meuse River’s tributary in the Netherlands, the city of
Valkenburg was flooded. As the downpours often occurred
during the night, people were not prepared for their homes to
be inundated by floodwaters and torrential rainfall. Due to the
sudden nature of flooding, many people were swept down the
rivers and were injured. Some areas were more fortunate than
others; however, many houses and other critical infrastructure
sites were significantly damaged. The floods therefore had a
significant impact on critical resources and services, as they
hindered access to electricity and telephone networks, impeding
people’s ability to access critical support. Additionally, the floods
resulted in major road closures, which rendered some towns
inaccessible and prevented emergency crews from entering.
C O N C L U S I O N
40
135
flood
events
The fires and floods throughout Europe created an unforgettable summer. The widespread
natural disasters had severely detrimental impacts on European individuals and
communities. Unfortunately, the scale and severity of these natural disasters is unlikely to
decrease in future, given the increasingly noticeable impact of climate change. Despite the
losses experienced during the fires and floods in Europe, these events demonstrated the
importance of adapting to changing climatic conditions. The 2021 European natural disasters
should be the catalyst for developing strategies to become more resilient to the increasing
threat of natural disasters in the coming decades.
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P H O T O V I A S K Y N E W S
locations

P H O T O B Y G A Y A T R I N U R P H O T O V I A G E T T Y
by Declan Hourd | YDS Regional Correspondent
On 12 December 2021, the world had a chance to see the birth of the independent
nation of New Caledonia, but a boycott and heavily skewed result have instead left
tensions heightened and the future unresolved. Achieving decolonisation from the
French has been a long held desire of the indigenous Kanak people who today
comprise approximately 40% of the population. The road to achieve a path to
independence has been long and without a guaranteed outcome. A significant
milestone in this process was the Noumea Accords, signed in 1998, which legislated a
promise from Paris to Noumea to implement mechanisms of greater autonomy,
cultural respect, and the opportunity to gain political self-determination through
democratic referendum. The referendum this week was the third and final
opportunity for New Caledonian independence. However, new geopolitical tensions
surrounding the French role in the Indo-Pacific and the global public health crisis
brought on by the coronavirus have added new complications to the Kanak plight for
political autonomy in their traditional lands.
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C O L O N I A L
R E C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
New Caledonia was colonised by the French in 1854 and the discovery of rich nickel
deposits on the island saw great migrations of workers from within the empire and
elsewhere to exploit the opportunity. For nearly a century the exploitative,
exclusionary, and racist structures of colonialism stood in place. Support for the
Free French government in World War II paved the way for more autonomy for the
island country and the establishment of a multiethnic general council that governed
the island. Once the war had concluded, Paris committed to liberal reforms to their
colonies in order to retain them. In 1959, New Caledonia democratically voted to
remain under French sovereignty, and the island was redesignated as an external
territory of France, with its wartime won autonomies intact.
K A N A K S E P A R A T I S M A N D
This increased political autonomy was short-lived due to the increasing commodity prices
of nickel in the 1960s. Paris unilaterally withdrew these reforms, centralising the
administration of these natural resources and the government in the name of the national
interest, and encouraging more European migration to the islands. This recolonisation of
New Caledonia would foment renewed interest in anti-colonialism with an infusion
communist, Marxist, and socialist ideas brought from abroad by returning students,
mirroring the civil unrest of the concurrent May ‘68 movement happening in France. There
was a plurality of radical groups that agitated for change in this period. This agitation would
result in the publishing of journals and newspapers, protests, demonstrations, and riots.
This environment would also prove fertile for the formation of Kanak political parties.
Collectively these parties lobbied for increased autonomy or independence, elimination of
racism, promotion of the unique Melanesian culture and improving material conditions.
Parties were ideologically divided and struggled to achieve mainstream political
recognition,subsequently merging in 1984 to form the Kanak and Socialist National
Liberation Front (FLNKS).
The formation of a unified political front allowed the independence activism to take on
international characteristics. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) was formed with
newly decolonised Melanesian nations of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and
Vanuatu the intention of supporting FLNKS case for independence. The establishment of
this subregional group was important in generating wider international support at the 1986
UN General Assembly where, despite French protestations, New Caledonia was relisted as
a non-self-governing territory which brings international scrutiny to the French
administration. Building an international network of allies in the MSG and their plight for
decolonisation recognised formally in the UN gives independence activists a larger
platform to project their goals onto, and can force Paris to act faster than they normally
would if only faced by domestic pressures.
Despite these major developments, there were no improvements to the New Caledonian
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T H E M A T I G N O N A C C O R D S

political environment. In 1988 militant FLNKS members assaulted a police station, took hostages,
and assumed a defensive position in Gossanah Cave on Ouvéa island. A tense standoff between
separatists and the French military resulted in 19 Kanaks and six police staff dead. The severity of
this conflict shocked both sides into negotiations that would result in the Matignon Accords of
1988.
The Matignon Accords were a major compromise between FLNKS and Paris, and the first step in a
peace that has lasted 30 years in New Caledonia. The Accords would see the issue of
independence, and associated activism, postponed for 10 years. In exchange, three new provinces
would be created. The borders of the North and Loyalty Island Provinces were drawn to
encapsulate Kanak majority territories, returning a measure of political autonomy to indigenous
peoples, and the South Province would have a majority of residents with European heritage.
T H E N O U M M E A A C C O R D S
After the 10 years postponement guaranteed by Matignon, the issue of
independence became a live political issue which necessitated a new agreement. In
1998, the Noumea Accords were implemented to resolve the grievances of the
Kanaks.
The Noumea Accords are a substantial document which recognised the Kanaks as
the original inhabitants of New Caledonia and that colonisation was a process
imposed upon them which alienated them from their traditional lands in the name of
conquest and profit, and undermined their culture, civilisation, and identity. Paris also
agreed to return cultural artefacts stolen from New Caledonia.
The Noumea Accords committed to three democratic independence referendums to
take place 20 years after the signing of the accords, allowing for the transfer of full
sovereignty from France to New Caledonia. Furthermore, to prevent French migrants
from outnumbering the Kanak vote the electoral roll was restructured to ensure that
only long-time residents, and their relations, of New Caledonia could participate in
these referendums.
During the two decades preceding the first referendum, Paris would begin to
transition more responsibilities of the metropole to New Caledonia, thus restoring
and increasing the autonomy Noumea enjoyed prior to the 1960s. These
responsibilities included policing, lawmaking capacity, and administration of mining
projects, as well as limited foreign policy options like joining international
organisations and creating agreements with regional countries. The Accords also
saw the commencement of a range of development initiatives across the islands such
as the electrification of rural areas and the implementation of profit sharing from
mining operations. Critically, these improvements, both political and material, would
not be reversed should the independence referendums fail to pass.
The Noumea Accords has largely been successful at delivering upon its promises of
political access, however, there is a lack of a Kanak professional class to take
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advantage of these changes. The 2011 UN Special Rapporteur brought attention to
these deficits stating: “There are no Kanak lawyers, judges, university lecturers, police
chiefs or doctors and there are only six Kanak midwives registered with the State health
system, out of a total of 300.” Furthermore, the development initiatives proposed by the
Accords have failed to deliver substantive results. Kanaks disproportionately live in
poverty, are over incarcerated, and many do not attain secondary education diplomas.
I N D E P E N D E N C E R E F E R E N D U M S :
2 0 1 8 A N D 2 0 2 0
The 2018 referendum saw a voter turnout of 81%, a number that conferred legitimacy
to the results, which saw 56% of residents vote to remain. Despite losing, the
independence movement was not deterred by the results. It represented how
competitive the desire for New Caledonian sovereignty was among the people. The
2020 referendum saw an improvement for the voting statistics with 85% turnout and
the remain camp eked out a slim majority of 51%. This improvement in the polls has
been attributed to the proactivity of separatist campaigners to persuade electorates
that had previously abstained from voting and the deft use of social media to engage
the youth vote. Social media has become an essential part of daily life and political
engagement, and comparative inexperience from Paris on these platforms to reach
similar audiences undercuts the loyalist cause because there is a dearth of evidence to
support
Despite these improvements, the independence movement has been unable to flip a
significant amount of the European population of the island, which has consistently
\
voted to remain in both elections. There are substantial material benefits for retaining
its relationship with France, and these are major obstacles to the cause for
independence. New Caledonia receives €1.5 billion in subsidies from France,
constituting 15% of New Caledonia’s GDP, and significant funding for essential services,
and residents are also granted French passports.
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C O V I D - 1 9 , T H E C O N T E S T E D I N D O - P A C I F I C , A N D
The containment measures for the coronavirus in New Caledonia were initially
largely effective, with the nation being COVIDfree until August 2021. Between
September and October 2021, an outbreak of the more infectious Delta variant
wreaked havoc in the community, causing thousands of infections per day and
hundreds of deaths. Eighty percent of these cases, both infections and deaths,
have been borne by Kanak and other Pasifika communities, demographics that
support independence. Indigenous communities across the island have entered
into a period of mourning, and these practices take precedent over any and all
political activity.
It is during this time the metropole scheduled the third referendum for 12
December 2021. In an October 2021 interview, in defence of this culturally
I N D E P E N D E N C E

P H O T O V I A T H E E C O N O M I S T
insensitive decision, the French Overseas Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated that only an
“out-of-control pandemic could justify a postponement” and that “in democracies
elections are held on time.” It is in French interest to push for this election now to retain
control over New Caledonia. In the international domain, Paris has worked to be Europe’s
leading voice on the Indo-Pacific because of the sovereign territory held in the region and
New Caledonia is a point of significant investment for its regional security apparatus. On
a domestic front, President Emmanuel Macron is up for re-election in 2022 and New
Caledonia becoming independent of France would be an incident used by his political
opponents. These two concerns intertwine with the recent AUKUS deal that
simultaneously appears to minimize the French role in the Pacific and undermine
Macron’s credibility with the loss of the $90 billion submarine contract.
In minimizing the concerns of the Kanaks and the spirit of the Noumea Accord, France is
undermining the political autonomy of New Caledonia. The overwhelming vote against
independence reported on the 12th is a product of the refusal of independence groups
to participate, reflected in a strikingly low turnout rate of only 41% of the eligible
population. Participation at the voting booth has served as a proxy for legitimacy in the
prior elections, and without this vital component in place it might usher a new era of civil
discontent and violence to New Caledonia. Already there are calls to contest the outcome
of this referendum from FLNKS and the MSG Secretariat.
In some ways history is repeating itself in New Caledonia, where local autonomy is being
overruled by the strategic interests of the metropole. While independence is the ultimate
goal, fruitful compromises can be reached embodied by the peaceful legacy of the
Matignon and Noumea Accords. The onus is on Paris to recognise that it is stoking the
flames of future civil unrest and that there is still time to compromise before it is too late.
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by Daniel Whitehurst
Since 1945, Australia has shown a consistent and fierce tendency to align with the
United States; after all, why wouldn’t we? Under the world’s most significant and
advanced military umbrella and with close financial connections to the world’s
largest economy, Australia has blossomed. Today we possess a prosperous and
stable economy that entices overseas investment, especially from the US, witnessed
a world-leading thirty year streak without a recession that was only ended by the
onset of COVID-19, and have a crucial security relationship that reduces our
historical fear of isolationism. As a result, Australia has developed a voice within the
Indo-Pacific region and serves as a hub from which the US seeks to ensure the
continuation of their rules-based order
The benefits Australia has inherited from Washington, being our ‘great and powerful
friend’ are indisputable. However, such interconnectedness has also served to
distance us from like-minded partners in our region. Being a middle power in any
region is challenging, however in the contemporary
Indo-Pacific it is particularly unenviable. The great power
competition that exists between the US and China, and
the ramifications for Australia siding with the US so
vehemently over the past year, have further contributed
to a feeling of isolation within our own backyard. As a
result of our strict adherence to US policy and political
ties, our ability to interact with those states in our
periphery and affect change – much less lead – within
our region has been compromised. Against the
backdrop of the US having its international image
tarnished again by the withdrawal
from Afghanistan and Australia
signing the AUKUS pact, it is now time
to consider loosening one hand
P A G E 4 9 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

of our grip on Uncle Sam and engaging with other regional partners with whom we
share common characteristics and strategic interests.
A N U N D E R D E V E L O P E D R E G I O N A L A L L I A N C E
There are multiple states within the Indo-Pacific with whom Australia has an
underdeveloped political relationship. However, complications concerning relations
with China, differing political systems, and a lack of shared values will continue to
limit progress with many of our regional neighbours. When considering potential
regional partners, Australia’s attention should turn to those with whom we share a
common strategic alliance with the US, an interest in preserving the rules-based
order, and upholding democratic tendencies. When applying this test, South Korea
offers a particularly attractive opportunity for Australia.
2021 marks the sixtieth anniversary of relations between South Korea and Australia.
This milestone should be one of celebration, but also of future planning. There has
long been reinforced impetus for closer collaboration between the two states, but
now is the time to capitalise on creating true regional influence and stability. While
there is some contestation over whether a common strategic outlook exists
between Canberra and Seoul, there is no question that they share overlapping
economic, political and military interests. Australia must focus on these specific
areas where the two can deliver mutually beneficial outcomes. This is particularly
important today given the omnipresent rise of China and its increasingly assertive
foreign policies. There is a need in both Canberra and Seoul to guard against the
power-based international order being driven by Beijing. Collaboration to meet this
challenge is most likely to be facilitated in defence and economic sectors.
U N T A P P E D C O L L A B O R A T I O N
The most likely sector of cooperation between Australia and South Korea in the
immediate term is that of defence. Historically, South Korea has been wary of
Australia’s propensity to choose alternate military providers, particularly from
Germany, over Korean manufacturers. However, recent progress has been
promising. South Korea’s Hanwha Group was selected as the preferred bidder for
the LAND811 project in September 2020, budgeted at around AUD$1 billion. This
commitment from the Department of Defence (DoD) follows the aims set forward
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by the Defence Science and Technology Strategy 2030, where future contracts
would be expanded beyond traditional European partners to those in the local
region. The LAND811 project is promising, yet more progress is necessary. The path
to further collaboration can be facilitated as soon as this year, should the Hanwha
Group be awarded the far greater LAND400 project, valued at AUD$18 billion, over
the German group Rheinmetall. The LAND400 project would affirm the DoD’s
strategy and be foundational in expanding bilateral defence industry cooperation
between Canberra and Seoul. Flourishing defence ties would be conducive to more
cohesive collaboration between the two middle powers, whilst also facilitating closer
cooperation in other sectors of the bilateral relationship. We live in an era of vast
and often unforeseen change. Given the ongoing strategic competition in the Indo-
Pacific, it is vital that Australia and South Korea plan for opportunities particularly
because of their expertise in manufacturing military equipment (through the
Hanwha Group), compared to other regional partners.
The renewable energy sector stands as another vital avenue for collaboration
between the two states that has so far been underutilised. As we shift into an
international society driven by sustainable energy solutions, Australia must step out
from under the umbrella of fossil fuels and consider alternative energy avenues.
While Australia has abundant natural resources that have powered its economic
growth over the past two decades, it also possesses significant potential to thrive in
an era of renewable energy. South Korea is a like-minded partner in this effort to
deliver a carbon-free future and promote a shift to green energy. South Korea has
demonstrated this commitment by adopting a target of net-zero by 2050 and with
an ambitious private sector striving towards carbon neutrality. Despite such a
promising relationship, however, Australia has fallen behind other western
democracies by not making similar commitments. Prime Minister Scott Morrison
and Foreign Minister Marise Payne have been steadfast in their refusal to commit to
carbon neutrality, yet the issue may be one of timeframe rather than the
overarching objective. Given our abundance of fossil fuel resources, the political
power of multinational mining conglomerates and the economic benefit they
provide to the Australian economy, it is understandable - albeit dismaying - that a
commitment has not been made. As climate change continues to be a 'hot topic' in
diplomatic and political circles internationally, Australia could be risking a significant
opportunity with South Korea in working towards reducing carbon emissions by not
committing to net-zero.
"There is a need in both Canberra and Seoul to guard against
the power-based international order being driven by Beijing."
P A G E 5 1 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

A S I A

by Chloe Marriott | YDS Regional Correspondent
As the world sets upon the road to recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic, East
Asia once again has restored its position at the forefront of technological
development, competition and regional investment. However, the region continues
to be defined by an increasingly aggressive China, with the majority of foreign policy
throughout Asia becoming reactionary. As this authoritarian influence in the region
continues to spread, democracy becomes even harder to instil in an already
struggling region. Any and all attempts to counter China’s bid for regional
dominance are imperative to ensure regional security and are essential in aiding
East Asia’s recovery in a post-pandemic world.
Here are six key developments that occurred in East Asia throughout 2021 that will
continue to shape the future of the region:
1 : I N T E R - K O R E A N C O N F L I C T
Following the destruction of the Korean Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong that ended
formal ties between North and South Korea in 2020, relations have suffered from an
extended lull. With major parties to the conflict, including the US and China,
frequently butting heads, what little progress is made can easily be undone.
Communication largely consists of each side accusing the other of pursuing “hostile
policies” and engaging in aggressive displays of military prowess via missile testing
across the peninsula. South Korean President Moon Jae-In has repeatedly
emphasised his proposal for a declaration to end the Korean War but attempts have
been complicated by rumoured North Korean famine and Supreme Leader Kim Jong
Un’s speculated health concerns. Most recently, the Kim family reciprocated interest
in an inter-Korean summit in September to restore mutual trust. However, such a
prospect should be met with cautious optimism. With Moon’s term expiring in early
2022, the two states will enter the new year without any agreement to halt North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program and without the global community lifting
sanctions on an increasingly troublesome state.
2 : S O U T H C H I N A S E A C O N F L I C T
The disputed territory of the South China Sea remains one of the most crucial
challenges for maintaining peace and security throughout the East Asia region.
Negotiations to establish a South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) have been
significantly delayed due to worsening COVID-19 outbreaks in affected countries.
mportantly, any COC must establish geographic boundaries for states that are
compatible with international law, effective monitoring and compliance mechanisms
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and avenues for dispute resolution. 2021 has seen China consistently taking
unilateral action to dominate territory across the Taiwan Strait, largely via
establishing artificial islands and military outposts across the region whilst imposing
on the territories of multiple states. The ongoing conflict, which involves one of the
world’s most important trading routes, has also attracted the attention of the
European Union and US, and has assisted the Biden administration in defining its
foreign policy throughout Asia. This policy shift has focused on encouraging
cooperation with youthful and dynamic South East Asian states, creating a
diplomatic space for cooperation on major issues concerning China. It is promising
to witness the US’ return to multilateralism throughout Asia following an
unpredictable and confrontational term under Trump.
3 : O L Y M P I C D I P L O M A C Y
The Olympic games have ostensibly provided an opportunity for states to come
together and channel the “Olympic truce” spirit of international cooperation. The
2020 Tokyo Olympic Games were viewed as an opportunity for Japan and South
Korea to repair two years of damaged relations in the same way the 2018
Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games assisted in fostering inter-Korean reparations
discourse. The diplomatic relationship suffered a serious blow following Japan’s
refusal to pay reparations to Koreans affected by Japan’s actions during WWII and
subsequently implementing export controls on critical resources. In the hopes of
gaining momentum, following brief bilateral meetings between Japan and South
Korea, South Korea’s President Moon expressed an intention to attend the Games’
opening ceremony and hold a bilateral summit with the then Japanese President
Yoshihide Suga. However, following comments from the Japanese embassy in Seoul
that referred to Moon’s efforts as tantamount to “masturbating”, the trip was hastily
cancelled, leaving the two states with a wasted chance for reconciliation.
In a similar vein, multiple countries have already announced their intention to follow
suit and stage a diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics.
The US and Australia, who have primarily suffered the wrath of China throughout
2021, have taken a strong stance against China’s bullying and various human rights
abuses. This shift may represent a larger phenomenon of states becoming less
hesitant to utilise such events to send a political message.
4 : O N E C H I N A P O L I C Y
China has once again stepped up its pursuit of unification of former territories
throughout 2021. With greater conviction than his predecessors, China has once
P A G E 5 3 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

again stepped up its pursuit of
unification of former territories
throughout 2021. With greater
conviction than his predecessors,
President Xi Jinping has expressed
a strong desire to reunify Taiwan
with mainland China. A current
deterrence strategy to wane
support for Taiwanese
independence has been somewhat
successful with middle-powers, but
Beijing’s interpretation of the US’
military presence in the Taiwan
strait as “provocation” leaves the
potential for an impending use of
force. However, considering
Taiwan’s growing international
support, it is unlikely China will
pursue reunification by force in the
near future. With support from the
US and allies, China may risk
economic, diplomatic and military
isolation for violating international
laws of non-aggression which
would risk failing to achieve its
ambitious goals of modernisation
by mid-century.
P A G E 5 4 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S
The reality of what reunification
may constitute for Taiwan has
been demonstrated clearly in Hong
Kong following the handover from
the British government. After
passing a controversial National
Security law soon after
reunification in 2020, the past year
has shown the devastating effects
of Beijing’s enforcement which has
landed several pro-democracy
protestors in prison. The city’s
freedoms and liberal democratic
institutions have been eroded
swiftly and effectively, with further
curtailment anticipated following a
December P A2021 G E Felection.
I V E | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

