Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

expected that both connectionist and embodied theories reject many, if not all, of
these properties.
In the current chapter we examine each of these properties in turn and make the
argument that they do not serve as marks of the classical. First, an examination of the
properties of classical theories, as well as a reflection on the properties of the computing
devices that inspired them, suggests that none of these properties are necessary
classical components. Second, it would also appear that many of these properties are
shared by other kinds of theories, and therefore do not serve to distinguish classical
cognitive science from either the connectionist or the embodied approaches.
The chapter ends by considering the implications of this conclusion. I argue
that the differences between the approaches within cognitive science reflect variances
in emphasis, and not qualitative differences in kind, amongst the three kinds
of theory. This sets the stage for the possibility of hybrid theories of the type examined
in Chapter 8.
7.1 Symbols and Situations
As new problems are encountered in a scientific discipline, one approach to dealing
with them is to explore alternative paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). One consequence
of adopting this approach is to produce a clash of cultures, as the new paradigms
compete against the old.
The social structure of science is such that individual scientists will justify the
claims for a new approach by emphasizing the flaws of the old, as well as the virtues
and goodness of the new. Similarly, other scientists will justify the continuation of
the traditional method by minimizing its current difficulties and by discounting the
powers or even the novelty of the new. (Norman, 1993, p. 3)
In cognitive science, one example of this clash of cultures is illustrated in the rise of
connectionism. Prior to the discovery of learning rules for multilayered networks,
there was a growing dissatisfaction with the progress of the classical approach
(Dreyfus, 1972). When trained multilayered networks appeared in the literature,
there was an explosion of interest in connectionism, and its merits—and the potential
for solving the problems of classical cognitive science—were described in widely
cited publications (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986, 1988; Rumelhart & McClelland,
1986c; Schneider, 1987; Smolensky, 1988). In response, defenders of classical cognitive
science argued against the novelty and computational power of the new connectionist
models (Fodor & McLaughlin, 1990; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Minsky &
Papert, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988).
A similar clash of cultures, concerning the debate that arose as part of embodied
cognitive science’s reaction to the classical tradition, is explored in more detail
316 Chapter 7