Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

strong equivalence of a cognitive theory by determining the characteristics of the
cognitive architecture.
As a champion of classical cognitive science, it should not be surprising that
Pylyshyn has published key criticisms of other approaches to cognitive science.
Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1988) Cognition article “Connectionism and cognitive architecture”
is one of the most cited critiques of connectionist cognitive science that
has ever appeared. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) have also provided one of the major
critiques of direct perception (Gibson, 1979). This places Pylyshyn securely in the
camp against embodied cognitive science; direct perception in its modern form
of active perception (Noë, 2004) has played a major role in defining the embodied
approach. Given the strong anti-classical, anti-representational perspective of radical
embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009), it is far from surprising to be able
to cite Pylyshyn’s work in opposition to it.
In addition to pioneering classical cognitive science, Pylyshyn has been a crucial
contributor to the literature on mental imagery and visual cognition. He is well
known as a proponent of the propositional account of mental imagery, and he has
published key articles critiquing its opponent, the depictive view (Pylyshyn, 1973,
1979b, 1981a, 2003b). His 1973 article “What the mind’s eye tells the mind’s brain:
A critique of mental imagery” is a science citation classic that is responsible for
launching the imagery debate in cognitive science. In concert with his analysis of
mental imagery, Pylyshyn has developed a theory of visual cognition that may serve
as an account of how cognition connects to the world (Pylyshyn, 1989, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2003c, 2007; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). The most extensive treatments of this
theory can be found in his 2003 book Seeing and Visualizing—which inspired the
title of the current chapter—and in his 2007 book Things and Places.
The purpose of the current chapter is to provide a brief introduction to Pylyshyn’s
theory of visual cognition, in part because this theory provides a wonderful example
of the interdisciplinary scope of modern cognitive science. A second, more crucial
reason is that, as argued in this chapter, this theory contains fundamental aspects
of all three approaches—in spite of Pylyshyn’s position as a proponent of classical
cognitive science and as a critic of both connectionist and embodied cognitive science.
Thus Pylyshyn’s account of visual cognition provides an example of the type
of hybrid theory that was alluded to in the previous two chapters: a theory that
requires classical, connectionist, and embodied elements.
8.1 The Transparency of Visual Processing
Some researchers are concerned that many perceptual theorists tacitly assume a
snapshot conception of experience (Noë, 2002) or a video camera theory of vision
(Frisby, 1980). Such tacit assumptions are rooted in our phenomenal experience of
360 Chapter 8