[textbook]Traversing the Ethical Minefield Problems, Law, and Professional Responsibility by Susan R. Martyn (z-lib.org)(1) (1)

. . . was far superior to what consumers of legal services in the legal marketplace . . . could
reasonably expect to receive for the rates used in the lodestar calculation.”
On the basis of what I have read, I believe that assessment was correct. I recognize that
the ordinary lodestar calculation yields a large fee award. But by my assessment, the lodestar
calculation in this case translates to an average hourly fee per attorney of $249. . . .
At $249 per hour, the lodestar would compensate this group of attorneys — whom the
District Court described as extraordinary — at a rate lower than the average rate charged by
attorneys practicing law in the State of Georgia, where the average hourly rate is $268.
Accordingly, even the majority would seem to acknowledge that some form of an
enhancement is appropriate in this case. . . .
In any event, the circumstances I have listed likely make this a “rare” or “exceptional”
case warranting an enhanced fee award. And they certainly make clear that it was neither
unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion for the District Court to reach that conclusion.
Indeed, if the facts and circumstances that I have described are even roughly correct, then it
is fair to ask: If this is not an exceptional case, what is? . . .
I would hold that the principles upon which we agree — including the applicability of
abuse-of-discretion review to a District Court’s fee determination — require us to affirm
the judgment below.
Problem
12-10. Martyn & Fox agrees to a one-third contingent fee contract with Client and
spends 2,000 hours on Client’s federal civil rights action alleging police brutality against
Local Municipality, resulting in injunctive relief and a jury verdict of $21,000. What fee
will Martyn & Fox receive? What if Local Municipality offers to settle for injunctive relief
in exchange for Client’s agreement not to seek statutory attorney fees?
1. RLGL § 34.
2. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6147 (2016); Colo. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b) (2016); D.C. R. Prof. Conduct
1.5(b) (2016); N.J. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b) (2015); Pa. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b) (2016).
3. MR 1.5(b).
4. RLGL §§ 18, 38.
5. Cox’s Case, 813 A.2d 429 (N.H. 2002) (lawyer who failed to respond to client’s request for accounting data
reprimanded for violating MR 1.4 and 1.15(b)).
6. See William G. Ross, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based Billing by Attorneys 23-38 (Carolina Academic
Press 1996); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Penn. L. Rev. 659, 705 (1990). The bill padding was
accomplished by billing for hours not actually worked, or by “premium billing,” which added lump sums to a bill based
on the lawyer’s subjective determination of its value. Id. at 709-715.
7. Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 205
(1999). See also Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Stahlbush, 933 N.E. 2d 1091 (Ohio 2010) (lawyer who submitted bills to local
courts for more than 24 hours a day suspended for two years.)
8. Lerman, supra, at 263-271 (detailing criminal prosecutions of nine lawyers for billing fraud); id. at 282-287
(detailing civil penalties in 16 cases of billing fraud).
9. The Law Governing Lawyers: Loss of Fee or Other Benefits, supra Chapter 10. E.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v.
400