Mind, Body, World- Foundations of Cognitive Science, 2013a

that others “are like me in being thinkers, that they possess the same fundamental
cognitive capacities and propensities that I do” (p. 137).
However, other versions of simulation theory are far less Cartesian or classical
in nature. Gordon (1986, pp. 17–18) illustrated such a theory with an example from
Edgar Allen Poe’s The Purloined Letter:
When I wish to find out how wise, or how stupid, or how good, or how wicked is
any one, or what are his thoughts at the moment, I fashion the expression of my
face, as accurately as possible, in accordance with the expression of his, and then
wait to see what thoughts or sentiments arise in my mind or heart, as if to match or
correspond with the expression. (Gordon, 1986, pp. 17–18)
In Poe’s example, mind reading occurs not by using our reasoning mechanisms
to take another’s place, but instead by exploiting the fact that we share similar
bodies. Songwriter David Byrne (1980) takes a related position in Seen and Not
Seen, in which he envisions the implications of people being able to mould their
appearance according to some ideal: “they imagined that their personality would
be forced to change to fit the new appearance. . . .This is why first impressions
are often correct.” Social cognitive neuroscience transforms such views from art
into scientific theory.
Ultimately, subjective experience is a biological data format, a highly specific mode
of presenting about the world, and the Ego is merely a complex physical event—an
activation pattern in your central nervous system. (Metzinger, 208, p. 208)
Philosopher Robert Gordon’s version of simulation theory (Gordon, 1986, 1992,
1995, 1999, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008) provides an example of a radically embodied
theory of mind reading. Gordon (2008, p. 220) could “see no reason to hold on to the
assumption that our psychological competence is chiefly dependent on the application
of concepts of mental states.” This is because his simulation theory exploited the
body in exactly the same way that Brooks’ (1999) behaviour-based robots exploited
the world: as a replacement for representation (Gordon, 1999). “One’s own behavior
control system is employed as a manipulable model of other such systems. . . .
Because one human behavior control system is being used to model others, general
information about such systems is unnecessary” (p. 765).
What kind of evidence exists to support a more embodied or less Cartesian
simulation theory? Researchers have argued that simulation theory is supported by
the discovery of the brain mechanisms of interest to social cognitive neuroscience
(Lieberman, 2007). In particular, it has been argued that mirror neurons provide
the neural substrate that instantiates simulation theory (Gallese & Goldman, 1998):
“[Mirror neuron] activity seems to be nature’s way of getting the observer into the
same ‘mental shoes’ as the target—exactly what the conjectured simulation heuristic
aims to do” (p. 497–498).
Elements of Embodied Cognitive Science 253