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Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

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ather they explored variations within this form in attempts to heighten its emotional<br />

expressiveness. “Strictly speaking, no doubt, musical Romanticism is more<br />

style than language” (Whittall, 1987, p. 17). Romantic composers developed radically<br />

new approaches to instrumentation, producing new tone colours (Ratner, 1992). The<br />

amount <strong>of</strong> sound was manipulated as an expressive tool; Romanticists increased<br />

“the compass, dynamic range, and timbral intensity <strong>of</strong> virtually all instruments”<br />

(Ratner, 1992, p. 9). New harmonic progressions were invented. But all <strong>of</strong> these<br />

expressive innovations involved relaxing, rather than replacing, classical conventions.<br />

“There can be little doubt that ‘romantic’ musical styles emanate from and<br />

comingle with ‘classic’ ones. There is no isolable time and place where one leaves <strong>of</strong>f<br />

and the other begins” (Plantinga, 1984, p. 22).<br />

Connectionist cognitive science has been portrayed as a revolution (Hanson<br />

& Olson, 1991) and as a paradigm shift (Schneider, 1987). However, it is important to<br />

remember that it, like musical Romanticism, also shares many <strong>of</strong> the characteristics<br />

<strong>of</strong> the classical school that it reacted against.<br />

For instance, connectionists don’t abandon the notion <strong>of</strong> information processing;<br />

they argue that the brain is just a different kind <strong>of</strong> information processor than<br />

is a digital computer (Churchland, Koch, & Sejnowski, 1990). Connectionists don’t<br />

discard the need for representations; they instead <strong>of</strong>fer different kinds, such as distributed<br />

representations (Hinton, McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Connectionists<br />

don’t dispose <strong>of</strong> symbolic accounts; they propose that they are approximations to<br />

subsymbolic regularities (Smolensky, 1988).<br />

Furthermore, it was argued earlier in this book that connectionist cognitive science<br />

cannot be distinguished from classical cognitive science on many other dimensions,<br />

including the adoption <strong>of</strong> functionalism (Douglas & Martin, 1991) and the<br />

classical sandwich (Calvo & Gomila, 2008; Clark, 1997). When these two approaches<br />

are compared in the context <strong>of</strong> the multiple levels <strong>of</strong> investigation discussed in<br />

Chapter 2, there are many similarities between them:<br />

Indeed, the fact that the two can be compared in this way at all indicates a commitment<br />

to a common paradigm—an endorsement <strong>of</strong> the foundational assumption <strong>of</strong><br />

cognitive science: cognition is information processing. (Dawson, 1998, p. 298)<br />

Copland (1952, pp. 69–70) argued that the drama <strong>of</strong> European music was defined<br />

by two polar forces: “the pull <strong>of</strong> tradition as against the attraction <strong>of</strong> innovation.”<br />

These competing forces certainly contributed to the contradictory variety found in<br />

musical Romanticism (Einstein, 1947); perhaps they too have shaped modern connectionist<br />

cognitive science. This issue can be explored by considering connectionist<br />

approaches to musical cognition and comparing them to the classical research<br />

on musical cognition that was described earlier in the current chapter.<br />

Classical Music and <strong>Cognitive</strong> <strong>Science</strong> 285

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