5 : T E C H N O L O G I C A L A D V A N C E S A N D
E C O N O M I C R E C O V E R Y
As the world adapted to a new normal of living with COVID-19, focus shifted to
overcoming uncertainties in global trade and restoring productivity growth.
Technological advances have been at the forefront of accelerating the transition to
better modes of production and sustained economic recovery in the post-pandemic
era. As blockchain technology continues to improve and crypto currencies gain
popularity worldwide, central banks have sought to maintain sovereignty over
national currencies by establishing digital currencies. China has been at the
forefront and plans to launch the digital renminbi in early 2022 with many countries
hot on their tail.
Further challenges are likely to arise concerning cybersecurity, privacy protection
and data sovereignty but this new technology will provide an opportunity for
individuals and institutions across the globe to engage in fair and equitable access to
a globalised economy. With an absence of multilateral rules governing this rapidly
growing digital economy, the need for an economic cooperation agenda is
becoming more apparent. Data is now viewed as the “new oil” and it is more
important than ever to ensure common interests in areas such as digital trade
facilitation are prioritised to deepen cooperation.
6 : B E L T A N D R O A D I N I T I A T I V E
China’s ambitious Belt and Road initiative (BRI), first announced in 2013, has
continued with gusto throughout 2021. The monumental project, aimed at building
infrastructure developments in over 100 countries and establishing a new Silk Road
across Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa, has successfully boosted regional
trade and commerce. Over the last year, the project has embarked on major
developments across the globe and has expanded to the Health and Digital Silk
Road which has allowed for the provision of medical equipment, vaccines and tech
systems as part of a post-pandemic recovery strategy. However, China has faced
mounting criticism for engaging in debt-trap diplomacy, which involves China
extracting political concessions from partner states and accusations of corruption. In
a move to bridge the infrastructure gap across Asia, counter-initiatives were
launched in 2021 by both the G7 (‘Build Back Better World’) and European Union
(‘Globally Connected Europe’). These initiatives aim to offer alternatives to the BRI for
primarily South East Asian states that secure individual sovereignty and allow for
choices that best suit their developmental and geopolitical needs while providing
accountability for Beijing’s shortcomings.
P A G E 5 5 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

by Samuel Garrett | YDS Senior Correspondent
2021 saw Central Asia ravaged by a severe drought that has brought the impacts of
climate change across the region into sharp focus. Even in a region known for
extreme temperatures and dryness, the effects of the drought, and the changing
weather patterns which caused it, stand to make the lives of people harder and
heighten national tensions as water usage and power shortages intersect.
D r o u g h t i n C e n t r a l A s i a h a s k i l l e d t h o u s a n d s o f a n i m a l s .
P H O T O : M I G U E L G A L M E S / A L A M Y S T O C K P H O T O
P A G E 5 6 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S
P A G E F I V E | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

The Central Asian drought’s unprecedented severity and duration indicate the
growing impacts of climate change on vulnerable areas and people within the
region, with flow-on effects on supplies and prices hitting poorer regions and
populations hardest. Worse, the future is expected to see conditions further
deteriorate and more prolonged drought conditions, further impacting the region.
In particular, the droughts have highlighted the impacts and devastation for farmers
on multiple fronts. Without adequate water, their fields remain unirrigated and
begin to die, with both yield and ongoing soil quality negatively affected. The rising
summer heat has also had huge impacts on grazing animals, who now lack water
and food amid high temperatures. In 2021, the result has been mass die-offs of
thousands of animals in livestock herds across Central Asia, with many farmers
forced to resort to feeding wet cardboard to their animals. But even cardboard
began running low in some regions. Disturbing images of emaciated horses have
since emerged in multiple countries, along with animal corpses strewn in fields. With
climate change and drought conditions likely to continue in future years, the
ramifications of the effects this year will continue to be felt by the region, financially
and emotionally.
S h o r t a g e s o f b o t h f o o d a n d w a t e r h a v e l e f t f a r m e r s l i t t l e o p t i o n
b u t t o f e e d l i v e s t o c k w h a t e v e r t h e y h a v e t o h a n d .
P H O T O : P A U L M I K H E Y E V / R E U T E R S
Temperature extremes besides droughts are also further impacting the
environment, and likely to continue to have effects in the region. For example,
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current spring temperatures are proving insufficient to melt glaciers, hampering
crops, while sudden record-breaking summer highs across the region bring little
precipitation yet speed up dramatic glacier retreat. In Kyrgyzstan, whose alpine
glaciers serve as a reservoir for Central Asia’s longest rivers, their disappearance
risks dramatically reducing water supplies not just for the country, but the entire
region. Yet despite warming temperatures, the changing rain patterns are
shortening the growing season for crops by almost a day every year. The impact is
even more keenly felt at higher altitudes, particularly in northern Kazakhstan, where
crop yields at altitude are hampered by precipitous drops in rainfall. In the nearby
Tian Shan mountain range, the source of many Central Asian rivers, changing
weather patterns are also expected to produce less snow. The situation is also
exacerbated by aging irrigation infrastructure across the region and canals which
are ill-suited for the modern, water-intensive crops now regularly grown, such as
corn, cotton and melon. Prices of crops and goods have since skyrocketed as
adequate yields and distribution become harder to maintain.
Political responses to changing weather patterns have varied across Central Asia.
Despite pleas and calls for action on the 2021 drought, responses have been
considered unsuccessful and largely met with indifference. In Kazakhstan, measures
such as imports and redistribution to maintain hay supplies and the agricultural
sector came too late to save thousands of animals from death or starvation. Similar
failings resulted in protests in Kyrgyzstan and across the region, with governments
receiving the bulk of the blame for the situation. Authorities in Turkmenistan have
maintained that there is little cause for concern, with President Gurbanguly
Berdimukhamedov offering a typically upbeat outlook despite the catastrophic
environmental impacts on his nation.
Central Asia is no stranger to large scale environmental change. The Aral Sea in
western Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was once hugely important both
environmentally and economically. However, poor policies and management, along
with ecological change, have caused a drastic reduction in the Sea’s size in recent
decades, effectively destroying ecosystems and leaving once-coastal communities
dried up and desolate, with the livelihoods of fishermen and others having literally
evaporated. Even the far larger Caspian Sea is now shallowing out, placing further
pressure on rainfall across regional farmland areas and reservoirs.
Environmental change and the pressures of water shortages also stand to
potentially heighten geopolitical tensions between the Central Asian republics. The
Toktogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan is vital for storage of the nation’s water, and also
houses a critically important hydroelectric plant. Crucially, it holds water that
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eventually flows through rivers in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. With water
levels low, discussions over closing the floodgates to secure Kyrgyzstan's water
supply drew concerns domestically over the possible loss of power, and
internationally over the impacts on water supplies for countries downstream.
Negotiations focussed on potentially trading power for water guarantees. Yet
despite a spirit of cooperation and engagement, the possibility for conflict in the
future cannot be discounted, particularly in light of ongoing border disputes across
Central Asia which have prompted occasional skirmishes in recent years.
K y r g y z s t a n ’ s T o k t o g u l r e s e r v o i r , t h e f o c u s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r p o w e r a n d w a t e r s u p p l i e s a c r o s s C e n t r a l A s i a .
P H O T O : N I N A R A / F L I C K R
Central Asia faces an extremely uncertain environmental future. Economies and
government budgets which have already been hit hard by the coronavirus
pandemic have and will continue to struggle to properly address such large scale
change. This will be to their detriment, and that of their people. While the long-term
political and geopolitical ramifications are yet to be fully clear, it is the most
vulnerable that will continue to be hit hardest.
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P H O T O : A L T E R N A T I V N N Y Y N O V O S T I T U R K M E N I S T A N A / B B C
by Samuel Garrett | YDS Senior Correspondent
Source: Eurasianet
Discussing regional ties with Russian governor Igor Babushkin. Facing
intense economic crises and coronavirus outbreaks which it has refused to
acknowledge, Turkmenistan is keen to boost regional cooperation.
P A G E 6 0 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

Source: Reuters
President Berdimukhamedov at independence day celebrations. Both
Turkmenistan and its president are known for their love of horses,
particularly when used as a political symbol of national pride.
Source: Reuters
Having revealed an enormous golden statue of an Alabai dog in 2020,
President Berdimukhamedov this year dedicated a national holiday to
the breed.
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Before Japan’s longest serving prime minister in the post-war period, Shinzo Abe,
came to power in 2012, Japan had been through six prime ministers in six years.
Last September, Abe resigned due to chronic health issues. In his wake, Yoshihide
Suga was selected as prime minister by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
which has dominated Japanese politics for decades. However, after just twelve
months he has stepped down, leading to concerns that Japan will return to the
unstable pre-Abe revolving door of prime ministers.
Admittedly, in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, Suga had a challenging task
ahead of him. Nevertheless, he started with a strong approval rating of 70 per cent,
promising to lead Japan through the pandemic. However, before long, his rigid
communication style and dismissiveness towards journalists led to concern about
his leadership. Among other blunders, his indecisive action on COVID-19 outbreaks
and his decision to push forward with the Tokyo Olympics in 2021, despite it being
opposed by some 80 per cent of Japanese citizens, led to a catastrophic plummet in
his approval ratings, from 41 per cent in January to 26 per cent in August of this
year. Suga was not the leader of any of the LDP’s factions, and having lost the
confidence of party leaders, he was forced to announce that he would withdraw
from the contest for party leadership in September.
This led to a contest for the role of prime minister between four candidates: crowd
favourite Taro Kono, ex-foreign minister Fumio Kishida, the Abe-backed ultranationalist
Sanae Takaichi, and liberal Seiko Noda. The latter two female candidates
were knocked out of the race in the first round of voting within the LDP, with Kishida
narrowly pulling ahead of Kono 256 votes to 255. As Suga’s election showed,
however, the candidate chosen as prime minister is not necessarily the most
popular among the public, but is the candidate who party heavyweights believe can
lead the party to victory on a viable policy platform.
by Daniel Gage-Brown
P A G E 6 2 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S

P H O T O : K I M I M A S A M A Y A M A / P O O L V I A A P
Kono’s opposition to expanded missile defence capabilities and nuclear power, and
his progressive stance on gay marriage made him a difficult pill to swallow for the
LDP’s growing ranks of far-right politicians, while Kishida was the leader of the
progressive Kochikai faction, and a well-connected member of a political dynasty
extending from his grandfather. After Takaichi was eliminated from the race, Abe
threw his support behind Kishida and helped him come out on top. Kishida was
selected by the party as prime minister on September 29, and took office on
October 4.
While his first tasks were preparing for the lower house general election on October
31, in two main policy addresses since his ascension to office, he has articulated his
administration’s goals, in an attempt to distinguish himself from his predecessors.
His decisive response to the Omicron variant in recent weeks, completely closing
Japan’s borders to foreign visitors, shows his desire to avoid Suga’s mistakes.
Additionally, he has announced a US $496 billion stimulus package, and has vowed
to pioneer a ‘new model of capitalism’ to redress rising inequality in Japan,
highlighting climate action and economic security as the two main pillars of this
model. He has criticised neoliberal ‘Abenomics’ as misguided trickle-downeconomics,
and has promised to improve the distribution of wealth across society.
Additionally, he will inherit the legacy of Suga’s new digital transformation agency,
which the LDP believes will be vital for Japan’s future competitiveness.
On the foreign policy front, Kishida has been forced to shed his dovish feathers and
adhere to the party-line on China, which now involves strong commitments to
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Taiwan, development of a missile-defence program, and plans to discuss revising
Article 9 of the constitution, the article which prevents Japan from possessing any
offensive military force. Kishida has signalled that he will continue close cooperation
with the Quad nations of Australia, the US and India, as well as the EU to
protect “the basic values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law and human
rights”.
Ultimately, Kishida is a liberal and relatively centrist face for a Japan which is
becoming more right-wing, with the left-wing Constitutional Democratic Party of
Japan (CDP) losing fourteen seats at the lower house election in October, and the
populist Japan Innovation Party gaining thirty. The CDP, Japan’s largest opposition
party, remains in a political alliance with the Japanese Communist Party, which
frightens away most voters. Therefore, in the short to medium-term, the LDP’s hold
on power seems secure. Additionally, the LDP’s easy victory in the lower house
election will give Kishida breathing room to carry out his ambitious policies. Whether
Kishida will soon be out the door, however, depends on if he can balance his public
appeal with the LDP’s conservative agenda.
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by Chloe Marriott | YDS Regional Correspondent
The pursuit of a ‘Chinese Dream’ instils
hope for a new generation of
supporters of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), one of the longest-running
single-party regimes in modern history.
However, the vague promise of eternal
prosperity and cultural bliss, entangled
with China’s quest to become a
superpower and global hegemon, more
likely suggests misplaced optimism for
the future of the party. Having recently
celebrated its 100th anniversary, the
party’s growing assertiveness, perfectly
embodied by their controversial leader
Xi Jinping, has the potential to either
bolster regime survival or lead to its
demise. While Xi claims the party's
future offers ​”bright prospects for the
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”,
others suggest the same regime is
fragile and slowly corroding. In an hourlong
speech delivered on July 1, 2021, Xi
praised “socialism with Chinese
characteristics” for transforming the
domestic economy and creating a “new
world” for Chinese citizens. However,
many criticised Xi’s description of
China’s past as a historical and the
vision of China’s future as self-righteous
and overly aggressive. There is an
apparent disconnect between Chinese
and foreign accounts of the party's
history, which must be reconciled to
allow for practical cooperation in the
future.
R E S I L I E N C E O F T H E
P A R T Y - S T A T E : C H I N A ’ S
A S S E R T I V E N E S S I N T H E
2 1 S T C E N T U R Y
The CCP continues to gather popular
support for the regime by using a wide
variety of material and normative
means, including facilitating economic
development, fostering a fear of
instability, repressing opposing views
and co-optation of carefully selected
groups. Repression remains a vital
characteristic of any authoritarian
regime’s survival strategy; suppressing
political opponents, limiting free speech
and censoring media and education to
pre-empt and punish resistance. The
modern age of ‘big data’ has allowed
digital propaganda to legitimise the CCP
with “elegant simplicity”, censoring
media by utilising artificial intelligence,
national firewalls, surveillance
technology and biometric databases.
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Minimal resources enforce
“omnipresent” coercive measures,
reducing the need for co-optation while
simultaneously strengthening the
regime's stability and reducing the
possibility for a ‘Tiananmen-II’.
The fundamental contributor to China’s
timely ascension to superpower status
and high levels of support for the CCP is
rooted in 30 years of unprecedented
economic growth. Their impressive rise
to become the world’s second-largest
economy as the result of substantial
economic growth over this period has
tripled the economy, setting the state
on course to overtake the US economy
by 2030.
This exceptional economic growth has
enabled China to excel within the global
capitalist market and promote the
Chinese governance model abroad.
Growing confidence in their economic
achievements has flowed into their
foreign policy, evident in the CCP’s
hardened position on territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, One
China policy and the ambitious One Belt
One Road infrastructure development
initiative. Promoting Chinese ideals
internationally through infrastructure,
aid policy and military prowess will
continue to solidify China’s position as a
global power and prolong regime
support.
monopoly over many economic,
financial and social institutions.
Furthermore, state control assists elites
in controlling wealth distribution and
decreasing incentives for democratic
reform. It is no surprise that a positive
relationship is found between
economic growth and higher levels of
support for the regime. The stability
provided by economic growth has been
crucial to the CCP’s survival strategy,
raising potential concerns for the CCP
upon economic downturn amidst the
COVID-19 pandemic, energy shortages
and a deteriorating housing market.
Consequently, China faces challenges in
the coming months that may derail
economic progress and delegitimise the
party’s governing ability.
The state plays a primary role in
economic growth, controlling the
nature, scope, content and direction of
market reform while maintaining a
P A G E 6 6 | 2 0 2 1 B Y Y D S
P H O T O : S T R / A G E N C E F R A N C E -
P R E S S E / G E T T Y I M A G E S

