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Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

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<strong>of</strong> thought should be excluded from cognitive science by definition. One example<br />

domain in which synthesis is courted is computational vision.<br />

9.3 Lessons from Natural Computation<br />

To sighted human perceivers, visual perception seems easy: we simply look and see.<br />

Perhaps this is why pioneers <strong>of</strong> computer vision took seeing for granted. One student<br />

<strong>of</strong> Marvin Minsky was assigned—as a summer project—the task <strong>of</strong> programming<br />

vision into a computer (Horgan, 1993). Only when such early projects were<br />

attempted, and had failed, did researchers realize that the visual system was effortlessly<br />

solving astronomically difficult information processing problems.<br />

Visual perception is particularly difficult when one defines its goal as the construction<br />

<strong>of</strong> internal models <strong>of</strong> the world (Horn, 1986; Marr, 1976, 1982; Ullman,<br />

1979). Such representations, called distal stimuli, must make explicit the threedimensional<br />

structure <strong>of</strong> the world. However, the information from which the distal<br />

stimulus is constructed—the proximal stimulus—is not rich enough to uniquely<br />

specify 3-D structure. As discussed in Chapter 8, the poverty <strong>of</strong> proximal stimuli<br />

underdetermines visual representations <strong>of</strong> the world. A single proximal stimulus is<br />

consistent with, in principle, an infinitely large number <strong>of</strong> different world models.<br />

The underdetermination <strong>of</strong> vision makes computer vision such a challenge to artificial<br />

intelligence researchers because information has to be added to the proximal<br />

stimulus to choose the correct distal stimulus from the many that are possible.<br />

The cognitive revolution in psychology led to one approach for dealing with this<br />

problem: the New Look in perception proposed that seeing is a form <strong>of</strong> problem<br />

solving (Bruner, 1957, 1992; Gregory, 1970, 1978; Rock, 1983). General knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />

the world, as well as beliefs, expectations, and desires, were assumed to contribute<br />

to our visual experience <strong>of</strong> the world, providing information that was missing from<br />

proximal stimuli.<br />

The New Look also influenced computer simulations <strong>of</strong> visual perception.<br />

Knowledge was loaded into computer programs to be used to guide the analysis <strong>of</strong><br />

visual information. For instance, knowledge <strong>of</strong> the visual appearance <strong>of</strong> the components<br />

<strong>of</strong> particular objects, such as an air compressor, could be used to guide the<br />

segmentation <strong>of</strong> a raw image <strong>of</strong> such a device into meaningful parts (Tenenbaum&<br />

Barrow, 1977). That is, the computer program could see an air compressor by exploiting<br />

its pre-existing knowledge <strong>of</strong> what it looked like. This general approach—using<br />

pre-existing knowledge to guide visual perception—was widespread in the computer<br />

science literature <strong>of</strong> this era (Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1975). Barrow and Tenenbaum’s<br />

(1975) review <strong>of</strong> the state <strong>of</strong> the art at that time concluded that image segmentation<br />

412 Chapter 9

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