Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

usually in the form of differential equations. Its utility was illustrated in Randall
Beer’s (2003) analysis of an agent that learns to categorize objects, of circuits for
associative learning (Phattanasri, Chiel, & Beer, 2007), and of a walking leg controlled
by a neural mechanism (Beer, 2010).
While dynamical systems theory provides a medium in which embodied cognitive
scientists can conduct computational analyses, it is also intimidating and
difficult. “A common criticism of dynamical approaches to cognition is that they
are practically intractable except in the simplest cases” (Shapiro, 2011, pp. 127–
128). This was exactly the situation that led Ashby (1956, 1960) to study feedback
between multiple devices synthetically, by constructing the Homeostat. This does
not mean, however, that computational analyses are impossible or fruitless. On the
contrary, it is possible that such analyses can co-operate with the synthetic exploration
of models in an attempt to advance both formal and behavioural investigations
(Dawson, 2004; Dawson, Dupuis, & Wilson, 2010).
In the preceding paragraphs we presented an argument that embodied cognitive
scientists study cognition at the same multiple levels of investigation that characterize
classical cognitive science. Also acknowledged is that embodied cognitive
scientists are likely to view each of these levels slightly differently than their classical
counterparts. Ultimately, that embodied cognitive science explores cognition at
these different levels of analysis also implies that embodied cognitive scientists are
also committed to the notion of validating their theories by seeking strong equivalence.
It stands to reason that the validity of a theory created within embodied cognitive
science would be best established by showing that this theory is supported at
all of the different levels of investigation.
5.14 What Is Embodied Cognitive Science?
To review, the central claim of classical cognitive science is that cognition is computation,
where computation is taken to be the manipulation of internal representations.
From this perspective, classical cognitive science construes cognition as an
iterative sense-think-act cycle. The “think” part of this cycle is emphasized, because
it is responsible for modelling and planning. The “thinking” also stands as a required
mentalistic buffer between sensing and acting, producing what is known as the classical
sandwich (Hurley, 2001). The classical sandwich represents a modern form of
Cartesian dualism, in the sense that the mental (thinking) is distinct from the physical
(the world that is sensed, and the body that can act upon it) (Devlin, 1996).
Embodied cognitive science, like connectionist cognitive science, arises from the
view that the core logicist assumptions of classical cognitive science are not adequate
to explain human cognition (Dreyfus, 1992; Port & van Gelder, 1995b; Winograd &
Flores, 1987b).
260 Chapter 5