China will not be intimidated by a
hypocritical US. The two superpowers
are likely to continue to clash over ‘hotbutton’
issues, including the recovery of
"lost territories", which leaves states
such as Taiwan, Japan and India in the
middle.
P H O T O : N I C O L A S A S F O U R / R E U T E R S
T O W A R D S G L O R Y O R
D E M I S E ? T H E F R A G I L I T Y
O F C H I N A ’ S
A U T H O R I T A R I A N
R E G I M E
China may be reaching a crossroads at
which many authoritarian regimes have
fallen throughout history. The CCP,
frequently relying on oppression to
maintain its power, carries out the most
intense human rights abuses seen in
decades. Beijing’s response to an
outraged international community has
been nothing short of aggressive,
claiming they will not accept
“sanctimonious preaching” from other
states. Xi’s anniversary speech drew
attention to the subtle comment that
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Xi’s policies are increasingly facing
criticism from foreign bodies. Hong
Kong’s pro-democracy protests have
perhaps become the most vocal outcry
for upholding human rights and
freedom from Beijing’s intervention.
The backlash has assisted in shining a
spotlight on Chinese practices and has
gained traction and stimulated
widespread support. It has since been
described as the biggest challenge to
China’s rulers by the territory since
Tiananmen Square.
Notably, the outcry has begun to
translate to the domestic sphere.
Restricting information highlight’s
Beijing’s trepidation and has generated
disillusionment leading to resentment
among groups bearing the costs of an
intensified crackdown on liberties.
Many young people are cautious of
censorship regulations and penalties,
and have turned to defiance via
recoding, satire and wordplay, utilising
cartoons and social media to generate
support for censorship resistance. The
sheer volume of information circulating
throughout the country’s 1.4 billion
population creates an opportunity for
censorship avoidance.
The CCP was once referred to as
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evidence of stability without democracy,
held together by the fact that
successors-in-waiting are selected and a
maximum of two five-year terms are
permitted for elite leaders. The 2018
decision of the National Party Congress,
to abolish the maximum of two fiveyear
terms as a senior party member in
office, has further shattered the stability
of power-sharing and succession.
Mandatory retirement and term
limitations have historically assisted in
providing a much needed balance of
power within the Chinese authoritarian
regime. Whether Xi will step down upon
the expiry of his second term in 2022,
will speak volumes as to the future of
the regime and may act as a muchneeded
catalyst for change or further
risk fostering a climate of mutual
distrust and uncertainty concerning
succession in the coming years.
challenges behind closed doors. In stark
contrast to Xi’s promise of “national
rejuvenation”, the CCP more accurately
represents a candle burning from both
ends.
C O N C L U S I O N
The CCP is under increased pressure
within the current political landscape,
suggesting the façade can only remain
so long as the economy grows at an
unprecedented rate. Economic
downturn has resulted in excessive
political control to maintain Party
legitimacy, leading to central Party
disunity and resistance from the
Chinese people. For the time being, the
general public’s perception suggests the
CCP is confident in itself, with stories of
triumph continuing to shape the
country’s worldview and public policy.
However, it must be difficult to ignore
Beijing’s mounting internal and external
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A R E V O L U T I O N A R Y M O V E M E N T
V O I C I N G T H E O N C E U N T H I N K A B L E
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by Aishwarya Gowda
Since early 2020, an unprecedented
wave of student-led protest has swept
across Thailand. The Constitutional
Court’s decision to dissolve the Future
Forward Party (FFP) in February
changed the country’s political
landscape drastically, and the youth
have since taken to the streets calling
for a reformation of the monarchy and
the resignation of Prime Minister
Prayuth Chan-Ocha along with several
other demands. While it was once
taboo to call for reforms to the Thai
monarchy, young protesters are
becoming increasingly bold and publicly
voicing their opinions in the hope of a
just future.
The banning of the FFP in February
2020 triggered demonstrations across
Thailand, especially in university and
high school campuses. Pandemic
restrictions soon brought the protests
to a brief halt. But in July 2020, following
reports of the abduction of democracy
activist Wanchalearm Satakshi in
Cambodia, Thailand witnessed one of
the largest street demonstrations since
the 2014 coup d’état. Around 2,500
protestors, organised under the name
Free Youth, gathered around the
Democracy Monument in Bangkok.
Here, the demonstrators announced
three core demands, which included
the dissolution of parliament, an end to
harassment of government critics, and
redrafting the military-backed
constitution. At a subsequent protest in
August, student groups announced 10
additional demands, which were later
formally submitted to the House of
Representatives for consideration.
These included expanding LGBTQI+ and
women’s rights, educational reforms,
military reforms, improvements in the
economy, a ban on the king’s
endorsement of future coups, abolition
of royal offices, reduction in
government expenditure on the
monarchy, and amnesty to those
prosecuted under Article 112 of the
Thai Criminal Code, otherwise known as
the Lese Majeste law.
The following month, the Thai
Parliament established a study
committee to assess the popularlyproposed
constitutional changes. In
Thailand, any amendment to the
constitution must pass through a
complex parliamentary procedure
before being approved. The decision to
set up the study committee delayed this
process even further. Riots soon broke
out, and a state of emergency was
declared in Bangkok. Leaders of the
protests were arrested and a ban on
sensitive media was imposed.
On 22 October 2020, the Prime Minister
revoked the state of emergency.
Following this, an emergency
parliamentary session was held to
discuss the Constitutional Bill and the
popularly-proposed internet reforms,
also known as the iLaw Charter. Both
the Senate and the House of
Representatives rejected the proposal
owing to a lack of support from the
senators.
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In December 2020, the Constitutional
Court ruled in favour of the Prime
Minister in a conflict of interest case
concerning his use of military housing.
Frustrations boiled over once more.
Thousands of casualties followed
before another brief halt due to a surge
in COVID-19 infections. During this quiet
break, the leaders of Free Youth were
prosecuted under the Lese Majeste law.
Nevertheless, in February 2021, Free
Youth rebranded itself under the name
“Restart Democracy” and began to
regain momentum. Riots intensified
from their 2020 peak, with violence
erupting on both sides. The police’s use
of water cannons and tear gas was met
with Molotov cocktails by the
protestors.
In March, the Thai Parliament again
voted down two constitutional bills after
the Constitutional Court held that the
amendment must pass a referendum
first. Throughout 2021, the movement
continued to spread across the country,
with rallies in over 30 provinces. The
protests were mainly peaceful, but the
use of water cannons and tear gas by
the police increased, resulting in a
higher number of casualties.
Further arrests of prominent activists
under the Lese Majeste law followed. In
August, the prominent activist Benja
Apan was arrested for claiming that the
2014 coup only benefited the elite and
calling for constitutional reform. Further
demands were made regarding
vaccines and a reboot of the economy.
In October, Thai activist Panusaya
Sithijirawattanakul was arrested by the
Royal Thai Police after calling for the
repeal of the Lese Majeste law. Around
3,000 protestors gathered to witness
Panusaya’s speech in a central Bangkok
shopping district, during which she
used a razor blade to engrave the text
“112” into her left arm. Panusaya is
currently facing the prospect of a
lengthy prison sentence.
In November, the Constitutional Court
made another ruling stating that the
demands to reform the monarchy were
illegal and the anti-government
activists, including Panusaya, aimed to
overthrow the monarchy during their
speeches made in August 2020. Street
rallies at the Democracy Monument
and the Grand Palace intensified, this
time in opposition to the Court. Effigies
of Constitutional Court judges were
burnt and the riots have only intensified
since.
The Thailand protests have lasted for
almost 22 months. Since then, around
300 protestors, leaders and supporters
of the pro-democracy movement have
been arrested and detained. The Thai
government has stated that it will show
zero tolerance towards dissent. But this
hasn’t stopped the youth in their efforts
to radicalise the nation, and they
remain committed to the same
objectives: reform of the monarchy,
freedom of self-expression, and the
abolition of Lese Majeste. In any event,
the demonstrations have broken a
longstanding taboo of speaking out
against the monarchy.
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And the fervour of the protests means they will not be subsiding anytime soon. The
challenges to the legitimacy of the monarchy have only led to an increased sense of
democratisation in Thailand. In the meantime, the protests grow larger by the day,
as more Thai citizens seek an equitable future.
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P H O T O B Y P S K S L A Y E R O N U N S P L A S H

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by Declan Hourd | YDS Regional Correspondent
Since the coup in February, violence committed by the Tatmadaw, the armed forces
of Myanmar, against the Burmese people has only escalated. The Young Diplomats
Society has tracked the promising results of the November elections, despite their
flawed rollout, and explored the underlying tension between civilian and military
leadership in Myanmar. The coup is another tragedy in a country with a long history
of violent ethnic conflict and a myriad of social issues that many developing
countries experience. In the broader context of the international system, the
geopolitical contest taking place in the Indo-Pacific has encouraged a range of
responses from many actors.
The military junta was swift to suppress civil disobedience by imposing curfews and
internet blackouts across the country. Despite this, civilians were quick to organise
peaceful demonstrations in the streets. Civil servants, teachers, and doctors have
joined in solidarity by stopping work and, in doing so, impaired the ability of the
junta to govern the country. The international diaspora brought protests to their
embassies, and Myanmar’s Permanent Representative to the UN elected before the
coup, Kyaw Moe Tun, expressed his heartfelt support for the protests. He called for
the return of democracy to his country and implored other countries to cut ties with
the military junta until normalcy is restored.
As the preliminary efforts of the Tatmadaw failed to curb public outcry against their
seizure of power, soldiers were sent into the streets to break up protests and quell
any opposition. According to Human Rights Watch, over 700 people, including
children, have been killed so far, and hundreds have disappeared. Video footage has
revealed soldiers beating medical staff, firing shotguns into crowds, and using
grenades against barricades built by protestors. Complementing its physical
suppression of the people, the junta has also recently charged the captive Aung San
Suu Kyi with violations of the secrets act and has recalled over 100 diplomatic staff
from foreign postings. Among those recalled was Myanmar’s Ambassador to the UK,
Kyaw Zwar Minn, who supported the protestors by calling for the release of Aung
San Su Kyi and President U Win Myint, and has since been locked out of the London
embassy compound,
As this unrest unfolds, discussions on the role of the various Ethnic Armed
Organisations (EAOs) in Myanmar have begun to take place. For decades, these
groups have been fighting against the central government for recognition and selfgovernance.
In order to dissuade these groups from collaborating against them, the
junta has removed some of these organisations from terrorist organisation lists,
declared ceasefires, and released prisoners related to the EAOs. However, the junta
can only stall for so long. The junta’s continued use of violence against civilians has
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not gone unnoticed. The Arakan Army, a powerful EAO from within Rakhine state,
has condemned the junta for this violence, and other EAOs have echoed a similar
message. EAOs Karen and Kachin have also begun to engage the junta in small-scale
combat. Protestors fleeing the junta's violence have sought the protection of other
nearby EAOs, with some of these protestors having begun to receive military
training from these organisations in order to fight against the Tatmadaw.
The National Unity Government (NUG) has been formed as a government in exile in
the aftermath of this violence. The NUG comprises of members of the Committee
Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and a group of democratically elected
parliamentarians from the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party
dissolved by the junta. The NUG also includes protest leaders and representatives of
ethnic minority groups, with one exception. Troublingly, the NUG does not have any
Rohingya representation. The NUG aims to restore democracy in Myanmar and
divorce the military from political power. To do this, it is seeking international
recognition as the legitimate government of Myanmar, a mission led by Kyaw Moe
Tun, who remains in the UN because of the NUG. In further servicing their aim, the
NUG announced the formation of the People’s Defence Force, a military wing of
their government to fight against the junta and as a precursor to a federated army
that will incorporate EAOs. The Tatmadaw in response has since labelled this group
a terrorist organisation.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E A C T I O N S T O T H E C O U P
Beyond the domestic sphere, much of the international community has rallied
against the coup. Both the United States and the European Union have deployed
rigorous sanctions that target military officials and stymie the ability of different
Burmese business entities to trade internationally. Despite being prominent voices
in the Indo-Pacific, however, Australia, China, and Japan have all had subdued
responses to the coup.
Sean Turnell, an Australian economist working as an advisor for the NLD, was
arrested on February 1 by the Tatmadaw without cause. Subsequently, in April,
Turnell was charged with violation of the secrets act. This has constrained Australia’s
response to the coup, as Turnell has had limited consular access during his captivity,
despite Canberra asking for his release. So far, Canberra has only made a statement
to condemn the coup and has cancelled the limited military training programs
between Australia and Myanmar.
For Japan, the seizure of power by the Tatmadaw is particularly problematic given
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Tokyo's significant investment in Myanmar. The major foreign policy themes of the
previous Abe government was the promotion of democratic ideals and increasing
aid development in the Indo-Pacific. The international community rallying against
the military coup through sanctions, the cancelling of programs, and a direct
statement from Kyaw Moe Tun is a clear message to the Suga government to wind
down its aid and investments in Myanmar until order is restored. Currently, Japan
has only issued a statement condemning the coup without any sanctions or other
tangible coercive measures to encourage the restoration of democracy. The
slowness and lack of severity in Tokyo’s reaction highlight its fear that a harsh
response would impact their current role as a development partner, a role that can
be usurped by Beijing.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become a major investor in
Myanmar, fuelling many development projects. Unlike Japan, China has a clear
policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. To this end, China has argued in
international forums that the coup is an internal affair and has blocked sanctions
from the UN. However, conflict is bad for business. Protestors in Myanmar have
targeted Chinese owned factories with vandalism and arson. Amid this rising anti-
Chinese sentiment in Myanmar, Beijing has made requests of the Tatmadaw to
protect oil and gas infrastructure that has been developed as part of the BRI. In
April, Chinese troops began to gather on the border, allegedly to protect these
pipelines. Despite holding a position of non-interference and lack of support for
sanctions, China has backed UN statements calling for the violence to end. It is in
China’s interests to see stability restored in Myanmar. However, it is unlikely to risk
its investments in Myanmar by joining a larger international effort to stop the
violence. Harsher responses from China would greatly undermine its noninterference
policy, affect the rollout of the BRI elsewhere, and result in cooperation
with governments that have been vocal critics of Chinese human rights abuses.
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P H O T O B Y S A W W U N N A O N U N S P L A S H

With the growing importance of Southeast Asia to the geopolitical competition in the
Indo-Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an organisation
the world is increasingly looking towards to be the leading voice on Southeast Asian
interests and affairs. However, ASEAN is struggling to effectively deal with this crisis.
The organisation is grappling with its own non-interference policy and the possibility
of Myanmar’s conflict spilling over into other countries. To further complicate
matters, ASEAN makes decisions through group consensus. Since Myanmar is a
member nation, it can influence the output of the organisation, especially in
responding to the coup.
In February, Indonesia and Malaysia were vocal in calling for an ASEAN Leaders
Summit to discuss the situation in Myanmar. This Summit convened in Jakarta on
April 24 and controversially invited Min Aung Hlaing, head of the Tatmadaw, to
represent Myanmar and featured no representation from the NUG. The Summit
was summarised in a comprehensive statement from the ASEAN Chairman that
expressed ‘deep concern’ regarding the violence and called for the release of
political prisoners. It also produced a ‘five point consensus’ with the consent of
Hlaing to wind down the conflict. The first point calls for the immediate cessation of
violence against civilians. The next points outline how ASEAN will facilitate the peace
process through establishing dialogues between relevant parties and providing
humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately, there were no mechanisms to force the
Tatmadaw to comply with these statements. The junta has since commented that it
will consider the consensus after it has stabilised the country.
Violence in Myanmar will likely only continue to escalate in intensity as the
Tatmadaw will have to contend with armed resistance from EAOs and the NUG. As
for the international responses, condemnations of violence are proving ineffective.
For this civil conflict to end, there must be consistent international pressure applied
to the regime so it can no longer benefit from its usurpation of power. It remains
unclear whether economic concern will be enough, or whether a stronger response
such as military intervention is required. Additionally, it is uncertain whether there is
enough international will to unify and commit to either of those actions, as specific
geopolitical concerns may outweigh a unified response.
Whatever the outcome, the effects of this coup will be felt long term. Confidence in
Myanmar’s governance has been shattered. International development assistance
will likely be a casualty of this event, with existing projects paused and future
partners more hesitant to invest in Myanmar. This coup also prevents a resolution
of the Rohingya genocide, as there is not a stable government that can be held
accountable for those crimes. Ultimately, this violence is an impediment to
improving the quality of life for the people of Myanmar.
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P H O T O B Y S A W W U N N A O N U N S P L A S H
S P E C I A L E D I T I O N U P D A T E
Since the publication of this article in May 2021, diplomacy has taken a backseat in
Myanmar. The National Unity Government (NUG), government in exile, declared war
on the military junta in September. In the fourteen point declaration, acting
president Lashi La described the war as a ‘People’s Defensive War,’ calling for citizens
to seize control of Tatmadaw assets in their localities. La advocated for the various
EAOs to attack Min Aung Hlaing and other apparatus of the illegitimate junta,
although his statement is more aspirational than authoritative given the diverging
views among the EAOs. Furthermore, it warned local level civil servants to refuse to
work for the junta, continuing the atrophy of the Tatmadaw’s governing abilities, and
describing them as possible targets for NUG-affiliated violence.
International opinion has also hardened against the Tatmadaw in ASEAN and in the
West. Further complicating issues is the global pandemic, with the spread of the
infectious Delta variant increasing the difficulty of delivering humanitarian aid to the
country. Additionally, the attempted genocide of the Rohingya people facilitated by
the deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) is still left without resolution and
countless refugees remain stuck in camps on the fringes of Myanmar’s border with
India.
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P H O T O B Y G A Y A T R I M A L H O T R A O N U N S P L A S H
D E S C E N T I N T O C I V I L W A R & T H E
S T R E N G T H E N I N G O F T H E N U G
The civil resistance to the coup has been robust since February. In addition to
opposition from the general public, professionals like bankers, doctors, and
teachers, are refusing to work and crippling important parts of the economy.
However, consistent military pressure from the junta forced these elements to flee
cities and seek refuge in the countryside, which resulted in many civilians acquiring
combat training from various EAOs - which have been locked in their own war
against the government for decades.
The civilian-soldiers have professionalised and organised under the banner of the
People's Defence Force (PDF) as the military wing of the NUG. The PDF have
occupied Kawlin, a northern region of the country, acquired materiel such as
explosives, jets, and firearms, and are simultaneously repelling incursions from the
Tatamadaw and working to stabilise areas under their control. Recent reporting
from the region indicates the effectiveness of PDF. In July they seized a shipment of
gold headed for Mandalay, the nation's second largest city and headquarters of the
military council, and in October at least 40 Tatamadaw soldiers were killed in an
attempted incursion of the Kawlin region.
Matching these military successes is its international appeal to the diaspora. In
November, the NUG issued bonds to fund its warfighting efforts. Unlike typical
government bonds, these are not investments expected to generate returns within
the stated two-year timeline. Rather, they are direct contributions to the
revolutionary effort. Within 24 hours of the bonds being released, mainly to
overseas Burmese, $US 6.3 million worth of bonds were sold. The shadow
government aims to generate $US 1 billion through this initiative.
Apart from the military conflict, which is seemingly necessary to displace the junta,
the NUG is grappling with the political questions that have evolved from the intense
ethnic divisions that have plagued the country since independence. The solution
formulated by the NUG is to form a federal democratic union in coalition with the
EAOs. The most ideal outcome is the end of ethnic separatism, because the federal
government will have representatives drawn from all ethnic groups, giving them
political representation and a meaningful voice in governance. A notable exception
from this configuration is the Rohingya ethnic group, a product of Burmese
conceptions of identity which is exclusive of Islam.
A second complication, and a more concerning one for the NUG, is buy-in from the
EAOs. While all can agree with the dissolution of the Tatmadaw, what comes after is
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a difficult proposition. One concern is trust in the NUG. EAOs have been fighting the
government since their formation, and a founding faction of the government-in-exile
are former members of that government. A second issue is the territory and
economies governed by them, as being folded into a federal union would threaten
the sovereignty of the EAOs in those areas and bring scrutiny to the various illicit
industries that underpin those regions' economies. Despite these difficulties,
however, the NUG has been able to engage the Kachin, Chin, Karen, and Karenni
EAOs, forming the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). This is a platform that
is being used to coordinate against the junta and demonstrates a willingness to
cooperate in good faith for a better Myanmar.
T A T M A D A W H U M A N R I G H T S V I O L A T I O N S
C O M E T O L I G H T
Faced with insecurity from at home and abroad, the Tatmadaw has attempted
everything in its power to stop attacks on its legitimacy, resulting in disastrous
outcomes for the people of Myanmar. As of November, 1300 people have been
killed. At least 100 of these casualties have been children, and over 10,000 arrests
have been made by the junta in a futile attempt to stem popular revolt.
The junta is familiar with violence, and has inflicted it upon Myanmar
indiscriminately throughout the year. A recent report from Human Rights Watch has
accused the junta of herding protesters into smaller locations to maximise the effect
of the deadly force they employed during the March demonstrations. The conflict
with the People's Defence Force and their EAO allies has grown in intensity since the
declaration of war in September, creating new internal refugees who are fleeing to
the Indian border to escape the conflict. In some cases, these refugees will not have
homes to return to should fighting cease. In October, the Tatmadaw fired artillery at
Thantlang, burning 160 homes to the ground – a response to the killing of junta
soldiers by the Chinland Defence Force (CDF) in the territory. Many of the 8000
residents of the territory had fled in September after a previous attack by the junta;
however, some eldery citizens and children are believed to have remained, and their
status is currently unknown. This shelling is part of a larger offensive movement in
the region to surround and suffocate the NUG, which is currently occupying territory
nearby. In an attempt to depict itself as upholding the rule of law, the junta has
branded the NUG as a terrorist organisation.
The junta is also attempting to legitimise its rule through terror and the eradication
and vilification of the democratically elected NLD party and its leader, Aung San Suu
Kyi.
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In October, the Associated Press
published an interview with a former
Tatmadaw officer that highlighted that the
use of torture is an established and
widespread tactic of the junta, and has
been used more frequently since April. It
has also been applied indiscriminately,
targeting teenagers (and younger
children) and Buddhist monks, in an
attempt to silence anti-military agitators
or under the pretence of settling scores.
The detention centres used for these
activities provided the perfect
environment for the transmission of
COVID-19, which further enhanced the
human suffering facilitated by the junta.
Nearly 500 NLD members have been
arrested since the coup in February.
These admissions of systematic torture of
prisoners align with earlier reporting of
NLD members being declared dead days
after arrest. Complimenting this regime of
political oppression is the ongoing show
trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. While Suu Kyi’s
legacy as a politician is flawed, she has
been a consistent symbol of change and
hope for democracy in Myanmar.
Consequently, the junta aims to
delegitimise her by accusing her of
electoral fraud and throwing on a variety
of other charges such as inciting public
unrest, illegal importation of walkietalkies,
and breaking COVID-19
regulations. The cumulative sentencing of
all these charges would see the 76 year
old spend 102 years in prison.
As the junta struggles to control the
narrative building around them, the
Tatmadaw also arrested a second foreign
national. American journalist, Danny
Fenster, was detained while attempting to
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P H O T O B Y A L E X A N D E R
S C H I M M E C K O N U N S P L A S H

