[textbook]Traversing the Ethical Minefield Problems, Law, and Professional Responsibility by Susan R. Martyn (z-lib.org)(1) (1)

Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002). . . .
The Florida Bar faces a demanding task in defending Canon 7C (1) against Yulee’s
First Amendment challenge. We have emphasized that “it is the rare case” in which a State
demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
Here, Canon 7C (1) advances the State’s compelling interest in preserving public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, and it does so through means narrowly tailored
to avoid unnecessarily abridging speech. This is therefore one of the rare cases in which a
speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.
The Florida Supreme Court adopted Canon 7C(1) to promote the State’s interests in
“protecting the integrity of the judiciary” and “maintaining the public’s confidence in an
impartial judiciary.” . . . Simply put, Florida and most other States have concluded that the
public may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or favor if
he comes to office by asking for favors.
The interest served by Canon 7C(1) has firm support in our precedents. We have
recognized the “vital state interest” in safeguarding “public confidence in the fairness and
integrity of the nation’s elected judges.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868,
889 (2009). . . . Unlike the executive or the legislature, the judiciary “has no influence over
either the sword or the purse; . . . neither force nor will but merely judgment.” The
Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (capitalization altered). The
judiciary’s authority therefore depends in large measure on the public’s willingness to
respect and follow its decisions. As Justice Frankfurter once put it for the Court, “justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice.” It follows that public perception of judicial integrity
is “a state interest of the highest order.” Caperton, 556 U.S., at 889. . . .
The parties devote considerable attention to our cases analyzing campaign finance
restrictions in political elections. But [a]s we explained in White, States may regulate
judicial elections differently than they regulate political elections, because the role of judges
differs from the role of politicians. Politicians are expected to be appropriately responsive to
the preferences of their supporters. The same is not true of judges. In deciding cases, a
judge is not to follow the preferences of his supporters, or provide any special consideration
to his campaign donors. . . .
In the eyes of the public, a judge’s personal solicitation could result (even unknowingly)
in “a possible temptation . . . which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). That risk is especially pronounced
because most donors are lawyers and litigants who may appear before the judge they are
supporting. . . .
In short, it is the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that judges who personally ask
for money may diminish their integrity that prompted the Supreme Court of Florida and
most other States to sever the direct link between judicial candidates and campaign
contributors. . . . A State’s decision to elect its judges does not require it to tolerate these
risks. The Florida Bar’s interest is compelling.
Yulee . . . notes that Canon 7C (1) allows a judge’s campaign committee to solicit
money, which arguably reduces public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary just as
513