Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

to produce networks that are capable of reflecting appropriate deficits in behaviour
when damaged, such as single or double dissociations. Medler, Dawson, and
Kingstone (2005) have shown that the ability to do so, even in PDP networks,
requires local representations. This provides another line of evidence against the
claim that distributed representations can be used to distinguish connectionist
from classical models. In other words, local representations do not appear to be a
mark of the classical.
7.6 Internal Representations
One of the key properties of classical cognitive science is its emphasis on sensethink-act
processing. Classical cognitive scientists view the purpose of cognition as
planning action on the basis of input information. This planning typically involves
the creation and manipulation of internal models of the external world. Is the classical
sandwich (Hurley, 2001) a mark of the classical?
Sense-think-act processing does not distinguish classical models from connectionist
networks. The distributed representations within most modern networks
mediate all relationships between input units (sensing) and output units
(responding). This results in what has been described as the connectionist sandwich
(Calvo & Gomila, 2008). Sense-think-act processing is a mark of both the classical
and the connectionist.
While sense-think-act processing does not distinguish classical cognitive science
from connectionism, it may very well differentiate it from embodied cognitive
science. Embodied cognitive scientists have argued in favor of sense-act processing
that abandons using internal models of the world (Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999). The purpose
of cognition might not be to plan, but instead to control action on the world
(Clark, 1997). Behaviour-based robots arose as an anti-representational reaction to
classical research in artificial intelligence (Brooks, 1991). The direct link between
perception and action—a link often described as circumventing internal representation—that
characterized the ecological approach to perception (Gibson, 1979;
Turvey et al., 1981) has been a cornerstone of embodied theory (Chemero, 2009;
Chemero & Turvey, 2007; Neisser, 1976; Noë, 2004; Winograd & Flores, 1987a).
The distinction between sense-think-act processing and sense-act processing is
a putative differentiator between classical and embodied approaches. However, it is
neither a necessary nor sufficient one. This is because in both classical and embodied
approaches, mixtures of both types of processing can readily be found.
For example, it was earlier shown that the stored program computer—a digital
computer explicitly designed to manipulate internal representations—emerged
from technical convenience, and did not arise because classical information processing
demanded internal representations. Prototypical classical machines, such as the
Marks of the Classical? 343