leave the country in May. Fenster was the managing editor of Frontier Myanmar, an
English language publication on political issues inside Myanmar. The curtailing of
press freedoms is a typical tactic of authoritarian regimes; however, the targeting of
an American highlights the pressure felt by the military. Fenster was detained for six
months. During his detention he was tried for sedition and sentenced to 11-years in
prison. However, he was released into American custody at the end of November
following intervention from Washington. The first foreign national arrested,
Australian economist Sean Turnell, still remains in Burmese custody. The junta has
continued to obstruct his access to Australian consular assistance and are still
charging Turnell with violations of the secrets act. The legal process is particularly
opaque at this time, and without more diplomatic pressure the outcomes for the
economist are unlikely to be good.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E A C T I O N S S I X M O N T H S L A T E R
International opinion of the coup has soured against the junta, particularly in
international forums. Most prominently, diplomatic representatives from junta have
not been recognised by the UN. As such, the incumbent and NLD-appointed
Burmese ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, has remained in his position. Tun has been
an outspoken advocate against the violence being unleashed in his country, actions
which have resulted in a foiled assasination attempt. The ambassador released a
letter in association with the NUG which called for the restoration of democracy and
decried the indiscriminate violence used on civilians by the Tatmadaw.
Broadly, the international community has rallied around these ideas, hence the
comprehensive sanctions regime being implemented by Canada, European Union,
United Kingdom and the United States. Still absent from these efforts are Australia
and Japan, who are important pillars of the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.
It appears that Australia is facing pressure from its allies and from domestic
politicians to reform its sanctions policies to be more muscular in order to
appropriately condemn international violations of human rights and better act in
congruence with its friends and allies. The Australian Council for International
Development succinctly demonstrated the current weakness of Canberra’s sanction
apparatus in comparison to like minded countries, highlighting that this is a major
inconsistency between Australia’s loud critique of human rights violations abroad
and its inability to support those words with action.
On the other hand, Japan appears to be playing a different game in Myanmar. Its
wait-and-see attitude has evolved, and it has begun to engage with the junta
diplomatically. A number of current and former Japanese cabinet ministers have
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met with Min Aung Hlaing and other junta officials in private and public capacities.
Japan has outwardly condemned the coup and is attempting to broker peace in the
fractured country using its links to the regime. However, it also has its own
geopolitical ambitions. In continuing to use and creating new ministerial connections
between the Tatmadaw and the Diet, Tokyo is hedging its bets on the possibility of
the junta winning the civil war to preserve the influence it has in the country against
the growing prominence of Beijing. In an April interview, former Japanese
ambassador to Myanmar, Tateshi Higuchi, expressed his belief that his country
should join in the international sanctions effort, with the express interest of
stymying cash flow into Myanmar to de-escalate the conflict.
The world has also looked to ASEAN, the foremost regional organisation in
Southeast Asia, to lead solutions to the conflict in Myanmar. Since the Five Point
Consensus developed in the April ASEAN meeting was soundly ignored by the
Tatmadaw, the organisation has been sluggish in formulating a new response, a
consequence of the principle of non-interference that lays at the heart of the
organisation. Despite it seeming flimsy at times, ASEAN also has ideological
commitments to democracy and human rights. While the organisation currently
lacks the mechanisms to punish the junta through sanctions or expulsion from
ASEAN, it has made an effort to legitimise the NUG. At the November China-ASEAN
Summit, a representative from Myanmar was absent on the first day, and on the
second the Burmese representative was an official from the NUG. This was a high
profile snubbing that followed multiple instances of Myanmar being disinvited from
international ASEAN Summits. However, while taking any action based on the
domestic politics of any member state is an important development within the
organisational culture of ASEAN, it is a far cry from substantive leadership on the
issue.
C O N C L U S I O N
The ongoing civil war in Myanmar will only continue to get worse before it gets
better. The February coup and the ensuing conflict represents the boiling point of
unresolved grievances on a range of issues. The popularity and coalition-building
capacity of the NUG marks it as a competent player, qualities that will prolong the
conflict because of the threat it poses to the junta.
As violence continues to rage in Myanmar, international reactions continue on a
similar track to earlier this year, with the major development being a clarification in
the strategy of onlookers. This is an opportunity to defend democracy on the
international stage. As such, many countries are taking that opportunity to use
sanctions to end the civil war – or at least even the odds between the Burmese
revolutionaries and the more seasoned military.
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by Daniel Gage-Brown
Until 2016, many in Australia thought
that we could enjoy both US military
protection and enormous bilateral
trade with China indefinitely. However,
disagreements about the South China
Sea, the Sino-US trade war and Chinese
espionage, have forced Australia to reexamine
its stance on China. Similarly,
while some have viewed Cambodia as
well placed to exploit Sino-US rivalry to
extract aid and concessions from both,
it would seem that the US has chosen
to force Cambodia’s hand, and will likely
push it closer to China.
In 2019, the Wall Street Journal reported
that Cambodia planned to secretly
grant China exclusive military access to
the Ream Naval Base in its major port
city of Sihanoukville. Both Cambodia
and China strenuously enied this claim.
In 2020, Cambodia demolished a USfunded
facility at the very same naval
base without notifying the US, and
declined a US offer to repair
the base. Then, in October of this year,
the US government revealed that it had
detected significant new construction at
the base using satellite imagery, and
called on Cambodia to clarify the
Chinese military’s involvement in its
construction. Cambodia denied that it
would allow China to station forces at
the base, but on November 10, the US
imposed the first sanctions on two
Cambodian military officials on the
grounds of corruption, claiming that
they had siphoned funds from the
Ream Naval Base project for personal
gain.
A month later, on December 8, the US
backed these insipid accusations up
with a broader arms embargo on
Cambodia, restricting its access to
American dual-use items (regular
consumer goods which may also have
military applications), military items,
and defence services. To give the US
government credit for its barefaced
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realpolitik, it did not pretend to solely
invoke concerns about human rights,
and explicitly called on Cambodia to
“reduce the influence of the PRC
military in Cambodia, which threatens
regional and global security”. Just as
well, because pro-establishment media
in Cambodia was quick to point out
with mirth that the US hypocritically
provides Vietnam with military
assistance, despite its communist
leadership and questionable human
rights record.
Observers have pointed out that the
sanctions are largely symbolic, given
that the U.S does not supply arms to
Cambodia. However, the State
Department also warned U.S.
businesses against investing in
Cambodia in the financial, real estate,
casino, infrastructure, manufacturing,
and timber sectors, due to human
rights and drug-trafficking concerns.
Sanctions expert Peter Kucik has
suggested that US sanctions may be
painful for Cambodia, if they also
influence the behaviour of US allies.
Nevertheless, the US has limited
leverage to influence the behaviour of
Cambodian dictator Hun Sen, who has
been in power for 36 years. While the
US is a major market for Cambodian
textile exports, US policymakers have
conceded that sanctions on the textile
industry would hurt already vulnerable
workers most, and potentially be a selfdefeating
strategy, solidifying
Cambodian resistance against US
interference.
Unfortunately, it is criticism of
Cambodia’s human rights that pushed it
so close to China in the first place, and
the most recent US sanctions will be no
different. Of Cambodia’s Foreign Direct
Investment, 43 per cent came from
China in 2019, with an additional US
$588 million pledged in aid between
2019-2021, making China Cambodia’s
largest economic partner. China is
happy to provide generous funds, even
as Hun Sen has cracked down on civil
society, dissolved the opposition party,
and exploited the pandemic emergency
to jail opponents for 20 years for
health-related offences. With a new
bilateral FTA to come into force on
January 1, 2022, China-Cambodia
relations seem closer than ever. In
return for Chinese support, Cambodia
has acted as China’s pawn within
ASEAN, and has twice blocked ASEAN
resolutions (which rely on unanimous
consensus) on the South China Sea in
2012 and 2016. Tensions are running
high, as Cambodia is set to chair
ASEAN’s next two summits in 2022.
Although it is true that the US cannot
claim the moral high ground in this
latest proxy-spat, neither can China.
Given Hun Sen’s unswerving grip on
power, and US determination to
pressure China in the Indo-Pacific,
Cambodia is playing out as yet another
backdrop to great power rivalry.
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by Jacques Joseph
July 2021 witnessed what was once feared by the world: a Taliban resurgence in
Afghanistan following the final withdrawal of US troops. Until the US-NATO presence
left Afghanistan, Taliban forces were predominantly hiding in the mountains of the
Hindu Kush. Post US exit, they were unleashed in full force in July when the US
administration finally pulled the last of the stationed troops out of Afghanistan. The
Taliban arrested several members of the Afghan military, took over banks and
government offices, asked NGOs to leave Afghanistan immediately, and threatened
Afghan journalists who spoke unfavourably of the Taliban. Thousands fled from
Afghanistan, with the rest left to the mercy of Taliban forces. While the Taliban has
promised the proper functioning of the state, it has failed to keep its promises of
maintaining peace in the country.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E A C T I O N S S I X M O N T H S L A T E R
The Taliban of the 1990s wanted to establish an Islamic stratocracy in Afghanistan,
and from there spread their wings across surrounding Muslim nations. However,
the Taliban today is weaker than it was in the 1990s. In the short term, the Taliban is
currently focusing inwards to create a strong political and supporter base in
Afghanistan. In the long term, it is likely they will again pursue their transnational
ambitions of uniting Islamic nations under one caliphate. Previously, the Taliban
operated under a model very similar to that of the present-day Islamic State (IS)
insurgent group. The Taliban has drawn up its present political structure similarly to
that of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Taliban wants to build a proper nation-state
first, and then afterwards venture into foreign territories, an approach that is very
similar to Iran's geopolitical model. The Taliban understands that a strong home
base is needed before it can unite Islamic nations under one caliphate. A functioning
Afghanistan, or at least the semblance of it, would ward off any western criticism
and thereby any possible future invasion. Hence, the rhetoric of “education for
women” and “jobs for the youth” has been promoted extensively by the Taliban.
I N T E R N A L Q U A G M I R E
Within Afghanistan, however, multiple factions are engaged in an intra-state conflict
for a hold of the political reigns. IS has carried out multiple attacks against the
Taliban, accusing them of swaying away from the religious goal of attaining an
Islamic caliphate all over the world towards a political one where it only wants to run
the state system of Afghanistan. The remaining Afghan military troops are resisting
Taliban takeover of the Panjshir valley. Multiple factions including Islamic State
Khorasan (ISIS-K) are also jostling for power in the aftermath of the US withdrawal.
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D O M E S T I C I M P L I C A T I O N S
The rise of the Taliban puts two groups under severe threat; ethnic minorities and
women. Amnesty International’s Secretary General, Agnès Callamard, lamented the
Taliban's killing and torture of women and minorities, stating that "the cold-blooded
brutality of these killings is a reminder of the Taliban's past record, and a horrifying
indicator of what Taliban rule may bring. Ethnic and religious minorities are at grave
risk, along with human rights defenders, journalists, and professionals."
The Hazara ethnic group are the most targeted minority in Afghanistan today. In the
19th century, the Hazaras comprised 67 per cent of Afghanistan’s population.
Following waves of ethnic violence over the past century, they now only comprise
between 10 and 20 per cent of the population. The majority of Hazaras are Shia
Muslims and were viewed during the 19th century as an existential threat to the
Sunni minority. The Emir of Afghanistan, Pashtun tribal leader Amir Abdur Rahman
Khan, ordered mass killings of Hazaras, resulting in the death of over 50 per cent of
the Hazara population. Following the Soviet departure from Afghanistan in 1989, the
Taliban once again went after the Hazaras, massacring them in large numbers.
Following the Taliban’s rise to power in 2021, the group once again has upped its
offensive against the Shia minority group, torturing and killing them on multiple
occasions. The real number of Taliban killings remains unclear since the Afghan
media is under direct control of the Taliban, and international agencies have found
no grounds to conduct their work under Taliban rule.
Women have also witnessed excessive levels of repression by the Taliban
government. Women have been instructed to adopt proper Sharia attire in public
places and not leave their houses without male guardians. This ignited the
worldwide internet campaign #donottouchmyclothes, where Afghan women
refused to give up their ethnic attire and follow the Taliban system of clothing.
Educational institutions have also been told to conduct schooling on a segregated
basis, where men and women sit in separate sections of the room divided by a
screen. Due to the Taliban's repressive policies and Afghanistan's economic decline,
many women have also lost their jobs. Many families are being forced to sell their
young children in open markets to local bidders, a clear case of child trafficking.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L I M P L I C A T I O N S
Following the Taliban's rise to power, China was one of the first countries to offer
significant financial assistance to Afghanistan. This is because Afghanistan is a
country of great strategic interest for China. Afghanistan is home to rare minerals
valued upwards of $US 1 trillion. These minerals are of great value for China due to
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the ever-growing demand for electronic manufacturing in domestic and
international markets. Additionally, a good relationship with the Taliban would
ensure that the Taliban do not support any insurgency by Uighur Muslims in the
Chinese province of Xinjiang, where between one and three million Uighur Muslims
are held in so-called ‘re-education centres.’
Pakistan also benefits from the Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan. The previously
elected Afghan government, led by Ashraf Ghani, was hostile towards Pakistan and
accused the Pakistani government of training and arming Taliban insurgents. This
accusation weakened the relationship between the two countries and has been
strongly refuted by Pakistan.
On the other hand, the United States and its allies have expressed deep concerns
about the Taliban's uprising. The American Secretary of State, Antony Blinken,
indicated through corroborated intelligence that a terrorist attack smiliar to 9/11
against the US or its allies could occur in late 2021 or early 2022. The US also
attempted a preemptive drone strike against ISIS elements on Afghan soil on August
29. Unfortunately, several civilians were killed instead, adding misery to the already
mortified Biden administration.
Furthemore, following the rapid escalation of violence after the international
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Europe, the United Kingdom and other nations are
struggling to take in waves of incoming Afghan refugees.The Taliban has urged
world powers to open up financial aid to Afghanistan and lift sanctions on its
financial markets, but its request has fallen on deaf ears, since many in the West
suspect the Taliban uses financial aid to strengthen their operations within and
outside of Afghanistan.
R O A D A H E A D
Unlike the Taliban of the Soviet era, the Taliban of today are well versed in
geopolitics. The Taliban know that it is strategically beneficial to establish political
control of Afghanistan rather than just being a guerrilla force within the state.
Having control of the political establishment is particularly beneficial, as it provides
them the ability to negotiate with international parties. Inhumane conditions for the
common people of Afghanistan could be used as a political leverage for nations to
act more on Afghanistan’s behalf. This would entangle the world in a moral dilemma
of entrusting the Taliban with more financial aid. Global and regional powers like
America, Europe, UK, Saudi Arabia and Iran must therefore keep tabs on the Taliban
to prevent any possible terrorist attack on foreign soil, and to negotiate for better
treatment and participation of women and ethnic minorities in Afghanistan.
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SUB
SAHARAN
AFRICA
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SUB SAHARAN AFRICA
by Ezekiel Dobelsky I YDS Regional Correspondent
E T H I O P I A
The civil war in Ethiopia, which began
in late 2020 due to a dispute between
the Ethiopian government and
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF), has expanded over the past
year. 2021 saw numerous important
developments in the conflict: new
ethnic groups joined the fighting, with
the formation of the United Front of
Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist
Forces in early November.
This alliance, which contains nine antigovernment
factions, is committed to
removing the current, Abiy-led
Ethiopian government. With the
southern-based Oromo Liberation
Army (OLA) joining the rebel alliance,
there are fears that the Ethiopian
capital Addis Ababa may be
surrounded in the near future
(although this may have been
alleviated in recent days). Eritrean
troops have also been involved in the
violence, joining the conflict in
partnership with Ethiopian forces.
There is deep animosity between
Eritrea and the TPLF, as a TPLF-ruled
Ethiopia fought a war against Eritrea
from 1998-2000.
Human rights abuses are frequently
committed by both sides. The Ethiopian
blockade over Tigrayan territory has
caused widespread hunger, with at
least 400,000 Tigrayans facing
‘catastrophic famine conditions’. Ethnic
Tigrayans face detention in
government-controlled areas. There is
widespread displacement, with many
Tigrayan refugees fleeing to
neighbouring Sudan.
A political solution does not appear
likely in the near future, as outside
institutions such as the African Union
(AU) and the United Nations (UN)
appear powerless to stop the
bloodshed. The decision by Ahmid Abiy,
the current Ethiopian prime minister
who was once lauded for his 2019
Nobel peace prize, to join the frontlines
in the war and repeatedly refuse
calls for a ceasefire, indicates that the
bloodshed and violence will continue
into 2022.
IN REVIEW
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S A H E L R E G I O N
There has been persistent violence
throughout the year in the Sahel region,
with numerous attacks on both civilians
and troops committed by insurgent
forces such as Islamic State in the
Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al Qaedaaffiliated
Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam Wal
Muslimin (JNIM).
The attacks resulted in the deaths of
thousands of civilians and Sahelian
troops. The main hotspot of these
attacks is the Liptako-Gourma region, on
the border between Mali, Burkina Faso
and Niger. However, 2021 has seen
further spread of the violence beyond
this region, even reaching neighbouring
Benin and Ivory Coast.
Although Sahelian states are typically
reliant on assistance from the French
army, in recent months Mali has sought
to attract other actors to help its cause.
In response to French plans of reducing
its troop presence in the region, Mali has
approached the Russian-linked
mercenaries Wagner Group. This has led
to an open disagreement between
France and Mali. There have also been
anti-French protests in Burkina Faso and
Mali, against the failure of French and
Western forces to reduce the violence.
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C E N T R A L A F R I C A N
R E P U B L I C
The civil war within the Central African
Republic (CAR) continued during 2021,
between government forces and rebels.
The CAR conflict is notable for the strong
Russian presence, with commentators
noting the use of the Wagner Group as a
means of furthering Russian interests in
the region. The Wagner Group is a
network of military businesses and
mercenaries, who provide arms and
military advice for clients. There are
strong connections between the Wagner
Group and the Russian government,
although this is denied by Russia.
Although President Touadera declared a
unilateral ceasefire in October, it did not
even last till the end of the year. Violence
has begun once again, as early December
saw over 30 people, mainly civilians, killed
in a rebel attack. It is expected that
conditions will decline in 2022, as the UN
Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates
63% of the population will require
humanitarian assistance and protection.
D E M O C R A T I C R E P U B L I C
O F T H E C O N G O ( D R C ) &
U G A N D A
The DRC has continued to witness
violence, predominantly in the volatile
eastern region of the country.
With 4.5 million internally displaced
persons (IDP), and an influx of refugees
from the CAR, the governance capacity of
the DRC is severely hindered. A notable
development in 2021 has been the
presence of Ugandan troops, who are
fighting alongside DRC forces to destroy
the ISIS-linked Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF).
The ADF, which is one of the deadliest
insurgent groups in the DRC’s east, has
launched numerous attacks on civilians in
both the DRC and Uganda, including a
twin suicide bombing in Uganda’s capital
of Kampala in mid-November. The group
has allegedly killed 6,000 civilians since
2013.
M O Z A M B I Q U E
In March and April, ISIS militants took
over the town of Palma, with a population
of approximately 75,000. Located near
French-owned gas projects, the
insurgents held the town for a few weeks,
murdering almost 100 civilians and
displacing 40,000.
Although the town was recaptured by
Mozambican forces, with aid from other
nations such as Rwanda and private
military contractors from South Africa,
the attack was a major success for the
insurgent group. Violence is still common
in northern Mozambique, with attacks
now spreading into southern Tanzania as
well.
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S I E R R A L E O N E
There have been positive
developments in human rights on
the African continent. 2021 saw
Sierra Leone formally abolish the
death penalty, along with the
Malawi Supreme Court ruling it
unconstitutional.
Sierra Leone also adopted a policy
in March that confirms the right of
pregnant women to access
education. Given the high rate of
teenage pregnancies in Sierra
Leone, this policy is a significant
step in furthering the education of
women, and of removing
discriminatory boundaries.
B E N I N
In Benin, legislators voted to
expand the country’s abortion
laws, which is expected to reduce
the number of unnecessary deaths
of women who undergo illegal
abortions.
A R T E F A C T S
Acknowledgements, compensation and the
return of culturally significant artefacts
occurred over the past year. A growing
number of Western institutions, which
possess African statues that had been
looted during the Scramble for Africa and
subsequent colonial period, have begun
returning some of the artefacts.
The artefacts and artworks (taken from
Nigeria and Benin the 19th and 20th
century) have been returned from
museums and universities in the USA, UK,
France and Germany. In October, Belgium
shared recordings it had made during its
colonial rule over Rwanda, with the aim of
forging closer ties in the creative arts
sphere.
African art was further acknowledged by
the wider world in 2021, with Tanzanian
author Abdulrazak Gurnah winning the
Nobel Prize for Literature.
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Z A M B I A
2021 witnessed a democratic and
peaceful transition in several
countries. Zambia marked an
important milestone in the
country’s history, with opposition
leader Hichilema defeating
incumbent Edgar Lungu by almost 1
million votes.
Although there was sporadic
violence during the election, and
fears preceding the vote of unfair
play, the August election was
commended for its transparency
and peaceful organisation.
C A P E V E R D E / S Ã O
T O M É A N D P R Í N C I P E
Similarly, the island nations of Cape
Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe
maintained their robust democratic
processes, with new leaders elected
in both. The elections of both
nations proceeded without
violence, and continued to maintain
their stability.
G A M B I A
The recent election in Gambia (which uses a
unique system of marbles to compensate
for high illiteracy rates) saw incumbent
Adama Barrow win with a sizeable margin,
and was praised by observers from the
African Union and the European Union for
its transparency.
However, there have been complaints from
opposition leaders that there were issues at
polling stations.
The ability for a peaceful
transfer of power is a
cornerstone of liberal
democracy. While there has
been a worrying trend in sub-
Saharan Africa of the rise of
coups, there were also
elections which confirmed
the democratic progress of
African countries.
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!" #$%!&''% ()**+&
On October 25, 2021, under the leadership of General Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan, the Sudanese military engaged in a coup d'état against the
internationally-backed Sovereignty Council of Sudan. Al-Burhan, who had
been the leader of the Sovereignty Council, dissolved the government,
installing a technocratic system under his rule. This is the latest in a series of
coups in Sudan since the overthrow of the Warlord Omar al-Bashir in a 2019
coup. Prior to the 2019 coup, al-Bashir enjoyed a three decade-long
dictatorship riddled with instability and civil war.
After the coup that overthrew Omar al-Bashir in 2019, two groups were
tasked with democratisation in Sudan. These were the Transitional Military
Council, which operated from April 2019 to August 2019, and the Sovereignty
Council of Sudan. The Sovereignty Council was born out of a political
agreement in 2019 between military leaders and political activists that was
designed to see the transition of Sudan into a democracy, and involved the
installation of a government composed of civilian and military leaders.
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A B D A L L A H A M D O K
The most recent coup conducted by al-Burhan saw several government
officials taken hostage, and Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok placed
under house arrest. The majority of his government was also arrested
alongside pro-government forces. Upwards of 200,000 pro-government
individuals and groups took to the streets of Sudan in retaliation against al-
Burhan’s attempted overthrow, with reports of 25 civilians having been killed
by the al-Burhan forces by November 17.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E
While the coup unfolded, international groups and Western countries, such as
the United States and European Union, reiterated support for Hamdok’s
Sovereignty Council of Sudan, with the Hamdok government vehemently
rejecting demands from coup organisers to transfer power. As a result, al-
Burhan was forced to engage in dialogue with Hamdok from as early as
October 28 about prospects for the restoration of Hamdok’s cabinet.
N E G O T I A T I O N S
This was formalised on November 21 in a 14 point plan that returned power to
Hamdok and his government, and released the political prisoners taken in the
coup. The negotiations, though successful for ongoing democratisation
attempts in Sudan, were rejected and criticised by anti-military groups in the
country, citing caution about returning to an arrangement that gave al-Burhan
too much power in the civilian government.
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What happens now?
As of mid-December 2021, Sudan is
still in the midst of a power struggle.
Prime Minister Hamdok’s release, and
the meeting of demands of external
Western actors, appear to have only
partially resolved the broader issues
behind Sudan’s ongoing instability. As
it stands, al-Burhan and his antidemocratic
forces maintain a tight
control over the power structures in
Sudan, with prospects of a democratic
handover by November 2022 - as
outlined in the Sovereignty Council of
Sudan’s draft Constitutional
Declaration - looking unlikely.
Reports of Russian mercenary activity
in Sudan suggest these groups have
also been active in aiding antigovernment
forces. Alongside this,
Sudanese sources reported that coup
instigators sought a ‘green-light’ from
Moscow prior to the 2021 coup in an
attempt to avoid UN sanctions. This
raises questions surrounding the
Russian presence on the African
continent, and the efforts Russian
actors are going to in order to impede
democratisation efforts in these
countries. It is clear that the ongoing
power struggles in Sudan will continue
to affect the stability of the region for
years to come.
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by Liep Gatwech
Succumbing to political infighting and
ethnic tension, Ethiopia has
unexpectedly joined the ranks of
developing nations, including its
bordering neighbours Somalia and
South Sudan, that have fallen to the
brutal horrors of civil war. The
prosperous East African nation that
was once looked to as a negotiator of
peace is now a haven for violence. The
main rebel group on the frontlines of
the fight against the government of
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is the
Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF),
led by Debretsion Gebremichael.
The political party turned guerilla force
claims to represent the Tigrayan
minority located in the Northern
region of the country. The group
previously held power in the country
for three decades after toppling the
brutal communist regime of General
Secretary Mengistu Haile Mariam in
1991. In classic fashion, the liberators
became oppressors; the TPLF
instituted their own unembellished,
repressive regime that marginalized
and brutalised Ethiopia’s larger
Ahmara and Oromo ethnic groups.
Resentment and anger towards this
imbalance of power is what carried
Abiy Ahmed, of Oromo descent, to the
Prime Ministership in 2018 as part of
the now Prosperity Party.
.
Prime Minister Ahmed aimed to
distance the nation from the
federalism and tribalism that has
characterised Ethiopian politics since
its inception, instead opting towards a
unified national identity to the dismay
of the TPLF that thrived from the
brand of politics Ethiopia was seeking
to rid itself of. The TPLF, dissatisfied
with these changes to the political
system they benefited from, lobbied
against the Ahmed government.
These challenges turned into
skirmishes as disputes between the
two factions of power reached a
boiling point in 2020, when Prime
Minister Ahmed blamed the TPLF for
an attack on a national military base.
Ahmed retaliated by launching
bombing raids near the Tigrayan
regional capital of Mekele and sending
ground troops into the region to quell
rebellion.
TPLF forces in Tigray retaliated against
the Ahmed administration by targeting
neighbouring Eritrean forces and
infrastructure which had, at the time,
pledged support to the Ethiopian
government.
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B R E A K O U T O F C I V I L W A R
Unfortunately, skirmishes quickly turned to all out war. In moves which some experts
have considered as against international law, Prime Minister Ahmed blocked
communications, restricted aid coming into the region and restricted foreign observers.
Legal scholar, Eugène Bakama Bope, noted that serious violations of these laws may be
considered as war crimes. If these actions are determined to be war crimes, Ahmed and
his government could potentially be prosecuted in Ethiopia's national courts and
internationally at the International Criminal Court in Geneva, Switzerland. An alternative
route to the international legal system would be creating a tribunal such as those
established to investigate violations of human rights and allegations of war crimes in
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
For months, it appeared that Prime Minister Ahmed’s military had the upper hand and
was suppressing dissent. Eventually the TPLF regrouped, linking with other rebel groups
such as the Oromo Liberation Army, and taking hold of strategic towns and trade routes.
In June of 2021, the TPLF recaptured the regional Tigrayan capital of Mekele, and in early
November pushed within 200 miles of Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. This led Prime
Minister Ahmed and the mayor of Addis Ababa to declare a state of emergency, calling on
residents to take up arms in what the Prime Minister has called an “existential war”.
Sadly, those impacted the most by the conflict have not been Mr Ahmed or leaders of the
resistance, it’s the estimated more than two million innocent Ethiopians who have been
displaced, with millions more in need of humanitarian assistance, and according to aid
groups and United Nations agencies, 350,000 experiencing famine conditions. The famine
conditions are of particular concern, bringing back ghastly memories of Ethiopia’s wide
ranging famine that struck from the mid-1980s, which is estimated to have killed at
minimum one million Ethiopians.
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As the fallout from the crisis
continues, many have begun to ask if
Prime Minister Ahmed was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize prematurely?
In 2019, Ahmed was awarded the
prestigious prize "for his efforts to
achieve peace and international
cooperation”. Two years on, the same
man is accused of utilising his nations
military to commit brutal acts of
violence against the Tigrayan people,
with the scale of the violence
witnessed so brutal, some experts
have considered it a possible
precursor to genocide and ethnic
cleansing.
This is not the first instance in which
recipients of the prize, supposed
promoters of peace, are then seen to
become carriers of violence. This
phenomenon has become so
prevalent that it even has a name; the
Nobel Peace Prize curse.
T H E
P R E M A T U R E
P E A C E
P R I Z E
It happened first with the currently
exiled de facto leader of Myanmar,
Aung San Suu Kyi.
The charismatic leader won the peace
prize in 1991, being heralded a
defender of democracy and promoter
of universal freedom in the face of
adversity and government repression.
Her stance, however, as a Burmese
nationalist and a fundamentalist has
over time been revealed. Suu Kyi
remains complicit in the persecution of
the Rohingya minority, with no clear
will to prevent the human rights abuses
committed against the Rohingya
people, even when she has had the
authority to do so.
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P E A C E O V E R A C C O L A D E
So, should promoters of peace even be celebrated? Some would argue that the
promotion of peace and proactively taking steps towards making the world a
better place should be characteristic of all strong leaders. Achieving and
endeavouring towards a more peaceful world should be motivated by visions of
a better future, not by potential accolades. We do not celebrate politicians with
medals, cash and diplomas for passing beneficial legislation, nor do we celebrate
drivers for simply not crashing their cars because these are simply the expected
things to do. We should hold our leaders to this same standard, and when we do
award international leaders for taking steps towards peace, we set them up for
failure. When given the title of a promoter of peace, any following act of
aggression sanctioned by this leader, no matter how strategic, warranted or
essential, then stains their reputation, as peace and aggression are diametrically
opposed. The world is full of uncertainties, but one thing is certain: aiming for
international peace should be an expectation we have for all our leaders on the
international stage, not an accolade.
C O N C L U S I O N
What is clear is that the international political sphere is an ever changing,
anarchic one; every regime one day comes to an end, public opinion alters
overtime and motivations change. By placing international leaders on a faltering
pedestal, we set them up to fall hard when circumstances change. Abiy Ahmed
was considered an international beacon and promoter of peace within Africa
and the international community in 2019. It is now 2021, and the same Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed is accused of breaking international law and facilitating a
creeping genocide.
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CHAD
BEYOND
DÉBY
by Madeleine Bishop
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Idriss Déby, the long-serving President
of Chad, died in April 2021, the day
after provisional election results
forecasted he would win a sixth
consecutive presidential term. He was
killed while visiting military forces in
northern Chad, as they battled rebels
seeking to overthrow the government.
He was 68 years old.
Déby first came to prominence as a
military leader in the Chadian Ground
Forces, becoming Commander-in-
Chief in 1983, aged just 31. In late
1990, he staged a coup, ousting thenpresident
Hissène Habré to form a
provisional government and become
President. A new constitution was
approved in 1996, and Déby won
every election held after that, despite
somewhat tumultuous Chadian
domestic politics.
appointment a coup d’état, and
doubt that the country will ever
return to civilian rule.
Since Itno’s ascension to power,
the military has enjoyed
expanded authority and
liberties throughout Chad. Nongovernment
organisations, such
as Human Rights Watch, have
warned that the military has
been cracking down on peaceful
protest, freedom of movement,
and civic discourse.
TRANSITION
Following Déby’s death, his son
Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno was
appointed head of a military council
tasked with governing the country
for the next eighteen months. After
this transition period, the army has
stated that democratic elections will
be held. However, the formation of a
military council has been broadly
criticised as being undemocratic,
and is a departure from the proper
parliamentary procedures that are
meant to occur following the death
of a sitting president. Some critics
have gone as far as calling Itno’s
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MILITARY POWER
Even prior to Déby’s death, the Chadian military was already
very powerful. It is one of the largest and most effective armies
in the sub-Saharan region, being involved in nearly all conflicts
in the Sahel region and West Africa over the past twenty years.
Chad is surrounded by several unstable states, including Libya,
Nigeria, Sudan and the Central African Republic. Its military,
which has close alliances with its neighbours and France (of
which it is a former colony), provides a great deal of stability
throughout the region.
The formation of the military council therefore expands the
military’s powerful reach into the domestic sphere and gives it
great authority over the Chadian state, as well as over
neighbouring states.
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Chad therefore faces an unpredictable future. The country may
never return to civilian-led government if the military refuses to
relinquish power. However, this may not be the biggest threat
faced by the country.
Domestic conditions have deteriorated, with an estimated 5.5
million people needing humanitarian assistance. COVID-19 has
also had a major impact, and the effects of climate change are
already being felt nationwide.
Outside of Chad, jihadist terrorism in the Sahel is increasing, and
neighbouring states continue to have serious domestic
problems. As such, whether Chad continues to be controlled by
the military or returns to civilian rule, there is no doubt that
serious problems for the country’s leadership lie ahead.
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MALI'S
COUP WITHIN
A COUP
by Liep Gatwech
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AUTHORITARIANISM IN AFRICA
A coup then a coup within a coup;
this is the terminology being used
to describe the two successive
coups that have occurred over a
span of 9 months in the landlocked
West African state of Mali.
Members of the international
community condemned the first
coup in August 2020, with the
United States cutting off military
aid to the country. The response to
the second coup in May 2021,
however, held much more weight.
In an unprecedented move,
leaders of the 15-member
Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) held a
summit in the Ghanaian capital of
Accra, agreeing to suspend Mali
from the bloc, with the African
Union following suit.
The suspensions came in response
to a disturbing trend which has
been plaguing Sub-Saharan Africa:
the decline of democratic
principles. According to a report by
Freedom House and the Council of
Foreign Relations, more Africans in
2021 live under authoritarian
regimes than at almost any other
point in the last 20 years.
Freedom House’s 2021 report on
‘Freedom in the World’, which
ranks and evaluates nations
around the world based on social
liberties, individual rights to
expression and democratic
principles (or the lack thereof),
rated only eight of the fourty-six
nations in Sub-Saharan Africa as
‘free’. However, the number of
countries that Freedom House
rated ‘Not Free’ on the continent
increased by 70% over a 15 year
period, from fourteen in 2006 to
twenty in 2021.
MORE AFRICANS
IN 2021 LIVE
UNDER
AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES THAN
AT ANY
OTHER POINT IN
THE
LAST 20 YEARS.
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13 6 3
MONTHS COUP ATTEMPTS SUCCESSFUL
This case of creeping authoritarianism in
Africa has been especially potent in 2021. In
just 13 months, the continent has
experienced six coup attempts. with three
being successful: two in Mali and one in
Sudan, and an unsuccessful coup in Niger
and two partial-coups that did not result in
significant changes of government but had
an impact on the political sphere in Chad
and most recently again in Sudan.
Most interestingly, Sub-Saharan Africa,
according to an in-depth study, experienced
198 coup attempts, 80 of which were
successful and 108 which were
unsuccessful in the 45 years from 1956 to
2001, an average of 4 coup attempts a year.
According to statistics by the BBC, this
figure halved in the 18 years from 2001 to
2019 before ascending once again in 2020
and 2021.
Whilst even before 2019, democracy was on
the decline in African states, the COVID-19
pandemic allowed for corrupt heads of
state and military officials to have greater
leverage, with officials seeing opportunities
to make moves towards authoritarianism
and undemocratically seize power under
the pretence of public health directives and
orders to ‘slow the spread’ of the virus. This
is seen specifically in the democratic
election of leaders, with the pandemic used
as a justification for the postponement of
parliamentary elections in Somalia and
Ethiopia. Smaller, more local elections took
a larger hit with 15 African nations,
according to the Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance, indefinitely or
temporarily postponing these almost more
crucial elections. According to a report that
detailed the impact of COVID-19 on digital
rights in Africa, the pandemic has also been
utilised as a pretence to impose restrictions
on media and constrain freedom of the
press across the entire continent.
As the campaign to get the world
vaccinated progresses and restrictions
across the globe continue to ease, we must
be vigilant. Will creeping authoritarianism
become simply more explicit, without the
ability to hide behind the pandemic, or will
this trend too, simply pass with the virus?
Time will soon tell.
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M E N A
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P H O T O B Y B O R I S S T R O U J K O V I A S H U T T E R S T O C K

