Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

that the application of the criterion of appropriateness does not entail the occurrence
of a process of considering this criterion. (Ryle, 1949, p. 31)
Ryle’s regress occurs when we explain outer intelligence by appealing to inner
intelligence.
Ryle’s regress is also known as the homunculus problem, where a homunculus
is an intelligent inner agent. The homunculus problem arises when one explains
outer intelligence by appealing to what is in essence an inner homunculus. For
instance, Fodor noted the obvious problems with a homuncular explanation of how
one ties their shoes:
And indeed there would be something wrong with an explanation that said, ‘This
is the way we tie our shoes: we notify a little man in our head who does it for
us.’ This account invites the question: ‘How does the little man do it?’ but, ex
hypothesis, provides no conceptual mechanisms for answering such questions.
(Fodor, 1968a, p. 628)
Indeed, if one proceeds to answer the invited question by appealing to another
homunculus within the “little man,” then the result is an infinite proliferation of
homunculi.
To solve Ryle’s regress an algorithm must be analyzed into steps that do not
require further decomposition in order to be explained. This means when some
function is decomposed into a set of subfunctions, it is critical that each of the subfunctions
be simpler than the overall function that they work together to produce
(Cummins, 1983; Dennett, 1978; Fodor, 1968a). Dennett (1978, p. 123) noted that
“homunculi are bogeymen only if they duplicate entire the talents they are rung in
to explain.” Similarly, Fodor (1968a, p. 629) pointed out that “we refine a psychological
theory by replacing global little men by less global little men, each of whom has
fewer unanalyzed behaviors to perform than did his predecessors.”
If the functions produced in a first pass of analysis require further decomposition
in order to be themselves explained, then the subfunctions that are produced
must again be even simpler. At some point, the functions become so simple—the
homunculi become so stupid—that they can be replaced by machines. This is
because at this level all they do is answer “yes” or “no” to some straightforward question.
“One discharges fancy homunculi from one’s scheme by organizing armies of
such idiots to do the work” (Dennett, 1978, p. 124).
The set of subfunctions that exist at this final level of decomposition belongs
to what computer scientists call the device’s architecture (Blaauw & Brooks, 1997;
Brooks, 1962; Dasgupta, 1989). The architecture defines what basic abilities are built
into the device. For a calculating device, the architecture would specify three different
types of components: the basic operations of the device, the objects to which these
operations are applied, and the control scheme that decides which operation to carry
Multiple Levels of Investigation 47