Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

First, this sequence of publications nicely illustrates Norman’s (1993) description
of culture clashes in cognitive science. Dissatisfied with the perceived limits of
the classical approach, Winograd and Flores highlighted its flaws and detailed the
potential advances of the embodied approach. In reply, Vera and Simon (1993) discounted
the differences between classical and embodied theories, and even pointed
out how connectionist networks could be cast in the light of production systems.
Second, the various positions described above highlight a variety of perspectives
concerning the relationships between different schools of thought in cognitive
science. At one extreme, all of these different schools of thought are considered to be
classical in nature, because all are symbolic and all fall under a production system
umbrella (Vera & Simon, 1993). At the opposite extreme, there are incompatible differences
between the three approaches, and supporters of one approach argue for
its adoption and for the dismissal of the others (Chemero, 2009; Fodor & Pylyshyn,
1988; Smolensky, 1988; Winograd & Flores, 1987b).
In between these poles, one can find compromise positions in which hybrid
models that call upon multiple schools of thought are endorsed. These include proposals
in which different kinds of theories are invoked to solve different sorts of problems,
possibly at different stages of processing (Clark, 1997; Pylyshyn, 2003c). These
also include proposals in which different kinds of theories are invoked simultaneously
to co-operatively achieve a full account of some phenomenon (McNeill, 2005).
Third, the debate between the extreme poles appears to hinge on core definitions
used to distinguish one position from another. Is situated cognition classical?
As we saw earlier, this depends on the definition of symbolic, which is a key classical
idea, but it has not been as clearly defined as might be expected (Searle, 1992). It is
this third point that is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. What are the key
concepts that are presumed to distinguish classical cognitive science from its putative
competitors? When one examines these concepts in detail, are they truly distinguished
between positions? Or do they instead reveal potential compatibilities
between the different approaches to cognitive science?
7.2 Marks of the Classical
In previous chapters, the elements of classical, of connectionist, and of embodied
cognitive science have been presented. We have proceeded in a fashion that accentuated
potential differences between these three schools of thought. However, now
that the elements of all three approaches have been presented, we are in a position to
explore how real and extensive these differences are. Is there one cognitive science,
or many? One approach to answering this question is to consider whether the distinctions
between the elements of the cognitive sciences are truly differences in kind.
The position of the current chapter is that there are strong relations amongst
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