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by Elle Greaves | YDS Regional Correspondent
Climate change’s multifaceted effects
don’t end at the environmental
disasters, conditions or resource scarcity
we experience. For indigenous persons
around the globe, climate change is a lot
more than mere environmental shifts –
it forces a change to and loss of
culturally significant practices which
have been learned over thousands of
years. From First Nations people in
Canada to the Himalayas, the
Amazonian jungle and Australia, all have
experienced loss at the hands of rising
temperatures. But what happens when
the environment is already harshened
by its geographical location? The Middle
East is unique in the sense that its
indigenous people, from Berbers to
Bedouins and Marsh Arabs, have
survived for thousands of years in
deserts with soaring temperatures and
scarce resources compared to those in
many Western colonised countries. It is
in these already harsh climates, coupled
with dynamics of modernism and
capitalism, where the climate begins to
force a change in their sacred traditions
and simple way of life.
The fragility of heritage can very easily
lead to the extinction of civilisations if
indigenous issues and equal
representation are not directly
addressed at international climate
forums. Remarkably, at the most
recent COP26 Climate Conference in
Glasgow, Thomas Joseph from the
Hoopa tribe located in California stated
that “the leaders pushing for marketbased
solutions and the
commodification of our Mother Earth
are signing a death sentence”. With
more than 80 per cent of the planet’s
biodiversity existing on indigenous
lands, it is imperative that indigenous
voices are given more seats, platforms
and opportunities to be involved in
international climate decision making.
M I D D L E E A S T A N D N O R T H
A F R I C A ’ S
D I S T I N G U I S H E D
E N V I R O N M E N T
Among the struggles indigenous
persons have with the international
response to climate change is that the
effects they experience are the same
on the surface as many Western
countries. However, these effects differ
in the long term, impacting the survival
of a whole lineage of clans, tribes and
families who have existed from before
colonisation. The Middle East is home
to many indigenous tribes who rely on
the lands of their ancestors to live a

