[textbook]Traversing the Ethical Minefield Problems, Law, and Professional Responsibility by Susan R. Martyn (z-lib.org)(1) (1)

Martyn & Fox if we will get one of our paralegals to apply for employment at the plant.
What should we say?
1. The Bounds of the Law: Court Orders, supra Chapter 6; The Bounds of the Law: Fraud, supra Chapter 7; The
Bounds of the Law: Crime, supra Chapter 8.
2. See Lawyers and Clients: Representing Governments, supra Chapter 11.
3. See Lawyers and Clients: Insurance Defense, supra Chapter 10.
4. E.g., Greycas v. Proud, supra Chapter 4 (judgment against an opposing party’s lawyer for $833,760); United States
v. Shaffer Equip. Co., supra Chapter 8 (lawyers ordered to pay personal sanctions for violating Rule 3.3).
5. 26 U.S.C. § 6050I (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6721.
6. Very few cases have found such special circumstances. The courts seem to agree that the statutory filing must
amount to something like the facts in Belge: a coerced confession (rather than suspicion) of criminal activity, disclosure
of which would violate the client’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Gerald B. Lefcourt, P.C. v.
United States, 125 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1997).
7. Id.; see also In re Vanderveen, 211 P.3d 1008 (Wash. 2009) (lawyer who accepted $20,000 in cash for his fee and
later pleaded guilty to willfully violating federal cash reporting laws disbarred).
8. See U.S. Department of Justice, Patriot Act Reports (Section 1001), available at
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/patriot.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
9. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012).
10. See International Bar Association, Anti-Money Laundering Forum, available at http://www.antimoneylaundering.org/europe/united_kingdom.aspx
(last visited April 17, 2017).
11. Federation of Law Soc. of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 339 D.L.R. 4th 48 (B.C.
2011) (criminal statutes designed to control money laundering and funding of terrorist activities unconstitutional as
applied to lawyers because the underlying purpose put client’s liberty interests at stake and violated the solicitor-client
privilege; the federal government should regulate banks and other professions, but the law societies should regulate
lawyers, thereby minimizing interference in the client-lawyer relationship).
12. See e.g., International Bar Association, American Bar Association and Council of Bars and Law Societies of
Europe, A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_preventingmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited August 27, 2017).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012); 17 C.F.R. Part 205.
14. See Lawrence J. Fox & Susan R. Martyn, The Ethics of Representing Organizations: Legal Fictions for Clients 255-
261 (Oxford U. Press 2009).
15. Empirical evidence is slim, but suggests that in about 15 percent of money laundering convictions in one circuit,
a lawyer’s services “likely were used to launder money.” Lawton P. Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother’s
Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney Facilitation of Money Laundering through Commercial Transactions, 2011 J. Prof.
L. 1, 36.
11. Section 1927 provides for imposition of “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees” on counsel who “multiplies
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.”
12. For example, because the action was frivolous on its face, why would Mattel’s attorneys need to spend 700 hours
($173,151.50 in fees) for the summary judgment motion and response? Although Hicks clearly complicated the
proceedings through multiple filings, Mattel’s theory and approach was stunningly simple and required little
explication: (1) Mattel’s Barbie dolls and face paint were prior copyright creations that could not infringe the aftercreated
Claudene doll and (2) Christian was neither a contributor to nor owner of the copyright. This is not to say that
Hicks’ defense of the motion necessarily called for a timid response, but neither does it compel a bazooka approach.
5. A court may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine what facts the attorney knows and whether they are
necessary to the disposition of the matter. In this case, such a hearing is unnecessary because Williams’ knowledge of the
nature of the advice and information provided to the defendant in the underlying case is apparent and undisputed by
the defendant.
3. Harvard claimed fees of $152,255.96. The judge reduced this amount after deducting fees incurred in the
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