[textbook]Traversing the Ethical Minefield Problems, Law, and Professional Responsibility by Susan R. Martyn (z-lib.org)(1) (1)

contingent fees demonstrates, for almost all cases there is a range of possible recoveries.
Since the amount of the recovery will be largely determined by the lawyer’s knowledge,
skill, experience and time expended, both the defendant and the plaintiff may best be
served by a contingency fee arrangement that ties the lawyer’s fee to the amount recovered.
Also, an early settlement offer is often prompted by the defendant’s recognition of the
ability of the plaintiff’s lawyer fairly and accurately to value the case and to proceed
effectively through trial and appeals if necessary. There is no ethical reason why the lawyer
is not entitled to an appropriate consideration for this value that his engagement has
brought to the case, even though it results in an early resolution. . . .
That having been said, there may nonetheless be special situations in which a
contingent fee may not be appropriate. For example, if in a particular instance a lawyer was
reasonably confident that as soon as the case was filed the defendant would offer an amount
that the client would accept, it might be that the only appropriate fee would be one based
on the lawyer’s time spent on the case since, from the information known to the lawyer,
there was little risk of non-recovery and the lawyer’s efforts would have brought little value
to the client’s recovery. 15 And even if, in such circumstances, after a full discussion, it were
agreed between lawyer and client that a contingent fee was appropriate, the fee arrangement
should recognize the likelihood of an early favorable result by providing for a significantly
smaller percentage recovery if the anticipated offer is received and accepted than if the case
must go forward through discovery, trial and appeal. . . .
In re Everett E. Powell, II
953 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. 2011)
PER CURIAM. . . .
Prior to Respondent’s representation of T.G., another attorney, Mark E. Ross (“Ross”),
had represented T.G. in obtaining a settlement of a personal injury action. T.G. had a
history of drug and alcohol abuse, and she was in an apparently abusive and controlling
relationship with J.S., the father of her six children. In August 2004, Ross created, with
T.G.’s consent, a “special needs trust” to hold $42,500 from the settlement to preserve
T.G.’s eligibility for public assistance and to prevent rapid depletion by T.G. and those
who may not be acting in her best interests, including J.S. Ross agreed to become the
trustee because he was unable to find any other qualified individual or institution to serve.
T.G. soon began demanding access to the trust money, pressured, Ross believed, by J.S.
and his mother. Ross sent a series of letters to T.G. reminding her of the purposes of the
special needs trust, expressing willingness to surrender his position to a qualified successor
trustee, saying that he was, in fact, very close to resigning as trustee (in which case, he told
her a court would appoint a successor), and suggesting she contact some smaller banks to
see if any would be willing to take over as trustee.
On October 27, 2004, T.G. (accompanied by J.S.) consulted Respondent about getting
access to the funds in the trust. During this consultation, Respondent reviewed documents
provided by T.G., which showed the amount of money placed in the trust and indicated
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