nomadic life sustained by naturally
derived resources such as water, shade,
temperature and even food. Nomadic life
becomes even harder to sustain when
higher temperatures cause natural
disasters and rising sea levels.
With thousands of tribes worldwide, the
Middle East’s indigenous population is
vast and widespread. With many now
living abroad due to displacement, it is
worth understanding how and why the
Middle East’s indigenous people are
affected by climate change. Below are
several case studies which demonstrate
the imminent threat human activity is
having on the climate and ultimately the
lives of the Middle East’s longest surviving
people.
A S S Y R I A N S : A W A R N I N G
T O T O D A Y ’ S S O C I E T I E S
Descendants of ancient Mesopotamia,
now modern-day Iraq and Syria, Assyrians
are an ethnic-religious indigenous group.
Assyrian’s have long been denied their
identity by the oppressive ideology of
Ba’athist regimes in Iraq and Syria and are
now considered one of the most widely
scattered groups of indigenous peoples in
the world. Unlike other indigenous groups
throughout the MENA region, Assyrians
are highly acclimated to modern ways of
life. However, their ethnic and religious
values have been under constant attack
by extremists and throughout the civil
war in Syria.
Now a minority group, Assyrians were
once a superpower of the ancient world.
The indigenous lands of Assyrians, being
Mesopotamia, ran the stretch of the
Tigris-Euphrates river system. This
system offered habitable land in a region
of stark desert contrast, with American
Orientalist James Henry Breasted coining
the region “the fertile crescent”. The land
boasted fertile soil and most importantly,
a natural source of water and trade
transportation all of which combined to
thrust Assyria into a mega power
position. However, scientists have found
that this period of Assyrian rule aligned
with an unusually high rainfall period.
This wet period then abruptly ended and
the demise of the Assyrian empire began
with a crippled economy and repeated
crop failures. With this theory, comes a
stark warning for the region’s future
stability when crippled by the increasing
effects of climate change. With droughts
and crop failures already apparent
throughout the Middle East, even dating
back to 2007-2008, it is essential that
climate change is taken into account
when regional instability surfaces.
B E R B E R S : A T A L E O F
N O M A D S I N N O R T H
A F R I C A
Indigenous to North Africa, Berbers
(singular Amazigh) are an ethnic group
originating from the Maghreb region in
north-western Africa dating back to
10,000 BC. Berbers are an isolated group
separated from the rest of Africa by the
Sahara Desert and live mainly in
Morocco. With indigenous methods of
survival, Berbers inhabit the deserts of
the Sahara as nomads. This nomadic way
of life was not always the preferred
method of habitation – the Sahara was
once a grassy woodland until humans
brought with them grazing animals and
the effects of
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climate change, such as warming of the
earth’s surface and volatile weather
patterns, to create a nearlyuninhabitable
desert. Berbers therefore
decided to acclimatise and make the
desert the location of their mobile way
of life, often referring to themselves as
“free men”. Berber clans live in portable
tents and are centred around the tribe’s
chief.
With modern life creeping ever so
slowly into the desert, Berbers have
begun to gravitate to larger cities in
order to support their families and find
work. Not only do Berbers struggle with
the onset of modernism in their daily
traditional life in the desert, but they
have also long been persecuted by Arab
groups. Examples include the Libyan
government led by Muammar Gaddafi,
who suppressed Berber identity,
claiming that all Libyans were Arab.
Expected to speak Arabic and abandon
their nomadic lifestyle meant that an
entire ethnic group has been at risk of
losing their history. Furthermore,
Morocco has not yet adopted the UN
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
People. Without this protection, Berbers
are constantly under threat of
displacement as they are unable to
secure compensation or legal
protections. A group of Berbers near
Morocco’s largest silver mine have
experienced climate vulnerability firsthand
with the depletion of their water
reserves. As nomads, Berbers rely on
fresh and natural water sources but this
in turn makes them vulnerable to the
harsh realities of climate change and
modernism. The two go hand in hand
when human development impedes on
the natural environment around them.
Berbers need protection in the form of
rights to land and resources under the
law and until such a day comes, this
indigenous group will be at the mercy of
the larger Arab populace as well as a
modernist society.
B E D O U I N S :
D I S P L A C E M E N T A T T H E
H A N D S O F M O D E R N I S M
Bedouins have long lived a nomadic
lifestyle throughout the desert regions
of Arabia, the Levant and North Africa
and are the First People of the Negev
desert in southern Palestine. Bedouins
are a collection of Arab nomadic tribes
who live off the land. They distinguish
themselves from other indigenous
people throughout the region with their
simplistic way of life. Their traditional
practices include grazing the land for
agricultural rewards and living under
‘bait al shaar’, the traditional name for
the types of tents they build, which are
made from woven goat hair giving the
appearance of black specks amongst
the vast expanse of the desert regions.
At the core of Bedouin culture is the
value they place on nature – they are
natural conservationists. Their grazing
practices are limited to spending three
to six months at a time in one valley so
as to let it regrow and respect the
sustainability of the land. This
subsequently means Bedouins are
constantly on the move and require
new land to graze every few months.
However, with modernism comes
increased infrastructure and less land to
feed oneself with. But it isn’t just
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modernism which threatens the Bedouins
way of life – with increased infrastructure
comes the destruction of traditional lands
which inhibits the Bedouins traditional
home: the desert.
Displacement has only increased as a
result of modernism coupled with the
effects it brings on the environment. A
loss of land for Bedouins means a loss of
traditional nomadic practices, increased
reliance on a capitalist society and further
hardships faced in terms of the natural
heating and cooling of the environment
around them as nomads of the desert.
M A R S H A R A B S : W A T E R
I N S E C U R I T Y I N T H E
H A R S H E S T O F C L I M A T E S
The Marsh Arabs are the indigenous
people of the Marshlands of Southern
Iraq. This indigenous population was once
a minority group with Sumerian and
Bedouin origins. Their culture entwined
with the ecosystem which they rely on for
breeding water buffalo and bird hunting.
Despite Iraq’s marshes being declared a
World Heritage Site in 2016 by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation, climate change
has continued to deprive this region of
much needed wetlands.
Previously displaced in the 1990s by
Saddam Hussein, Marsh Arabs have
continually been forcibly displaced, if not
by dictatorships, then by their reliance on
natural resources. The same wetlands
they still call home after thousands of
years were drained during the 1991 Iraq
uprisings. Now, just 20 years on, Marsh
Arabs are facing permanent
displacement and hardships as a result
of the “recurring droughts and receding
water levels”. The Marsh Arabs rely
heavily on breeding water buffalo and
selling their milk to sustain their
livelihoods. Without prosperous
marshes, the water buffaloes do not eat
enough nutrient rich plants nor drink
enough water to be able to supply much
needed resources to sell. Broken
government promises from declaring the
marshlands a World Heritage Site and
the effects of climate change threaten
not only the environment but Marsh
Arabs’ income sources.
C O N C L U S I O N
Assyrians, Berbers, Bedouins and Marsh Arabs represent only a small portion of those
ethnic and indigneous groups who have suffered from the effects of climate change at
the hands of increased human activity. Modernism is not only a contributor, but a
major threat resulting in the displacement of thousands of people from their
indingeous and ancestral lands throughout the Middle East. This also includes a loss of
land, food, water and resources in order to sustain a traditional nomadic lifestyle. With
an already volatile and harsh landscape, the Middle East needs the international
community to work towards limiting global warming and developing international
forums where indingeous persons are included in negotiations and problem solving.
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by Elle Greaves | YDS Regional Correspondent
Many eyebrows were raised when it was announced that the Group of 20’s (G20)
Women 20 (W20) meeting would be hosted by Saudi Arabia, and for good reason. Saudi
Arabia has long been governed by the rules and practices of Wahhabism, with women
bearing the brunt of restrictions placed on Saudi citizens. Gender equality has always
been a contentious issue in Saudi Arabia and many believe that the country has failed to
meet international standards in this area. With Saudi Arabia hosting the W20, an official
G20 engagement group which brings together women’s organisations, entrepreneurs
and think tanks, there was speculation as to whether the country had come full circle in
their ambitious plan to pursue modernisation.
As the only Middle Eastern representative at the G20, Saudi Arabia already had a point
to prove. Having hosted the W20 in 2021, the country has well and truly come a long
way. Once prohibited from driving, women are now able to vote in elections. These
strides in women’s rights have seen an increase in female labour force participation
from 20 to 33 per cent by the end of 2020, marking a 65 per cent rise. Not only do such
labour numbers recognise that women are gaining a larger presence within Saudi
society, but it also means that female leadership is being advanced in the process.
Most recently, however, Saudi Arabia hosted the Formula 1 Grand Prix, an event which
further stirred up claims of the country breaching the human rights of women and the
LGBTQIA+ community. Despite women’s rights moving in the right direction, the country
still follows Sharia law and therefore prohibits many of the LGBTQIA+ community from
exercising their basic rights. The Gulf state criminalises same-sex sexual activity and the
right to change legal gender. In December at the Formula 1 Grand Prix, many sporting
icons including the likes of Lewis Hamilton Mick Schumacher and Sebastian Vettel
donned rainbow articles of clothing protesting
Saudi Arabia’s current stance on LGBTQIA+
rights. As the country sustains its pledge to
fulfil its Vision 30 goals and modernise, it is
clear that the international community will
continue to place Saudi Arabia’s human rights
pitfalls under a spotlight. Despite their
engagement to improve women’s rights in
the country, there are other human rights
abuses for which the Saudi government has
not yet accounted. As such, they continue to
put their citizens in precarious positions.
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P H O T O B Y A S S O C I A T E D P R E S S

P H O T O B Y A B D E L K A R E E M H A N A V I A
A S S O C I A T E D P R E S S
by Bella Baker
May and June of this year marked the worst fighting between Israelis and
Palestinians since 2014, in an eruption of conflict that saw civil and political unrest
sweep across Gaza and Israel. The violence saw the displacement of more than
72,000 people, and left more than 240 Palestinians, a quarter of whom were
children, and twelve Israelis, dead. Israel claims that their aerial bombardments of
Gaza were a justified response to rocket attacks launched by Hamas. In contrast,
Palestinians argue that their rockets were a reaction to ongoing Israeli oppression
and form part of the resistance movement against Israeli occupation, which has
continued since the creation of Israel in 1948.
Tensions began with escalations in occupied East Jerusalem, where Palestinians
protested an Israeli court ruling which forcibly expelled Palestinian families from the
Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood. These protests, compounded with violent incursions
by Israeli police into the Al-Aqsa Mosque during the last days of Ramadan,
exacerbated the long-standing conflict and socio-political divide between the two
groups. After weeks of Palestinian protests and demands for Israeli forces to leave
parts of East Jerusalem, Hamas fired rockets into Israel from Gaza. This instigated a
series of attacks and airstrikes between Israeli and Palestinian forces over eleven
days of violence and unrest.
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"The violence saw the
displacement of more than
72,000 people..."
The Israeli Defence Forces launched more than 1,500 airstrikes into Gaza,
destroying residential buildings and critical infrastructure. More than 184
residential and commercial properties were struck and pipework
infrastructure was severely damaged, cutting off access to networked
sanitation, sparking humanitarian concerns for the approximately two
million Palestinians living in one of the most densely populated regions in
the world. Hamas launched more than 4,300 rockets and mortar rounds at
Israel, including barrages at the highly populated cities of Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem, forcing hundreds of thousands of Israelis to flee for shelter. Less
than four weeks after the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, Israel launched air
strikes on the Gaza Strip in response to Palestinian militants sending
incendinary balloons into Southern Israel.
The conflict was the fourth war between Israel and Hamas since the Islamic
militant group gained control of Gaza after winning the Palestinian
parliamentary elections in 2007. For Hamas, the conflict enabled them to
revive their spirit as a resistance movement and revitalise claims to the
leadership of Palestine. Fuelling the widespread anger against Israeli police
and encouraging the grass-roots campaign to prevent the eviction of
Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah, Hamas utilised the conflict to present
itself as the defender of Jerusalem. For former Isareli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, the conflict fractured his leadership as the distraction
of war loomed, widening divisions within the Israeli government. Shortly
after the airstrikes, Netanyahu lost the Israeli election held in June 2021,
with Israel welcoming Naftali Bennett as prime minister.
The 2021 airstrikes were a confronting reminder of the long-standing
tensions between Israel and Palestine as the region continues to grapple
with complex socio-political and religious disparities against a backdrop of
humanitarian crisis, insecurity and conflict.
P H O T O B Y H A T E M M O U S S A
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by Satara Uthayakumaran
Following the recent elections, Israel is once again mired in a period of
political turmoil. On December 2, 2020 Israel’s unicameral parliament
“the Knesset” passed a bill to dissolve by a vote of 61 to 54 - marking
the end of a fragile power-sharing arrangement between the Blue and
White party and the ruling coalition, and setting the stage for the fourth
round of national elections in two years.
This was followed by an additional failed attempt to avoid dissolution
on December 21, when a bill to delay the national budget’s deadline
failed by a vote of 47 to 49. Finally, the Knesset’s failure to approve the
state’s budget by the required midnight deadline of 23 December
resulted in the collapse of the coalition government. Predictably, this
resulted in the dissolution of the 23rd Knesset.
The Basic Law of the Knesset stipulates that elections must be held
within 90 days following the dissolution of the Knesset. Thus, the
election date for the 24th Knesset was set for March 23, 2021.
However, it was clear that then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
was facing an unprecedented, high level of opposition in 2021. The
following parties signed surplus vote-sharing agreements for the 2021
election:
Yamina and New Hope
Yesh Atid and Yisrael Beiteinu
Blue and White and New Economic Party
Likud and Religious Zionist Party
Israeli Labor Party and Meretz
Shas and United Torah Judaism
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T H E F A L L O F N E T A N Y A H U ?
The opposition to Netanyahu’s office may be attributed to multiple reasons.
Although instrumental in pushing for Israel’s comprehensive and highly-successful
vaccination drive, he was criticised for several earlier errors during the pandemic, as
well as refusing to step down following his indictment. Netanyahu is facing several
fraud charges, and is on trial for breach of trust and accepting bribes in three cases.
In denying these accusations, Netanyahu claims that such charges are the result of
opportunistic and politically motivated rumors fabricated by biased law
enforcement officials and members of the media.
Despite being on trial, Netanyahu’s party of the National Liberal Movement (Likud)
won one-quarter of the 120 available seats, positioning it as the largest party in the
Knesset. Furthermore, having completed the vote count, the Israeli election
commission announced that the Likud party and its allies had collectively won 52
seats. While this constituted an arguable victory for Netanyahu, several of his
opponents commenced discussions to pass a bill which would disqualify a politician
under indictment from being tasked with forming a government. The passing of
such a bill would immediately prevent him from taking office. Although a similar bill
had been discussed immediately following the March 2020 elections, it was never
passed.
As a result, an ideologically diverse collective of 13 parties, with the intention to
replace Netanyahu, won 57 seats in the Knesset. Representing various ultra-
Orthodox, Arab, secular, nationalist and liberal factions, the volume of votes and
degree of support received for this coalition represents the most significant
challenge to Likud since the 2003 election.
A S S E M B L I N G A C O A L I T I O N
On April 5, 2021 Israel’s then-acting President Reuven Rivlin met with the leaders
of all political parties, tasking Netanyahu with forming a majority government the
next day as a precondition for retaining power. However, Netanyahu’s failure to
achieve this by the May 4 deadline compelled Rivlin to entrust Leader of the
Opposition Yair Lapid with the task of forming a majority government.
On May 9, leaders of the Yamina Alliance - Lapid and Naftali Bennett - were
engaged in active coalition talks. It was reported that plans had been discussed
to form a new majority government. However, the Islamist Ra’am Party froze
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talks between Lapid and Bennett due to the recent developments in Gaza. Their
support was crucial for the opposition to secure majority control in the Knesset.
However, Lapid was able to secure the support of Blue and White, Labor Party,
Yisrael Beiteinu, New Hope and Meretz, with the potential support of Yamkina
and Ra’am.
On May 30, it was officially announced that Yamina would join a unity
government with Lapid. On June 2, Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas signed a
coalition agreement with Lapid, formalising the formation of a new majority
government and bringing an end to 12 continuous years of Netanyahu’s reign as
Prime Minister.
L I N G E R I N G U N C E R T A I N T Y
The 36th government of Israel was formally sworn in on June 13, with Bennett
assuming the office of Prime Minister and Lapid service as both Alternate Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affair. Consequently, Lapid is expected to
assume the office of Prime Minister in 2023 under the power sharing
arrangement.
Forced to resign on June 14, Netanyahu was neither gracious nor humble in
defeat. In resigning, the ousted leader issued a defiant final speech before the
Knesset, criticising Bennett as a weak leader while publicly vowing to work in the
opposition to “topple this dangerous government” while expressing his intent to
return to power in the future.
Similarly, many Israeli citizens do not share such optimism for the current fragile
coalition government, with 45 percent of people indicating a preference for a
Likud chairman to be prime minister — compared 25 percent who would prefer
Bennett, and 24 percent for Lapid. Confidence in political stability similarly
remains low, with 70 percent of Israelis anticipating a fifth election occurring in
the near future.
Where the March 2021 elections in Israel marked the fourth snap election within
two years, it appears that an end to internal struggles within Israel’s political system
remains beyond reach within the immediate future. This is given lingering
uncertainty amongst Israeli citizens as to the possibility of political stability, unity,
and bipartisanship between Netanyahu and the new government.
It is hoped that the new coalition government will prove itself capable of navigating
the combined challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, national security, and foreign
affairs amid an increasingly complex and uncertain era.
S U M M A R Y
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H O W 2 0 2 1
C H A N G E D T H E
W O R L D - A N D
B E Y O N D
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I D I P L O M A T :
D I P L O M A C Y I N T H E P O S T -
C O V I D D I G I T A L A G E
by Sarah Knight
T H E N E W F R O N T I E R
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the usefulness of information technology
for bridging distances and facilitating communication. As families and loved ones
connected around the world through Zoom and workplaces went remote, industries
and professions that rely heavily on instant communication also turned to online
spaces. Diplomacy, which has traditionally been characterised by travel,
conferences, and informal modes of interaction like drinks or bumping into
someone in the hallway between meetings, was one of the pandemic’s many
victims. The salience of technology and communication infrastructure, which has
become intertwined with all facets of everyday life, was made apparent through the
daily video meetings diplomats endured - the price of keeping the world connected.
However, there has been less consensus on whether this was the push diplomacy
needs to digitise effectively, or whether diplomacy should remain a fundamentally
physical interpersonal phenomenon.
T H E ( G E O ) P O L I T I C S O F D I G I T A L D I P L O M A C Y
The digitisation of the diplomatic world has been acknowledged by its largest
governing organisations. In 2020, the United Nations Secretary General Antonio
Guterres released the UN’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. The roadmap makes
clear how governments and traditional diplomatic stakeholders will participate in
the global intergovernmental forums that facilitate discussion and negotiation.
While the 2020 roadmap was triggered by the necessity of COVID-19, the methods
of communication established during the pandemic period will endure beyond
initial lockdown periods. In the roadmap, Guterres emphasised the UN’s role as a
multilateral organisation with multiple governmental and non-governmental
stakeholders, and that the digital roadmap would better facilitate cooperation in an
increasingly digital world.
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The road map includes eight pillars of diplomacy: digital security, essential
technological infrastructure, global digital cooperation, digital connections, digital
inclusion, digital human rights, public goods, and digital capacity building. Capacity
building across all stakeholders, including less technologically developed states, is
essential for ensuring the ongoing equality and efficacy of the UN as a multilateral
negotiation forum. Guterres placed particular emphasis on the importance of not
allowing communication technology to surpass the capacity of states and
stakeholders to effectively use them. This is because uneven technological
development, if left unchecked, could replicate issues of uneven socio-economic
development. Guterres noted with concern that embedded digital inequality could
become “the new face of insecurity” in the digital age.
Geopolitics also has its part in digital connectivity. The vast majority of internet
cables are laid below the sea floor along traditional sea lines of communication
(SLOC). If damaged or severed, the disruption would have severe economic and
political ramifications. The cables are also laid in traditional geostrategic
chokepoints, such as the Suez Canal which connects much of Asia and Europe, the
Strait of Malacca, and the Strait of Hormuz. In 2008, two submarine cables off the
coast of Alexandria were cut, impacting internet connections in both India and
Egypt, with theories of digital warfare immediately surfacing. As grey zone tactics
increasingly move into the digital space, the physical infrastructure that supports
global connections will also become a vulnerable target in states’ defences.
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P H O T O B Y E V A N S C H N E I D E R / U N P H O T O

