Dominick Salvatore Schaums Outline of Microeconomics, 4th edition Schaums Outline Series 2006

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CONTENTS
10.8 The Kinked Demand Curve Model 241
10.9 The Centralized Cartel Model 242
10.10 The Market-Sharing Cartel Model 243
10.11 Price Leadership Model 243
10.12 Long-Run Equilibrium Under Oligopoly 244
CHAPTER 11
Recent and Advanced Topics in
Market Structure 262
11.1 The Lerner Index as a Measure of a Firm’s Monopoly
Power 262
11.2 The Herfindahl Index as Measure of Monopoly Power
in an Industry 262
11.3 Contestable-Market Theory 262
11.4 Peak-Load Pricing 263
11.5 Cost-Plus Pricing 264
11.6 Transfer Pricing 264
CHAPTER 12 Game Theory and Oligopolistic Behavior 272
12.1 Game Theory: Definitions and Objectives 272
12.2 Dominant Strategy 272
12.3 Nash Equilibrium 273
12.4 The Prisoners’ Dilemma 273
12.5 Price and Nonprice Competition and Cartel Cheating 274
12.6 Repeated Games and Tit-For-Tat Strategy 274
12.7 Strategic Behavior 274
CHAPTER 13 Input Pricing and Employment 283
Perfect Competition in the Product and Input Markets
13.1 Profit Maximization and Least-Cost Input Combinations 283
13.2 The Demand Curve of the Firm for One Variable Input 283
13.3 The Demand Curve of the Firm for One of Several
Variable Inputs 284
13.4 The Market Demand Curve for an Input 285
13.5 The Market Supply Curve for an Input 285
13.6 Pricing and Level of Employment of an Input 285
13.7 Rent and Quasi-Rent 286
Perfect Competition in the Market and Monopoly in the
Product Market
13.8 Profit Maximization and Least-Cost Input Combinations 286
13.9 The Demand Curve of the Firm for One Variable Input 286