[textbook]Traversing the Ethical Minefield Problems, Law, and Professional Responsibility by Susan R. Martyn (z-lib.org)(1) (1)

Multidisciplinary practice (MDP) occurs when lawyers and nonlawyers collaborate to
provide clients legal and nonlegal services. Examples include mental health counselors
teamed with divorce lawyers, real estate brokers and title insurance providers working with
lawyers, or social workers associated with criminal defense lawyers. Clients in complex
business transactions might benefit from the combined services of investment bankers,
lawyers, accountants, and other associated consultants. Under current rules, these
associations are perfectly acceptable so long as lawyers and nonlawyers do not share legal
fees or work in an organization in which lawyers and nonlawyers share managerial
control. 11 In other words, lawyers can hire nonlawyers but cannot be hired by for-profit
organizations owned in whole or part by nonlawyers to provide legal services to third
parties. These restrictions protect clients from harm by preventing economic coercion by
nonlawyers that will inevitably lead to the compromising of clients’ interests.
The ABA has steadfastly refused to change these provisions, despite the
recommendation of several groups over the past 30 years. 12 Yet some UK and EU countries
have rather aggressively changed their regulatory structures for lawyers, allowing some
shared ownership or management. 13
States and countries considering MDP reform must face a number of issues. First,
empirically, do clients want diversified professional services from one company or firm?
Second, if client demand is present, will clients benefit from MDPs? Third, does any
benefit outweigh the harm? Fourth, if demand occurs and clients seem well-served, what
will happen when a client who receives MDP services claims competence, confidentiality,
or loyalty obligations from such an integrated firm? Finally, if lawyers are members of the
MDP firm, will courts impose lawyers’ fiduciary duties on the firm’s nonlegal services (as
the Court did in Campbell, Chapter 2), even if other professionals offer a large part of the
service?
Lawyers differ tremendously over the answers to these questions. Some dream of “an
unregulated marketplace,” where “clients would have the choice of hiring a single firm that
provided all of these services or multiple firms that specialized in some subset.” These
proponents for change also argue that MDPs offer an opportunity to avoid lawyer fiduciary
duties such as confidentiality and loyalty. With respect to confidentiality, they maintain
that clients can decide when the attorney-client privilege is important enough not to risk an
MDP. As for loyalty, MDPs offer a great opportunity to avoid imputed conflicts rules that
restrict law firms from growing to their efficient size. 14
Those who oppose MDPs argue that the entire law governing lawyers promotes client
interests over lawyer economic advantage. 15 Loyalty rules including imputed
disqualification mean that lawyers must say “no” to some clients to protect the interests of
others. Association with other service providers easily could compromise the confidentiality
obligations of lawyers because MDPs need shared information among professionals to
thrive. Worst of all, lawyers might be tempted to cheat on their independent professional
judgment and competence if their part of the package needs to be subordinated to some
other service, such as the sale of securities or insurance, to maximize profit. The market
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