W I L L Z O O M L A S T ?
Since 2020, diplomacy and international relations have moved firmly into the digital
space. Social media platforms such as Twitter were used extensively throughout
2020 and 2021 to connect with those who suddenly found themselves isolated.
Digital meetings have also had the added benefit of facilitating more conversations
between heads of state and high-level officials, held in “virtual No Man’s Land” from
wherever they are in the world.
One of the pandemic’s silver linings has been the fact that it has pushed technology
and digital communications from public-facing diplomacy to traditional diplomatic
interactions. However, the interpersonal aspect of diplomacy remains an
indispensable part of the art of negotiation. It is the capacity to feel the atmosphere
of a room, to grab a coffee between meetings, to bump into someone in the
corridor, and to pursue strategies which develop a rapport and trust between
diplomats and negotiators. It is this trust which facilitates effective diplomatic
connections. These trust-building aspects are largely lost over Zoom.
The digitisation of communications and diplomacy not only connects people in
times of separation, but also mitigates the negative impacts of prolific international
travel on the environment. However, the recent UN Climate Change Conference
(COP26) saw the return to in-person high level diplomacy en masse. While more and
more avenues for digital diplomacy have been formed and made robust over the
last two years, COP26 has made it clear that diplomats, leaders, negotiators and
decision makers want to transition back to in-person diplomacy. After all, bilateral
ties are more effectively reinforced by setting foot in each other’s countries and
partaking in physical cultural exchanges.
As the world ponders whether working from home will be the new norm across the
corporate sphere, diplomacy may be one of the professions that cannot let go of
conferences and coffee meetings. A hybrid diplomatic future is essential for keeping
up with an increasingly digital world while maintaining the incidental trust-building
that comes from meeting people face-to-face.
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S O U T H K O R E A N P R E S I D E N T I A L B L U E H O U S E V I A G E T T Y I M A G E S

F A S T E R , H I G H E R ,
S T R O N G E R - T O G E T H E R
T H E O L Y M P I C S I N
T H E T I M E O F C O V I D
by Patrick Quinn
As has been widely noted, the 2021 Olympics and Paralympics were an event unlike
any other in modern history. It was hoped that when the Tokyo Olympics were
delayed last year, the 2021 games would serve as a triumphant symbol and
celebration of how humanity had overcome the devastation of the COVID-19
pandemic. While such hopes proved premature, so too did criticisms which
lamented the demise of the Olympic games altogether. From the opening ceremony
on July 23 to the moment the flame went dark on August 8, the world witnessed an
Olympics which carried more meaning than could usually be expected in any
‘normal’ year. The trials, heartbreak, inspiration and triumph of the games was, for
two weeks, at the forefront of global news cycles that had otherwise been
dominated by COVID-19 for almost 2 years.
The surreal spectacle of events held in empty stadiums surrounded by widespread
public opposition is likely to be remembered as an example of how strange,
unpleasant, and ‘unprecedented’ life had become due to COVID-19. Overall, there
were 20 world records set throughout this year’s games. Japan itself finished third in
the medal tally, winning 27 golds, surpassing the previous national record of 16, a
record nine of which were won in Judo. Yet, the Games also came at a huge cost to
both the economy and public health. By conservative estimates, the games cost
Japan approximately $US 15.4 billion. More recently, however, auditors from the
Japanese government placed the true cost at upwards of $US 25 billion. Such a hefty
price tag, coupled with the pre-existing economic hardship created by the pandemic,
a lack of tourism that would typically accompany the Games, and a spike in case
numbers both during and following the Games, has undoubtedly proved a
controversial topic.
If asked whether the 2021 Tokyo Olympics were a success, anyone would be hardpressed
to find a straightforward answer. Indeed, perhaps we should not look for
one. The Olympics have never been so locally unpopular or uncertain, a situation
driven in large part by Japan being in a simultaneous state of emergency due to
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COVID-19. Before the Tokyo games, well-founded concerns and critiques highlighted
how out of place the games seemed to be in a world, let alone a country, still
grappling with the devastation of a pandemic. Most tellingly, Japanese polls
consistently indicated that over 80 per cent of Tokyo’s population were against the
games. Thus, any attempt to emphasise the success of the games must come with a
significant caveat. The Olympics are bigger than the sports alone, and should be a
celebration of the host city and its people, not a cause for anxiety.
Despite the surrounding hardship brought on by the pandemic and the
unprecedented nature of the games, however, there were a great number of firsts
worth celebrating. The island nation of P H O T O B Y M A T T H I A S H A N G S T O N G E T T Y I M A G E S
Bermuda, for example, was given its
first Olympic champion in triathlon
gold medallist Flora Duffy. The
Philippines also claimed their first
ever-Olympic gold, when weightlifter
Hidilyn Diaz managed to lift an
amazing 127kg. Likewise, Alessandra
Perilli, Gian Marco Berti, and Myles
Amine became San Marino’s first-ever
medal winners, making the microstate
the smallest ever to win a medal at the
Games. Quinn, a member of the
Canadian women’s soccer team,
became the first transgender athlete
to ever win a gold medal with Canada’s
victory over Sweden. And Chelsea
Wolfe, a BMX freestyle athlete, became
the first transgender athlete on the US
team. Skateboarder Alana Smith
competed as the first openly nonbinary
athlete as part of the US
delegation. With a bronze medal in the
women’s 400m, American Allyson Felix
claimed her 10th Olympic medal to
become the most decorated Olympic
female track-and-field athlete of all
time. Australian Emma McKeown won
an astonishing seven medals at the
Games, the equal best medal haul of
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any female Olympian in history. Also in the pool, American Katie Ledecky
guaranteed her place in swimming history by attaining her sixth Olympic
gold medal.
Ultimately, the Olympics represent more than just the biggest sporting
event in the world. As people watched from around the world, the duality
of isolation and connection comprised the unique paradox that lay at the
heart of the 2021 Tokyo Olympics. The Games have always strived to be a
reminder of our shared humanity, and Tokyo represented this better than
any other precisely because of the difficulty and hardship surrounding it.
Never has such a reminder been so important than after almost two years
where the peoples of the world have largely been cut off from one
another. That said, it is important that history remembers the severe
hardship that preceded and coexisted with the games; in particular, the
disproportionate burden which fell on the people of Japan. Nevertheless,
to turn the choice to go ahead with the Games into a decision between
public health and a sporting event is a false trade off. While we have not
yet been able to fully conquer COVID-19, we are learning to overcome it
safely and in a measured way. As such, the Olympics represent more than
just another sporting event. They represent a connection that goes
beyond perspex barriers, face masks, and 1.5 metre social distancing.
Ultimately, the 2021 Tokyo Olympics, if nothing else, represented a desire
to hope and strive for better, both on the sporting track and in our own
lives.
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T H E T W O G R E A T R I V A L S , M A T T H E W A B S A L O M - W O N G
by Belle Davenport
In 2003, forty years after Russia and the United States made it into space, China first
entered the game. Now, China has growing ambitions in space, and has made swift
progress. In less than twenty years, China has launched more rockets into space than
any other state, has landed unmanned spacecraft on the far side of the moon and on
Mars, and has sent astronauts to their under-construction space station Tiangong.
China is making its presence in space permanent.
China’s ambitions and successes in space are making American officials nervous. Both
the Biden and Trump administrations have attempted to frame China’s progress in
space as a new space race, reminiscent of that between the US and USSR during the
Cold War. However, experts in the field of astropolitics are hesitant to take such an
aggressive stance on Chinese advancements.
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Automatically assuming that China’s
activities in space are for the singular
purpose of technologically undermining the
United States is short-sighted. Broadening
our understanding of how China’s
intentions in space are to be understood, to
include factors such as national pride and
the desire to improve upon the scientific
understanding of space, creates a more
nuanced analysis of the long-term
implications of its success.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that America’s framing of China’s intentions in space will
shift from the confrontational ‘space race’ narrative while the relationship between the
two states continues to be tense. While both states are vying for ‘first place,’ the US
arguably has more to lose, in terms of both hard and soft power, by coming in second.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the US was a preeminent spacefaring
nation. However, over recent decades, the desire of successive American
administrations to send people into space has waned. NASA has not sent any people
to the moon since 1972, and more recently has been relying on Russia and private
American space companies to ferry astronauts to the International Space Station. For
the US, having to rely on private companies has hurt national pride. Furthermore,
America’s relative inaction in space could be interpreted as a reflection on its
technologically ageing defence capabilities. On the other hand, having the advantage
of being relative newcomers in the development of space technology, China has
nowhere to go but forward.
“...having the advantage of
being relative newcomers
in the development of
space technology, China
has nowhere to go but
forward.”
Of course, neither the US nor China are
making inroads into space in isolation. The
US has a long history of international space
cooperation. To revitalise their space
program, NASA announced the Artemis
program in 2017. The program will return
astronauts to the moon with the
involvement of other allied states. To
facilitate this cooperation, the US has
developed the Artemis Accords, which must
be signed by any state who wishes to
participate in the program.
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Thus far twelve states have joined the US in signing: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine, the United
Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The Accords outline principles (grounded in
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967) that will “create a safe and transparent environment
in space, facilitating exploration, science, and commercial activities for all”.
It is notable that Russia has not signed the Accords. They argue the Artemis program
is “too US-centric,” and have instead chosen to partner with China to build an
international base on the moon — the International Lunar Research Station.
Although humanity initially went to space in part because of the competition
between the US and USSR, the US and Russia have cooperated with each other since
the end of the Cold War. This is most evident in the International Space Station,
which is composed of two sides: the Russian-owned Russian Orbital Segment (ROS)
and the US Orbital Segment (USOS), which is majority-owned by the US. While this
cooperation is beginning to falter as the two states have disagreed over how much
longer the ISS will need to be funded and maintained, this history of collaboration
remains significant.
On the other hand, China and the US have a long history of non-cooperation in
space, with the US maintaining a policy of excluding China from international
cooperative missions. Congress passed a provision in 2013 which requires NASA to
obtain congressional approval before partnering with China, with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation also having to certify that the cooperation will not jeopardise national
security. The intent of this was to stop China from stealing or learning from American
technology. However, the requirement reflects a broader political unwillingness from
both Democrats and Republicans to cooperate with China — arguably Washington’s
greatest adversary. Nevertheless, such policies of exclusion have not stymied China’s
technological advances. Rather, they appear to have created an incentive for China to
build an alternative coalition for space exploration that could undermine America’s
traditional leadership in this arena.
At the same time that the US has seen a decline in public interest and funding for
space pursuits, China has made significant leaps in their space-oriented scientific and
technological capabilities. It is clear that US officials are highly concerned about
China’s technological advancements. Not only does space hold great potential for the
discovery of new resources, the establishment of human settlements, and
opportunities for power projection, the technology required to do so also serves a
secondary purpose as a source of weaponry in potential conflicts. These concerns
from US officials have led to the framing of China’s progress in space as a new space
race. However, this is yet to be determined. What can be said is that taking such a
confrontational view may be short-sighted and increase tensions between the two
competing states.
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by Timothy Pinzone
Pegasus, first identified in August
2016, is the flagship spyware
product of the Israeli-based NSO
Group. Pegasus, according to its
developer NSO, was developed
to aid intelligence operations
against serious crime and
terrorism. Pegasus can covertly
self-install to Android,
BlackBerry, iOS and Symbian
operating systems using zeroclick
software known as
ForcedEntry, which exploits
vulnerabilities in mobile devices.
Initially, this meant that Pegasus
could only be installed after a
prospective target was sent a
text message or email with a link
or attachment that tricked them
into clicking and installing the
malicious software.
However, a recent update now enables Pegasus (known as the Zero-Click exploit) to
be implanted on users’ phones autonomously without their knowledge. No other
exploit has been identified on any other spyware. Pegasus can be sent through
popular apps, and enables remote surveillance of smartphone communications,
and operation of camera, microphone, calls, text and GPS location tracking without
the user’s knowledge.It is the most advanced operating spyware program ever
identified. Despite claims that the spyware is only being used to target terrorists,
human rights organisations have raised concerns over the dangers of allowing
authorities to conduct surveillance on over 50,000 government officials, journalists,
politicians, chief executives and human rights activists in over 50 countries. In
particular, 180 journalists from Al Jazeera, CNN and the New York Times have been
identified as targets. It is clear that the NSO Group has violated their privacy with
Pegasus. In fact, Pegasus is being used to identify and locate individuals who may
pose a political threat to particular governments in India, Saudi Arabia and Rwanda,
not just terrorists.
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I L L U S T R A T I O N B Y G U A R D I A N D E S I G N
T H E P E G A S U S P R O J E C T
The Pegasus Project was an investigation
conducted from mid-2020 to July 2021
into Pegasus and the NSO Group by
Amnesty International and Forbidden
Stories, with input from the University of
the Toronto based Citizen Lab. It revealed
that Pegasus is still active and operational.
The findings suggested that 14 heads of
state were former targets of Pegasus,
most notably French President Emmanuel
Macron. However, India’s opposition
leader Rahul Gandhi, Iraq’s President
Barham Salih, Pakistan’s President Imran
Khan, and the former Italian Prime
Minister Romano Prodi were also victims.
The Project also reported that Pegasus is
predominantly used by authoritarian
governments to spy on human rights
activists, journalists and lawyers
worldwide.
Currently, there are 11 countries that are
strongly linked to and suspected of using
the Pegasus software. This could number
as many as 40 state actors. Countries
currently confirmed to be using Pegasus
include: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kazakhstan,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Morocco, Rwanda, India and Hungary
have
also been identified as being partnered
with the NSO Group, but have denied
using Pegasus. Morocco has sued
Amnesty and Forbidden Stories for
defamation in response to being exposed
as a user of Pegasus, stating that such
allegations were incorrect. Likewise,
Rwanda and Hungary have denied using
Pegasus, and have accused Amnesty of
trying to provoke violence against their
regimes. It is currently unknown how the
NSO Group selected their clients for the
Pegasus spyware.
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T H R E A T T O A U S T R A L I A
Australia, in particular, has faced significant cybercrime threats in recent years. In the
2020-2021 financial year, cybercrime reports totalled 67,500, with over 35 percent of
these attacks targeting Commonwealth, state and territory, and local governments.
Due to the prevalence of cybercrime in Australia, and the high number of iOS and
Android users, Pegasus could pose a significant domestic threat. However, no known
reports of Pegasus’ usage in Australia has been identified.
An Australian Financial Review report on November 9, 2021 suggests that it is unlikely
Australia will ban the NSO Group. However, it is possible that the software will be
‘shadowbanned’ instead.
The report also suggests that Australia’s links with the Five Eyes intelligence group,
including the US, makes it unlikely that the NSO Group will operate in these countries
or within Australia.
I L L U S T R A T I O N B Y M O H A M M E D
A L - S H A I K H / A F P / G E T T Y / B E A T A
Z A W R Z E L / N U R P H O T O / G E T T Y / W A S
H I N G T O N P O S T
G L O B A L R E S P O N S E S T O P E G A S U S
Pegasus has been widely condemned worldwide. The international community is
beginning to respond to the advancing spyware and its emergence throughout the
globe. Recently, India’s Supreme Court ordered an inquiry into whether the
government was using Pegasus to illegally spy on journalists, political opponents and
activists. This committee will consist of three cybersecurity experts who will be
overseen by a retired supreme court judge. The Indian National Congress also called
for the removal of Home Minister Amit Shah, and an investigation into Prime
Minister Modi’s links to the NSO Group and Pegasus due to the investigation.
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In the US, the Biden administration placed the NSO Group on a blacklist on
November 3, 2021 in response to the findings, concluding that the group is acting
“contrary to the foreign policy and national security interests of the US”. This
blacklisting has barred the NSO group from purchasing the parts and components it
needs to develop its spyware from US companies. Amnesty Tech Deputy Director
Dana Ingleton supported the US decision to blacklist the NSO Group, describing
Pegasus as “a tool of repression… used around the world to violate human rights”.
After it was revealed that Emmanuel Macron and his cabinet members were
identified as possible targets for surveillance, Macron changed his phone number
and phone, and announced an overhaul of France’s security procedures. France
initiated contact with Israel to express concern about the NSO Group and Pegasus,
with the former denying that Pegasus was used to target Macron or French
government officials. On November 1, 2021, Mexican police arrested a former
technician with links to the group for allegedly phone tapping a journalist between
2015 and 2016. Nearly one-third of the 50,000 phones identified as being infected
by Pegasus were from Mexico. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan also
demanded the United Nations investigate India’s use of Pegasus.
Messaging service WhatsApp affirmed the US government’s decision and has sued
the NSO Group in response to allegations that Pegasus was used to target 1400
WhatsApp users in 2019. They believe that the blacklist goes a long way in protecting
people’s ability to have private conversations online.
The American Committee to Protect Journalists, the International Press Institute, and
intelligence whistleblower Edward Snowden have all called for further investigation
into Pegasus, highlighting numerous abuses of the Pegasus spyware. Amazon’s
cloud subsidiary AWS also terminated “relevant infrastructure and accounts” linked
to NSO in response to the investigation.
The EU Parliament awarded the Pegasus Project the 2021 Daphne Caruana Galicia
journalism prize for its work on exposing Pegasus. Nevertheless, the NSO Group has
defended Pegasus and plans to present more information on their group and their
product to the world.
C O N C L U S I O N
It is clear that Pegasus has emerged as the threat in the modern era, and much
more still needs to be done to address it. While the NSO Group may claim their
technology is specifically for targeting terrorists and national security threats, it is
evident that this is not the case.
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by Jonathan Lim
2021 has been a challenging year for the international space industry, one mired by
the ongoing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and set against the backdrop of
growing competition between private space actors and nation-states across the final
frontier. There has been a continued acceleration of spaceflight activities,
concentrated in the United States (US) and increasingly driven by private companies
as opposed to established national space agencies.
In focus here are the top three largest private spaceflight companies – SpaceX, Blue
Origin, and Virgin Galactic – which are set to dominate the space race over the next
decade. Competition between them has elicited claims of a “billionaire space race”,
reviled for its extravagant demonstrations of wealth and grandeur amid a period of
intensified global austerity and deepening wealth inequality.
Private investment in space companies increased from US$9.8 billion to a high of
$10.3 billion between 2020-2021, constituting 49.1% of the global space economy in
2020. In contrast, global government spending on military and civil space programs
– led chiefly by the US, China and the European Space Agency – declined by 1.2%
over 2019-2020. The landscape in space is clearly shifting as the dominance of
nation-states declines, and private actors and private capital increasingly step in to
fill that void. This raises questions concerning the future of space exploration and
the global space industry.
Further assessment of the looming private space race requires attention to several
key developments over the past 12 months: the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic;
the success of several landmark commercial spaceflight launches; the everexpanding
growth and reach of private space applications; and the challenges
presented by an international space ecosystem dominated by private entities.
T H E C O V I D - 1 9 P A N D E M I C
Contrary to other industries, the slowdown of product deliveries and mission
deployments following the COVID-19 pandemic has had a limited impact upon the
revenues of large space manufacturers. This is supported by the growth of the
global space economy from a worth of US$428 billion to $447 billion between 2019-
20, continuing a five-year trend of uninterrupted growth. This optimism has been
reinforced by market watchers, who posit that increasing interest in space
infrastructure, distribution, and applications will propel the international space
industry into a US$1.4 trillion market by 2030.
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However, the pandemic did have a notable impact upon the various small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which constitute the majority of commercial
actors in the global space industry. The industry’s inherent and unique
requirements for high levels of specialisation and its limited number of suppliers
meant that these smaller companies were acutely impacted by congested
international supply chains, diminished consumer demand, reduced government
funding, and an increase in demand for semiconductors.
This has elicited uncertainty over future innovation, employment opportunities,
and economic development in the industry from the perspective of market
diversity. Since a free and open marketplace requires healthy competition
between a variety of actors, the continuing domination of the global space
industry by several large companies will inevitably contribute to the increasing
monopolization of space over the coming decade.
In countering the effects of the pandemic and promoting a diverse and
innovative space ecosystem, the OECD has promoted targeted policymaking
measures to assist small and vulnerable actors in the industry. This includes their
integration into overall crisis responses, increasing the visibility and accessibility
of government space programs and funding schemes, and addressing the
unique barriers of entry into the market for space-related SMEs.
W E H A V E L I F T O F F !
2021 was marked by a record number of private rocket launches in the US, with
the top three largest space companies alone contributing a total of 17 human
spaceflight launches shuttling non-professional astronauts to low earth orbit
(LEO). This included SpaceX’s landmark achievement of the first mission to space
with an all-civilian crew on September 15. Costing an estimated $55 million per
seat, Inspiration4 circled the Earth 15 times each day before re-entry on
September 18.
Competing launches were also conducted by Blue Origin, most notably its first
crewed spaceflight on July 20 aboard the Mercury 13 mission, carrying billionaire
Jeff Bezos and three other passengers. The sub-orbital flight achieved an altitude
of 107 kilometres before re-entry over the course of 10 minutes. Passengers
reportedly paid up to $28 million a seat.
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Virgin Galactic also launched its first operational tourist flight on July 11. The Unity 22
sub-orbital test mission over New Mexico was crewed by entrepreneur Richard
Branson, with passengers reportedly paying up to $250,000 each. The flight climbed
to an altitude of 86 kilometres, providing its passengers with four minutes of
weightlessness before returning to Earth.
Outside the US, a similar intensification of private spaceflight activities has been
observed in Australia, with Southern Launch and DEWC Systems conducting the
country’s first commercial launch on September 19. Similar success was enjoyed by
Black Sky Aerospace’s launch of the Sighter 150 on November 16 – Australia’s first
domestically designed, built and powered rocket in 40 years.
In China, Galactic Energy’s November satellite launch using its Ceres-1 vehicle
marked the county’s second private launch company to successfully reach orbit. The
event underscored China’s rapidly developing commercial space industry, and its
growing ability to challenge established international space companies in the
provision of competitive and affordable launch vehicles, spacecraft, satellites, and
launch services.
The growing pace of landmark commercial space launches
over the past 12 months bears strong indications for the
future of commercial spaceflight and space tourism, which is
projected to develop into a $805 billion market by 2030.
While the costs of travelling to space today represent an
improvement on the $30 million fronted by Dennis Tito in
2001 when visiting the International Space Station, the
opportunity to travel to space remains beyond the financial
reach of the masses and largely restricted to the highly
affluent. The future of space tourism will thus be contingent
upon the capacity for private space companies to address
socio-economic stratification, and to continually improve
upon the affordability and accessibility of space travel.
S P A C E - B A S E D A P P L I C A T I O N S
Additionally, the private space race has been diversified across space-based
applications, namely concerning the improvement of internet access via satellitebased
services. This is predicated upon the interest in reaching an estimated 2.9
billion people around the globe who remain without reliable access to the
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internet, and a predicted exponential growth in internet users
from 4.4 billion to 7.5 billion between 2019-30. The goal is to
deploy satellite constellations in LEO, or a group of
interconnected satellites that can act in concert to deliver
continuous and reliable high-speed internet to any location
across the globe.
This sub-sector has again been dominated by several key
players including Amazon’s Project Kuipier, OneWeb, and
SpaceX’s Starlink – constituting an effective monopoly on
satellite-based internet services. Starlink represents the most
advanced of these, having launched its first satellite back in
2019. The active service provides accessible internet services
reaching rural and remote areas, currently priced at $499
upfront with an ongoing $99 per month. Between 2020-21
SpaceX has more than doubled the number of Starlink satellites
in orbit from 800 to 1,944 with plans to have 4,425 satellites in
orbit by 2024, though it has received authorisation to launch as
many as 42,000. The number of subscribers to the service has
also been growing: 2021 saw an increase from 10,000 to
140,000 users, bolstering predictions that the service could
reach 500,000 customers by the end of 2022 and 14.4 million by
2025.
However, the immediate success of the technology is constrained by several business
and operational factors. Firstly, there is the capacity of operators to provide affordable
and competitive services in terms of speed and latency versus traditional fibre-optic
broadband networks. Second, there are the high entry costs presented by both physical
base stations to access the service and the monthly subscription fees. Third, sensitivity
to disruptions in global supply chains and shortages in semiconductors during the
COVID pandemic have potential ramifications for the manufacturing process, the quality
and longevity of satellites and the companies’ market shares.
C O N T E S T E D A N D C O N G E S T E D
Developments over 2021 further highlighted several existential threats to the private
space industry. From an environmental perspective the anticipated rise in space tourism
and satellite deployments, combined with a parallel increase in rocket launches, has
driven widespread public concern over long-term environmental sustainability and the
implications for future generations.
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This was highlighted in November when various space companies – including
Amazon, OneWeb, Boeing and others – filed requests with the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to approve the launch of 38,000 satellites. This
contributed to mounting concerns over the growing number of objects in LEO, and
the risk of collisions leading to a catastrophic chain reaction known as the Kessler
syndrome.
Similarly, in December China submitted a note verbale to the UN Office for Outer
Space Affairs (UNOOSA) censuring SpaceX and complaining that the Tiangong Space
Station had come under repeated risk of collision with Starlink satellites. Beijing
asserted that the events posed an unacceptable risk to the safety and lives of its inorbit
astronauts, and urged continuing compliance with the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty (OST).
The issue of orbital congestion and space debris also gathered international
attention following the G7 meeting in June. Member states published a joint
statement which recognized the growing hazard of space debris and collectively
committed to the safe and sustainable use of space. This would again arise following
Russia’s direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) test on November 15, which generated
over 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and drew swift condemnation from the
international community.
The private space industry must also navigate the rising danger of legal action as a
tool of corporate warfare. This was demonstrated following NASA’s decision in April
to award a $2.9 billion contract for a lunar lander prototype to SpaceX over Blue
Origin. In response, Blue Origin issued a 175-page protest with the US Government
Accountability Office before filing a subsequent lawsuit in the US Court of Federal
Claims in August against NASA and SpaceX.
Although the lawsuit was subsequently dismissed, the resulting seven-month pause
on the start-of-contract for SpaceX contributed to further delays in NASA’s plans to
return to the moon, setting a dangerous precedent concerning public-sector
influence and leverage over national space programs. The public opposition against
Blue Origin was best summarised by NASA’s legal filing in response to the lawsuit, in
which it accused the company of seeking “to prioritize its own fortunes over that of
NASA, the United States, and every person alive today”.
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These examples emphasize long-standing challenges in regulating the activities of
private actors in space. Legal loopholes within the OST and the differing classification
of private entities under international law both raise concerns over the future of
accountability in international space governance. This has in turn seen intensified
dialogue amongst policymakers and civil society stakeholders on how to regulate the
activities of private actors in space, and on the need for a stricter institutional regime
with effective jurisdiction and informed by expert knowledge.
T O I N F I N I T Y A N D B E Y O N D ?
While 2021 represented a year of landmark achievements, the private space
race is far from settled. Over 2022 and the following decade, private space
companies will increasingly concentrate on the normalisation of commercial
rocket launches and satellite-based internet services while continuing to push
the boundaries of human spaceflight ever further – including plans for hotels in
space and humans on Mars by 2031.
This will be enabled by the continuing erosion of traditional barriers of entry to
the space ecosystem via mass production, the miniaturization of electronics, and
huge investments from private capital under the Space 2.0 ecosystem and
Fourth Industrial Revolution. This has the potential to catalyse innovation and
propel humanity toward a brighter future as we explore the final frontier.
In achieving these objectives, private space companies must continually adhere
to their corporate social responsibilities both on Earth and in space amid an
increasingly congested and polluted LEO environment. Of additional concern is
the effective monopolization of the space industry by SpaceX, Blue Origin, and
Virgin Galactic. Left unchecked, this could create an unsustainable, stratified, and
hostile framework for future innovation and competition within the global space
industry.
Regardless, acknowledging the spate of watershed achievements in space over
2021, the coming private space race presents a cautiously promising vision for
the future democratisation of space. With government-led space activities on the
decline, policymakers must strike a delicate balance when it comes to the
growing reliance on private space companies. We must ensure that the
commercialisation of space will continue to open new opportunities for ordinary
people to communicate, connect, and voyage across the stars.
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W H A T A R E H Y P E R S O N I C W E A P O N S ?
by Hannah Scallion
Hypersonic weapons have repeatedly made international news across all of 2021,
gaining the attention of the powerful US, Russian and Chinese defence departments
and sparking fears of a new type of arms race.
So, what are hypersonic weapons? The term 'hypersonic' usually refers to the study
of flight in the Mach 5 to Mach 10 range, which is 5 to 10 times faster than the speed
of sound (Mach 1). To put this into perspective, that's seven times faster than a
conventional airliner, allowing a hypersonic plane to make the trip from London to
New York in under an hour.
Added to this, hypersonic weapons are highly manoeuvrable and low flying. They
differ from ballistic missiles since they have no predetermined trajectory, and tend
to re-enter the atmosphere much further away from their targets. These factors
contribute to making them harder to detect and defend against. Most interceptor
missile systems, like the US' Aegis Ballistic Missile defence, are designed to intercept
in the exoatmosphere, not the lower, more volatile altitudes of a hypersonic
weapon. Depending on the manufacturing of the specific weapon, they are also
capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. However, in a move to
de-escalate tensions, the US has explicitly stated that their missiles will not be made
to carry nuclear weaponry.
There are two major categories of hypersonic weapons: boost-gliders (or glide
vehicles) and cruise missiles. Hypersonic gliders initially use a rocket booster to
achieve hypersonic speeds and then utilise their momentum to glide to their
destination. In comparison, hypersonic cruise missiles are powered in the air by
engines that compress oxygen to produce thrust, allowing them to maintain a
steady velocity. At present, hypersonic gliders have received far more attention as
well as development efforts since they are cheaper and far easier to produce than
the more challenging powered hypersonics. The most recent Chinese and US tests
have all been gliders; however, Russia's Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile showed
proof of a feasible powered hypersonic missile following its test launch in the White
Sea.
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While the new weaponry has stoked fears of a devastating attack unable to be detected or
intercepted by current defence systems, an article by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
warns against overexaggerating the destructive power of the technology. They outline the
careful balance needed between speed, distance, and manoeuvrability in order to maintain
a functionally accurate hypersonic weapon. For example, a glider relies on its initial velocity
and altitude to generate speed. Therefore, the further it travels, the slower it becomes
when reaching its target due to drag. While it might begin its trajectory at Mach 20, the
glider will be nowhere near that fast when it actually arrives at its target. Additionally, this
type of hypersonic weapon must also sacrifice some of its speed to turn, resulting in a
trade-off between overall speed and manoeuvrability. As such, the technology may
represent a new step in modern weaponry, but it is far from infallible, and like all weaponry
is subject to the physical and political limitations of its use.
C H I N A ' S R E C E N T T E S T S
China has become the latest country to
create and successfully test hypersonic
weapons, after a test on July 27 saw it
launch a nuclear-capable glider that
was successfully put into orbit. It now
sits with Russia and the US as the only
countries to have successfully
manufactured the weapons. China's
motivation is thought to stem primarily
from the fear of a US pre-emptive
strike that would render its nuclear
arsenal useless and prevent a Chinese
retaliatory strike.
General Mark Milley, the US’ highestranking
military officer and close
advisor to the President, commented
on the launch, likening it to a 'Sputnik
moment' in a reference inciting
memories of the Cold War arms race.
The tests have sparked a greater US
focus on hypersonic technology, with
the Pentagon requesting an extra $US
600 million on top of its current $US
3.2 billion budget for hypersonic
research. This is despite the US’ stance
that nuclear weapons are its main
form of deterrence.
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T H E F U T U R E O F H Y P E R S O N I C
W E A P O N S
With an abundance of other countries looking
into the technology, it seems likely that
hypersonic weapons will become a mainstay of
the 21st century. Australia has announced its
own plans to increase defence spending in
hypersonics, following in the footsteps of
France, India, Japan, Korea and Pakistan. As for
their purpose or use, obtaining the weapons
provides countries with a few different
advantages. Firstly, it displays a high level of
engineering and technological capability.
Secondly, it demonstrates a willingness to be on
the pinnacle of innovations in modern
weaponry and displays military power and
might. Thirdly, it will hopefully act as a
preventative measure against hypersonic
conflict between countries. Given that
controlled flight and the possibility of
undetectable attack is the biggest advantage of
hypersonic weapons, we can imagine that this is
the kind of warfare modern governments are
preparing for. As such, hypersonic weapons
present an interesting political challenge for
Russia, China and the US, who are faced with
either choosing to engage in a modern arms
race, or to rely on the more preventative and
containment approaches of security used in the
Cold War.

by Nathaniel Sgambellone |
YDS Senior Editor
In August 2021, the infamous
container ship Ever Given passed
quietly back through the bustling
waters of the Suez Canal after a 3-
month impoundment by the
Egyptian government. Much to the
relief of the Suez Canal Authority, its
return attracted little international
attention.
Few could forget the stark images
from March 2021, when the
enormous vessel became wedged in
the world’s busiest waterway for six
days, causing a logjam of 369 other
vessels and interrupting 12 percent
of global trade per day at a daily
cost of USD 9 billion. The plight of
the Ever Given demonstrated the
growing fragility of global supply
chains in the neoliberal era.
Now more than any other period in
history, when one cog in the engine
of global industry fails, all elements
of global trade are directly affected.
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However, the loosening of COVID-19
restrictions worldwide in 2021 has not
facilitated the recovery of global supply
chains many predicted. The global
vaccine rollout, combined with
increased consumer spending, has
caught producers by surprise, leading
to significant shortages as they struggle
to source enough materials to cope
with exponentially increasing demand.
As 2021 comes to a close, the world’s
reliance on supply chains stretching
from one corner of the globe to the
other has never been greater.
Nevertheless as the divisive COP26
climate summit showed, the world is
more fractured than ever on the need
to reduce the environmental impact of
production and trade, while the
wealthiest corporations have
maintained their position as key
stakeholders in the world’s economic
recovery from the pandemic.
“Now more than any other
period in history, when one
cog in the engine of global
industry fails, all elements of
global trade are directly
affected.”
As such, it is more important than ever
that policymakers do not lose sight of
the need to foster sustainable and
equitable growth in their efforts to
galvanise a stuttering global economy in
the aftermath of COVID-19.
G L O B A L S U P P L Y
C H A I N S : I N C R E A S I N G
R E A C H , D E C R E A S I N G
R E S I L I E N C E
The clogging of one of the world’s most
significant trade arteries in March 2021
was merely the tip of an ever-growing
iceberg casting an ominous shadow
over global trade. Global supply chains
have been severely affected by
shortages of labour and congestion at
transit checkpoints since early 2020, as
COVID-19 restrictions saw governments
reduce the movement of people and
goods. In Australia, backlogs of parcels
driven by increased online shopping
led Australia Post to temporarily
suspend deliveries in Melbourne. In the
United States, increased consumer
spending has seen consumption grow
exponentially, resulting in overloaded
transport networks, a shortage of truck
drivers, and major delays at many US
ports.
Usually, increasing demand for goods
causes a rise in global trade which
leads to higher shipping rates until the
trade bubble eventually bursts.
However, the pandemic disrupted this
cycle; while the global exodus from the
workplace and into the home office
saw billions of people increase their
spending to facilitate working from
home, government restrictions severely
decreased trade levels, ensuring that
“the pipeline of international commerce
has never been so clogged.”
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These global goods shortages have also
demonstrated that the global
production matrix is far more fragile
than once thought. For example, while
China seemed to have made a rapid
recovery from the effects of COVID-19
in 2020, it experienced only 4.9 percent
growth in the July to September quarter
this year, compared to 8 percent in the
previous quarter. Automotive sales
remain low as a result of the global
semiconductor shortage, which was the
result of production slowdowns and an
explosion in demand as millions of
people transitioned to working from
home during the worst of the
pandemic. Furthermore, China’s push
to become carbon neutral by 2060 led
to steel production hitting a 15-month
low in July 2021, which led to
significantly decreased demand for
commodities on global markets.
As of December 2021, World Bank data
reveals that maize and wheat prices
have risen by 11 and 21 percent
respectively since January 2021,
severely worsening food insecurity for
millions of people in developing states.
This is largely due to soaring natural gas
prices in Europe and thermal coal prices
in China causing a drop in ammonia
production, a key ingredient in fertiliser.
The increasing cost of producing food
has thus led to the inflation of prices at
the consumer level, leading the World
Food Program to estimate that the
pandemic has caused 272 million
people to experience greater food
insecurity worldwide. Essentially, the
pandemic has provided
a sobering example of what happens
when supply chains fail to meet the
voracious – and often unsustainable –
demands of modern consumerism.
T R A D E D Y N A M I C S
P O S T - P A N D E M I C :
W H O G A I N S , W H O
L O S E S ?
Despite the seemingly intractable
shortages that have come to dominate
global trade, the World Bank estimates
that as more states open their borders
and markets the global economy will
grow by 5.6 percent by the end of 2021,
its strongest post-recession growth rate
in 80 years. Additionally, the OECD
predicts that the eventual resolution of
transport bottlenecks will not only ease
inflation, but will see prices on
manufactured goods such as cars fall
as goods and services become easier to
source. As more businesses emerge
from their two-year hibernation and
breathe life back into dormant trade
networks, supply seems destined to
catch up to demand.
When it does, however, the critical
problem facing policymakers will be
how to manage a neoliberal trading
system that is not only prone to
seemingly repeated collapses, but
prioritises the interests of transnational
capital seemingly above all else. The
businesses that thrived during the
pandemic did so because they
possessed the structural assets –
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capital, networks, technology and
manpower – to overcome global supply
chain shortages. For example, Apple
received USD 58.3 billion in revenue in
the March quarter of 2020 despite
closing all its retail outlets, proof of the
significant market power that comes
from dominating online sales in the
post-pandemic era. Elsewhere, online
retail giant Amazon added USD$401.1
billion in market cap value by June 2020,
despite the skyrocketing logistics costs
of delivering more parcels than ever
before.
This means that despite the economic
uncertainty and instability of the past
two years, capital continues to beget
capital in the neoliberal era.
“...capital continues to beget
capital in the neoliberal era.”
The economic actors that possess the
greatest structural assets enjoy a
disproportionate advantage over those
that do not when it comes to
reconstructing the global economy to
suit their business interests, as they
retain access to the financial, human
and material resources needed to
reshape the global economy. As such,
the defining assumption of the
neoliberal era – that the market is
capable of regulating itself, ensuring
that “everyone gets what they deserve”
– has endured.
This paints a one-dimensional view of
global trade as a level playing field,
ignoring the structural factors such as
endemic unemployment, access to
secure finance, or conflict and instability
that consign non-state actors, such as
NGOs, as well as developing states
themselves to the periphery of
international trade. This means that
despite increased global discourse on
the need to promote a more
sustainable economic model in the
post-COVID world, the preferences of
the richest economic actors continue to
dominate its formation and
implementation.
This is particularly evident when it
comes to the fight against climate
change. The corporations which
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possess the requisite (in other words,
enormous) structural assets to
overcome and benefit from supply
chain shortages at the expense of other
private actors are, by and large, some of
the worst contributors to climate
change.
The world’s top 20 energy companies
have emitted a combined 480 billion
tonnes of carbon dioxide since 1965;
critically, 90 percent of this has come
from global usage of their products. The
constant demand for fossil fuels in a
world constructed around the internal
combustion engine has therefore
ensured that supply chain shortages
have not prevented the wealthiest firms
from maintaining control of the
fundamental structures of the global
economy. Rather, they have
consolidated their business position
while perpetuating the world’s reliance
on fossil fuels as a means of expediting
short-term economic recovery. There
certainly is a long way to go before the
real-world dynamics of international
trade reflect the lofty ambitions of the
UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.
order to tackle successive climate,
employment, and security crises
around the world. Furthermore,
crippling worldwide supply shortages
have demonstrated to policymakers
that the need for sustainable and
equitable financial support for the
world’s most vulnerable has never been
greater. As states cautiously navigate
their way out of this maze of economic
uncertainty, there has never been a
more opportune moment to tackle the
endemic economic issues that led to
the worst shortages in decades.
C O N C L U S I O N
This being said, however, the postpandemic
global economic outlook is
not all doom and gloom. The recent
COP26 climate summit in Glasgow
showed that there is increasing global
awareness of the need to promote
sustainable economic development in
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Editorial Leadership:
Victoria Cooper
Nathaniel Sgambellone
Samuel Garrett
Design:
Kelly Phan
Zeinab Elsheekhly
Deeksha Patil
Sarah Knight
Regional Correspondents:
Ezekiel Dobelsky (Sub-Saharan Africa)
Eliza Archer (Europe)
Elle Greaves (MENA)
Samuel Garrett (South and Central Asia)
Declan Hourd (NZ and the Pacific)
Chloe Marriott (East Asia)
Iain Johnson (South East Asia)
Dylan Gaymer (Latin America)
Cameron Smith (North America)